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deceased Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a work of Christian theology. Its purpose is twofold: firstly to develop an 
adequate understanding of reconciliation at the level of peoples and nations; and 
secondly to make a practical contribution to resolving the problems in Australia for the 
welfare of all the peoples, and of the land itself. 
 
The history of the relationships between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in 
Australia has left many problems, and no matter what the non-Indigenous people try to 
do, the Indigenous peoples of Australia continue to experience themselves as being in a 
state of siege. Trying to understand what is happening, and what can be done to resolve 
the problems for the peoples of Australia and the land, have been the implicit drivers for 
the theological development in this thesis. 
 
This thesis argues that the present generation in any trans-generational dispute is likely 
to continue to sin in ways that are shaped by the sins of the past, which explains why 
Indigenous peoples in Australia find themselves in a stage of siege, even when the non-
Indigenous peoples are trying to pursue policies which they believe are for the welfare 
of all. The only way to resolve this is for the peoples of Australia to seek reconciliation. 
In particular, the non-Indigenous peoples need to repent, both of their own sins, and the 
sins of their forebears. 
 
Reconciliation processes have become part of the international political landscape. 
However, there are real concerns about the justice of pursuing reconciliation. An 
important part of the theological development of this thesis is therefore to show that 
pursuing reconciliation establishes justice. It is shown that the nature of justice, and of 
repentance, can only be established by pursuing reconciliation. Reconciliation is 
possible because God has made it possible, and is working in the world to bring 
reconciliation. 
 
Because land is an essential part of Indigenous identity in Australia, the history of land 
in court cases and legislation in Australia over the past half century forms an important 
case study in this work. It is shown that, although there was significant repentance 
within the non-Indigenous legal system in Australia, the degree of repentance available 
through that legal system is inherently limited, and so a more radical approach is needed 
in order to seek reconciliation in Australia. A final chapter considers what the non-
Indigenous people of Australia need to do in order to repent. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis is an exercise in applied Christian theology. Its purpose is to explore the 
nature of reconciliation in the context of the relationships between First and Subsequent 
peoples in Australia,1 thereby making contributions both to the theological 
understanding of reconciliation, and to the practice of reconciliation in Australia. 
 
Reconciliation has come to the fore in recent theological discussions, as a concept that 
may have practical applications in the political realm.2 It has also been part of 
international political discourse and practice in the last two or three decades, but there 
are real concerns about the justice of pursuing reconciliation. Susan Dwyer expresses 
this well when she writes, 
 
[t]he notable lack of any clear account of what reconciliation is, and what it 
requires, justifiably alerts the cynics among us. Reconciliation is being urged 
upon people who have been bitter and murderous enemies, upon victims and 
perpetrators of terrible human rights abuses, upon groups of individuals whose 
very self-conceptions have been structured in terms of historical and often state-
sanctioned relations of dominance and submission. The rhetoric of reconciliation 
is particularly common in situations where traditional judicial responses to 
wrongdoing are unavailable because of corruption in the legal system, 
staggeringly large numbers of offenders, or anxiety about the political 
consequences of trials and punishments. Hence, a natural worry, exacerbated by 
the use of explicitly therapeutic language of healing and recovery, is that talk of 
reconciliation is merely a ruse to disguise the fact that a “purer” form of justice 
cannot be realized.3 
 
The purpose then of this thesis is twofold: to give a clear account of the nature of 
reconciliation, which takes proper account of the nature of justice; and to explore what 
this might mean for the peoples of Australia. Although the theological insights are 
applied to the situation in Australia in particular, it is believed that they are more 
generally applicable. Further, this work is properly theological, developing an 
understanding of reconciliation that is not simply a recasting of insights from other 
disciplines into a theological language system. 
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The first section recalls the arrival of the first 
Europeans to live in Australia, and it rehearses some of the problems that have followed 
from this. Section 2 discusses the truth and reconciliation processes that have taken 
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place in Chile and South Africa, highlighting some of the issues that they raise. Then 
the situation in Australia is compared and contrasted with those in Chile and South 
Africa, and some movements towards reconciliation in Australia are examined, in the 
third section. The third section also explains why this thesis makes a substantial case 
study of the history of land in Australia over the last half century. Finally, the last 
section outlines the approach taken in this work, which is followed by a summary of the 
thesis. 
1.1 Introducing the Problem 
The first known records of Europeans coming across the land that is now commonly 
called Australia date from the seventeenth century. They encountered nations that had 
been established for tens of thousands of years in that land.4 It was not an isolated land, 
nor was it an isolated people, for the oral traditions of these people, supported by 
archaeological and other anthropological evidence, show that trade and other 
relationships had been going on for a long time with people from across the seas, and 
that the results of this had percolated through the trading routes of the various nations 
that lived with the land of Australia.5 
 
In an attempt to alleviate the problems in the prison population in England, and to pre-
empt any other European power from making a claim on this land, a fleet of ships 
containing prisoners and military personnel landed in Botany Bay on 18th January, 
1788, and then moved a bit further up the coast.  The new arrivals proclaimed British 
sovereignty over the Eastern half of Australia. Because the earlier expedition by Cook 
had found no evidence of the cultivation of the sort of crops that were recognised by 
Europeans, it had been assumed that any inhabitants of the land had to live near the 
coast, living off fish, and since there had been few sightings of First peoples as the 
expedition made its way up the coast, it was concluded that the land must be sparsely 
populated, and that there would be little resistance to a British settlement in the land.6 
There seems to have been genuine surprise on the part of the newcomers that there were 
so many people in the land already, and that they could live so far from the coast.7 
 
There are many different ways of narrating the subsequent history of the relationships 
between the First and Subsequent peoples of Australia. Of course, once the two cultures 
had encountered each other, it was inevitable that they would shape each other. It never 
was possible to speak of a monolithic Indigenous culture, and this is the case even more 
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so now. Nor is the dominant culture that grew out of its European roots identical to 
related cultures in north America and Aotearoa/New Zealand, because these cultures 
have been shaped by different founding stories, and encounters with different 
Indigenous peoples, and encounters with different lands. 
 
It would be easy to narrate the history of the Indigenous peoples of Australia over the 
past two and a bit centuries from the position of the dominant culture, either writing 
them out of the history of Australia, or even from a seemingly compassionate position 
that speaks of the unfortunate demise of some First peoples and cultures through murder 
and disease. However, this suffers from a triple blindness: to the adaptability of 
culture;8 to the creative response of First peoples in the face of oppression;9 and to 
Aboriginal narrations of history.10 That is, such narrations ignore the active role that 
First peoples have taken in shaping their history, of negotiating the points of 
engagement.  
 
Whilst many people may think of Indigenous people in Australia as living 
predominantly in remote communities, of the half a million Indigenous people who 
currently live in Australia, only about one quarter live in remote or very remote areas.11 
  
The difficulties in the relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians 
are not only a thing of the past, but also continue into the present. For example: there is 
a continuing debate about making a treaty between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
population, which indicates that the Indigenous population is not happy with the basis 
of their relationship with the rest of the people in Australia;12 and there has been a long 
and difficult battle over land rights, which will be examined in detail in Chapter 5. The 
complex history of the inter-relationship between cultures and people groups has left 
those who identify themselves as Indigenous in Australia with multiple and different 
histories of experience. Even so, it is the case today that, on average, Indigenous people 
live with significantly greater economic and health deprivations than other people in 
Australia.13 These deprivations are symptoms of the problem, rather than the problem 
themselves.14 
 
This thesis will argue that these problems can only be solved by pursuing a policy of 
reconciliation amongst the Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples of Australia. 
However, the nature of reconciliation is disputed, and so the next section will look for 
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lessons that can be learnt about large-scale reconciliation projects, before returning to 
examine the situation in Australia (in Section 1.3).   
1.2 Learning from Experiments in Reconciliation in Chile and South Africa 
There is no universal agreement on the nature of reconciliation, nor the desirability of 
the political pursuit of reconciliation, nor the realistic possibility of achieving 
reconciliation. By looking at two concrete examples, those of Chile and South Africa, 
this section will highlight both the good things that have happened in seeking 
reconciliation, and also the problems that have been encountered. The problems are 
largely to do with a truncated notion of reconciliation, so leading to a truncated version 
of justice. It will be seen that this is often because of the huge problems of negotiating a 
way of breaking the cycle of violence, or of convincing the more powerful and more 
oppressive party to stop its violence, and then having to work with a socio-economic-
judicial system that was set up to service the old regime. 
  
One of the remarkable features of the political landscape over the last couple of decades 
has been the number of countries who have tried to make a transition towards a more 
just and stable future by dealing in some formal way with the atrocities in their recent 
history. Foremost amongst these is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(hereinafter the TRC) in South Africa, but there have also been investigations or 
commissions with ‘truth’ or ‘reconciliation’ in their title in other countries, including 
Argentina,15 Brazil,16 Chile,17 El Salvador,18 and Guatemala.19 These real attempts at 
some sort of reconciliation raise important questions about the nature and possibility of 
reconciliation. In order to highlight some of the issues, the commissions in Chile and, 
South Africa will be described briefly and analysed.20 It is not the purpose of this 
section to provide a detailed analysis, but to highlight some of the problems that they 
bring to the fore. 
 
The seeking of reconciliation is a way of dealing with what has happened in the past. It 
is not the only way of approaching the past. History is littered with people seeking 
vengeance for what has happened in the past, continuing the cycle of violence. Or the 
law has been used to establish the guilt of people for crimes against humanity and to 
bring them to punishment, such as the Nuremberg trials. Or, the concept of nationhood 
has been redefined so that groups of people have been divided into smaller and smaller 
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groups, based around a common language, religion, culture and land, hoping that peace 
can be established if a pure enough group can be found.21 
 
None of these really leave the past in peace. Moreover, the seeking after justice by 
bringing people to trial just does not work in many cases where peoples have to live 
together after a history of deep alienation and violence.22 There are real practical issues 
arising in, for example, the transfer from a military government to a democracy, for the 
democratic government may not be powerful enough to ensure justice, and there is 
always the fear of a military reaction if strong measures are taken.23 This is not to 
mention the problems of trying people under new laws; the capacity of the legal system; 
and the fact that the established legal and bureaucratic system will have been upholding 
the old regime.24 Criminal justice systems only work when violation of the law is the 
exception rather than the norm, and where violence is not systemic.25 Moreover, where 
the conflict has engulfed most of the population, such as in Rwanda, the approach of 
trying people simply cannot be done.26 This highlights the problems of Western legal 
systems, which are based on the premise of individual guilt or innocence.27 Here other 
notions of justice and ways of dealing with disputes and concepts of what it means to be 
human come to the fore.28 
1.2.1 Chile 
After a military coup in 1973, General Augusto Pinochet took over the rule of Chile 
until 1990, when Patricio Aylwin was elected president. During the seventeen years of 
the rule of Pinochet, thousands of people were arrested, tortured,29 and disappeared. The 
story that the military told the nation was that they were protecting the country from 
communism. They had responded to a political situation, and it took longer for them to 
sort it out than they had expected. The armed forces claimed that did not have any 
policy of extermination, and if there were any excesses, it was due to individuals rather 
than an institutionalised policy.30 The military government passed an amnesty law 
covering all acts committed between 1973 and 1978.31 
 
When Alywin was elected president of Chile, he instituted an investigation of violations 
of human rights during from 11th September, 1973 to 11th March, 1990, the date he took 
power. It was a national commission on truth and reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de 
Verdad y Reconciliación), sometimes called the Rettig Commission, after its chairman. 
According to the Rettig Commission, 1886 of the total of 2298 deaths that were 
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established as having occurred during the dictatorship, occurred during the period 1973 
to 1978,32 and so there was no way to proceed with prosecutions for these because of 
the amnesty law passed by the government.33 Indeed, no further investigations were 
allowed. The Rettig Commission strongly criticised this approach, pointing out that 
according to Article 413 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a case may only be 
definitively closed after a full investigation into the alleged crime and the attempt to 
identify the criminal.34 On receiving the report of the Rettig Commission, Alywin made 
a public apology to the nation, saying that human rights abuses are never justified. He 
asked for forgiveness from the families who had suffered, and called on the military to 
make a gesture of recognition of the pain it had caused, and to help alleviate it.35 
 
A second report was produced in 1996 by the Corporación Nacional de Reparación y 
Reconciliación, created in 1992 by the Chilean government to continue the work of the 
Rettig Commission. However, there remained over two thousand people still 
unaccounted for.36  
 
Although there had been a transition to civilian rule, the military still held a lot of 
power. In contrast with Argentina, which returned to a constitution from before military 
rule, Chile inherited a constitution drawn up in 1980 under the military rule, which 
afforded the military a central role in political institutions.37 Whenever the government 
tried to cut military expenditure, or asked questions about human rights abuses, 
Pinochet would recall all troops to barracks and put them on red alert.38 
 
The arrest of Pinochet in October 1998 in London put Chile in a serious predicament 
with regards to its foreign policy (whilst many Chileans recognised the guilt of 
Pinochet, they did not want a foreign court to try him39), but it also made space for 
opening up the discussion of unresolved issues and themes concerning human rights 
abuses that had happened during the Pinochet regime, partly because of a desire to show 
the world that Chile had once and for all dealt with the past.40 A formal process, called 
the Mesa de Diálgo was established. But by that time, investigations were difficult. For 
example, the military wanted a process which emphasised their role in combating 
communism and which enforced the 1978 amnesty law.41 On the other hand, human 
rights lawyers wanted to pursue the Rettig report and cases filed by victims’ families 
until guilt could be established, before the amnesty law was applied.42 After nine 
meetings of the people selected to take part in the process (not all the sections of the 
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community were represented in the dialogue43), it ground to a halt, partly because of the 
release of Pinochet.44 
 
It is worth noting the role of the church during the Pinochet regime. The church in Chile 
was greatly influenced by the work of Maritain, who was trying to think about the role 
of the church when it gave up or lost direct political power.45 He argued that the church 
was not ‘political’ but on a separate plane, influencing the political. At first, the church 
emphasised unity, and being Chilean, which meant that it could not criticise the State.46 
Gradually some political practices emerged in the church. Ex-communication was 
announced for people who tortured or could have stopped it. Note that ex-
communication was for sins that denied the politics of the body. This meant a change in 
understanding of the church, from the church being the hierarchy, and only protecting 
the hierarchy from attacks, to the church being all the people.47 However, Pinochet and 
other leaders were never ex-communicated. A second political practice that emerged 
was the ‘Vicaria de la Solidaridad’ in the Santiago Archdiocese, which pursued human 
rights abuses through the courts from 1976 to 1992, and the documentation that they 
produced continues to supply human rights lawyers with evidence.48 Besides legal 
work, it also supported victims’ relatives, and dispensed food, education, medical help, 
and shelter for the poor, the dispossessed, and those persecuted by the military regime.49 
A third thing that they did was to organise lightning protests at sites of torture, forming 
quickly with banners and a liturgical type chant, and then dispersing into the crowd, 
although some were injured and/or arrested in attacks from police.50 
 
It is clear that there is incomplete knowledge of what happened during the Pinochet 
regime, and continued obfuscation on the part of the military. Aguilar argues that there 
can be no national unity and peace within in the country until the social and historical 
truths are fully established. But there does not seem to be the political will to make 
further progress at the moment.51 Even a leading figure in the church has stated that 
‘truth and justice are not everything, only through forgiveness there will be 
reconciliation, that the only road to peace is forgiveness.’52 
1.2.2 South Africa 
Turning to South Africa, a scene that remains etched on peoples’ memories is the 
queues of people waiting to vote in elections in 1993. How had a nation that had been 
heading towards a bloodbath ended up with democratic elections instead? An important 
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part of the transition was the promise of the TRC, which was mandated by the South 
African Interim Constitution.53 Rather than blanket amnesty provisions, or trials and 
prosecutions, a third way, that of the TRC, was chosen.54 Both the African National 
Congress and the National Party wanted amnesty provisions in the legislation.55 The 
Act setting up the TRC attracted the most debate of any legislation in the first two years 
of the fledgling parliament,56 and its formation was deeply influenced by participants of 
the Argentine and Chilean commissions.57 
 
Section 3(1) of the Act sets out the objectives of the TRC: 
 
The Objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding, which transcends the conflicts and 
divisions of the past by: 
(a) establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent 
of the gross violations of human rights which were committed …, by conducting 
investigations and holding hearings; 
(b) facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of 
all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective and 
comply with the requirements of this Act; 
(c) establishing and making known the fate or whereabouts of victims, by 
restoring the human and civil dignity of such victims by granting them an 
opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of which they are the 
victims, and by recommending reparation measures in respect of them; 
(d) compiling a report providing as comprehensive account as possible of the 
activities and findings of the Commission …, and which contains 
recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations of human rights.58 
 
Although amnesty was on offer, it came at the cost of taking part in a process.  
 
In this [amnesty] process the relationship between truth and reconciliation is 
sensitively balanced: the perpetrators must personally apply in the prescribed 
form within a certain time limit; appear at a public hearing; make a full, public 
confession; comply with the (Norgaard) criteria for amnesty; recognise the 
wrongfulness of the deed, in public; and acknowledge the truth. The crime is 
condemned legally and publicly, the report is published and the parties named. 
The full disclosure of a violation by the criminal replaces the need for 
punishment if it is found that all the requirements have been met. In the context 
of a system in transition this connection between amnesty and disclosure is 
innovative. One commentator has observed that it is a solution that is ‘both 
politically intelligent and legally workable.’59 
 
The Commission was to deal with the apartheid era from 1960 to 1993. Hugo van der 
Merwe notes that the only stipulation of the Act concerned the granting of amnesty to 
people; it was considerably more flexible and vague about the rest of its task.60 Maclean 
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notes that ‘[t]he South African TRC caught the world’s attention … because it seemed 
to have found a means to overcome the conflicting demands of victims and perpetrators, 
between those of justice (and truth and reparations) and amnesty, that had hindered and 
often marred the hopes of earlier Latin American commissions seeking national 
reconciliation.’61 
 
The main, visible, information-gathering work of the Commission was done by holding 
around eighty community hearings, hearings that were extensively covered in the 
media. Hearings were arranged by making contact with local community leaders, who 
had the responsibility of gathering stories together, and the Commission would choose a 
selection of them, which represented a range of different things which had happened, to 
be heard in public.62 This meant that only a fraction of the twenty-two thousand cases 
brought to the attention of the Commission could actually be addressed in public 
hearings.63 
 
Some have suggested that the hearings were sometimes more like ‘church’ than a 
court.64 Whilst there was strong debate amongst the Commissioners, the dominant ethos 
was one of restorative justice, the idea of, ubuntu, of healing the breaches, redressing 
the imbalances, restoration of broken relationships, seeking to rehabilitate both the 
victim and the perpetrator.65 Tutu writes, ‘[t]hus we would claim that justice, restorative 
justice, is being served when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiveness 
and for reconciliation.’66 This does not mean that forgiveness is cheap, for there must be 
reparation and rehabilitation measures, although the TRC could only recommend, not 
enforce them, without which there can be no healing or reconciliation; reparation 
balances the amnesty given to the perpetrators.67 Tutu stresses that confession and 
forgiveness are not enough, but reparation is needed; whilst the whites are still living 
off the fat of the apartheid system and blacks are in hovels, ‘we can kiss goodbye to 
reconciliation.’68 
 
When the report of the TRC was due to be published, it faced opposition both by Vice-
President Thabo Mbeki of the African National Congress and F W de Klerk, former 
Prime Minister and leader of the National Party. It was published on time, partly 
through the intervention of the Prime Minister, Nelson Mandela.69 
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For Tutu, one of the greatest weaknesses of the TRC process was that it failed to attract 
the bulk of the white community to participate enthusiastically in the TRC process,70 
despite vigorous attempts to follow up some key people, and there was almost no 
presentation from the South African Defence Force, which was a significant gap in the 
truth-gathering process.71 However, van der Merwe argues that more significant was the 
way that the process was ‘top-down’, aiming at national reconciliation, without 
significantly affecting local communities, where the violence was often between black 
people themselves. By not working at the level of individual worries, such as whether 
one’s neighbours were informers or not, good relationships cannot be re-established in 
local communities.72 
1.2.3 Observations from these Case Studies 
Several observations arise from these two case studies that help to clarify the questions 
being addressed in this thesis. 
 
Firstly, the pursuit of reconciliation often comes in situations where there is no amicable 
agreement to pursue reconciliation to its fullest extent. Both in Chile and South Africa, 
any investigations were made in the context of people trying to protect themselves and 
others, either through explicit amnesty laws, or refusing to be part of the investigative 
process. The establishment of truth and reconciliation can be further hampered by 
extreme political pressure to destabilise the whole process, such as the presence of the 
military in Chile, where the government was also working under a constitution prepared 
by the former military regime.  
 
Secondly, under these circumstances, the possibilities for reconciliation may be limited. 
Taking a cue from Zalaquett’s study of truth commissions up until 1992,73 Maclean 
argues that ‘a study of the most prominent such commissions reveals that the process of 
developing Truth, or Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in fact represents a balance 
between the claims of the perpetrators and those of the victims, for as much justice, 
amnesty, and truth as possible. The extent to which this balancing act succeeds in 
satisfying all parties, represents the extent of possible reconciliation.’74 
 
Thirdly, commissions often do not get to hear of significant levels of the conflict. In a 
disturbing essay, David Tombs explores the omission of reporting on systematic sexual 
violence, against both men and women, in the truth commissions in El Salvador and 
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Guatemala. Sometimes the shame and damage to individuals and communities is too 
deep to be allowed to be named and to be viewed in such a process.75 
 
Fourthly, although the hopes for truth and reconciliation commissions may have been 
high, and some of their results have been extraordinary compared with other ways of 
dealing with conflicts, they have not delivered deep and long-lasting reconciliation. The 
two case studies have shown that the reconciliation process is far from complete. This is 
because any commission must be seen as only part of the process of reconciliation. Only 
some of the truth is uncovered, and that which is, does not always lead to reconciliation. 
It was seen that Chile had a second and third go at truth and reconciliation, and van der 
Merwe stresses the importance of seeing commissions as just part of the process of 
reconciliation. He noted that, over time, some of the commissioners of the TRC 
changed their goal to being one of establishing a foundation for building reconciliation. 
He continues, 
 
[i]f the success of the TRC is judged on this basis, there may be some grounds 
for optimism. If we recognize reconciliation as a long-term process that requires 
ongoing efforts of empowerment, confrontation, pain, dialogue, exchange, 
experimentation, risk-taking, the building of common values, and identity 
transformation, then the TRC’s work might be evaluated more favorably.76 
 
Related to this is the relatively short time that all the commissions have been given, and 
the inadequacy of their resources to complete the task in a comprehensive manner. 
 
Fifthly, when significant issues remain unresolved, the future is at stake. It is not 
possible to just draw a line under the past and move on. Michael Ignatieff, in his 
exploration of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, helpfully writes, 
 
… the past continues to torment because it is not the past. These places are not 
living in a serial order of time but in a simultaneous one, in which the past and 
present are a continuous, agglutinated mass of fantasies, distortions, myths, and 
lies. Reporters in the Balkan wars often observed that when they were told 
atrocity stories they were occasionally uncertain whether these stories had 
occurred yesterday or in 1941, 1841, or 1441. 
 
He concludes that this ‘is the dreamtime of vengeance. Crimes can never safely be fixed 
in the historical past; they remain locked in the eternal present, crying out for 
vengeance.’77 
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Sixthly, the starting point of Tutu’s work on the TRC is that human beings are 
relational, and relational with God.78 The importance of this will emerge later in this 
thesis.79 
 
Seventhly, the notion of justice is obviously important, and it is related to reconciliation, 
but its nature, and its relationship with reconciliation, need further work.80 One of the 
political realities of the commissions and reconciliation processes is that they have pre-
established the nature of justice, usually as some form of amnesty, sometimes 
conditional, for the perpetrators. Moreover, although the TRC had power to recommend 
reparation, this has often not been delivered.81 Attention needs to be given to the 
beneficiaries of apartheid in South Africa, for example, who have a moral obligation ‘to 
contribute to the material restoration of those who have suffered from it.’82 Moreover, 
discussions of the nature of justice often focus on the Western idea of individual 
responsibility, whereas African notions of justice are more concerned with re-
integrating the victim and the offender into society.83 
 
Eighthly, there must be some discrimination between atrocities committed by those in 
power in the domination system and those who were living under the domination 
system.84 Is there a difference between crimes committed by the domination system and 
those to committed opposing it?85 
 
Ninthly, it is not only justice systems that need to be changed, but the whole culture has 
been affected by false stories and structures, and needs to be reformed.86 
 
Finally, the truth and reconciliation commissions have mainly dealt with the recent past, 
and usually with particular years in mind. However, problems in societies often have 
much longer histories, and for countries which have had to negotiate their history with 
colonising powers, or have even been created by colonising powers drawing lines on 
maps, the premises of the founding of the nations themselves may need to be addressed 
because otherwise reconciliation may be being attempted with systems that are 
inherently evil.87 In some countries, Indigenous cultures are still strong enough to 
reassert themselves. For example, Greider writes, 
 
[t]he indigenous Maya communities of Guatemala and Southern Mexico vividly 
manifest the ‘reconciliation’ process as a ‘camino’ or road to restoration and 
reparation of cultures surviving the ravages of colonialism and the forces of 
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globalization in order to create a sustainable future. … ‘Reconciliation’ is the 
path to repairing these tattered communities, restoring the strength of their 
connection to the land, and affirming their cultural survival into the new 
millennium.88 
 
Some of these observations will be important in the next section, which considers the 
situation in Australia. Although this work will not explicitly return to all of the 
observations that have arisen from these case studies, they have been important in 
shaping the questions addressed in this thesis, particularly concerning the nature and 
possible extent of reconciliation, and the relationship between justice and reconciliation. 
1.3 Reconciliation in Australia 
The disputes in Australia are about more than the ownership of land, and the problems 
are more than just the welfare problem of First peoples. At stake are alternative 
constructions of the nature of Australia, and the possibility of life itself. 
 
There is more than one construction of the nature of Australia. These constructions are 
more than just alternative histories, or the negotiation of uneasy, and sometimes 
destructive, relationships between peoples. Although they include these things, they are 
more fundamentally about the relationship of human beings to the land, and so how we 
understand what it is to be a human being. Because of this, the focus of this thesis is 
quite different from a study of reconciliation where the dominant issue is more about 
living together after a period of war. Nevertheless, the observations made in the 
previous section have highlighted things that need to be looked out for in studying the 
situation in Australia. 
 
This section will do two things. Firstly, it will further elucidate some of the problems in 
Australia by drawing on the insights from the case studies of Chile and South Africa 
from the previous section, and also by comparing it with the more analogous situations 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Canada, and the United States of America. Secondly, noting 
that there seems to have been some significant shifts in the consciousness and practice 
of Subsequent peoples, it will explain why this thesis will make an extended study of 
the history of land in Australia over the last half century. 
1.3.1 Comparing the Situations in Australia and Other Countries 
The major difference in Australia from Chile and South Africa is that, in Australia, the 
non-Indigenous population in Australia far outnumbers the Indigenous one, and it 
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dominates both the culture and the legal framework. Moreover, the approach of the non-
Indigenous population to the Indigenous population has, by and large, been one of 
seeing the Indigenous population has having (or even, being) problems that need to be 
solved, rather than engaging with them in a way which would allow the dominant 
culture to be challenged and transformed by the encounter.89 In fact, some non-
Indigenous peoples style themselves as the victims. For example, Senator Tchen, who 
thinks of himself as Chinese, and who was the first Chinese member of the Senate, said 
the following in his valedictory address to the Senate on 22nd June, 2005: 
 
Under the leadership of John Howard … [w]e are starting to see the Indigenous 
community becoming reconciled to us. Reconciliation has never been about us 
becoming reconciled to the Indigenous community. We are here and they must 
become reconciled to our presence here, and that is what we are working 
towards. We are lifting their living standards and education standards and giving 
them hope so that they can become part of the Australian community as equals. 
That is true reconciliation – and I am glad to see that we are on our way.90 
 
Ann Curthoys makes the more general observation that 
 
[m]any non-indigenous Australians have difficulty in seeing themselves as the 
beneficiaries of the colonisation process because they, like so many others, from 
the United States to Canada to Israel and elsewhere, see themselves as victims, 
not oppressors … [For the victim], the legacy of the colonial past is a continuing 
fear of illegitimacy.91 
 
Mark McKenna continues, 
 
[t]he sense of victimhood that Curthoys describes is certainly present in south-
eastern new South Wales. Indeed, it is not possible to understand the attitude of 
some non-Aboriginal people in the community towards reconciliation without 
first understanding one of the most powerful beliefs within their society.92 … So 
strong was the cult of the victim in non-Aboriginal society that many people 
came to believe that they were now victims of unfair and illegitimate land claims 
by Aboriginal activists.93 
 
The perception of Indigenous people, however, is very different. One Indigenous leader 
expressed this by saying that Aboriginal people feel continually under siege.94 
 
As the situation in Chile showed, there are more ways to pursue a conflict than through 
open warfare. Although it is true that there has been no systematic attempt at 
overcoming the First peoples in Australia through large-scale wars,95 the incomers have 
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behaved in many ways that have been very destructive of the Indigenous populations. 
The organisation of Aboriginal societies – small bands of people with attachments to 
particular lands and waters – meant that large-scale warfare on their part was never an 
option. However, there were always skirmishes as the frontier of non-Indigenous 
settlement expanded, often with reprisal killings by the incomers that far exceeded any 
perceived original offence.96 There are continuing problems between the police and 
sectors of some Aboriginal communities.97 Moreover, taking Aboriginal people away 
from their land strikes at their very identity as human beings.98 
 
Many non-Indigenous Australians behave as if the problems faced by Indigenous people 
in Australia were caused by others in the past. However, this is clearly not the case. For 
example, the Bringing Them Home report99 highlighted the fact that Indigenous children 
were taken away from their families as late as in the 1970s. No matter how well-
meaning government policies of ‘assimilation’ ‘integration’, ‘self-determination’, 
‘practical reconciliation’ and so on, seeking to solve the ‘Aboriginal problem’ have 
been, the continuing welfare problems for Indigenous peoples in Australia show that 
these have not been effective. That is, it appears that there has been, and there still is, a 
continual destructiveness of the non-Indigenous population of Australia towards the 
Indigenous peoples of Australia, whether this has been intentional or not. Debbie Rose 
reminds us of this when she writes, 
 
Hobbles [a member of the Yarralin people from the Victoria River area in the 
Northern Territory] and other story tellers are concerned to show that invasion is 
not a process of the past which is now finished. Rather, they go to considerable 
effort to explain that the process is on-going and is continuing to destroy people 
and land. The other integral point, which is rarely stated explicitly, is that 
conquest is based on desire and on the illusion of winners and losers. One wins 
by disabling not only the opposition but the very life systems in which the 
opposition is embedded. This is a fatal error, for there are no other life systems. 
As Riley Young said, ‘I know government say he can change him rule. But he’ll 
never get out of this ground.’100 
 
Warnings such as this should alert the non-Indigenous population to the fact that it is 
not possible simply to draw a line under the past, and to move into the future. The 
problems of the past are being reproduced in the present, and they need to be addressed 
so that they do not continue to damage the future. 
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The case studies from Chile and South Africa show that the pursuit of reconciliation and 
justice is difficult either when the law has been set by the outgoing regime, or where the 
institutions, such as the legal system, remain in place following a change in power. This 
suggests that it will be important to look at the place of the law in Australia. In 
Australia, there are two different types of law: that of the Indigenous peoples; and that 
of the non-Indigenous peoples. Whilst the non-Indigenous law, based on English 
Common Law, has space to recognise the law and customs of other nations, this has 
largely not happened in Australia, a process that was begun at the founding of the 
English settlement in Australia, which did not recognise any system of law or the 
ownership of the land by its First peoples. It will be seen in Chapter 5 that the non-
Indigenous law in Australia has not been powerful enough to resolve the problems in 
Australia. It will be concluded that, in fact, the law has been part of the problem. 
 
The reconciliation process in South Africa was set up as a way of finding a way into the 
future that avoided large-scale violence, whilst delivering some form of justice. In 
Chile, the commission was overshadowed by the continual threat from the military. 
Both of these limited the extent of justice and reconciliation that was possible at that 
time.  The non-Indigenous people of Australia need to recognise that the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia are still under a state of siege, but, because this is not necessarily 
intentional, there is the possibility that a deeper degree of reconciliation can be 
achieved. 
 
The history of the conflict in Australia is different from many other conflict situations 
around the world, and that means that the issues surrounding the process of 
reconciliation could be different. For example, Volf, a Croat, reflects theologically on 
reconciliation from the situation in the Balkan states.101 The questions that arise when 
reflecting on the situation in Australia are quite different: the radically different 
experience of the non-Indigenous and Indigenous peoples of Australia; the meaning of 
being First peoples and Subsequent peoples; the place of false foundational myths; and 
the relationship to the land. That is not to say that some of these issues are not present in 
other disputes, but they come to the fore in particular ways in Australia. 
 
The situation in Australia is most similar to those in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and north 
America (Canada and the United States of America). However, the history of the non-
Indigenous occupancy of Australia has some significant differences from these areas 
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with which it has the most in common. Firstly, the first non-Indigenous outpost in 
Australia was a penal colony.102 Secondly, those first non-Indigenous people had 
wrongly understood that the land was essentially empty, thinking that there could be no 
resistance to their taking up occupation.103 Thirdly, the Indigenous population was not 
organised into large-scale units that offered coordinated military resistance to the 
invaders, because Aboriginal societies were ordered on a much smaller scale, with 
relationships to particular areas of land.104 Fourthly, no treaties were made with the 
Indigenous inhabitants.105 
 
Although First peoples in Australia compare their experiences with their Indigenous 
colleagues in Aotearoa /New Zealand, Canada and the USA,106 the fact that the land of 
Australia was settled by Europeans as if it was empty107 is deeply embedded in non-
Indigenous Australian law and culture, making it much harder for Australia’s First 
peoples to make progress in the non-Indigenous law system than their colleagues in 
other countries.108 Thus, the situation in Australia merits study as a sort of worst-case 
scenario for countries in similar situations. 
 
From his experience of working on reconciliation in conflict situations, Lederach has 
two observations that are helpful here in thinking about reconciliation. Firstly, he has a 
rule of thumb that it takes as long to get out of a conflict as the conflict has been 
running.109 This means that reconciliation is a long-term process. Secondly, he has 
shown that short-term measures only work in a culture where there is trust that they are 
part of a long-term strategy for reconciliation with which all parties are happy,110 and 
there is, understandably, little trust of non-Indigenous people in much of the Indigenous 
community.111 
 
1.3.2 In an Uncertain State 
Over the last two or three decades, there have been some significant shifts in the place 
of the First peoples of Australia in non-Indigenous consciousness. For example, at many 
public meetings that I attended in May and June 2005,112 the speakers acknowledged the 
Aboriginal elders on whose lands we were meeting, and many road signs marking town 
and shire boundaries acknowledged the original Aboriginal owners of the land, such as 
in Figure 1-1113 (where it is stated that it is Wiradjuri country), something that I had not 
noticed when I had last visited in January 2000.  
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Figure 1-1: A road sign outside Narrandera 
Several factors have contributed to this shift in consciousness: a decade for 
reconciliation, the results of public enquiries, and some significant land judgements and 
land legislation.114 However, it is unclear if these changes represent a fundamental shift 
in the way the Subsequent peoples relate to the First peoples in Australia, that is, in the 
terminology of this thesis, if they are part of a bigger process of repentance by the 
Subsequent peoples. So, this section will briefly examine two indicators of the state of 
the relationships between the peoples of Australia: the decade for reconciliation, and 
public art and signage. It will be argued that the former failed to produce substantive 
change for the First peoples of Australia, and the second is ambiguous concerning the 
change of spirit in the Subsequent peoples. Therefore, it will be argued in Section 1.3.3 
that a more substantial study, of land over the past half century, is needed in order to see 
what is really driving the relationships between the peoples of Australia, to see what the 
dominant spirit of the Subsequent peoples is. 
1.3.2.1 A Decade for Reconciliation 
A decade for reconciliation in Australia was initiated in 1991. It is widely believed that 
this was as a result of one of the recommendations of the report of the Royal 
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Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, but the Hawke government was 
already talking about a process of reconciliation as early as 1988. Some suggest that this 
was a way of diverting attention from the fact that the government had reneged on 
commitments to national land rights and a treaty.115 
 
When the decade of reconciliation was announced, there was a justified concern that it 
would simply be another policy directed at the First peoples, which would continue the 
history of damaging relationships towards them, as aptly captured in the cartoon by 
Geoff Pryor (Figure 1-2). There was a further concern that it would be aimed at 
incorporation of the First peoples into a universalising national history.116 
 
 
Figure 1-2: A Geoff Pryor cartoon concerning the policies pursued by Subsequent 
peoples towards First peoples117 
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, established by the Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation Act 1991, suffered from two problems in its name. Firstly, the original 
title was to have been ‘Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and Justice’, but the 
removal of the words ‘and Justice’ was felt to be more politically acceptable.118 
Immediately this disconnects the idea of justice from reconciliation, and leaves open the 
problem of how one can pursue reconciliation without also taking into account justice.  
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Secondly, the name suggested that it is the First peoples who have to be reconciled.119 
The objective of the Act makes it clear that it is reconciliation between all the people in 
Australia that is sought, 
 
[t]he object of the establishment of the Council is to promote a process of 
reconciliation between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and the wider 
Australian community, based on an appreciation by the Australian community 
as a whole of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures and achievements 
and of the unique position of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders as the 
indigenous peoples of Australia, and by means that include the fostering of an 
ongoing national commitment to co-operate to address Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander disadvantage.120 
 
But even this wording is problematic, for it tends towards seeing the First peoples as 
being a subset of the ‘the Australian community’. 
 
One of the Council’s functions was 
 
to promote, by leadership, education and discussion, a deeper understanding by 
all Australians of the history, cultures, past dispossession and continuing 
disadvantage of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and of the need to redress 
that disadvantage.121 
 
The Council was to recommend on whether formal documents of reconciliation would 
advance the process of reconciliation.122 
 
One of the measurable outcomes of the reconciliation decade was the creation of 
learning circles, whose objective was for non-Indigenous and Indigenous people to meet 
each other and learn from each other, with a focus on non-Indigenous people 
understanding more about Indigenous cultures.123 In Queensland alone there were over 
five hundred such groups during 1991-2001, and some public authorities, like 
Queensland Health, established membership of such a group as part of staff training.124 
 
It turned out that the decade of the duration of the Act was a turbulent one in Australian 
politics, seeing: the landmark Mabo and Wik judgements about land; the preparation of 
a Native Title Act by a Labour Federal government, which was later radically modified 
by a Liberal government half way through the decade;125 the forcing out of the 
Aboriginal chairman of the Council, Pat Dodson, part way through the process; and a 
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huge groundswell of popular support which saw tens of thousands of people march 
across bridges in major cities and elsewhere. 
 
Significantly, although the final report of the Council was received with much public 
fanfare, it was quickly shelved by the Howard government, which failed to act on its 
recommendations, just as it and previous governments had failed to act on other 
significant reports. 
 
It is still too early to assess the full impact of the decade of reconciliation. However, in 
his study of the decade, Gunstone argues that it failed the people of Australia for a 
number of reasons.126 Firstly, it was partly established to divert attention from the 
government’s failure to address issues that were more important to Indigenous people, 
such as land rights and a treaty. Secondly, the emphasis was on symbolic and practical 
reconciliation rather than the substantive issues of Indigenous rights and the existing 
power relationships. Thirdly, the focus was a nationalistic agenda, to create one people 
who would walk together, a sharing of histories, cultures and identities, but this failed to 
take into account problematic historical events such as invasion, massacres, the taking 
of land and children, and so on, factors which continue to have repercussions. Fourthly, 
the notion of justice was too narrow, largely restricted to addressing socio-economic 
disadvantage. Finally, it focused on building relationships between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people, without addressing historical and contemporary injustices. In other 
words, Gunstone sees that the reconciliation process failed to address those issues that 
are important to Indigenous people. 
 
The failure of the decade to deliver significant outcomes must be in part due to the 
actions of the Howard government, which overtly and systematically sought to 
undermine the Council, and then shelved the final reports from its decade of work.127 
1.3.2.2 Public Art and Signage 
Public art and signage gives mixed messages concerning the history of Australia since 
Europeans first came to live in the land. In some places, public works of art have been 
erected in order to engage with the history since Europeans first came to Australia. Two 
examples of public signs will be given, and then three examples of such art will be 
briefly described. 
1.3.2.2.1 Public Signage 
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A plaque was unveiled in 1967, marking the site where the Union flag was planted by 
Captain Arthur Philip, on 28th January, 1788 (Figure 1-3), and the road sign outside 
Narrandera (Figure 1-4) probably recalls an inglorious memory. On the other hand, 
many cities, towns and shires are beginning to acknowledge the Aboriginal owners of 
the land on which they are established, such as the road sign outside Narrandera (Figure 
1-1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1-3: The plaque commemorating the planting of the flag by Arthur Philip 
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Figure 1-4: A road sign outside Narrandera 
1.3.2.2.2 The River Walk in Parramatta 
In Parramatta, the “River Walk”, designed by the Aboriginal artist, Jamie Eastwood, 
charts the history of the area from an Aboriginal perspective. The walk is about 800m 
long, and consists of a painted pathway with various explanatory boards128 along the 
way.129 Themes explored include the river, bush tucker and indigenous plant life, 
fishing, early hostilities between Europeans and Aboriginal people, Aboriginal 
resistance to the invasion, the Native Institution, the Stolen Generations, and 
reconciliation.130 It uses the language of “invasion” (Figure 1-5), and the death of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people is made explicit (Figure 1-6). 
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Figure 1-5: An explanatory panel and the corresponding segment of the walkway 
     
Figure 1-6: Segments of the walkway showing the death of First and Subsequent 
peoples 
 
1.3.2.2.3 The Myall Creek Memorial 
A second memorial is a pathway through the bush, alongside which are narrative boards 
with etched pictures,131 and leading to a memorial stone, which can be found near Myall 
Creek in the northern tablelands of New South Wales. The Myall Creek massacre is 
unique in Australian history in that it is the only massacre by non-Indigenous people for 
which some of the non-Indigenous perpetrators were rounded up and hung.132 Each year 
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a memorial ceremony and other events are held at the site.133 The story-boards are 
explicit about the history of the local people and the massacre. In January, 2005, 
Catherine de Lorenzo found all the boards defaced. Most of the boards had large crosses 
etched onto them, and Figure 1-8, shows that the words “murdered”, “women, children 
and men”, have been scratched out on one of the boards, besides the big cross which 
had been inscribed on the others.134 As these boards are found along a pathway with 
completely open access, and in a sparsely populated rural area, it could be that these are 
simply random acts of vandalism,135 like the graffiti spray painted onto some of the 
storyboards along the River Walk in Parramatta. However, one is left wondering if the 
defacing of these boards is contesting the interpretation of the history of what happened. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-7: The Myall Creek Memorial Stone 
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Figure 1-8: The defaced storyboard at the Myall Creek Memorial site 
1.3.2.2.4 Reconciliation Place in Canberra 
The final piece of public art that will be examined here is in the Parliamentary Zone in 
Canberra. Called “Reconciliation Place”, it runs from near the High Court of Australia 
to the National Library. Sited in this significant place, a government pamphlet says that 
 
Reconciliation Place recognises the importance of understanding the shared 
history of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, and reaffirms our 
commitment to the cause of reconciliation as an important national priority. 
 
The location of Reconciliation Place in the Parliamentary Zone places the 
reconciliation process physically and symbolically at the heart of Australia’s 
democratic life and institutions. It signifies the importance the Australian people 
place on the ongoing process of reconciliation and is a prominent symbol of the 
nation’s commitment to healing the wounds of the past. 
 
Hundreds of thousands of Australians have demonstrated their enthusiasm for 
reconciliation by walking across bridges in their capital cities and country 
towns, and by supporting a number of reconciliation initiatives. 
 
Continuing this journey, Reconciliation Place provides an opportunity to 
represent a shared history from the perspective of the original owners and those 
who came later: artworks about achievements, partnerships, of connection to the 
land and waters, and of belonging.136 
 
On the face of it, this is a bold move, acknowledging the need for reconciliation at the 
heart of life of the nation. However, a closer examination of the artwork on 
Reconciliation Place tells a more ambiguous story. The permanent installation consists 
of a number of constructions called ‘slivers’ which record some of the important aspects 
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of Indigenous life in Australia. All the slivers, except for one, have the same Architect, 
Aboriginal Cultural Advisor, Exhibition Designers and Graphic Designer, and were 
designed without public consultation, including a sliver that remembers the Indigenous 
children who were taken away from their parents. The slivers are all of a similar design, 
using silver metal, glass and wood (see Figures 1-9 and 1-10). 
 
 
Figure 1-9: A ‘sliver’ in Reconciliation Place 
 
   37 
 
Figure 1-10: A ‘sliver’ in Reconciliation Place 
 
The members of the National Sorry Day committee were able to take responsibility for 
another sliver to commemorate the children taken away from their parents, so that there 
are two slivers remembering this. This second sliver was designed with public 
consultation. The committee had a lot of difficulty in getting it passed by the Federal 
Government. The sliver (Figure 1-11) is made of red oxide concrete, inspired by the 
landscape of the centre of Australia. The map of Australia is made with holes drilled 
into the concrete, so people can post their responses to what happened. On the face of 
the sculpture there are short quotations of people who were part of the whole process of 
taking children away, and there is a facsimile copy of a letter written by one Aboriginal 
couple asking for their children back. On the side of the memorial, there is an 
extraordinary explanation in raised bronze lettering.137 A movement-activated speaker 
plays the song, “Took the Children Away”, by Archie Roach.138 
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Figure 1-11: One face of the second sliver in Reconciliation Place concerning 
children who were taken away from their families 
1.3.3 The Need for a Case Study on Land 
The artworks examined above show that a number of attempts have been made to 
remember the history of Australia in a way that does not avoid the violence and 
injustice that occurred, even with the goal of reconciliation in mind. However, they tell 
an ambiguous story. For example, Reconciliation Place indicates that there is still a 
tendency to both control the public telling of the story, and to sanitise it in its telling: 
this has happened in the past, it is firmly situated in the past, and we are now brave and 
secure enough to admit that it happened, and move on differently into the future. 
 
So what is the state of the relationships between the peoples of Australia? Has there 
been any substantive shift in these relationships? What is the spirit that is driving the 
relationships between the peoples? Why do the First peoples of Australia still feel under 
siege? Why has there been no significant shift in their welfare? 
 
In order to try to understand the state of the relationships between the peoples of 
Australia, in order to try to answer these questions, a substantial case study of the 
history of land over the past half century will be made in Chapter 5. The issue of land 
has been chosen because it is central to Aboriginal identity, and so the approach taken 
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to it by the Subsequent peoples is a strong indicator of their commitment to 
reconciliation with the First peoples. 
1.4 Outline of this Thesis 
The previous sections have indicated that there is some ambiguity in the state of the 
relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia. This is 
captured in Figure 1-12, which was taken in Canberra on the National Day of Healing in 
May 2005.139  
 
 
Figure 1-12: A banner at a gathering in Canberra on the National Day of Healing 
in 2005 
In front of the billboard was the paving of the square, which was the stage on which 
Aboriginal artists performed, dancing, playing music, and singing.140 The billboard for 
the Australian Ballet performance is attached to wooden fencing around a construction 
site. The title of the ballet is ‘White’, and its strap line is ‘Escape into a brilliant white 
world of elegance, style and gorgeous music’.141 The ballerina on the poster is deeply 
sun-tanned (not white, but not Indigenous). On the top of this poster is a smaller one, 
partially covering the poster about the wonders of whiteness, but not removing it, nor 
hiding it from view, declaring the ‘National Day of Healing’. How can a society, which 
is very conscious of constructing itself, deal with its past and go into the future in a way 
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that is more than just placing a sticking plaster over the deep-seated myth of normality 
of whiteness portrayed by the dominant culture, where the Indigenous people are more 
than just an interesting spectacle to be watched by a mixed crowd? 
 
By planting a flag in the soil, claiming ownership of the land and sovereignty over it for 
the English Crown, Captain Arthur Philip committed a foundational sin against the First 
peoples of Australia. This act did not recognise Indigenous systems of law, and thus it 
recognised neither the sovereignty of the Indigenous peoples, nor their ownership of the 
land. The incomers assumed that they had the right to settle in the land, and very 
quickly defended this assumed right by resorting to destructive violence. Although 
English Common Law is able to incorporate aspects of the legal systems of countries 
that were colonised by England, it failed to do this in Australia, because it did not 
recognise Aboriginal systems of law. Furthermore, the full humanity of the Aboriginal 
peoples was not recognised: they were seen as curious and primitive, suitable for 
anthropological study. The first incomers almost starved, as they struggled against the 
land, rather than learning how to live with the bounty of the land, and so established a 
narrative of overcoming and conquering the land. 
 
It will be argued, in Chapter 4, that communities have a propensity to continue the sins 
of their forebears, even if they think that they are doing what is right. This observation 
has both explanatory power and hortatory power: it explains why government policies 
are continuing to cause problems for Indigenous people; and it says what needs to be 
done, namely, as part of a process of reconciliation, repenting of the sins, including the 
sins of the past, which have been perpetrated against the Indigenous peoples of 
Australia. 
 
Chapter 5, on the argument over land in Australia since the 1960s, is a case study on the 
nature of the relationships between the peoples of Australia. For Aboriginal people, land 
is fundamental to their identity as human beings, and not just any piece of land, but 
particular areas of land that are their responsibility,142 so how non-Indigenous 
Australians have responded to Aboriginal claims over their land indicates the nature of 
the relationship between the peoples. In particular, it asks the question, given the 
apparent, but ambiguous, shift in attitudes of non-Indigenous Australians towards their 
Indigenous neighbours that has been outlined in this chapter, how is this reflected in 
areas where it really matters, like land, which is foundational for Aboriginal identity? It 
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will be seen that there were some significant advances in preserving Aboriginal 
ownership of land, but the overall thrust of legislation and its outworking in the courts 
has been to secure non-Indigenous claims over land when there were competing claims. 
This substantiates the argument, made in Chapter 4, concerning the propensity of the 
present generation to continue the sins of the past. Moreover, even when Aboriginal 
communities have secured the ownership of their land, on the whole, this has not led to 
improvements in Aboriginal welfare. This suggests that the problem is not only about 
the ownership of land, but a complex of issues that have arisen from the foundational 
sins of failing to attend to the full humanity of Aboriginal people, and the subsequent 
breakdown of relationships, which cannot be solved simply by giving back land to some 
Aboriginal people, even when this is linked with programmes to integrate them into an 
alien economic system. Rather, a process of reconciliation, which addresses all the 
damage that has been done over the decades, needs to be undertaken, for Aboriginal 
people to be well; their lack of well-being is a symptom of the illness of all the 
Australian cultures. 
 
But what is the nature of reconciliation, and how is it to be achieved? It is often 
assumed that reconciliation is at the heart of the Christian faith, and there is much truth 
in this. However, the word ‘reconciliation’ is rare in the New Testament, and 
interpretations of the key passages where it does occur have focused on the relationship 
between God and human beings. Of the surviving early Christian literature, Paul was 
the first Christian theologian to use this term, a term that was common in 
contemporaneous political literature, and so it is important to see how he uses it. 
Chapter 2 therefore focuses on Paul’s first uses of the idea of reconciliation, in his 
correspondence with the Corinthian church. From Paul’s perspective, there were three 
major problems in Corinth: factionalism; a wrong structuring of relationships in the 
church; and a breakdown of relationships with himself. At various points, he urges the 
Corinthians to overcome their factionalism, to change their social relationships, and to 
be reconciled, both with each other, and with God. Reconciliation between human 
beings, and reconciliation between human beings and God are linked: it is God’s not 
holding humanity’s sins against them which has made both reconciliation between 
human beings, and also reconciliation with God, possible. Furthermore, Paul says that 
God replaces sin by righteousness, that is, God establishes justice by removing sin. 
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The importance of Paul’s perspective must not be underplayed, for it is the foundation 
in Christian theology for the possibility of reconciliation in human relationships. But 
what is ‘reconciliation’ between human beings, from this theological perspective? This 
question is answered in Chapter 3. Reconciliation is a process that involves both 
repentance and forgiveness. In many conflicts, both parties will be guilty of sins against 
the other, and so reconciliation will involve elements of repentance and forgiveness by 
both parties. Many people are wary of the process of reconciliation in the realm of 
human relationships, especially when large groupings of people are involved, such as 
nations, because they believe that reconciliation is inherently unjust. However, this is a 
misconception, based on reconciliation commonly being used to name a truncated 
process of reconciliation, where justice has been prescribed, and so circumscribed, 
before the process began. Chapter 3 will argue that true justice is achieved through the 
process of reconciliation, the establishment of truly peaceful relations. This is because 
the nature of repentance itself, what must be done by those who have been the 
perpetrators of the actions which have caused the alienation, can only be determined by 
engaging with the wronged parties in seeking reconciliation. 
 
The primary people being addressed by this thesis are the non-Indigenous peoples of 
Australia. Chapter 6 therefore reflects on what it might mean for non-Indigenous people 
in Australia to be part of a process of repentance. 
 
The approach of this thesis is theological, drawing on the Christian theological tradition. 
As has been seen in this chapter, international experiments in reconciliation as a way of 
doing politics, and the situation in Australia, have raised questions, both about the 
nature of reconciliation, and also the possibility of reconciliation as a viable political 
process, and these questions lie in the background of the theological development here. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make a full survey of the history of the idea of 
reconciliation in Christian theology. This is, in part, due to the space that needs to be 
spent recovering some neglected Pauline insights into the nature of reconciliation, 
which are critical in founding a properly Christian understanding of reconciliation. In 
the main, the Bible is the primary source of the foundational theological material in this 
thesis, with a dual focus on the political context in which it was written, and the 
political context in which it is being read today. This thesis engages particularly with 
theologians who are either aware of the political context in which the biblical texts were 
written, or who are attempting to address contemporary political issues, or both, and 
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where the questions that are being asked of the biblical material are shaped by the 
contemporary questions which this thesis seeks to address. This way of reading the 
biblical text does not eschew more complicated reading strategies.143 Rather the 
approach taken provides sufficient insights for the purposes of this thesis. It is hoped 
that the resulting readings of the biblical text will prove liberative for the peoples of 
Australia, particularly as they focus on the responsibility of the Subsequent peoples in 
seeking reconciliation. 
                                                 
1 It is very difficult to find an adequate terminology for the land of Australia and its 
peoples. In this thesis, ‘Australia’ refers to the landmass commonly called ‘Australia’. 
This is to be read without any political overtones; in particular, it does not refer to the 
nation-state commonly called ‘Australia’ in international politics. Thus, in this thesis, 
the ‘peoples of Australia’ are simply those people who currently live in this landmass. 
Nevertheless, for ease of reference, places and areas of land in Australia will largely be 
referred to by the names given to them since 1788. 
 
Before Europeans began to live in Australia, there was no such thing as ‘Aboriginal 
people’: ‘people identified themselves according to their nation and language group, 
and within these their clan and kinship groups. People were Wiradjuri, Yanyuwa, 
Goreng Goring, Jawoyn, Pitjantjatjara, Wongkadjera, Yawaru and all the other 500 
nations that existed on this land before the invasion. The idea of “Aboriginal” or 
“Indigenous” identity is a distinctly postcolonial construct invented to both name and 
contain the “natives” of terra australis’ (Maddison, Sarah, Black Politics: Inside the 
Complexity of Aboriginal Political Culture (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2009), p. 
103). The essays on the construction of Aboriginal identity in Beckett, Jeremy, ed., Past 
and Present: The Construction of Aboriginality (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 
1988), are instructive on this issue. 
 
Once Europeans came to live in Australia, the subsequent interactions between the 
various peoples of Australia have resulted in a complex history that has affected all the 
peoples of Australia, meaning that many people have multiple layers of identity 
(Maddison, Black, pp. 111-117; Taylor, Louise, “'Who’s Your Mob?’ – The Politics of 
Aboriginal Identity and the Implications for a Treaty” in McGlade, Hannah, ed., Treaty: 
Let’s Get It Right! A Collection of Essays from ATSIC’s Treaty Think Tank and Authors 
Commissioned by AIATSIS on Treaty Issues (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2003), 
88-106, 200-216, p. 93).  
 
In this thesis, it will be necessary to be able to write about the people descended from 
those who were already in the land when Europeans first arrived, as well as those who 
have come since. There was a time when ‘Indigenous’, ‘Torres Strait Islander’ and 
‘Aboriginal’ were commonly used terms, but, because of the overtones of colonially 
constructed identities implicit in them, the continuing use of these terms is difficult. 
Some authors have begun to use the terminology ‘First’ and ‘Second’ peoples: see, for 
example, Perkins, Rachel and Langton, Marcia, First Australians: An Illustrated 
History (Carlton: The Miegunyah Press, 2008). Budden, (Budden, Chris, Following 
Jesus in Invaded Space: Doing Theology on Aboriginal Land (Eugene: Pickwick 
Publications, 2009)), consistently uses this terminology, as he explores ‘what it means 
to be part of that people who are Second peoples, invaders and newcomers, and how 
faith must be approached differently if we are conscious of our place in this land’ (p. 1). 
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However, the term ‘Second’ is problematic, because people who came after the initial 
European influx may see their incoming as different, for they were not part of the initial 
destructive behaviour towards the First peoples, and so try to excuse themselves from 
the responsibility from the whole history of problems in Australia. Therefore the term 
‘Subsequent’ is preferred in this thesis. 
 
However, the term ‘First peoples’ introduces new problems. Firstly, it does not 
discriminate sufficiently between diverse histories, cultures, nations, languages, and 
laws, in particular between those people from the Torres Strait Islands and mainland 
Australia (including Tasmania).  In fact, the history of contact of mainland First peoples 
and those from the Torres Strait Islands with Subsequent peoples has been quite 
different, although their histories have been tied together by the historic Mabo (2) 
judgement (see Chapter 5). Secondly, it does not easily admit an adjectival form: for 
example, whilst ‘the laws of the First peoples of mainland Australia’ is correct, it is 
certainly clumsy when repeated often. 
 
Because of these problems, it is hoped that the reader will excuse the use of the 
following inadequate terms as shorthand for longer expressions. In this thesis, 
‘Aboriginal peoples’ will refer to descendents of people who lived in mainland 
Australia (including Tasmania) before 1788, and ‘Torres Strait Islanders’ will refer to 
those who are descended from people who lived in the islands in Torres Strait. Clearly, 
these are not exclusive categories, and they make no judgments concerning the people 
groups that a person may identify with. ‘Indigenous peoples’ is used when a point is 
being made about descendents of people from the islands of Torres Strait and from 
mainland Australia (including Tasmania). Note that ‘peoples’ is being used in the 
plural, to highlight the fact that there was and is no monolithic culture of these peoples, 
although there were considerable cultural overlaps in the cultures of Aboriginal peoples, 
just as there are in European peoples. 
 
There is one more level of complexity, and that is how people regard themselves. As 
has been noted, the history of relationships amongst the peoples of Australia has led to 
people having multiple layers of identity. How these multiple identities are negotiated is 
a very complex question, but within the multiple cultures of Australia, it is generally 
agreed that a person may identify herself with one of the Indigenous people groups of 
Australia if: (1) she chooses to be so designated; (2) that she is descended from 
someone in that people group; and (3) that others in that people group recognise this 
designation. Of course, there is a significant problem in establishing the second criterion 
because of, amongst other reasons, ‘long histories of denial, poor record keeping, the 
removal of Aboriginal children from their families and the attempted process of 
assimilation’ (Taylor, “ ‘Who’s”, p. 97). 
 
Non-Indigenous peoples is another term for Subsequent peoples, and primarily names 
those people who do not regard themselves as being part of the Indigenous peoples of 
Australia. 
 
With these terminological conventions, ‘Aboriginal law’ means the various systems of 
law of the Aboriginal peoples, which have evolved from the systems of law in place in 
Australia before 1788, and similarly for ‘Indigenous law’ and ‘Torres Strait Islander 
law’. ‘Non-Indigenous’ in ‘non-Indigenous law’ is used in a more restricted sense than 
when writing of ‘non-Indigenous peoples’, and it refers to the legal system of the 
nation-state of Australia, that is based in English common law, and which has 
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developed through contact with various other international legal systems, including 
Indigenous ones. 
2 See, e.g., Gloer, W. Hulitt, “2 Corinthians 5.14-21” Review and Expositor 86 (1989), 
pp. 397-405, p. 400, who writes, 
[i]n our efforts to communicate the meaning of the cross-event, we must be 
cognizant of the fact that often the traditional terms and conceptions used to 
describe the significance of that event may seem quite foreign to the experience 
of many. “Redemption” comes from the slave market of the first century and 
implies a release from bondage, yet many in our world have no particular sense 
of bondage. “Justification” comes from the world of the courtroom, and its 
juridical emphasis may have little impact where the sense of sin and any sort of 
accountability before God have vanished. “Sacrifice” evokes images of cultic 
ritual which have little meaning for moderns who are no longer plagued by a 
dread of the numinous. “Reconciliation,” however, belongs to the sphere of 
personal relationships, and ours is an age which is acutely aware of the 
alienation between people which exists at every level. Ours is an age hungry for 
the healing of broken relationships. Thus, while for Anselm the sacrificial model 
was most relevant and for Luther the justification model spoke most powerfully, 
the concept of reconciliation may offer us the most powerful mode for 
expressing the significance of Christ’s death effectively today. 
3 Dwyer, Susan, “Reconciliation for Realists”, Ethics and International Affairs 13 
(1999), Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 81-98, p. 82. 
4 Although Aboriginal cultures in Australia showed some family resemblance, there was 
a diversity of cultures, as broad as the diversity of landscapes. Mudrooroo says that ‘We 
were many, as many as the trees, as the different types of animals’ (Us Mob, p. vi., 
quoted in  Budden, Following, p. 148). Budden continues, ‘The idea of a single 
Indigenous or Aboriginal people is the construct of colonizers.’ It is estimated that there 
were two hundred indigenous languages with approximately six hundred to eight 
hundred dialects (Rigney, Lester-Irabinna, “Indigenous Education, Languages and 
Treaty: The Redefinition of a New Relationship with Australia” in McGlade, Hannah, 
ed., Treaty: Let’s Get It Right! A Collection of Essays from ATSIC’s Treaty Think Tank 
and Authors Commissioned by AIATSIS on Treaty Issues (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies 
Press, 2003), 72-87, 200-217, p. 80). 
 
Observant early settlers noticed that the First peoples had a concept of boundaries and 
rights over particular areas of land. Beginning with Trench in 1791, who witnessed a 
diplomatic exchange when moving from one country to another, Reynolds records 
numerous reports on the Aboriginal understanding of land and country, with a veritable 
flood of reports published in the 1840s by ‘explorers’ such as George Grey, Edward 
Eyre and Paul de Strzelecki, who were often escorted through, and passed from one 
territory to another, and many more later (Reynolds, Aboriginal, pp. 25-38). Reynolds 
concludes that the judgement of ‘Justice Burton in R. v Murrell in 1836, that the 
Aborigines had no law, no politics and no sovereignty, was clearly inaccurate but did 
not diverge from what was generally known and understood about traditional society by 
the colonists at the time’ (Reynolds, Aboriginal, p. 36). However, after the flood of 
publications from the 1840s onwards, ‘[t]he same cannot be said of Lord Watson’s 1889 
judgement that in 1788 Australia had neither settled inhabitants, settled law, land tenure 
or even many people’ (Reynolds, Henry, Aboriginal Sovereignty: Reflections on Race, 
State and Nation (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 36). This understanding was to 
prevail until Justice Blackburn in the 1971 case Milerrpum v Nabalco in the Supreme 
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Court of the Northern Territory, accepted that the Yirrkala people had both law and 
politics, although he denied them title to their land. 
5 McIntosh, Ian S., Aboriginal Reconciliation and the Dreaming: Warramiri Yolngu and 
the Quest for Equality (Needham Heights, Massachusetts: Allyn & Bacon, 2000), p. 35; 
Trudgen, Richard, Why Warriors Lie Down and Die: Towards an Understanding of why 
Aboriginal people of Arnhem Land face the greatest crisis in health and education since 
European contact (Aboriginal Resources and Development Services Inc., 2000), pp. 
14f; Maddison, Black, p. 64. 
6 Sir Joseph Banks wrote (Banks, J, Copious Remarks of the Discovery of New South 
Wales (London, 1787), p. 51, The History of New Holland (London, 1787), pp. 230, 
232, quoted in Reynolds, Henry, The Law of the Land (Ringwood: Penguin, 1992, 2nd 
edn.), pp. 31f, that the sea ‘has I believe been universally found to be the chief source of 
supplys to Indians ignorant of the arts of cultivation: the wild produce of the land alone 
seems scarce able to support them at all seasons at least I do not remember to have read 
of any inland nation who did not cultivate the ground more or less, even the North 
Americans who were so well versed in hunting sowd their Maize. But should a people 
live inland who supported themselves by cultivation these inhabitants of the sea coast 
most certainly would have learn’d to imitate them in some degree at least, otherwise 
their reason must be suppos’d to hold a rank little superior to that of monkies.’ A House 
of Commons Committee on Transportation closely questioned Sir Joseph Banks in May 
1786 about the capacity to resist a European landing. Here is an extract from the 
transcript of that interview (cited from King,  R.J., “Terra Australis: Terra Nullius aut 
Terra Aboriginum”,  Journal Royal Australian Historical Society72(2), Oct. 1986, 75-
91, p. 77): 
 
Committee: Is the coast in General or the particular part you have mentioned 
much inhabited? 
Banks: There are very few Inhabitants. 
Committee: Are they of peaceable or hostile Disposition? 
Banks: Though they seemed inclined to Hostilities they did not appear at all to 
be feared. We never saw more than 30 or 40 together. 
Committee: Do you apprehend, in Case it was resolved to send Convicts there, 
any District of the Country might be obtained by Cession or purchase? 
Banks: There was no probability while we were there of obtaining anything 
either by Cession or purchase as there was nothing we could offer that they 
would take except provisions and those we wanted ourselves. 
Committee: Have you any idea of the nature of the Government under which 
they lived? 
Banks: None whatever, nor of their Language. 
Committee: Do you think that 500 men being put on the shore there would meet 
with that Obstruction from the Natives which might prevent them from 
settling there? 
Banks: Certainly not – not from the experience I have had of the Natives of 
another part of the same coast I am inclined to believe that they would 
speedily abandon the country to the newcomers. 
Committee: Were the Natives armed and in what Manner? 
Banks: They were armed with spears headed with fish bones but none of them 
we saw in Botany Bay appeared at all formidable. 
 
The temptation to read the context of the land in a way that is advantageous to oneself is 
not new. Robert Carroll (Carroll, Robert P, “The Myth of the Empty Land”, Semeia 59 
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(1992), 79-93), describes how the Jewish returnees from Babylon construed the land as 
being empty, where it patently was not. The great wealth that they brought with them 
would have set them apart from the local inhabitants. ‘Much of the story which follows 
the account of the deportees’ return to the ancestral homeland in Ezra 1 is an account, 
imaginary or otherwise, of the establishment of the hegemony of the deportees over the 
people of the land. Whatever the origins of these people (Ezra 4.2) they are not 
permitted to identify themselves with the community gathered around the altar and the 
partially rebuilt sanctuary. Their identity is strictly other than that of those who had 
lived in Babylonia, and in relation to the cult of YHWH they are non-persons’ (p. 81). 
The paper also investigates other aspects of the foundational myth, such as the land 
having to be cleansed of the original Canaanite inhabitants, but that this was only every 
partially done, and the remnant were blamed for polluting Israelite devotion to YHWH. 
There are echoes of the story of Australia here. 
7 Early on, the settlers remarked that the number of First peoples was much greater than 
they had been led to believe. Even before the settlement moved from Botany Bay to 
Port Jackson, Captain Tench noted that they found the local people ‘tolerably 
numerous’ and even at the harbour’s mouth they had reason to believe that the country 
‘was more populous than Mr. Cook had thought it’ (Tench, W., Sydney’s First Four 
Years (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1961), p. 35, quoted in Reynolds, The Law, p. 
56). A first-fleeter noted in his journal of 5th February, 1788 (HRNSW, 2, p. 664, quoted 
in Reynolds, The Law, p. 56), 
 
There is something odd in their never being seen but in small [numbers] but by 
accident, tho’ there is every reason to suppose they are numerous. Since our 
arrival at Port Jackson, during a survey of the harbour a body of near a hundred 
were seen drawn up with an unexpected degree of regularity. 
 
Captain Hunter found the locals ‘very numerous’ which he was ‘a little surprised to find 
after what had been said in the voyage of the Endeavour’ (Hunter, J, An Historical 
Journal (London, 1793), p. 52, quoted in Reynolds, The Law, p. 56). By May, the 
British had come across a party of three hundred, ‘striking proof of the numerousness of 
the natives’ (Tench, Sydney’s, p. 52, quoted in Reynolds, The Law, p. 56). Phillip 
reported to London his estimate that there were at least one thousand five hundred 
people within a radius of ten miles from the settlement, many more people than had 
arrived on the ships from England (HRNSW, 1 part 2, pp. 287, 324, quoted in Reynolds, 
The Law, p. 56). From these quotations, it is clear that the first fleet arrived expecting 
only a small population of Indigenous people, but this assumption was very quickly 
disabused, within days of their arrival. Moreover, this fact was reported the following 
year to the British public (Reynolds, The Law, p. 56). Phillip remarked in his journal in 
May 1788, that on an expedition inland, he raked through a fire and found no evidence 
of either shells or fish bones, again contrary to what he had been led to believe. At first, 
they thought that the people, smoke from whose fires on the mountains they could see, 
had been driven away from the coast by the settlers.  But contact with more distant clans 
increased. In April 1791, Tench records a conversation with a man who told him they 
relied little on fish, eating small animals and yams that they dug out of the ground. Later 
expeditions increased knowledge, and by 1802 Francis Barrallier was able to provide a 
list of many varieties of food used by inland peoples (Reynolds, The Law, p. 57). Not 
only did they have a wide variety of food sources, but it was also known early on that 
they managed the environment using fire. For example, John Hunter wrote about the 
Aboriginal use of fire in 1790, and by the 1830s the frontier settlers began to realise that 
the fire helped to create the open grasslands they were occupying. For example, Ludwig 
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Leichhardt wrote, (Journal of an Overland Expedition in Australia (London, 1847), pp. 
354f), quoted in Reynolds, Aboriginal, p. 23) 
 
the natives seem to have burned the grass systematically along every water-hole 
in order to have them surrounded with young grass as soon as the rain sets in … 
Long strips of lately burnt grass were frequently observed extending for many 
miles along the creeks. The banks of small isolated water-holes in the forest 
were equally attended to … It is no doubt connected with a systematic 
management of their runs, to attract game to particular spots, in the same way 
that stockholders burn parts of theirs in proper seasons. 
 
First peoples were also responsible for spreading animal and plant species (Rose, 
Deborah, “Sacred Site, Ancestral Clearing, and Environmental Ethics”, in Rumsey, 
Alan and Weiner, James (eds.), Emplaced Myth: Space, Narrative and Knowledge in 
Aboriginal Australia and Papua New Guinea (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2001), pp.  99-119, particularly pp. 101-103). Hobbles Danayarra, from the Victoria 
River District, said, ‘[b]efore white people, Aboriginal people were just walking around 
organizing the country’ (Rose, “Sacred Site”, p. 106). 
8 For example, it will be seen, in Chapter 5, that legislation has focused on the concept 
of ‘traditional owner’, which has increasingly been interpreted as a group of people who 
have maintained their traditions unchanged since 1788, and for many years, 
anthropologists failed to study the multiplicity of Aboriginal cultures (see the essays in 
Keen, Ian, ed., Being Black: Aboriginal Cultures in ‘Settled’ Australia (Canberra: 
Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988). Colishaw notes that in Bourke ‘[d]espite a population 
characterized by evermore interwoven relationships between evermore varied ancestors, 
with perhaps the majority of residents having black and white forebears, the binary 
system of identification is reproduced’ (Cowlishaw, Gillian, blackfellas whitefellas and 
the hidden injuries of race (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 55). She notes 
that people are descended from Afghans, Mauritians, Irish, Scots, English, Chinese, 
Pacific Islanders, and various Indigenous groups. Also Read, Peter, Belonging: 
Australians, Place and Aboriginal Ownership (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), and Hinkson, Melinda, and Harris, Alana, Aboriginal Sydney: A Guide to 
Important Places of the Past and Present  (with photographs by Alana Harris) 
(Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2001), are interesting on the adaptation of 
traditions of Aboriginal people from the Sydney area. The papers in Attwood, Bain and 
Arnold, John, eds, Power, Knowledge and Aborigines (Victoria: La Trobe University 
Press, 1992), and Beckett, Past, have helpful discussions of the construction of 
Aboriginal identity. 
9 For example: life on cattle stations allowed First peoples to stay in contact with the 
land; the lay-off in the wet allowed them to continue their ceremonial business; events 
like race meetings allowed the Aboriginal political systems to continue to function; 
introduced foods were not covered by taboos; and cattle began to be incorporated into 
the dreamtime (McGrath, Ann, Born in the Cattle: Aborigines in Cattle Country 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 148-153, 170). 
10 Budden, Following, p. 8, warns of the problem of narrating the history in ‘terms of 
categories privileged by invaders, and in terms of what Europeans have done to the 
“Other”, rather than allowing Aboriginal people to define the experience and outcome 
from their perspective as subjects rather than objects.’ This will be examined in more 
detail in Chapter 6.  
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11 Griffiths, Max, Aboririginal Affairs 1967-2005: Seeking a Solution (Dural: 
Rosenberg Publishing, 2006), p. 192, gives the following figures, gleaned from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population Distribution, Indigenous Australians, 1997: 
Major Cities 30.2% 
Inner Regional 20.3% 
Outer Regional 23.1% 
Remote 8.8% 
Very Remote 17.7% 
Note the city-centric designation of the geographical areas. Australian Bureau of 
Statistics figures from 30th June, 2006 give the numbers of Indigenous people in 
Australia at five hundred and seventeen thousand, with 32% living in capital cities, and 
more than 40% living in regional areas. It notes that these figures are ‘experimental 
because of the inherent uncertainty in indigenous census counts’ (as at 5.1.10, see 
http://tinyurl.com/5vdmb4). 
12 See, e.g., McGlade, Hannah, ed., Treaty: Let’s Get It Right! A Collection of Essays 
from ATSIC’s Treaty Think Tank and Authors Commissioned by AIATSIS on Treaty 
Issues (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2003); Behrendt, Larissa, “The Link 
Between Rights and a Treaty: ‘Practical Reconciliation’”, Balayi: Culture, Law and 
Colonialism 4 (2002), 21-27; Brennan, Sean; Behrendt, Larissa; Strelein, Lisa; and 
Williams, George, Treaty (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2005); Langton, Marica, and 
Palmer, Lisa, “Treaties, Agreement Making and the Recognition of Indigenous 
Customary Polities” in Langton, Marcia; Tehan, Maureen; Palmer, Lisa; and Shain, 
Kathryn, eds., Honour Among Nations?: Treaties and Agreements with Indigenous 
People (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004), 34-49. 
13 There are endless reports and statistics that show this. For example, an article in the 
Sydney Morning Herald (10.4.09) discusses the much lower life-expectancy of 
Indigenous people (available as at 14.5.09: http://tinyurl.com/cdn9yv). In a paper 
entitled, “These are the Killing Times: Closing the Indigenous Life Expectancy Gap 
within a Generation”, presented by Gary Highland, National Director of Australians for 
Native Title and Reconciliation, on 5th September, 2006, the following statistics were 
given: 
• An Aboriginal child born today will still live on average for 17 years less than a 
non-Aboriginal child. 
• Aboriginal babies in Western Australia and the Northern Territory are three 
times more likely to die than non-Aboriginal babies. 
• Indigenous people are between two and four times more likely to have diabetes 
than non-Indigenous Australians.  They are also eight times more likely to die 
from this illness. 
• The trachoma being suffered by Aboriginal children in central Australia gives 
our nation the dubious distinction of being the only developed country in the 
world that has yet to eradicate this disease. 
• Aboriginal babies are two and a half times more likely to die before the age of 
one than non-Indigenous babies. 
• Aboriginal babies are twice as likely to have a low birth weight – a condition 
that places major hurdles in front of these children for the rest of their lives. 
• Deaths from respiratory conditions are four times, circulatory conditions three 
times and rheumatic heart disease 20 times higher for Indigenous Australians. 
• Chronic heart disease rates are three times and chronic kidney disease nine times 
higher for Indigenous Australians. 
• Aboriginal women are four times more likely to be infected by AIDS than non-
Indigenous women. 
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(As at 14.5.09: https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/antar-news/2006-09/thrd1.html). 
Furthermore, Indigenous people in Australia, on average, fare worse than Indigenous 
people in Canada and Aotearoa/New Zealand. (See, for example, as at 14.5.09: 
https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/antar-news/2006-03/msg00027.html). 
 
The health and economic deprivations are only two of the ways in which Indigenous 
peoples in Australia are disadvantaged. A more extensive list can be found in Cronin, 
Darryl, “Indigenous Disadvantage, Indigenous Governance and the Notion of a Treaty 
in Australia: An Indigenous Perspective” in McGlade, Hannah, ed., Treaty: Let’s Get It 
Right! A Collection of Essays from ATSIC’s Treaty Think Tank and Authors 
Commissioned by AIATSIS on Treaty Issues (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2003), 
151-165, 200-216, pp. 151-154. 
14 Cronin, “Indigenous”, p. 154, rightly points out the concern of Indigenous people that 
‘Indigenous peoples are categorised [by the Australian governments] as disadvantaged 
Australians rather than as distinct political communities with rights and 
responsibilities.’ 
15 Maclean, Iain S., “Truth and Reconciliation: Hope for the Nations or Only as Much 
as is Possible?” in Maclean, Iain S., ed., Reconciliation, Nations and Churches in Latin 
America (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 3-39, pp. 7-11. 
16 Guider, Margaret Eletta “Reinventing Life and Hope: Coming to Terms with Truth 
and Reconciliation Brazilian Style” in Maclean, Iain S., ed., Reconciliation, Nations and 
Churches in Latin America (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 111-131; Minow, Martha, 
“Innovating Responses to the Past: Human Rights Institutions”, in Nigel Biggar (ed.), 
Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2001), pp. 87-100, p. 93;  
17 Aguila, Mario I., “The Mesa di Diálogo and the Fate of the Disappeared in Chile 
1999-2000: National Forgiveness Without Political Truth?” in Maclean, Iain S., ed., 
Reconciliation, Nations and Churches in Latin America (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 41-
55; Battle, “Truth”; and de Brito, Alexandra Barahona, “Passion, Constraint, Law and 
Fortuna: The Human Rights Challenge to Chilean Democracy”, in Nigel Biggar (ed.), 
Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2001), pp. 150-183. See also Cavanaugh, William T., 
Torture and Eucharist (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), for a deep analysis of the churches 
involvement in national life during the Pinochet years. 
18 Tombs, David and Liechty, Joseph, eds., Explorations in Reconciliation: New 
Directions in Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) 
19 Greider, Brett, “The Maya ‘Greening Road’ and Reconciliation: The Pan-Maya 
Movement in Guatemala” in Maclean, Iain S., ed., Reconciliation, Nations and 
Churches in Latin America (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 85-109; Sieder, Rachel. “War, 
Peace, and the Politics of Memory in Guatemala”, in Nigel Biggar (ed.), Burying the 
Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict (Washington: Georgetown 
University Press, 2001), pp. 184-206; Tombs, David, “Unspeakable Violence: The UN 
Truth Commissions in El Salvador and Guatemala” in Maclean, Iain S., ed., 
Reconciliation, Nations and Churches in Latin America (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 57-
83 
20 The descriptions of these commissions is particularly indebted to two excellent 
collections of essays: Biggar, Nigel, ed., Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing 
Justice after Civil Conflict (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2001); and 
Maclean, Iain S., ed., Reconciliation, Nations and Churches in Latin America 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 
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21 Hastings, Adrian, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and 
Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), is interesting on the 
recent rise of the nation state as a political concept. 
22 Tutu, Desmond, No Future Without Forgiveness (London: Rider, 1999), p. 26. 
23 E.g. in Brazil, Uruguay, Guatemala, the Philippines, Poland, Hungary, Chile 
Nicaragua and El Salvador (see Zalaquett, José, “Balancing Ethical Imperatives and 
Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human 
Rights Violations”, Hastings Law Journal 43/6 (1992), 1425-1438, pp. 1426, 1429). 
24 See, e.g., Maclean, “Truth”, pp. 29-31; van Zyl, Paul, “Justice Without Punishment: 
Guaranteeing Human Rights in Transitional Societies” in Villa-Vicencio, Charles and 
Verwoerd, Wilhelm, ed.,  Looking Back Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (Cape Town: University of Cape Town 
Press 2000), pp.  42-57, p. 46. Vandeginste makes interesting observations about the 
attempt to do this in Rwanda (“Rwanda”, pp. 261-269). The role of the law in 
perpetuating injustice in Australia will be examined in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
25 van Zyl, “Justice”, p. 46. 
26 Even so, a largely judicial approach has been taken Rwanda (Vandeginste, Stef, 
“Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in the Context of 
Armed Conflict and Failed Political Transition”, in Nigel Biggar (ed.), Burying the 
Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict (Washington: Georgetown 
University Press, 2001), pp. 223-253, p. 251). For the more general point, see Maclean, 
“Truth”, pp. 30f. 
27 Maclean, “Truth”, p. 31. 
28 Examples include ubuntu in South Africa (Maclean, “Truth”, p. 36.), and gacaca in 
Rwanda (Vandeginste, “Rwanda”, pp. 269-276), although such ideas might not scale up 
to situations of mass mutual genocide (Vandeginste, “Rwanda”). 
29 Cavanaugh argues that torture in Chile destroyed the social body, creating a nation of 
individuals who related directly with the State. Aldunate, (Aldunate, José, “The 
Christian Ministry of Reconciliation in Chile” in Baum, Gregory and Wells, Harold, 
eds., The Reconciliation of the Peoples: Challenge to the Churches (Geneva: WCC 
Publications, 1997), 56-66), p. 64 concurs: ‘Torture created fear and intimidation. One 
did not talk about it. First it created an atmosphere of silence, then of acquiescence.’ 
There was a technological approach to torture, which did not harm the surface of the 
body, so people could not tell that torture had happened. Amongst other things, this 
meant that there were no martyrs, killing the eschatological imagination of the church 
(Cavanaugh, Torture, pp. 63-68). Torture and murder created the illusion of a dangerous 
opposition to the military regime and the security of the country (Cavanaugh, Torture, 
p. 93). 
30 Aguilar, “The Mesa”, pp. 45, 50. 
31 Battle, Michael, “Truth and Reconciliation: From Chile to South Africa” in Maclean, 
Iain S., ed., Reconciliation, Nations and Churches in Latin America (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2006), 207-224, p. 211. 
32 Stanley, Ruth, “Modes of Transition v. Electoral Dynamics: Democratic Control of 
the Military in Argentina and Chile”, Journal of Third World Studies 18/2 (Fall 2001), 
71-91, who got her information from Inforyne de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y 
Reconciliación (Santiago: Corporación Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, 1996), 2 
vols, vol. I Pt. 2, Statistical Annexe, Tables I and 7, p. 945, p. 947. 
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35 El Mercurio, international edition, 28th February-6th March 1991, from footnote 19 
of Stanley, “Modes”. 
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Decolonization as Project or Beyond the Paradigm of War” in Maclean, Iain S., ed., 
Reconciliation, Nations and Churches in Latin America (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 
225-245, p. 240: ‘But what we have learnt is that oftentimes these nations themselves 
are premised on colonial premises that reproduce anti-black and anti-indigenous racism, 
along [with] other forms of evil … Thus, true reconciliation can hardly be achieved by 
nationalization alone. Decolonization, not nationalization, imposes itself as the ultimate 
horizon for reconciliation.’ And Aldunate, “The Christian”, p. 57: ‘Clearly the causes of 
the hostility and violence unleashed during the recent years [during the Pinochet regime 
in Chile] are very old. They have their roots in the Conquest and the domination of the 
continent by Spain and Portugal: the usurpation of sovereignty, of the lands and liberty 
of the indigenous peoples; exploitation and genocide; a legacy of misery and poverty. 
Over the years the distance separating the rich and the poor has grow, producing tension 
and violence.’ Cf. Villa-Vicencio, “Getting”, p. 199. 
88 Greider, “The Maya”, p. 85. 
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89 This was the general impression that I got when I visited many people during 2005, 
and is also confirmed by the research reported in 2000 in Newspoll, Saulwick & Muller 
and Hugh Mackay, “Public Opinion on Reconciliation” in Grattan, Michelle, Essays on 
Australian Reconciliation (Melbourne: Black Inc, 2000), 33-52. For example, Saulwick 
and Muller conducted fourteen focus group discussions throughout Australia from 
7.12.99 to13.1.00, and twenty-three in-depth interviews with leading citizens in high 
contact areas on behalf of the Council for Reconciliation. A summary of the main 
findings of focus groups is that there was little overt prejudice against Aboriginal or 
other minority groups on basis of race alone. There was a lack of understanding of the 
lives, beliefs and attitudes of the minority groups, but there was an egalitarian ideal that 
there should be one nation. There was an inability of many to see that other people 
might have a fundamentally different view of life, or that they might want different 
things from the dominant culture. Many see what has happened to the First peoples as a 
tragedy: ‘There is widespread agreement that Aborigines were badly treated by early 
white settlers. Many people find it hard to face up to this. Some, particularly those who 
are defensive on this point, argue that there was bad behaviour on both sides – that both 
settlers and Aborigines behaved badly towards each other. There are few who are 
inclined to see one side as the invaders and the others as the invaded. Nor are there 
many who wish to accept any responsibility for what happened in what most see as far-
off days’ (p. 37). People look at things that happened in the past and say things were 
sometimes done in ignorance, or with the best intentions, or that they sometimes did 
some good. There was strong feeling that what was done in the past cannot judged by 
today’s standards (p.37).  People felt that they were  not personally involved, and so 
could not take responsibility (p. 37f). There was a disinclination to look at it from the 
point of view of the disinherited, and little understanding of the psychological effects of 
undermining a culture by the dominant culture. There was little tolerance of aberrant 
behaviour that might have arisen from their experience (p. 38). People argued that there 
are few real First people left, which they define as more than 50% Aboriginal, living in 
a tribal and usually remote environment (p. 38f). There was resentment towards those 
who have lived on welfare: they don’t help themselves; they get special privileges, and 
people are choosing to call themselves Aboriginal and are thus abusing the system (p. 
39). It was perceived that First people were getting better treatment, and this offended 
the egalitarian ethic (p. 39). Demands by First peoples for land caused concern: they 
were worried that their tenure might be disturbed; and that Indigenous peoples will 
negotiate land rights in order to get royalties from mining (p. 39). Many said that there 
should be no apology, and no continuation of special help to First peoples. Three 
reasons were given as to why there should be no apology: (1) we did not do it; (2) the 
past was past and reconciliation is about now and future; and (3) an apology may lead to 
further substantial claims for compensation in the future (p. 40). This was the majority 
view, but not universally held (p. 40). The responses to the draft reconciliation 
document wide-ranging: some liked sentiments, others feared that it is divisive or 
biased towards Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders; and some worried about further 
land claims (p. 40).  People had given little thought about reconciliation, and only a few 
knew anything about the process or the Council (p. 40). 
 
Despite this, Henry Reynolds found a positive response from people throughout 
Australia for his lecture tours. He writes (“A Crossroads of Conscience” in Grattan, 
Michelle, Essays on Australian Reconciliation (Melbourne: Black Inc, 2000), 53-59, p. 
54): 
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In the last 18 months I have spoken to many audiences all over Australia. From 
as far south as Hobart to as far north as Darwin, and in South Australia and all 
the other states except Western Australia. Almost everywhere I have been, no 
matter how large or small the community, whether the meeting was at lunchtime 
or at night, on almost every occasion I was impressed by the size of the 
audience. But there was something else about the audiences and that was their 
deep concern, their intensity, their obvious concentration on the subject, their 
clear sense that this was an important thing they were involved in. The 
significant thing is that the reconciliation process has spread widely right across 
Australia. It is no longer just a movement of educated middle-class people. It is 
no longer just an urban movement. There are reconciliation groups all over the 
country. 
90 Hansard of the Senate for 22.6.06, p. 92. 
91 Curthoys, Ann, “Mythologies” in Nile, Richard, ed., The Australian Legend and Its 
Discontents (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2000), pp. 13, 37, quoted in 
McKenna, Mark, Looking for Blackfellas’ Point: An Australian History of Place 
(Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), p. 135. 
92 McKenna, Looking, p. 135. 
93 McKenna, Looking, p. 144. 
94 Private communication. 
95 The obvious exception to this is the infamous ‘Black War’ (1824-1931) and the 
‘Black Line’ (1830) in Tasmania (see, e.g., Boyce, James, “ ‘What Business Have You 
Here?’” in Perkins, Rachel and Langton, Marcia, First Australians: An Illustrated 
History (Carlton: The Miegunyah Press, 2008), 62-113; Reynolds, Henry, Fate of a 
Free People (Ringwood: Penguin, 2004, 2nd edn.)). This interpretation of the events in 
Tasmania is fiercely contested by Windschuttle, Keith, The Fabrication of Aboriginal 
History. Volume 1. Van Diemen’s Land 1803-1847 (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2002). 
96 Reynolds, Henry, Why Weren’t We Told?: A Personal Search for the Truth About 
Our History (Ringwood: Viking, 1999). In only one case, the massacre at Myall Creek, 
were the non-Indigenous offenders charged and punished (see further below). 
97 See, e.g., the study of the death of a man on Palm Island (Hooper, Chloe, Tall Man: 
Death and Life on Palm Island (Jonathan Cape Ltd, 2009)). 
98 See Section 5.2 for a discussion of the relationships between Aboriginal people and 
the land. 
99 The full title of the report is: Bringing Them Home: National Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families. A 
significant part of the report is the record of the experiences of many Aboriginal people. 
As at 2.12.09, the full text of the report can be found on 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/bth_report/index.html. See also Doris 
Pilkington, Rabbit-Proof Fence: The True Story of One of the Greatest Escapes of All 
Time (Miramax Books, 2002), and the film Rabbit-Proof Fence. This report, and 
subsequent political developments, will be discussed further in Section 3.2. 
100Rose, Deborah, Dingo Makes Us Human: Live and Land in an Aboriginal Australian 
Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 191. 
101 This is a foundational question for Miroslav Volf’s work, Exclusion and Embrace: A 
Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1996). He writes of how, having given a lecture on the theology of 
reconciliation, using the metaphor of embrace, he was asked by Jürgen Moltmann if he, 
as a Croat, could embrace a Serb, when the Serbs had been ‘herding people into 
concentration camps, raping women, burning down churches, and destroying cities’ (p. 
   57 
                                                 
9). The book, he writes, ‘is the product of the struggle between the truth of my argument 
and the force of Moltmann’s objection’ (p. 9). 
102 The detrimental legacy of this runs deep in Australian culture and the non-
Indigenous Australian corporate psyche. For example, many of the people who were 
transported to Australia were imprisoned because of petty offences such as stealing 
bread. The prison regime in Australia was harsh, with severe punishment of prisoners. 
This sowed the seeds of distrust of police and other authority figures in Australia, which 
has been fed by police often being responsible for the hunting down and murder of 
groups of First people and individuals, sometimes using other First people as trackers, 
so that today there is a deep distrust of the police by First peoples. It would also be 
interesting to investigate the relationship between this history and the strong emphasis 
on penal substitution in Sydney Anglican theology, and, more generally, of the 
approach to law in non-Indigenous Australian society. 
103 See the earlier footnote at the beginning of the chapter. 
104 Broome, Richard, Aboriginal Australians: Black Responses to White Dominance, 
1788-2001 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002, 3rd edition), pp. 30f. 
105 Brennan et al, Treaty, pp. 4f. Belgrave, Michael and Kawharu, Merata and Williams, 
David, eds., Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Bennion, Tom, “New Zealand: Indigenous Land 
Claims and Settlements” in Keon-Cohen, Bryan, ed., Native Title in the New 
Millennium (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2001), 367-376; and Kawharu, 
Waitangi show how the Waitangi treaty has been important for Maoris in New Zealand. 
106 See, e.g., Bartlett, Richard, “Canada: Indigenous Land Claims and Settlements” in 
Keon-Cohen, Bryan, ed., Native Title in the New Millennium (Canberra: Aboriginal 
Studies Press, 2001), 355-366; Bartlett, Richard, Native Title in Australia (Sydney: 
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004, 2nd edition), pp. 3-9; Bennion, “New Zealand: 
Indigenous Land Claims and Settlements”; Chartrand, Paul, (An Interview with), 
“Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: Aspirations for Distributive Justice as Distinct Peoples” 
in Havemann, Paul, ed., Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1999), 88-107; de Costa, Ravi, “Treaties 
in British Columbia: Comprehensive Agreement Making in a Democratic Context” in 
Langton, Marcia; Tehan, Maureen; Palmer, Lisa; and Shain, Kathryn, eds., Honour 
Among Nations?: Treaties and Agreements with Indigenous People (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2004), 133-146; Dorsett et. al., A Guide; Havemann, 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights; Morse, “Indigenous”; Tehan Maureen, “The Shadow of the 
Law and the British Columbia Treaty Process: ‘[Can] the unthinkable become common 
place?’” in Langton, Marcia; Tehan, Maureen; Palmer, Lisa; and Shain, Kathryn, eds., 
Honour Among Nations?: Treaties and Agreements with Indigenous People 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004), 147-162; and Williams, Joe, “Treaty 
Making in New Zealand/Te Hanga Tiriti ki Aotearoa” in Langton, Marcia; Tehan, 
Maureen; Palmer, Lisa; and Shain, Kathryn, eds., Honour Among Nations?: Treaties 
and Agreements with Indigenous People (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2004), 163-170.  Legal precedents from non-Indigenous law have also been important 
in shaping non-Indigenous legal judgements in Australia (see e.g. Pearson, Noel, “Land 
is Susceptible of Ownership” in Langton, Marcia; Tehan, Maureen; Palmer, Lisa; and 
Shain, Kathryn, eds., Honour Among Nations?: Treaties and Agreements with 
Indigenous People (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004), 83-100, pp. 89ff). 
107 When the English first came to live in Australia, they just came and stayed. It was 
only in a later legal case, Cooper vs Stuart, in 1889, that the Privy Council had to 
explicitly state the basis of the establishment of the legal system in Australia. Cooper vs 
Stuart was nothing to do with Indigenous land rights, but it had lasting consequences on 
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the legal system in Australia, and land tenure in particular. In order to make their 
judgement, the Privy Council had to establish the legal foundation of the colony. 
European ‘international law’ allowed colonisation under three circumstances, with 
differing legal consequences: conquest; the land being ceding to the incomers; and 
taking over an empty land. The court decision in Cooper vs Stuart (made in 1889) 
described New South Wales in 1788 as ‘practically unoccupied without settled 
inhabitants’, and so the occupation was regarded as the settlement of an empty land. Of 
course, by the time that the question was considered under English law, it was obvious 
that this was patently false (unless one considered the First peoples as not being human 
enough to be considered), even though it may have been thought to have been true 
before the First Fleet set sail (due to erroneous evidence from Banks, amongst others, as 
discussed in the endnote above). This (false and fictional) legal assertion allowed them 
to assert that common law was applicable in Australia, and that the feudal system of 
land tenure, where all tenure was derived from the Crown, so that no-one could hold 
title to land unless it could be traced back to a grant from the Crown, held sway. (This 
information was gleaned from the website (15.3.10): 
http://www.mabonativetitle.com/info/cooperVsStuart.htm and discussions with Pat 
McIntyre. I remain responsible for any errors in interpretation.) 
 
In the past two or three decades, the term terra nullius has entered the legal discourse 
and debate about land in Australia, as a shorthand name for the legal basis of the 
founding of the colonies in Australia. This term has been avoided in this thesis because 
acrimonious debates about the use of this term (e.g. Connor, Michael, The Invention of 
Terra Nullius: Historical and Legal Fictions on the Foundation of Australia (Sydney: 
Macleay Press, 2005)) have obfuscated the real point at issue, namely the basis, nature 
and content of non-Indigenous law in Australia, and its relationship to Indigenous 
systems of law. Instead, this thesis will speak of the foundational sin of failing to 
recognise Indigenous systems of law, along with their notions of sovereignty and land 
ownership. 
108 Broome, Aboriginal, p. 31, writes, 
[s]o it was that while the Indians of North America or the Maoris of New 
Zealand, who built villages, tilled the soil and had chiefs were offered treaties 
and some recognition of rights by the British, the Aborigines were not given any 
of these rights. This fact of dispossession was the crux of the future race 
relations problems in Australia, for it meant that injustice was sanctioned by the 
state and there could be little possibility of any fruitful human relations being 
formed with the Aborigines. 
Legally, the First peoples of Australia found themselves in a related, but importantly 
different position from these other nations. For example, in the United States of 
America, the Indigeneous peoples were regarded as ‘domestic dependent nations’ 
(Milirrpum and Others v. Nabalco Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth of Australia (1971) 
17 Federal Law Reports, 141, 215; Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 135, 
164 (Dawson J)), and the legal history of land in New Zealand has been governed by the 
Waitangi treaty (Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 137 (Dawson J)). 
109 Lederach, John Paul, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 78. 
110 Writing of establishing peace in an armed conflict, Lederach, Building, p. 75, says, 
‘[c]risis response tends to involve specific projects with short-term, measurable 
outcomes. In the interests of transforming the conflict, however, short-term efforts must 
be measured primarily by their long-term implications. For example, while achieving a 
cease-fire is an immediate necessity, this goal must not be mistaken for, or replace, the 
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broader framework of peacebuilding activity. Rather, a sustainable transformative 
approach suggests that the key lies in the relationship of the involved parties, with all 
that term encompasses at the psychological, spiritual, social, economic, political, and 
military levels.’ 
111 For example, Pat McIntyre alerted me to this being expressed in interviews with 
people on Elcho Island about the Federal Government Intervention in the Northern 
Territory (ABC 7.30 Report, 18th July, 2007, available on 15.3.10 at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s1981967.htm). Horner, Seeking, p. 155, in the 
context of his work with Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people over the decades, 
reflected that there ‘had been many decades, indeed generations, of oppression by 
whites on and off the Aboriginal reserves. Out of loyalty to their families and for self-
respect, some Aboriginal and Islander people could never feel comfortable working 
with white people, however considerate they might be. It was a truth not to be 
dismissed, a legacy of past and present violence.’ 
112 I spent six weeks in May and June 2005 travelling around Australia (mainly Sydney, 
Canberra, Brisbane and Darwin, and some travelling through rural areas, from Canberra 
to Narrandera, and driving from Sydney to Brisbane), talking with people about the 
reconciliation process in Australia. The main people that I visited are listed in the 
Acknowledgements. 
113 Unless otherwise stated, the photographs in this thesis were taken by myself, in 
2005. 
114 For example, McKenna, Looking, pp. 206f, describes how this has affected the 
visibility of First peoples in the Bega and Eden area, and the effect that this has had on 
the Subsequent peoples:  
 
Mabo [a legal judgement which recognised Indigenous ownership of land in 
Common Law for the first time, which is first discussed in this thesis in Section 
5.3.5] had vindicated the long-held belief of Aboriginal people that they had a 
right to their land. Legally, morally, and historically, it provided institutional 
recognition of native title and supported the integrity and validity of Aboriginal 
culture. Land councils in Bega and Eden gave the Aboriginal community an 
official status, and served as a source of positive information. After Mabo, 
Aboriginal people were seen more often in the local media. They were 
photographed at local schools, or seen helping out in various community 
projects. Mabo also helped to give them a platform from which they could 
explain their political campaign. By the end of the Hawke-Keating Labor 
government in 1996, a series of events had combined to create the perception 
that reconciliation was a pressing political and social issue – the political 
controversy surround the Bicentenary in 1988, the High Court’s Mabo decision 
in 1992, and its Wik  [see Section 5.3.7] decision, handed down nine months 
after the election of the Howard Government in 1996, and a succession of 
inquiries and reports such as the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody in 1991. Together, these events demonstrated that there was a history to 
reconcile, and helped to create a sense of moral crisis surrounding relations 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians. 
115 Clark, Geoff, “Not Much Progress” in Grattan, Michelle, Essays on Australian 
Reconciliation (Melbourne: Black Inc, 2000), 228-234, p. 230; “The Formal Australian 
Reconciliation Process: 1991-2000”, Paper prepared for the National Reconciliation 
Planning Workshop, Old Parliament House, Canberra, 30-31 May, 2005, available on 
web page (as at June 2005): 
www.reconciliationaustralia.org/docs/planning_workshop/background/andrew_gunston
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e_paper.pdf., p. 4 and n. 40; Wells, Pera, “Does Australia Have a Human Rights 
Diplomacy?” in Grattan, Michelle, Essays on Australian Reconciliation (Melbourne: 
Black Inc, 2000), 210-216, p. 212. 
116 Lattas, (Lattas, Andrew, “Aborigines and Contemporary Australian Nationalism: 
Primordiality and the Cultural Politics of Otherness”, Social Analysis 27 (1990), 50-69), 
p. 60, writes that the ‘Bicentenary has been ideologically construed as a time of 
reconciliation, for incorporating the otherness of Aborigines. Through this incorporated 
otherness, White institutions and ideologies discover their universality. The Other offers 
a space of unity and identity to the nation as a whole.’ 
117 Published in the Canberra Times. Used with Geoff Pryor’s permission. 
118 Tickner, Robert, Taking a Stand: Land Rights to Reconciliation (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 2001), “Taking”, p. 34. 
119 Recall the comments of Senator Tchen and the subsequent discussion above. 
120 “Object”, Paragraph 5 of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991.  
121 Paragraph 6 (1) (b) of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991. 
122 Paragraphs 6 (1) (g), (h), of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991. 
123 One of the outputs from the Council was some very good ‘Learning Circle’ material, 
where groups of people would come together to work on the material with at least one 
Indigenous person in the group. This was a transforming experience for those who took 
part. 
124 Foley, Charmaine, and Watson, Ian, A People’s Movement: Reconciliation in 
Queensland (Southport: Keeaira Press, 2001), p. 41. Foley’s account of how the decade 
was on the ground makes good reading. 
125 See Chapter 5. 
126 Gunstone, “The Formal”, pp. 4ff.  
127 Pat McIntyre, personal communication. 
128 Some of the explanatory boards had been defaced with spray paint, but this seemed 
more like random vandalism rather than an attack on the art work itself. 
129 Further information about this walk can be found in Hinkson et al, Aboriginal, pp. 
126-8. 
130 The list comes from Hinkson et al, Aboriginal, p. 128. 
131 Each of the plates included the words “We remember them”, linking into the debate 
about why Gallipolli is remembered, but not the Aboriginal wars. 
132 Johnson, Dianne, Lighting the Way: Reconciliation Stories (Sydney: The Federation 
Press, 2002), chapter 9, “Remembering Myall Creek” for an account of the development 
of the memorial, and Myall Creek Memorial Committee, The Myall Creek Massacre: 
Its History, Its Memorial and the Opening Ceremony, Pamphlet produced by the Myall 
Creek Memorial Committee, Bingara, New South Wales, 2001.  
133 I attended the one held in June, 2005. 
134 These two photographs are © 2005 Catherine de Lorenzo, who has kindly given her 
permission for them to be reproduced here. 
135 This was suggested to me by John Brown, in a private communication. 
136 The leaflet is called “Reconciliation Place: A Lasting Symbol of our Shared Journey 
– An Australian Government Project”, and I found it in the offices of Reconciliation 
Australia in Old Parliament House. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any more 
publication details. 
137 The inscription reads: 
 
“THEY TOOK OUR CHILDREN AWAY” 
For 150 years until the 1970s, many thousands of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander children were removed from their families, with the authorisation of 
   61 
                                                 
Australian governments, to be raised in institutions, or fostered or adopted by 
non-indigenous families. Some were given up by parents seeking a better life for 
their children. Many were forcibly removed and see themselves as “the stolen 
generations”. 
 
Many of these children experienced overwhelming grief, and the loss of 
childhood and innocence, family and family relationships, identity, language and 
culture, country and spirituality. 
 
Their elders, parents and communities have experienced fear and trauma, 
emptiness, disempowerment, endless grieving, shame and failure. 
 
Most who looked after the removed children believed they were offering them a 
better future, and did all they could to provide loving care. Some abused and 
exploited the children. 
 
This place honours the people who have suffered under these policies and 
practices. It also honours those indigenous and non-indigenous people whose 
genuine care softened the tragic impact of what we now recognise as cruel and 
misguided policies. 
 
In 1937 the first Commonwealth-State Native Welfare Conference, affirming the 
policies of previous decades, resolved that “the destiny of the natives of 
Aboriginal origin, but not of full blood, lies in their ultimate absorption by the 
people of the Commonwealth, and it therefore recommends that all effort be 
directed toward that end.” 
 
“Are we going to have a population of one million blacks or are we going to 
merge them with our white community and eventually forget that there were 
Aborigines?” A O Neville, Chief Protector of Aborigines, speaking at the 
conference in 1937. 
 
“I would not hesitate for one moment to separate any half-caste child from the 
Aboriginal mother no matter how frantic her momentary grief might be at the 
time. They soon forget their offspring.” James Isdell, Travelling Protector, 
Western Australia, 1909. 
 
The National Enquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Children From Their Families (known as the Bringing Them Home 
report) recommended in 1997 that reparation, including acknowledgement and 
apology, be made to all who suffered because of forcible removal policies. Its 
recommendations are directed to all Australian governments, the churches, and 
others involved in those policies. 
 
On 26 August 1999, both Houses of Parliament endorsed the Australian 
Government’s Motion of Reconciliation. Through the motion, the national 
parliament, 
 
– expressed its deep and sincere regret that Indigenous Australians suffered 
injustice under the practices of past generations, and for the hurt and trauma that 
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many indigenous people continue to feel as a consequence of these practices, 
and 
– reaffirmed a whole-hearted commitment to the cause of reconciliation between 
indigenous and non-indigenous Australians as an important national priority for 
all Australians. 
 
“The impacts of the removal policies continue to resound through the 
generations of indigenous families. The overwhelming evidence is that the 
impact does not stop with the children removed. It is inherited by their own 
children in complex and sometimes heightened ways.” Bringing Them Home 
report, 1997. 
138 See de Lorenzo, Catherine, “Remembering: Aboriginality, Public Art and Urban 
Design”, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Art 2 (2000), 130-145; and de 
Lorenzo, Catherine, “Confronting Amnesia: Aboriginality and Public Space”, Visual 
Studies 20/2 (October 2005), 107-123 for a further discussion of public art in Australia. 
139 For a further discussion of the National Day of Healing, see Section 3.2. 
140 Due to Aboriginal cultural sensitivity concerning the photographing and naming of 
people who have died, I have refrained from including the performers in the 
photograph. 
141 The 2006 season of the Australian Ballet included a production of “Gathering”, a 
collaboration between the Australian Ballet and the Bangarra Dance Theatre, an 
Indigenous dance company. The erasure of First peoples seems to unconsciously assert 
itself, as displayed in the poster, even when other events seemingly engage with them.  
142 The relationship of First peoples to the land is discussed further in Section 5.1. 
143 Tom Wright argues that interpreting the Bible is like completing the fifth Act of a 
Shakespearean play that was left incomplete, with only four Acts having been written. 
Quoting Tom Wright, Rowland and Roberts argue that the hermeneutical task ‘is to 
discover, through the Spirit and prayer, the appropriate ways of improvising the script 
between the foundation events and charter on the one hand and the complete coming of 
the kingdom on the other’ (Wright, N.T., Scripture and the Authority of God (London: 
SPCK, 2005), pp. 91f, quoted in Rowland, Christopher and Roberts, Jonathan, The 
Bible for Sinners: Interpretation in the Present Time (London: SPCK, 2008), p. 7). 
Rowland and Roberts emphasise that interpreting the Bible in this way is a collaborative 
process, which pays attention to the readings of people who are marginalised. There are 
some who argue that Paul was inherently hegemonic in his writing (e.g. Shaw, Graham, 
The Cost of Authority: Manipulation and Freedom in the New Testament (London: 
SCM, 1983); and Castelli, Elizabeth A., Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power 
(Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), or that he has suppressed the freedom 
of the Spirit, and so his writings must be read against the grain (e.g. Wire, Antoinette 
Clark, The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction Through Paul’s Rhetoric 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990). Wire is right in arguing that Paul was just one 
competing voice in the early years of ‘followers of the Way’, but it must not be 
forgotten, as will be seen in Chapter 2, that his interpretation of the way of the cross 
was marginalised within a church politics founded on the politics of the Roman Empire. 
Recognising that it is impossible to ever determine the authorial intention, one can 
nevertheless try to distinguish between the effects of the canonisation of what Paul 
wrote and its subsequent reception history, and how Paul might have been read in the 
much more fluid and uncertain early years of the followers of Jesus (such as the 
insightful readings of Kathy Ehrensperger in her Paul and the Dynamics of Power: 
Communication and Interaction in the Early Christ-Movement (London: T&T Clark, 
2009)). Although the genre of a thesis has certain limits on the type of collaboration 
   63 
                                                 
allowed, and so it may not be able to properly fulfil the requirements posed by Rowland 
and Roberts for a truly collaborative reading, it is hoped that, through extensive 
engagement with the literature, and in discussions with people, this thesis has been 
sufficiently attentive to the biblical text and to the contemporary context to provide a 
sufficiently nuanced reading of the text to enable a truly liberative ‘fifth Act’ to be 
performed, a reading that is in accordance with the good news in Jesus. 
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2 Reconciliation in the Corinthian Correspondence 
 
This chapter and the next lay some theological foundations of the concept of 
reconciliation. The theological investigations begin with the writings of Paul in the New 
Testament, and this chapter will focus on the use of reconciliation in Paul, particularly 
his first uses of the term in his correspondence with the Corinthian Christians.1 
 
The word ‘reconciliation’ in English is derived from Latin,2 but Paul wrote in Greek. 
The focus in this chapter will be on Paul’s use of the words καταλλαγή 
(‘reconciliation’ – Rom. 5.11; 11.15; 2 Cor. 5.18, 19) and its related verb καταλλάσσω 
(‘to reconcile’ – twice in Rom. 5.10; 1 Cor. 7.11; 2 Cor. 5.18, 19, 20), which were used 
in contemporaneous political discourse. Paul is the only New Testament author to use 
these words.3 
 
Although focusing on Paul’s use of these words, this chapter is not a word study, but 
instead investigates how these words arise from, and are used within the context of 
Paul’s whole argument in the Corinthian correspondence. The task of this chapter is 
different from those who want to argue that ‘reconciliation’, or indeed any other idea, is 
the overarching concept in Paul’s teaching.4 Rather, the task is to see what can be 
gained by focusing on this one metaphor from Paul’s rich network of metaphors.5 
 
Standard dictionaries note that the words καταλλαγή and καταλλάσσω are 
compounds of  ἀλλάσσω, which means to alter, or to exchange. In turn, ἀλλάσσω is 
based on ἀλλος meaning ‘other’. From the time of Herodotus, the usage of ἀλλάσσω 
moved from meaning ‘to change’ or ‘to exchange’, to meaning ‘to reconcile’. The 
prefix κατα in καταλλάσσω is understood as having no effect on the meaning,6 and so 
the compound καταλλάσσω ‘generally denotes in classical Greek the restoration of the 
original understanding between people after hostility or displeasure (Xen., Anab. 1, 6; 
Eur., Helena 1235; Aristotle, Oeconomica 1348b, 9).’7 ‘It was used figuratively for the 
‘“exchange” of hostility, anger, or war for friendship, love, or peace; it thus designates 
reconciliation in the human or political realm.’8 The religious use of καταλλάσσω was 
rare in classical Greek literature, and it is not used of the relationship between God and 
his people in Jewish literature until 2 Macc. 1.4; 5.20; 7.33; 8.29. In fact, it appears that 
it was Paul’s use of the term which was the motivating factor for a radically increased 
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use of καταλλάσσω and its cognates in Greek literature, with these words appearing an 
‘inordinately larger’ number of times in the Church Fathers, especially John 
Chrysostom.9 Interestingly, Plutarch described Alexander the Great as ‘reconciler of 
everything,’ sent by God to unite humanity into a world state (Alex. Fort. i.329c).10 
 
There are a number of reasons why it is important to begin a theological investigation of 
reconciliation with Paul. Of the early Christian writers known today, not only was he 
the first Christian writer who used the word reconciliation, but he also introduced a 
number of important innovations from its use in Greek culture. Moreover, following 
Paul, there was a large increase in the usage of these words in the Greek literature that 
has survived until today.11 It will be seen that some of the Pauline insights into 
reconciliation are crucial for giving meaning to the disputed concept of reconciliation. 
 
Paul first introduced the word ‘reconciliation’ in his letters to the church in Corinth, 
when he was arguing for unity in a church riven with factions, where significant issues 
of church polity, and the wider polity of the Roman Empire, were at stake. Paul’s 
disagreement with the people in Corinth was, in part, about the centrality of unity and of 
reconciliation in church politics. That is, part of the argument that was dividing the 
people was about the importance of unity and reconciliation itself. There are obvious 
echoes here for contemporary debates about the nature and importance of reconciliation. 
 
Although the words καταλλαγή and καταλλάσσω come from political discourse, most 
contemporary readings consider that Paul has used them in an apolitical way, referring 
only to the relationship between an individual and God. However, it would seem odd 
for Paul to draw on a metaphor from political discourse, when he is addressing what he 
sees as significant problems in human relationships in the Corinthian church, only to 
drop all the political connotations of the term. On the contrary, this chapter will argue 
that Paul chooses this metaphor precisely because he wants to say some very important 
things about the nature of human conflicts, about how to resolve them, and God’s role 
in all of this; in short, God has made it possible for human beings to be reconciled to 
one another, and justice is established through the seeking of reconciliation.12 
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, the dominant, apolitical 
reading of reconciliation in Paul will be considered, and found inadequate. Paul’s 
concern in the Corinthian correspondence is not simply about the relationship between 
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individuals and God; there is much about human relationships in Corinth (inside and 
outside the church), and their inter-relationship with God. So the following section 
(Section 2.2) will consider three problems that Paul sees in Corinth: factionalism; the 
place of the patronage system in relationships in Corinth; and the deterioration of the 
relationship between the Corinthians and Paul himself. These do not exhaust the 
problems that Paul saw in Corinth, but they are sufficient for the argument of this 
chapter. Then the question of Paul’s source for both the terminology, and also for the 
idea of, reconciliation is addressed. It will be argued that it was possible that Paul drew 
on a number of different sources, but that a primary source was from contemporaneous 
political discourse (Section 2.3). The reason why this is important is that the way that 
Paul uses the terminology can then be compared with the standard paradigms of its use 
elsewhere, so demonstrating some of the innovative ways that Paul has used this 
terminology (Section 2.4), which then leads to some theological insights into the nature 
of reconciliation between human beings that will be foundational in this thesis (Section 
2.5). 
 
By focusing on the Corinthian correspondence, where Paul first introduces the idea of 
reconciliation into his writing, some key concepts concerning the nature of 
reconciliation can be established, before the metaphor is brought into relationship with 
some of Paul’s other metaphors. These other uses of reconciliation will find their place 
in later chapters of this thesis.13 
2.1 Apolitical Readings of Reconciliation in 2 Corinthians 
Exegetes from the time of Athanasius, Ambrose and Augustine have linked atonement 
and reconciliation, and seen 2 Cor. 5.18-21 as being about reconciliation with God 
being achieved through atonement,14 and it is common in biblical exegesis and 
systematic theology to treat καταλλαγή as an hyponym15 of atonement. 
 
A high-point of this type of exegesis comes from the pen of Ridderbos: 
 
The oldest Christian confession of reconciliation known to us is “Christ died for 
our sins in accordance with the scriptures” (1 Cor. 15.3). “In accordance with 
the scriptures” here refers to the Suffering Servant of the Lord in Isaiah 53. In 
other words, reconciliation (Versöhnung, katallagē) is effected only in the mode 
of expiation (Sühnung, hilasmos). These words originated in a cultic context and 
refer to the expiatory offering, the blood of which was to cover the sins of the 
people. This offering was to be performed by a priest before God on behalf of 
the people. All of the New Testament pictures Christ’s death as a sacrificial 
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offering to God performed in our place, an offering that covers and takes away 
the sin of the world, reconciling us with God and calling us to be reconciled with 
him.16 
 
For people who take this approach, 2 Cor. 5.18-21 is a piece of high theological 
doctrine, and it seems peculiar that it is inserted in the middle of what seems to be a 
more mundane defense of Paul’s ministry. Mead summarises the problems of this sort 
of exegesis well when he writes, 
 
[i]n earlier comments we have mentioned two of the most stubborn questions 
about our passage. (1) Why does a notable passage about God’s reconciling 
work in Christ appear suddenly in the midst of Paul’s long, highly personal 
vindication of his apostolic conduct? (2) Why does Paul say, “Be reconciled to 
God” to a congregation who are already Christians? A third troublesome 
question for interpreters has been (3) why would Paul shift, 6.3ff, from his 
exalted description of God’s gracious work back into a detailed defense of his 
conduct as an apostle?17 
 
This chapter will argue that this passage is not at all out of place. The Corinthians need 
to be reconciled to God because of the failures in their human relationships. Insight into 
the nature of reconciliation between human beings will be gained by looking carefully 
at Paul’s argument in the Corinthian correspondence, and how he uses the metaphor of 
reconciliation. 
 
2.2 Three Problems in Corinth 
Three relational problems – factionalism, the patronage system, and relationships with 
Paul – will be examined in this section. The importance of these examples will become 
clearer in Section 2.5, where they are used to help explicate Paul’s theology of 
reconciliation. 
2.2.1 Problem 1: Factionalism 
The problem of factionalism in the Corinthian church appears right at the beginning of 
Paul’s correspondence with them, straight after the opening greeting (1 Cor. 1.10). 
Factionalism was not just a problem in the church, but in Corinthian society, and so it 
should be no surprise that factionalism was present in the church too.18 
 
Both Welborn19 and Mitchell20 have established the similarity of 1 Corinthians to the 
political discourse of contemporaries of Paul concerning reconciliation.21 Mitchell is the 
more thoroughgoing of the two, arguing that the whole of 1 Corinthians is an example 
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of deliberative rhetoric,22 persuading the Christian community at Corinth to be 
reunified, whereas Welborn focuses on Chapters 1-4. Whilst she may overstate her case, 
the evidence that she gathers for her conclusion is valuable for the argument of this 
thesis, so a brief résumé of her argument will be given here, followed by a critique of 
her conclusions. 
 
The purpose of deliberative rhetoric is to convince people to take a particular action in 
the future. Aristotle said that deliberative letters try to dissuade people from doing 
something harmful, or to persuade them that something is advantageous or of interest 
(συμφέριν), or the good (τό ἀγαθόν). The appeal to τό συμφέρον occurs in 
deliberative speeches right into the Graeco-Roman period.23 There is general agreement 
in the rhetorical handbooks that examples (παραδείγματα) are the most suitable form 
of proof for deliberative speakers, for it is as the past is examined that the future can be 
divined and judged, a point which is born out by the speeches and letters themselves. 
Examples may be copying something advantageous or avoiding something perilous, 
historical or invented (e.g. body, household, ship, building, chariot, chorus, heavenly 
bodies, various species in animal kingdom such as birds, ants, bees, myths), and some 
are commonly used and expected in certain sorts of appeals. Finally, rhetorical 
handbooks say deliberative rhetoric is for such topics as religious ritual, legislation, the 
form of the constitution of alliances or treaties with other states, war, peace, and 
finance. Political questions, particularly war and peace, are in every such list down into 
the Graeco-Roman period. Alongside war and peace emerges the important related 
political topic of ὁμόνοια (‘concord’), or unity within the political body, and this is 
overwhelmingly confirmed by extant deliberative texts and those referred to but no 
longer available.24 In 1 Corinthians, Paul makes extensive arguments about what is 
good for the Corinthians,25 and he also uses many examples in making his argument 
about the importance of concord in the church.26 
 
In 1 Cor. 1.2, the singular ἐκκλησία, with the plurals ‘those sanctified’ and ‘saints’, 
already indicates the theme of unity. The dual form of identification – the church named 
as a singular body and then two references to a composite of individuals – is 
unparalleled in Paul’s extant letters.27 It is quite possible that the Corinthian church did 
not start out as a united entity, but as a number of disparate groups meeting in people’s 
houses. However, Mitchell is correct when she writes that, ‘Paul’s rhetorical stance 
throughout 1 Corinthians is to argue that Christian unity is the theological and 
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sociological expectation from which the Corinthians have fallen short, and to which 
they must return.’28 
 
After careful rhetorical analysis, Mitchell concludes that 1 Corinthians is ‘a single letter 
of unitary composition which contains a deliberative argument persuading the Christian 
community at Corinth to become reunified.’29 The prothesis (πρόθεσις) of the 
deliberative argument is 1 Cor. 1.10, which Mitchell translates as 
 
I urge you, brothers and sisters, through the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, to all 
say the same thing, and to let there not be factions (σχίσματα) among you, but 
to be reconciled (κατητισμένοι) in the same mind and in the same opinion.30 
 
There is a strong case for translating κατητισμένοι as ‘to be reconciled’, as Mitchell 
has done.31 The ἐπίλογος is 1 Cor. 15.58: 
 
Therefore, my beloved brothers, be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in 
the work of the Lord, knowing that in the Lord your labour is not in vain. 
 
The bulk of Mitchell’s book is spent in proving that, as an example of deliberative 
rhetoric, 1 Corinthians is concerned throughout with the subjects of factionalism and 
concord. Her argument is in two parts: Chapter III shows that there is a thematic unity 
in 1 Corinthians in that the entire letter is permeated with the vocabulary and topoi used 
in political rhetoric to discuss and combat factionalism;32 and Chapter IV makes a 
compositional analysis to show that 1 Corinthians is a unified letter urging concord.  
 
Others have seen chapters 1-4 of 1 Corinthians as being concerned with encouraging 
unity in a factionalised community, and some have even noticed the political nature of 
the language. For example, Welborn writes that ‘Paul does not seek to refute a 
“different gospel” (as in 2 Cor. 11.4), but exhorts the quarrelling Corinthians “to agree 
completely, … to be united in the same mind and the same judgment” (1 Cor. 1.10). It 
is a power struggle, not a theological controversy, that motivates the writing of 1 
Corinthians 1-4.’33 However, this is a bit simplistic, because, for Paul, bad politics is 
bad theology. Welborn notes that Calvin argued that the problem Paul saw in Corinth 
was partisanship, and that Paul exhorts the Corinthians to be united in the same mind 
and judgement (1 Cor. 1.10).34 Thiselton notes that in ‘the subapostolic age and in 
earlier patristic times it was often broadly assumed that the problem of discord and 
splits to which 1.10-12 alludes featured as the major issue which Paul felt called to 
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address.’35 However, Mitchell was the first person to make such a thoroughgoing 
analysis of Greek texts, and to argue that the whole letter was encouraging unity in a 
factionalised community. 
 
Mitchell’s rhetoric overstates the case: 1 Corinthians is more than simply a ‘coherent 
appeal for unity and cessation of factionalism.’36 Rather, it is an argument for the unity 
that arises from a proper comprehension (intellectual and life-style) of the gospel. That 
is, the problems in Corinth will not be solved simply by a reorganization of its 
ecclesiastical structures, even achieving unity, ‘but by placing the community as a 
whole under the criterion and identity of the cross of Christ. Here a reversal of value 
systems occurs (cf. 1 Cor. 1.26-31), and as recipients of the sheer gift of divine grace 
through the cross, all stand on the same footing (cf. 1 Cor. 4.7). … not ecclesiology but 
a reproclamation of grace and the cross to Christian believers takes center stage.’37 
 
When writing 2 Corinthians, the problem of factionalism still seems to be present, for 
Paul returns to this at the end of 2 Corinthians (see 12.20-13.14). There is therefore a 
literary inclusio in the canonical form of the Corinthian correspondence in that the key 
verb in the prothesis of 1 Corinthians (1.10) – κατηρτισμένοι – is found again in 2 Cor. 
13.9, 11, in noun and verbal form, which indicates that the problems of factions which 
caused Paul to write 1 Corinthians were still present when he wrote 2 Corinthians.38 
Georgi argues that, in Paul’s eyes, the vices listed in 2 Cor. 12.20f arise from the 
‘unrestrained competition’ in Corinth39: ‘In Paul’s opinion, the competition exposed the 
essentially faithless attitude of the Corinthians (and naturally also of the opponents).’40 
Georgi goes as far as suggesting that Paul could ‘be stating very bluntly that the 
Corinthians in reality never had become Jesus-believers.’41 
 
Furthermore, factionalism continued to be a problem in Corinth, even after the writing 
of 2 Corinthians. For example, in his letter to the Corinthian church about factionalism 
in Corinth his day, Clement refers explicitly to what Paul wrote in 1 Corinthians about 
factions (1 Clement 47.1-3), and he uses the terms and topoi from 1 Corinthians in his 
own appeal for the cessation of factionalism in Corinth.42 
2.2.2 Problem 2: The In‐Comers43 to Corinth and the Patronage System 
The second problem that Paul saw with the church in Corinth, that will be highlighted 
here, was its being enthralled to the patronage system. Whilst the focus of 1 Corinthians 
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is on relationships between the members of the church in Corinth, in 2 Corinthians the 
focus has shifted to the triangular relationship between the Corinthian Christians, Paul, 
and some people who have come to the church in Corinth from elsewhere, and have 
exerted significant influence on it.44 This does not mean that the in-comers were a new 
phenomenon, for, from 1 Corinthians 1-4, it is clear that some in-comers were already 
present when Paul wrote 1 Corinthians, and were possibly a catalyst of, or even a cause 
of some of the factionalism, as people grouped themselves around particular leaders.45 
 
As the present-day reader only has access to what Paul has written, there is no certainty 
about who the in-comers were, and what they taught and did. However, it will be argued 
here that one aspect of their teaching and lifestyle was a continuation of the patronage 
system, which Paul roundly rejects as being antithetical to his understanding of the 
gospel. Again, this problem was already present in 1 Corinthians 1-4, 9 and 11.46 
 
Thrall gives a helpful summary of the main scholarly views about who the in-comers 
were, and what they taught.47 She divides theories into three main classes: those who 
argue that the in-comers were some type of Judaizing party;48 those who think that they 
taught some sort of elevated ‘spiritual’ status;49 and some combinations of the two 
viewpoints.50  Thrall, herself, argues that the in-comers might have had Palestinian 
connections, with links to Jesus’ original disciples. They are miracle-workers, they are 
probably visionaries, who boast of their visions, and they claim apostolic status. As 
missionaries, they claim their right of material support from the Corinthians. Paul 
queries their right to work in ‘his area’, both because he has done all the groundwork, 
and perhaps because of an agreement made with the Jerusalem apostles about areas of 
missionary responsibility.51 The different Jesus that they preach focuses on the post-
resurrection glorious figure, rather than the crucified Christ, and the different gospel 
stresses obedience to the teaching of the earthly Jesus, perhaps with some measure of 
Torah-observance.52 However, these hypotheses do not take sufficient account of the 
social dynamics in the Greek East of the Roman Empire. 
 
It is significant that, unlike other churches established by Paul, there seems to have been 
little friction between the church in Corinth and the wider society. For example, 
Corinthian Christians take disputes to the civil courts (1 Cor. 6.1-6); Christians are 
invited to meals at the homes of unbelievers (1 Cor. 10.27); and non-Christians might 
come to a home where Christian worship is taking place (1 Cor. 14. 24f).53 Paul, 
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however, is uneasy about both the degree of integration of the Corinthian Christians 
with the surrounding society, and their corresponding failure to see the church as the 
place of their primary and dominant relationships.54 ‘In the Corinthians’ easy dealings 
with the world Paul detects a failure to comprehend the counter-cultural impact of the 
message of the cross.’55 ‘Their perception of their church and of the significance of their 
faith could correlate well with the life-style which remained fully integrated in 
Corinthian society.’56  
 
In particular, it will be argued here that the Corinthians fitted happily within the 
patronage system, and that one of their problems with Paul was that he could not be 
captured into their patronage system, whereas the in-comers sat easily with the 
patronage system, and so the Corinthians were more at ease with them than with Paul. 
 
Graeco-Roman society was shaped and held together by the patronage system.57 The 
patronage system was an asymmetrical system of exchange, where one party had more 
control over resources, and would bind other parties to itself by the giving of 
benefaction in return for something beneficial to higher-status party. The receiving of 
benefaction tied the client to the patron. One of the roles of a patron was the writing of 
letters of recommendation. One of the obligations of clients was to attend meals given 
by their patron, which were an opportunity for the host to show off wealth and status. 
Roman satirists protested about the way that the good food and wine and seating was 
saved for the guests of honour, whilst the poorer clients had poorer food and places to 
sit.58 The fact that these are exactly the issues raised by Paul in 1 Cor. 11 shows that 
some of the church in Corinth was heavily influenced by patronage system.59 Recall that 
the church in Corinth met in people’s homes, where the host/ess had an automatic 
patronage role, so it was not easy to break away from the patronage system.60 
 
The giving and receiving of money is a key part of the patronage system, and it is an 
important issue in the relationship between the Corinthian church and Paul. Marshall 
has argued that Paul’s refusal to accept money from the Corinthians was the root cause 
of the breakdown in his relationship with them.61 Paul’s refusal to receive money from 
the Corinthians for his own support was a problem already when he wrote 1 Corinthians 
(1 Cor. 9), and this continued to be a problem in 2 Corinthians,62 a problem heightened 
by the fact that, although he did not accept money for himself, he did want to collect 
money for the saints in Jerusalem (2 Cor. 8 and 9).63 If Marshall is right, that the issue 
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of money was at the root of the cooling off of the relationship between the Corinthian 
church and Paul from the Corinthian end, then the fact that Paul refers to the monetary 
issue so many times in 2 Corinthians would strengthen the case that restoring his 
relationship with the Corinthians was at the forefront of Paul’s mind in 2 Corinthians. It 
would also suggest that the use of reconciliation as a metaphor is particularly 
appropriate, because he had become their enemy, and he wanted to establish peace. 
Paul’s relationship with the Jerusalem church had also been difficult, and it is 
conceivable that the collection was also a reconciliatory gesture on his part towards 
them.64 
 
Why did Paul not accept money from the Corinthians when he had accepted money 
from the Philippian church when he was in Corinth (2 Cor. 11.8f; Phil. 4.14-16)?65 It 
may have been the case that the factions in the Corinthian church centred around the 
homes in which members of the church congregated, perhaps with the householder 
acting as the patron of the particular congregation,66 and so, perhaps, Paul refused 
financial aid because he did not want to become aligned with a particular faction. 
However, it is more likely that Paul was concerned about the patronage system itself.67 
For Paul, part of the sociality of the gospel was to follow Christ in his becoming poor 
that others might become rich (2 Cor. 8.9), a sort of inverse of the patron-client 
relationship. Many times Paul expresses how he has become ‘poor’ so that the 
Corinthians might become ‘rich’ (e.g. 1 Cor. 4.6-13; 9.19ff; 2 Cor. 1.6; 4.5, 12; 12.15; 
13.6f, 9). Perhaps Paul was confident to receive money from the Philippians, because he 
saw them suffering as he did,68 whereas the Corinthians have failed to fully carry 
through the socio-economic distinctions that follow from their faith (2 Cor. 6.14-7.1; cf. 
1 Cor. 10.23-11.34). Further, it seems that Paul made it a policy not to receive money 
from people whilst evangelising in their city (1 Thess. 2.9; cf. 2 Thess. 3.7-9),69 but 
once he was confident of their understanding of the gospel and their relationship with 
him, then he expected them to send him on to new places (2 Cor. 10.15f), presumably 
with financial support for the work in the new situation. 
 
In his discussion of financial support for himself, Paul shifts the metaphor to say that he  
is acting as a parent to the Corinthians as children (2 Cor. 12.14). Some see in this a 
claim that Paul is acting like a patron to them, albeit that what is on offer is the gospel, 
and that he is offering the Corinthians the opportunity to become patrons of the 
Jerusalem church by taking part in the collection.70 Whilst Paul does use some of the 
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language of benefaction, it is unlikely that he would have been encouraging people to 
think in this way. Rather, other dynamics seem to be in play: becoming poor that others 
might become rich (2 Cor. 8.9); giving as an act of grace, flowing from the grace of 
God (2 Cor. 8.6f; 2 Cor. 9.13f); generosity (2 Cor. 8.2, 15; 9.6); a response of 
thanksgiving to God (2 Cor. 9.12); and the requirement that abundance should be shared 
with those who are poor (2 Cor. 8.13-15); not to mention the benefits that will flow to 
the Corinthians (2 Cor. 9.10f, 14).71 
 
In summary, Paul believed that the patronage system is antithetical to the life-style that 
flows from the cross of Christ. He is worried by the way that the Corinthians fit too 
easily into their cultural environment, and he accuses the in-comers of being supporters 
of the patronage system, as they pride themselves on three key aspects of the system: 
they accept money for their work (2 Cor. 2.17; 11.7-11; 12.13-18); they came 
recommended and require recommendation (2 Cor. 3.1-3; 4.2; 5.12; 10.12, 18);72 and 
they fitted easily into hierarchy of the patronage system (2 Cor. 11.20f).73 In fact, it 
could have been the refusal of Paul to fit into the Corinthian construal of the patronage 
system that led to his perceiving that the relationship between him and the Corinthians 
had broken down, which means that the desire to restore the relationship with the 
Corinthians is more than just an issue of the relationship between him and the 
Corinthians. This does not exhaust Paul’s critique of the message and life-style of the 
in-comers, but it is sufficient to show that Paul believes that the Corinthians must at 
least repent of their taking part in the patronage system.74 
 
The reason why this is significant is that the allegiance to the patronage system is part 
of the reason why Paul is concerned that the Corinthians have strayed from Christ (2 
Cor. 11.3), and he urges them to examine themselves to see if they are still in the faith 
(2 Cor. 13.5). Paul seems to think that they have strayed outside the Christian faith, and 
he seeks their restoration (2 Cor. 13.9, 11). This is a similar statement to his plea that 
they be reconciled to God (2 Cor. 5.20), especially as it uses the word – καταρτίζω – in 
its noun and verbal forms, that he used in his the prothesis in 1 Cor. 1.10, where Paul 
urges the Corinthians to be reconciled to one another. 
2.2.3 Problem 3: Relationships Between the Corinthians and Paul 
The final problem that Paul saw in Corinth that will be highlighted here is the 
relationship betweens the Corinthians and Paul. There is widespread scholarly 
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agreement that Paul was already facing opposition in Corinth when he wrote 1 
Corinthians.75 Dahl argued that slogans ‘I belong to’ (1 Cor. 1.12) should be understood 
as declarations of independence from Paul. If there are already problems in his 
relationship with the Corinthian Christians, then there are many features of 1 
Corinthians that could have made things worse. In this letter, Paul criticises almost 
every aspect of the lives of the Corinthian Christians: what they wear; how they 
worship; what, when, where and with whom they eat; what they do with their bodies; 
how they settle disputes; and so on. Not only does Paul criticise a wide range of aspects 
of their lives, but sometimes he also addresses them in a diminutive fashion.76 Mitchell 
writes that ‘Paul interprets [the Corinthian’s] factional activity as indicative, not of 
political sophistication, but of childishness and renunciation of their precious freedom, 
through their alignment behind various missionaries. Paul’s response is his replacement 
slogan which stresses their common allegiance to Christ (1 Cor. 3.23).’77 Paul refers 
repeatedly to the Corinthians as children, even babies, which could imply that their 
behaviour is like children (1 Cor. 3.1; 4.14; 13.11; 14.20).78 Paul may see some of these 
references as being a positive development of his metaphor of his being in a father-child 
relationship with the Corinthians, but in others they are definitely derogatory, and Paul 
sees them ultimately as signs that people are enslaved to some other power (e.g. 1 Cor. 
6.19f; 7.23). 
  
A striking feature of 2 Corinthians as a whole is ‘how much attention Paul gives to his 
relationship with the community at Corinth.’79 For example; he hopes that they will 
fully acknowledge ‘us’,80 as they have partially acknowledged ‘us’, and that they will 
boast of ‘us’ on the day of the Lord Jesus (1.13f); he refrained from visiting Corinth so 
that there would not be further pain in the relationship (1.23; 2.1-4); we are working 
together with the Corinthians (1.24);81 he leaves an opportunity to preach the gospel in 
Troas because his heart was troubled because he wanted to hear from Titus about how 
Titus’ visit to Corinth on his behalf had gone (2.12f); he is enabling the Corinthians to 
boast about ‘us’, so that they might answer those who boast about outward appearance 
and not what is in the heart (5.12); ‘our’ heart is wide open, but the Corinthians have 
restricted their affections, and he calls them to widen their hearts (6.11-13), and to make 
room in their hearts for ‘us’ (7.2-4); the report from Titus showed that Paul had received 
some of the restoration of relationship that he had hoped for (7.6-13); and he calls the 
Corinthians ‘brothers’ (1.8; and also 8.1; 13.11).82 Bieringer also argues that naming 
them specifically in 6.11 (‘We have spoken freely to you, Corinthians; our heart is wide 
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open’), being one of the only three places that he does so in his undisputed letters (see 
also Gal. 3.1; Phil. 4.15), makes the statement highly personal, making sure that the 
readers realise he is talking to them and no-one else.83 The Macedonians are held up as 
an example of giving themselves to Paul (8.5), and the collection is seen by Paul as a 
test of their love (e.g. 8.8, 24); he does not want to have to act in boldness when he gets 
to Corinth (10.2), waging war (10.3-6; cf. 13.1-4); he hopes that as the faith of the 
Corinthians increases, so will our area of influence increase amongst them (10.15); he 
fears he might not find them as he wishes when he visits them again (12.19-21); and he 
prays for their restoration (13.9, 11). Paul is eager for the relationship between himself 
and the Corinthians to be restored. He stresses that his love for them has been constant, 
and that he has always acted out of love for them (e.g. 2.4; 6.11; 7.3; and also 11.11; 
12.15, 19), and he wants the Corinthians to respond with love towards him (e.g. 6.12f; 
7.2); he wishes to be reconciled with the Corinthians. Paul has to say these things 
because he feels that some people in the Corinthian church have rejected him, and he 
has been humbled (2 Cor. 11.7; 12.21), even humiliated (2 Cor. 9.4) before them.84 
 
It is clear from the structure of the argument in 2 Cor. 5.16-7.2 that Paul interprets the 
Corinthian response to him as a rejection of himself and his gospel. In Paul’s mind, this 
is a serious offence, because they are rejecting God’s ambassador, and so are rejecting 
God. But, unlike the Romans when the Corinthians mistreated their ambassadors, God 
does not come to sack the city, but through Paul, urges the Corinthians to be reconciled 
to God. Part of that reconciliation to God is to open their hearts to Paul again (6.1, 11-
13; 7.2), that is, they must be reconciled with Paul as part of their being reconciled to 
God. In the words of Fitzgerald,  
 
[t]he first and foremost of these additional appeals in 2 Corinthians 6-7 is the 
call for a full reconciliation between himself and the Corinthians (6.11-13 + 7.2-
4). Indeed, since there can be no reconciliation with God apart from a 
reconciliation with Paul as God’s ambassador, this appeal constitutes the real 
point of the apostle’s earlier exhortation to be reconciled to God (5.20). Like the 
heart of the God who entrusted him with the message of reconciliation, Paul’s 
own heart stands wide open to the Corinthians (6.11); he has done nothing to 
harm them (7.2) or to present an obstacle (6.3) to their opening wide their hearts 
(6.13) and making room for him (7.2). There is thus no impediment to their 
reconciliation; there are no reparations to be made. And just as God had taken 
the initiative in reconciling Paul to himself, Paul now takes the initiative in 
trying fully to reconcile the Corinthians to himself.85 
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It is important to note that Paul makes a plea as an ambassador; he does not command 
the Corinthians. If ambassadors went from the defeated party to the dominant party in 
order to plead for reconciliation,86 then we have here an admission from Paul of his 
weakness before the Corinthians, and he must plead with them to be reconciled to 
him.87 
 
2.2.4 Three Problems in Corinth: Summary 
This section has examined three of the problems that Paul saw in Corinth, namely 
factionalism, participation in the patronage system, and the breakdown of the 
relationship with Paul. It is significant that these are problems in human relationships 
and the ordering of the community. In each of these, Paul says, the Corinthians have 
been alienating themselves from God. Generalising Fitzgerald’s comment above, it will 
be argued in Section 2.5 that reconciliation with God requires the resolution of these 
issues in human relationships. 
2.3 The Source of the Metaphor καταλλάσσω and the Idea of Reconciliation 
in Paul’s Theology 
The previous section has shown that Paul perceived that there were significant problems 
in the corporate life of the Corinthian church, and in its relationships with Paul and 
others. Whilst the source of the idea of reconciliation in Paul’s theology, and of the 
terminology he uses, can never be proved for certain, this suggests that Paul used the 
term reconciliation because it came from a realm of discourse about the ordering of 
human relationships. This section will show that there is significant evidence to suggest 
that the main place from which Paul drew the metaphor was contemporaneous political 
discourse. This is important because Paul’s use of the term can then be compared with 
the standard paradigm in the political literature, from which Paul’s important insights 
and innovations concerning the nature of reconciliation can be derived. It will also be 
argued that Paul’s experience of encountering the risen Christ, where his persecution of 
the church is interpreted as persecution of the risen Christ, is important in forming 
Paul’s theology, and the place of reconciliation in particular. There have been other 
suggestions of the source of the idea of reconciliation in Paul, but these seem rather 
fanciful and obscure when compared with the weight of the evidence for the view that 
Paul drew the metaphor from contemporaneous political discourse.88 
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2.3.1 Evidence that Paul Drew the Metaphor καταλλάσσω from Political Discourse 
The place to start is a negative piece of evidence, namely that ‘reconciliation’ comes 
from a different semantic network to ‘atonement’. This means that there is no linguistic 
foundation for interpretations that shift easily from atonement to reconciliation and back 
again, such as those outlined in Section 2.1 above.89 On the positive side, recall that 1 
Corinthians draws extensively from the language, topoi, and argument style of 
contemporaneous political works urging reconciliation. Furthermore, Paul makes 
extensive use of other political terms in the same place that he uses the term 
‘reconciliation’ in 2 Cor. 5, and perhaps, he uses ambassadorial language in order to 
contrast God’s actions towards the Corinthians with the way that the Romans responded 
to the mistreatment of their ambassadors by the Corinthians, a couple of centuries 
beforehand. These pieces of evidence will briefly be examined, except for the second 
point on 1 Corinthians, which is treated at length in Section 2.2.1 above, and so will not 
be repeated here, but it must be born in mind as a key piece of evidence. 
2.3.1.1 Atonement and Reconciliation are From Two Distinct Semantic Fields 
Cilliers Breytenbach has shown that semantic networks of reconciliation and atonement 
are distinct: neither did the translators of the LXX use reconciliation language in 
translating atonement language, nor is reconciliation language hyponymous to the 
language chosen to translate the atonement language.90 In the words of Breytenbach, 
 
[a]lthough “atonement” and “reconciliation” may be used as related concepts by 
the English speaking theologian, this is not the case with the Greek equivalents. 
The Greek translations of the Old Testament do not translate kpr with di- or 
katallassō ktl. Where the Hebrew kpr (pi ͑el) is used in the sense of “to atone”, it 
is translated by exilaskesthai ktl. In Greek, in fact, di- or katallassō ktl. are not 
hyponomous to (ex)hilaskesthai ktl. There are no semantic grounds to merge the 
Hebrew notion of atonement (kipper) with the Pauline reconciliation. Neither 
kipper nor its translation in the LXX ([ex]hilaskesthai) are sense-related to 
katallassō. … There is no semantic or traditio-historical reason to link the 
origins of the Pauline notion of “reconciliation” (or the scant use in the Greek 
translations of the Hebrew scriptures make of katallassō) with the Old 
Testament theology of the atonement.91 
 
It is not only a problem for the English-speaking theologian, for the German words for 
expiation (Sühnung) and reconciliation (Versöhnung) suggest that the latter is derived 
from the former.92 
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Breytenbach made a key contribution in the study of reconciliation in Paul when he 
showed that καταλλάσσω belongs in a different semantic network from that of cultic 
terminology, and that it belongs in the world of political discourse. 
2.3.1.2 Paul Uses a Cluster of Political Terms in 2 Cor. 5.18‐21 
Paul brings together a number of political metaphors in the few verses where he uses 
καταλλαγή and καταλλάσσω in 2 Corinthians: 
 
 καταλλαγή : 2 Cor. 5.18, 19 
 καταλλάσσω: 2 Cor. 5.18, 19, 20 
 πρεσβεύω: 2 Cor. 5.20 (cf. Eph. 6.20) 
 παρακαλέω: 2 Cor. 5.20; 6.1 (also 1.4, 6; 2.7, 8; 7.6, 7, 13; 8.6; 9.5; 10.1; 12.8, 
18; 13.11) 
 δέομαι: 2 Cor. 5.20 (also 8.4; 10.2) 
 διακονία93: 2 Cor. 5.18 (also 3.7, 8, 9; 6.3; 8.4; 9.1. 12, 13; 11.8) 
 
These words are inter-related. Ambassadors94 make supplication (δέομαι) and plead 
(παρακαλέω) on behalf of the ones who sent them.95 Similarly, people beseeched 
(παρακαλέω) others to be reconciled to them.96 There is some debate about the degree 
to which ambassadorial and reconciliatory language were used together in political 
discourse. In his study of epigraphic material concerning embassies from the Eastern 
Roman Empire, Bash concluded that the language of reconciliation is rarely found.97  
However, this is not the case in the literary evidence, where embassies were often sent 
(πρεσβεύω) in order to seek reconciliation (καταλλαγή).98 Ambassadors also sought 
peace (εἰρήνη), which is linked with reconciliation in Rom. 5.1, 1099 and Col. 1.20.100 
 
Paul also makes extensive use of other political terms in 2 Corinthians. For example: he 
writes of the gospel (εὐαγγέλιον: 2.12; 4.3, 4; 8.18; 9.13; 10.14; 11.4, 7);101 he is a 
conquered enemy in the triumphal procession of Christ (θριαμβεύεσθαι; 2 Cor. 2.14); 
he calls the Christians the ἐκκλησία of God; and in 2 Cor. 12.32f, Paul is not the 
victorious soldier who is awarded for being the first soldier to scale the wall of a city 
being attacked, but is instead lowered over the wall to escape.102 There is a debate as to 
whether Paul uses such political terminology in order to subvert the claims of the 
Roman Empire, or whether he just re-inscribes the power structures of Empire in the 
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church.103 What is certainly the case, is that Paul makes changes in how the 
reconciliation terminology is used, which will be discussed in Section 2.4 below. 
2.3.1.3 The Sacking of Corinth by the Romans 
Strabo records that Corinth was sacked by the Romans after some Roman ambassadors 
were badly treated by some of the populace: 
 
The Corinthians, when they were subject to Philip, not only sided with him in 
his quarrel with the Romans, but individually behaved so contemptuously 
towards the Romans that certain persons ventured to pour down filth upon the 
Roman ambassadors when passing by their house. For this and other offences, 
however, they soon paid the penalty, for a considerable army was sent thither, 
and the city itself was razed to the ground by Leucius Mummius.104 
 
Now whilst it cannot be assumed that Paul was familiar with Strabo, the story that the 
sacking of Corinth in 146 BCE was a result of offences against Roman ambassadors 
must have been well-known in the city, re-founded by Rome following a decree of 
Julius Caesar in 44 BCE. It was re-founded largely by war veterans and the urban poor 
from Rome, many of them freedmen.105 Paul’s use of ambassadorial language in 2 
Corinthians could have been prompted by this incident, where Paul has chosen to speak 
of his role in this way precisely because it makes a contrast between how the Romans 
treated the Corinthians in the past, and how God has chosen to treat them when they 
have behaved in the same way, rejecting Paul, God’s ambassador. If so, it would 
strengthen the premise that Paul drew his images and language from political discourse. 
2.3.1.4 The Use of καταλλάσσω in Jewish Literature 
Before moving on to consider Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus, it must be 
noted that the use of reconciliation terminology for the relationship between humans 
and God is rare in Greek literature, but not unheard of.106 It does appear in Jewish 
literature in 2 Macc. 1.5; 5.20; 7.33; 8.29 and 4 Macc. 7.28-29; 17.22.  Marshall writes 
of these passages that 
 
[t]he view of the writer of 2 Maccabees is that when people fall into sin and 
apostasy they arouse the wrath of Yahweh. He proceeds to punish them, and on 
the completion of the punishment his anger is satisfied and he is reconciled to 
the people. But the experience of punishment may lead the people to pray to 
Yahweh to be reconciled to them and to give up his anger, and Yahweh may 
respond to such prayers. Even more powerful is the action of the martyrs who, 
while recognising that their sufferings and death are primarily for their own sins, 
beseech God to accept their suffering as being on behalf of the nation and to be 
reconciled to the nation as a whole. In short, God is reconciled, i.e., abandons 
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his anger, as a result of the prayers of the people and their endurance (in 
themselves or their representatives) of the punishment which he inflicts upon 
them. These ideas are expressed with even greater clarity in 4 Maccabees 7.28-
29; 17.22.107 
 
It is possible that Paul is drawing on the ideas of these passages when writing 2 
Corinthians, but he makes significant changes, notably that in Maccabees it is God who 
has to be changed from being hostile to being friendly, whereas in Paul, it is human 
beings who have alienated themselves from God and need to be changed.108 A second 
difference is that in Paul’s understanding, it is God who takes the initiative and provides 
the means for this reconciliation to happen. These two differences are commonly noted 
in the literature.109 
 
Whether or not Paul was influenced by the Maccabean material, it must be remembered 
that the use of καταλλαγή  and καταλλάσσω concerning relationships between God 
and human beings is ‘so rare that it can safely be regarded as a metaphorical mapping of 
non-religious terminology onto a religious domain.’110 That is, even if Paul was 
influenced by, and correcting the theology of the Maccabeean material, the original 
source of the language is the political sphere. 
2.3.2 The Importance of Paul’s Encounter with the Risen Christ on the Road to 
Damascus 
Whilst the source of Paul’s reconciliation terminology may have been the political 
sphere, it would seem that it was Paul’s experience of meeting the risen Christ that was 
foundational in his understanding of the nature of enmity and reconciliation. Amongst 
recent authors, Kim is the one who presents the most thoroughgoing argument that 
Paul’s use of the metaphor of reconciliation originated from his personal experience of 
God’s reconciliation of Paul to himself on the road to Damascus.111 Whilst he goes too 
far in arguing that Paul’s experience is the source of his terminology, it must be true that 
Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus was a decisive catalyst for his theological 
development of the idea.112  
 
What does not seem to have been noticed by other commentators is the parallel between 
Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus and his fears concerning what the Corinthian 
church is doing. Paul was persecuting the church, but the question posed to him by the 
risen Christ was, “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?” (Acts 9.4).113 That is, 
whilst Paul’s action is against the church, it is received by the risen Christ as being 
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persecution of himself. From this, Paul understood that his behaviour towards the 
followers of Jesus was sinful, and had also alienated him from God, but Christ was 
calling him back into relationship with God, which became the pattern of his ministry as 
an ambassador of reconciliation. Regarding his relationship with the Corinthians, Paul 
fears that in rejecting him, the Corinthians are making exactly the same mistake that he 
did in persecuting the church, so that they risk alienating themselves from God. In the 
letter Paul has already sent to the Corinthians, he refers to the fact that he persecuted the 
church (1 Cor. 15.8-9).114 But Paul says that God’s ‘grace towards me was not in vain’ 
(1 Cor. 15.10).115 The Corinthians, however, are in danger of having received the grace 
of God in vain (2 Cor. 6.1) because they have restricted their relationship with Paul (2 
Cor. 6.11-13; 7.2), and so they must be reconciled with God (2 Cor. 5.20). Paul fears 
that the Corinthians have not only moved away from him, but are also moving away 
from his gospel, and so they will be ‘led astray from a sincere and pure devotion to 
Christ’ (2 Cor. 11.2-6). 
2.3.3 Conclusion 
Fitzgerald is surely right when he writes that ‘there is not a single source for Paul’s 
concept of reconciliation, but that his thinking on this topic is shaped by several 
different settings in which the term is used.’116 However, the overwhelming evidence is 
that Paul has drawn the metaphor καταλλάσσω from the political sphere. Breytenbach 
broke the connection between atonement and reconciliation. Mitchell showed that, in 1 
Corinthians, Paul makes extensive use of the language, the topoi and the style of 
argument of contemporaneous writings urging reconciliation. Paul uses καταλλάσσω 
both in discussing relationships both between human beings (1 Cor. 7.11) and human 
beings and God (2 Cor. 5.18-20), and he uses a cluster of political terms, which are 
especially appropriate considering the political history of Corinth, in the same passage, 
as well as using other political terminology throughout the letter. Even those who want 
to argue that he drew his ideas from Isaiah, look back to Maccabees for the actual 
terminology, and, even here, the terminology is drawn from the political sphere and 
used in the religious.117 Thus, the overwhelming evidence is that Paul drew his 
terminology from the political sphere. Moreover, it appears that Paul came to 
understand his persecution of the church as putting himself in a state of enmity with 
God, and so reconciliation is an appropriate term to use to explain what happened to 
him, and appropriate in resolving the problems that he sees in Corinth. 
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2.4 Continuities and Discontinuities in Paul’s Use of καταλλάσσω 
It has been argued that a major source for Paul’s use of reconciliation terminology was 
political discourse. But how did Paul use this terminology? To understand more of what 
he meant, it is important to see the continuities and discontinuities with how Paul used it 
when compared with the standard paradigm of reconciliation as used by writers up to 
and including the time of Paul.  
 
Before doing this, it is worth noting that reconciliation was not always expected in 
disputes. For example, ‘[i]n early Greek literature, friendship and enmity are strongly 
contrasted in the traditional maxim, that one ought to do everything “to help a friend 
and harm an enemy”.’118 In Aristotle, revenge upon an enemy, rather than 
reconciliation, is a noble act: ‘for to retaliate is just (δίκαιον) and that which is just is 
noble (καλόν)’.119 ‘A man’s virtue consists in outdoing his friends in kindness and his 
enemies in mischief.’120 Although later writers reacted against this, it remained in 
popular ethics.121 It was possible to make friends with those who were formerly 
enemies. Reconciliation was not only the province of noble conduct, but could be 
pursued for reasons of patriotism, expediency and self-preservation.122 
 
Paul has taken the standard paradigm of reconciliation, and has made a number of 
significant changes to it. Fitzgerald lists five features of the standard paradigm of 
reconciliation from the use of διαλλάσσω123 and καταλλάσσω in Greek literature:124 
 
1. the rule of thumb was that those responsible for the strife were to take the 
initiative in ending it, and that the offended party should show goodwill by 
accepting the offer of reconciliation; 
2. the guilty party’s initiative in reconciliation usually took the form of an appeal, 
typically introduced by a some work of entreaty, such as παρακαλῶ or δέομαι; 
3. appeals for reconciliation are often accompanied by some philophronetic 
indication of the guilty party’s affection and concern for the estranged person; 
4. in many cases, pleas for forgiveness were not sufficient, and some reparation 
had to be made. This was a standard precondition in the reconciliation of 
warring nations, and the severity of the demands by the more powerful nation 
often prolonged the conflict; and 
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5. although the desire for reconciliation often began with the guilty party, 
reconciliation brought benefits for both parties, and the reconciled were 
expected to live in renewed concord with one another. 
 
What is striking in looking at this list is that, although many of the features of the 
standard paradigm of reconciliation are present in 2 Corinthians, many of them appear 
back-to-front. This observation will now be examined more carefully, as it gives insight 
as to how Paul understood reconciliation. 
 
In 2 Corinthians, Paul argues that the Corinthians have become estranged from God by 
their behaviour. The key shift change that Paul has made in the reconciliation paradigm 
is that it is God, from whom the Corinthians have alienated themselves, who takes the 
initiative in reconciliation. That is, it is God, the offended party, who takes the initiative 
in reconciliation, making reconciliation possible between himself and the offending 
party.125 Marshall conjectured that this was the first time that καταλλάσσω had been 
used this way in Greek literature,126 and Porter has demonstrated it.127 The result of this 
shift is the radical and new understanding of God as the one who has taken 
responsibility for reconciliation because human beings were either unwilling or unable 
to take the steps necessary for reaching reconciliation.128 God is not an angry god who 
has to be appeased by humanity, but the one who desires that humanity be reconciled to 
him, and who removes all barriers that stop this from being a possibility. 
 
A second shift is that Paul has taken terminology from the domain of relationships 
between human beings, and he has applied it to God. Reconciliation was the exchange 
of enmity for friendship, and so ‘Paul’s use of this term in conjunction with the divine-
human relationship means that he is depicting God as the One who makes friends of his 
adversaries.’129 This is expressed winsomely in the Good News Bible translation of 2 
Cor. 5.18-20: 
 
All this is done by God, who through Christ changed us from enemies into his 
friends and gave us the task of making others his friends also. Our message is 
that God was making the whole human race his friends through Christ. God did 
not keep an account of their sins, and he has given us the message which tells 
how he makes them his friends. Here we are, then, speaking for Christ, as 
though God himself were making his appeal through us. We plead on Christ’s 
behalf: let God change you from enemies into his friends! 
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A third shift is that it is not the guilty party, the Corinthians, which is making 
expressions of affection and concern for the estranged party, but Paul (recall how he 
often expresses his love for the Corinthians, e.g., 2.4; 6.11; 7.3; 11.11; 12.15, 19).  
 
Related to this reversal and the key change discussed above, is that, according to the 
standard reconciliation paradigm, Paul should have been an ambassador for humanity, 
making supplication to God, but instead he is an ambassador for Christ, calling the 
Corinthians to be reconciled to God.130 This same shift has been made in the way that 
the term ‘ambassador’ has been used. Usually, it was the Sender’s embassy which 
sought and brought about peace, but in 2 Cor. 5.20, the embassy is addressed to 
humanity, not from humanity.131 
 
Fourthly, unlike the Romans, who sacked Corinth following the mistreatment of its 
ambassadors, God does not act in immediate judgment because of the mistreatment of 
his ambassador by the Corinthians.  There is a delay, perhaps to the day of judgement, 
of the consequences of the failure to receive the message of reconciliation (2 Cor. 5.10; 
6.1; seen more clearly in Rom. 5.9).132 
 
A final shift that Paul makes is in the need for the guilty party to make reparation. As 
has been noted earlier several times, until the work of Breytenbach, the majority of 
commentators have made some sort of equivalence between atonement and 
reconciliation, and have therefore read 2 Cor. 5 as expressing as a shift from the guilty 
party having to provide the reparation required by God, the means of atonement, to God 
providing Jesus as the means of atonement. However, there is no atonement language in 
2 Cor. 5, and there is not even any language of sacrifice. Paul does not even get near the 
idea of sacrifice and atonement in this passage: Christ’s death in 2 Cor. 5.14 is not 
sacrificial, but participatory (all have died in Christ); and the exchange of righteousness 
and sin in verse 21 focuses on the fact of the exchange, not on how it works.133 
Reconciliation, and the exchange of righteousness for sin, is a free gift, a new creation. 
 
Before turning to draw this chapter together by highlighting what can be learnt about 
the political theology of reconciliation from 2 Corinthians, it is worth making one more 
observation about the standard paradigm of reconciliation. Bash notes that embassies 
were often sent from a weaker group to a group which had power over them,134 and 
Fitzgerald notes that the large reparations that were required of the vanquished party 
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often extended the conflict.135 This completely side-steps the issue of moral 
responsibility in the conflict: it may sometimes be the case that one party is seeking 
reconciliation with another party not because they have done anything ethically wrong, 
but simply because they have not done what the more powerful party required.136 In the 
situation in Corinth, Paul argues that the Corinthians are definitely guilty of sin, and it is 
the party who has been affected by this sin who calls for the guilty party to be 
reconciled to them. 
2.5 Some Elements of Paul’s Theology of Reconciliation 
The previous section noted some changes that Paul made to the standard paradigm of 
reconciliation. There are two changes in particular that need further attention: firstly, 
that he used the political language of reconciliation to write of the relationship between 
human beings and God; and secondly, that he was the first to write of the injured party, 
God, seeking to be reconciled to the offending party. But these observations beg two 
important questions: how have the Corinthians alienated themselves from God; and 
what do they have to do in order to take up God’s offer of reconciliation? The short 
answer to these questions, to be argued further below, is that it is problems in human 
relationships that have caused the Corinthians to be alienated from God, and that they 
must sort out these problems in order to take up God’s offer of reconciliation. Thus, a 
more nuanced understanding of both the relationships between human beings and each 
other and God, and also God’s role in the process of reconciliation, needs to be 
established, which then leads to some insights concerning reconciliation that are 
fundamental to this thesis. This is the purpose of this section. 
 
Three problems that Paul saw in the life of the church in Corinth  – factionalism, the 
patronage system, and relationships with Paul – were discussed in Section 2.2. The 
reason why these were chosen out of all the problems that Paul addresses in his 
correspondence with the Corinthian church is that Paul saw each of them as being a 
source, or potential source, of alienation of the Corinthians from God, and that resolving 
these issues was part of the process which would enable the Corinthians to be 
reconciled to God. It is also the case, as was shown in Section 2.2, that these problems 
were present throughout the entire Corinthian correspondence (factionalism), or were 
specifically highlighted (patronage system and relationship with Paul) in 2 Cor. 2.14-
6.13 + 7.2-4, so, even if this formed a separate letter, written earlier than the rest of the 
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canonical 2 Corinthians,137 they will have been in Paul’s mind when he used the 
reconciliation terminology in 2 Cor. 5.18-20. 
 
That each of these three problems would result in alienation from God, if they were not 
addressed, was discussed in Section 2.2.138 However, it is worth recalling this here.139 
Factionalism undermined the understanding of what it meant to be church, and 
suggested that the Corinthians had never really become Jesus-believers.140 Allegiance to 
the patronage system is part of the reason why Paul is concerned that the Corinthians 
have strayed from Christ (2 Cor. 11.3), and he urges them to examine themselves to see 
if they are still in the faith (2 Cor. 13.5). Paul seems to think that they have strayed 
outside the Christian faith, and he seeks their restoration (2 Cor. 13.9, 11). This is a 
similar statement to his plea that they be reconciled to God (2 Cor. 5.20), especially as it 
uses the word – καταρτίζω – in its noun and verbal forms, that he used in his the 
prothesis in 1 Cor. 1.10, where Paul urges the Corinthians to be reconciled to one 
another. Finally, it is clear from the structure of the argument in 2 Cor. 5.16-7.2 that 
Paul interprets the Corinthian response to him as a rejection of himself and his gospel. 
In Paul’s mind, this is a serious offence, because they are rejecting God’s ambassador 
and his message, and so are rejecting God, and they can only be reconciled to God by 
being reconciled to him (2 Cor. 6.1, 11-13; 7.2). 
 
These three problems, and their resulting alienation from God, imply that the 
Corinthians can only be reconciled to God (2 Cor. 5.20) if they turn away from those 
practices which are causing the alienation, that is: if they cease their factionalism, and 
so be reconciled to one another; if they no longer order their relationships along the 
lines of the patronage system; and if there is a reconciliation between themselves and 
Paul. 
 
However, this is still not sufficiently nuanced, for there is a uniqueness and 
unrepeatability of what Christ has done, and when human beings are seeking 
reconciliation, there is a fundamental difference between what they are doing and what 
God has done in Christ. In Christ, God has made it possible for human beings to be 
reconciled to God, and to one another (2 Cor. 5.18f); in Christ, reconciliation is possible 
because sins are not counted against people (2 Cor. 5.19), and sin has been replaced by 
righteousness (2 Cor. 5.21). This must never be forgotten. Reconciliation between 
human beings is of a different order, but yet is possible because of what God has done 
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in Christ (2 Cor. 5.20). The world is to be told about the possibility of reconciliation (2 
Cor. 5. 19).141 Webster helpfully reminds us that, 
 
[m]ore than anything else, a Christian depiction of the field in which human acts 
of reconciliation take place will want to insist on the wholly unique and perfect 
action of God in Christ. … It is not just an incitement to human moral activity, 
still less a kind of cipher for what is properly a mode of human engagement; it is 
that without which reconciliation is groundless, lacking in any purchase on 
reality. … Human acts of reconciliation are in accordance with the structure of 
reality which God in Christ creates and to the existence of which the gospel 
testifies; and therefore they are acts which tend towards the true end of creation 
that God’s reconciling act establishes once and for all in Christ’s reconciling 
person and work.142 
 
In seeking reconciliation in the human realm, it must be remembered that it is simply 
making real what has already been achieved; it was achieved proleptically. Again, 
Webster is helpful here when he writes, 
 
[b]ut again, the question comes: … what room is left for the activity of 
reconciliation? What kind of peace-making is left to us? Pannenberg asks: 'Do 
we not have to regard not merely God's reconciling act but also its human 
acceptance as constitutive of the event?’143 A response might go along these 
lines: Human action is not constitutive of the event of reconciliation in the sense 
that the christological ‘once-for-all’ is dependent for its completion upon those 
human acts through which reconciliation is accepted and lived out; in this sense, 
the event of reconciliation is closed. But that event is not closed in the sense that 
it eliminates all subsequent reconciling activity. It is an event charged with force 
to expand itself and establish conformity with itself, for it is an event of which 
one of the agents is the Holy Spirit. And this expansion takes place as the risen 
Christ in the Spirit's power generates those human acts which seek to 
demonstrate conformity between achieved divine reconciliation and patterns of 
human life, and which refuse to act as if reconciliation had not, in fact, taken 
place. Truthful human action is action that is in conformity with the reality 
which is established in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. It is 'truthful' 
because it presupposes that its ratio essendi (and therefore its ratio cognoscendi) 
lies outside itself in a reality to which it is conformed, but which it does not 
establish or actualize. The Church, therefore, lives in that sphere of reality in 
which it is proper to acknowledge and testify to reconciliation because we have 
been reconciled; in which it is fitting to make peace because peace has already 
been made; in which it is truthful to speak to and welcome strangers because we 
ourselves have been spoken to and welcomed by God, and so have become no 
longer strangers but fellow-citizens. What is all-important is that an ethics, 
politics and spirituality of reconciliation is not burdened with the task of doing 
God's work. Action is hopeful and unanxious if it knows itself to be action 
which is in conformity with how the world is coram deo.144  
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One important and final observation remains to be made, which hints at the relationship 
between reconciliation and justice. In Greek, justice and righteousness are the same 
word, and so 2 Cor. 5.21 suggests that righteousness and justice are established as a gift 
of God in the process of reconciliation; God takes our sin and replaces it with 
righteousness and justice. The idea of exchange, that is foundational in the word 
καταλλάσσω itself, is carried over from vv. 18-20 to v. 21.145 God has made possible 
two exchanges: that of enmity for friendship; and that of sin for ‘righteousness’.146 The 
point is that justice is not achieved by pursuing it, rather it is a gift of God that comes 
from the process of seeking to make enemies friends through the process of 
reconciliation.147 Further, righteousness is relational in Hebrew thought, and so the 
meaning of the phrase, ‘the righteousness of God’ would be understood as ‘God’s 
activity in drawing individuals into and sustaining them within the relationship, as “the 
power of God for salvation”’ (cf. Rom. 1.16f), thus continuing the idea of reconciliation 
that is present in the immediately preceding verses (2 Cor. 5.18-20).148 The relationship 
between justice and reconciliation requires some further work, and will be returned to in 
Chapter 3 (Section 3.3). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on Paul’s use of reconciliation in the Corinthian 
correspondence, where he first uses the terminology and the idea. Once Paul has 
introduced the idea, he then makes further use of it in other letters, bringing it into 
contact with some of his other key metaphors and theological ideas. These other uses of 
reconciliation will be considered in later chapters in this thesis, where they assist the 
argument of the thesis.149  
 
This chapter has established that Paul understood that relationship with God depends on 
relationships with other human beings. Estrangement from God can arise when there is 
actual enmity between human beings, such as the rift between the Corinthians and Paul, 
or the factionalism in Corinth, and also when inadequate social orderings and practices, 
such as the patronage system, are in place. In order to seek reconciliation with God, it is 
necessary to (re-)establish right relationships between human beings. Volf, working 
from the Acts 9 account of Paul’s encounter with the risen Christ, writes ‘though 
reconciliation of human beings to God has primacy, reconciliation between human 
beings is intrinsic to their reconciliation to God … Reconciliation involves a turning 
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away from enmity toward people, not just enmity toward God, and it entails a 
movement toward a human community, precisely that community which was the object 
of the enmity.150 This resonates with the conclusions of our study of Paul’s use of 
reconciliation in the Corinthian correspondence.151 
 
However, there is an important asymmetry in this situation: God acts independently of 
any human response, and creates the space for human beings to be reconciled to God, 
by not counting their sins against them (2 Cor. 5.19). This has the effect in the world of 
human relationships of making the pursuit of reconciliation viable, and this is part of 
Paul’s message for the world (2 Cor. 5.18f).152 As enmity towards other human beings 
is also enmity towards God, it is not possible to be reconciled to God without seeking 
reconciliation with those with whom one is in a state of enmity.153 However, Paul does 
not make the opposite claim, that human beings can only be reconciled with one another 
if they are reconciled to God. His discussion of reconciliation takes place within the 
Christian community. He is concerned that the Corinthians have alienated themselves 
from God because of their factions, their hostility towards him, and their socio-
economic practices, and he urges them to re-establish their relationship with God, to be 
reconciled to God, which can only be achieved through working out their human 
relationships, within the gracious space that is the gift of God in Christ. His argument 
does not flow in the opposite direction, that to be reconciled to each other needs people 
to be reconciled to God. In fact, that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, 
suggests that God is at work in the world to bring reconciliation even between groups 
that do not acknowledge what God has done in Christ; reconciliation between human 
beings comes as a gift to those who seek it. 
 
The next chapter will explore the nature of reconciliation in more depth, considering 
what it means to repent and to forgive, and it will argue that justice is established as a 
result of the reconciliation process. Then Chapter 4 will argue that reconciliation is 
needed in trans-generational disputes, or else the present generation is liable to continue 
to sin in ways that are formed by the sins of the previous generations. 
                                                 
1 The other uses of the word ‘reconciliation’ will come to the fore in Chapters 3 and 5, 
and will be discussed most naturally in those contexts. 
2 The Latin noun ‘concilium’ means a council, and the related verb ‘conciliare’ means 
to bring together, and the prefix ‘re’ means again, so the Latin derivation of ‘reconcile’ 
would seem to indicate a meaning like ‘to bring together again’ contra Tawa, Michael, 
“Reconciliation in Action: Design Projects at Warburton Ranges, WA: A Collaboration 
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between the Ngaanyatjarra Community and the University of NSW” in Phillips, Scott 
K., Everyday Diversity: Australian Multiculturalism and Reconciliation in Practice 
(Altona: Common Ground Publishing Ltd, 2001), 37-51, p. 50, who argues that to 
reconcile is also to conceal, based on his derivation from the Latin, ‘con’ = together, 
and ‘celare’ to hide. This is far from the meaning that Paul gives to the Greek words. 
3 Three other related words are found in the New Testament: ἀποκαταλλάσσω (Col. 
1.20, 22; Eph. 2.16), διαλλάσσω (Mt. 5.24), and συνλλάσσω (Acts 7.26). There are, of 
course, other words that can be translated as ‘reconcile’, such as καταρτίζειν, which 
will be discussed below. 
4 For example, Martin, Ralph P, Reconciliation: A Study of Paul’s Theology (Eugene, 
Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1989, 2nd edition), argues that the ‘omnibus’ term 
reconciliation (p. 54) is ‘a suitable umbrella under which the main features of Paul’s 
kerygma and its practical outworking may be set’ (p. 239), and Stuhlmacher, Peter, 
“The Gospel of Reconciliation in Christ – Basic Features and Issues of a Biblical 
Theology of the New Testament” Horizons in Biblical Theology 1 (1979), pp. 161-190, 
is even bolder in arguing that the thrust of the whole of the New Testament can be 
placed ‘under the heading: The Gospel of Reconciliation in Christ’ (p. 164, his italics). 
5 David Williams’ study, Paul’s Metaphors: Their Context and Character (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1999), demonstrates the diverse contexts from which Paul draws his 
metaphors, as well as the extraordinary range of metaphors that he uses. 
6 Porter, Stanley E, Καταλλάσσω in Ancient Greek Literature, with Reference to the 
Pauline Writings (Cordoba: Ediciones El Almendro de Cordoba, 1994), p. 13. 
7 Vorländer, H and Brown, C, “Reconciliation” in Brown, C, ed., The New International 
Dictionary of New Testament Theology, vol. 3 (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1978), 
145-176, p. 166. 
8 Merkel, H., “καταλλάσω, ἀποκαταλλάσω, καταλλαγή” in Balz, Horst, and 
Schneider, Gerhard, Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament volume 2, pp. 261-
263, p. 261. 
9 Porter, Καταλλάσσω, p. 16. 
10 Merkel, “καταλλάσσω”, p. 261. 
11 Porter, Καταλλάσσω, p. 16. 
12 This last point, that justice is established through the seeking of reconciliation, will be 
introduced n this chapter, and then explored more fully in the next chapter (Section 3.3). 
13 The uses in Romans 5 will be important in the development of the relationship 
between justice and reconciliation in Section 3.3. Of the other words, ἀποκαταλλάσω 
in Eph. 2.16, will be explored in Section 6.1, ἀποκαταλλάσω, in Col. 1.20, will be 
useful in thinking about the relationships between human beings and the land in Section 
6.5, and διαλλάσσω in Mt. 5.24 will be used in Section 3.1. 
14 Mead, Richard, “Epochs in the History of Interpretation of 2  Corinthians 5.14-21” in 
Lewis, Jack P. ed.,  Interpreting 2 Corinthians 5.14-21: An Exercise in Hermeneutics 
(Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press 1989), 65-86, pp. 72-78; Mead, 
Richard, “Exegesis” in Lewis, Jack P. ed.,  Interpreting 2 Corinthians 5.14-21: An 
Exercise in Hermeneutics (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press 1989), pp. 
143-162. 
15 Cilliers Breytenbach (“On Reconciliation: An Exegetical Response” Journal of 
Theology for Southern Africa 70 (1990), pp. 64-68), p. 65, uses the term ‘hyponym’. In 
linguistics it describes the relationship of a specific term to a more general one. Thus, 
‘eucalypt’ is a hyponym of ‘tree’. Jonn Fitzgerald (“Paul and Paradigm Shifts: 
Reconciliation and Its Linkage Group” in Engberg-Pederson, Troels, ed., Paul Beyond 
the Judaism/Hellenism Divide (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 241-
262, 316-325), p. 317, n. 8, suggests John Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical 
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Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 453-5 for a discussion 
of hyponymy. 
16 Ridderbos, H, “The Biblical Message of Reconciliation” chapter 5 of his Studies in 
Scripture and Its Authority (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 72-90, p. 82.  
17 Mead, “Exegesis”, p. 160. To be fair, this is by way of introducing his conclusion, 
which follows immediately after the questions: 
  
If the assessment we have made of our passage is sound, the three questions are 
to be answered in this way. (1) The apostolic office is properly understood by 
the Corinthians only when it is recognized as an inseparable part of God’s 
reconciling working in Christ. (2) Paul says “Be reconciled to God” to 
Christians not as a sample of his mission message to unbelievers (which would 
strain the syntax of indirect discourse to admit an imperative), and not quite 
because “since we sin every day, so by a daily forgiveness God receives us into 
His favour” (Calvin; cf. Bultmann). Rather, because in Paul’s opinion the 
Corinthians are not reconciled as long as they stand uncertain about Paul and 
company or bicker among themselves. Perhaps they acknowledge the message 
that God has reconciled men to himself through Christ; but they are like some 
commentators, they neglect the rest of what needs to be said about reconciliation 
– specifically, God’s intention that his people should work harmoniously in the 
ministry of reconciliation. Consequently, (3) there is an integral connection 
between 2 Cor. 6.3-10 and 5.14-21 + 6.1-2. As Paul has tried over and over to 
explain, an apostle who understands his commission spends everything he is and 
has in order to protect (6.3) and recommend (6.4ff) the ministry with which God 
has entrusted him. 
 
There are some similarities between his answers to the questions and the conclusions 
that will be drawn in this chapter. 
18 Cf. Welborn, L L,  Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles (Macon, Georgia: 
Mercia University Press, 1997), p. 41: ‘Corinth had a history of faction: from the 
bloody revolution of Cypselus (Herodotus 5.92) to their role in initiating the 
Peloponnesian War, to the contemptuous act that sparked the revolt of the Achaean 
League (Strabo Geogr 8.5.23). Politics remained a concern of the Corinthians under the 
empire, though the game was played for lesser stakes. The names of her ambitious 
citizens, their rivalries, and election promises are known to us from inscriptions 
recording their donations. We deceive ourselves if we imagine that the Corinthian 
Christians were innocent of all of this.’ 
19 Welborn, L L, “On the Discord in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Ancient Politics” 
Journal of Biblical Literature 106/1 (1987), pp. 85-111 (Also reprinted in a revised 
form in his book Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles, pp. 1-42.); Wellborn, 
L L, Politics; and Welborn, L L, “A Conciliatory Principle in 1 Corinthians 4.6” in 
Welborn, L. L., Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles (Macon, Georgia: 
Mercia University Press, 1997), 43-75. 
20 Mitchell, Margaret, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical 
Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991). 
21 cf. also Williams, Demetrius, K., “Paul’s Anti-Imperial “Discourse on the Cross”: 
The Cross and Power in 1 Corinthians 1-4,” Society of Biblical Literature Seminar 
Series 39 (November 2000), 796-823, for a discussion of 1 Corinthians 1-4 as an anti-
imperial discourse, that is, an engagement with politics. 
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22 There were three types of classical rhetoric. Deliberative rhetoric was used to 
persuade people about some future action. Mitchell has shown that deliberative 
argumentation had four characteristics: (1) a focus on future time as the subject for 
deliberation; (2) employment of a determined set of appeals or ends, the most 
distinctive of which is the advantageous; (3) proof by example (παραδείγματα); and 
(4) appropriate subjects for deliberation, of which factionalism and concord are 
especially common. (Mitchell, Paul, pp. 20-23.) Cf. Witherington III, Ben, Conflict and 
Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 40-44. The purpose of deliberative rhetoric is not to prove 
that something is true, but rather to provide a reason for hearers to take up some action 
that is being advised (Mitchell, Paul, p. 202; Witherington, Conflict, p. 106).  
23 Mitchell, Paul, pp. 25-32. 
24 Mitchell, Paul, pp. 60-64.  
25 Summarising Mitchell, Paul, pp. 33-39, Paul uses συμφέριν five times in 1 
Corinthians: the impersonal verb συμφέρει in 6.12; 10.23; the neuter participle 
συμφέρον in 12.7; and the adjective σύμφορος (in the neuter σύμφορον) in 7.35; 
10.33 (although some manuscripts read the neuter participle συμφέρον in the latter two 
cases, but their meaning is the same).  He also uses other words for advantage or gain: 
μισθός in 9.18; κερδαίνειν in 9.20; ὠφελεῖν in 13.3; 14.6; ὄφελος in 15.32 and the 
litotes οὐκ ἔστιν κενός in 15.18. Paul changes what he presents as advantageous 
through his letter, starting with individual advantage in 6.12, and then in 6.13-20 he 
begins to argue that it is not what is advantageous to a single person that is to be 
considered, but what is advantageous to the ἐκκλησία, they are members of Christ 
(6.15, c.f. temple of God in ch. 3; 6.19), leading to the blunt statement, ‘you do not 
belong to yourselves’ (6.19). Paul is redefining advantage as that which is of advantage 
for the Corinthian community, so 10.24 ‘let no one seek his or her own advantage, but 
that of the other’ and 10.33 ‘not seeking my own advantage, but that of the many.’ By 
the parallelism in 10.23a and 10.23b, one is led to deduce that the advantageous act is 
one which builds up the community. Building language, especially the term 
(ἐπ)οἰκοδομεῖν, and its cognates, are very important in the letter (e.g. οἰκοδομεῖν 8.1; 
10.2; 14.4(twice); 14.7; οἰκοδομή 3.9; 14.3,5,12, 26; ἐποἰκοδομεῖν 3.10 (twice), 12, 
14, and the metaphor goes beyond even the use of these terms, as she shows in Chapter 
III). Rhetorically, the οἰκοδομή is Paul’s redefinition of the telos in relation to which 
he urges the Corinthians to choose their actions. Their true interests, he counsels them, 
are only served when those of the entire community are served (see especially. 14.3-5). 
This is sustained by his insistence on their communal identity: as the temple of God 
(3.9-17; 6.19); as members of Christ (6.15-17); and as the body of Christ (especially 
chapter 12). The redefinition of advantage to mean ‘the common advantage’ is complete 
in 12.7 : ‘to each the manifestation of the spirit is given for the common advantage’. 
The final appeal to advantage is in 15.58: ‘your work is not in vain in the Lord.’ 
26 Mitchell, Paul, pp. 39-42. On pp. 47-60, she summarises Paul’s uses of examples as 
follows. Paul appeals to his ancestors in 10.1-13 as negative examples from whom to 
learn how not to act. Other appeals to incidents, people, or practices in the Hebrew 
Bible are found interspersed in Paul’s argument: 5.6-8; 6.16-17; 9.8-10, 13; 10.18; 11.2-
16; 14.21; 15.32. There are also images from Hellenistic culture, such as: scapegoat; 
solider, planter, and shepherd (9.7); athletic competition; the body (one of the most 
common paradeigmata for concord and cessation of factionalism); the personification of 
agape; the exempla in ch. 14 of the nature of the voice, speech and communication; and 
the seed and varying illumination of heavenly bodies in ch. 15. Paul also uses himself as 
an example for imitation. The use of himself as an example is not restricted to the two 
verses where he explicitly urges the Corinthians to imitate him, but as part of the whole 
   94 
                                                 
argument of the letter. Sometimes he uses himself as an example of the non-divisive 
course of action (e.g. ‘all things to all people,’ ‘pleasing to all people in all things,’ and 
‘not seeking my own advantage’). Mitchell comments, ‘[t]he frequency of the 
references Paul makes to himself in 1 Corinthians is … outstanding. These self-
references are spread consistently throughout the letter; they are not merely clustered in 
a particular part of it. I take this to be another contributing argument for the unity of the 
letter, a unity in the rhetorical strategy of (deliberative) argumentation by the example 
of Paul himself, and the implicit or explicit call to imitation’ (pp. 59f).  
27 Mitchell, Paul, pp. 192-194. 
28 Mitchell, Paul, p. 1, n. 1, p. 303. 
29 Mitchell, Paul, p. 1. 
30 Mitchell, Paul, p. 1. See also Witherington, Conflict, pp. 94f, which is largely 
derivative of Mitchell. 
31 Mitchell makes a sound case for translating κατηρτισμένοι as ‘to be reconciled’ on 
pp. 74f of her Paul. Part of her argument is to show that καταρτίζειν is often used to 
mean bringing warring factions back together, and it is used as an antidote for factions 
well into the Graeco-Roman period. See also Lightfoot, J B, Notes on the Epistles of St 
Paul from Unpublished Commentaries (London: MacMillan and Co., 1904), pp. 152, 
47. Mitchell does not notice that, significantly, both καταρτίζειν and καταλλάσσω are 
brought together in Herodotus: 
(5.28.1) … but for two generations before this she had been very greatly 
troubled by faction [στάσις], till the Parians made peace [καταρτίζειν] among 
them, being chosen out of all Greeks by the Milesians to be peace-makers 
[καταρτιστῆρες]. (5.29.1)The Parians reconciled [κατῄλλαξαν] them in the 
following manner … 
(The translation of 5.28.1 is from Mitchell, Paul, p. 75, and of 5.29.1 from the Perseus 
database, web page http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Hdt.+5.29.1, last 
checked on 20.2.06.) 
32 In Paul, p. 180f, Mitchell notes that the following terms and phrases in 1 Corinthians 
have been demonstrated to be particularly appropriate to an ancient discussion of 
factionalism and concord: τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν (1.10), σχίσμα (1.10; 11.18; 12.25), 
καταρτίζειν (1.10), ὁ αὐτὸς νοῦς (1.10), ἔρις (1.11; 3.3), μερίζειν (1.13; 7.17, 34), 
συνζητητής (1.20), καυχᾶσθαι (1.29, 31; 3.21; 4.7; 13.3), φυσιοῦσθαι (4.6, 18, 19; 
5.2; 8.1; 13.4), ζῆλος/ζηλοῦν (3.3; 12.31; 14.1, 12, 39; 13.4), διχοστασία (3.3, variant 
reading), συνεργός (3.9), συναναμίγνυσθαι (5.9, 11, 14), συγκεραννύναι (12.24), 
κολλᾶσθαι (6.16, 17), πρόσκομμα / ἀπρόσκοπς / ἐγκοπή (8.9; 10.32; 9.12), 
συγκοινωνός / κοινωνός / κοινωνία (9.23 / 10.18, 20 / 1.9; 10.16 (twice)), ζητεῖν τὸ 
συμφέρον (combined:10.33; συμφέρος: 7.35; 10.33; συμφέρω: 6.12; 10.23; 12.7), 
ἀρέσκειν πᾶσιν (10.33; ἀρεσκο: 7.32, 33, 34), φιλόνεικος (11.16), αἱρεσις (11.19), 
συνέρχεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτο συνέρχεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτο (συνέρχομαι: 11.17, 18, 20, 33, 
34; 14.23, 26), σῶμα (numerous, from chapters 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15), 
συγχαίρειν / συμπάσχειν (12.26 / 12.26), κυβέρντσις (12.28), ἀγάπη (4.21; 8.1; 
numerous in chapter 13; 14.1; 16.14, 24), παροξύνεσθαι (13.13), ἀκαταστασία 
(14.33), κατὰ τάξιν (14.40), and εἰρήνη (1.3; 7.15; 14.33; 16.11). As can be seen, 
these terms and phrases are found well-distributed throughout the sixteen chapters of 
the letter. 
The following topoi or common appeals for concord are used by Paul as also by other 
ancient writers urging unity on divided groups: 
1. appealing to “ones,” things which the group has in common (in this 
argument one κλῆσις, one God, one Lord Jesus Christ, one Spirit, one 
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confession of faith, one baptism, one common language, one set of common 
traditions). The term εἶς is used a remarkable thirty-one times in the letter; 
2. appealing to the need to seek “the common advantage,” which is the direct 
response to factionalism, in which one seeks the advantage of one’s own 
group, and appealing for voluntary compromise of one’s right to do things, 
instead doing things for the sake of the common good and thus true freedom; 
3. appealing to the building as an example of concord, here particularized as 
“God’s building” which is also “the temple of the Holy Spirit.” The 
consequences of this metaphor are that the members of the building must be 
strong, unwavering and unchanging, in order to build up the building instead 
of allowing it to totter and fall, and ultimately to be destroyed by inner 
division; 
4. appealing to the political or social unit as a body, here specified 
theologically as “the body of Christ.” The body metaphor for concord entails 
customary political consequences (distribution of gifts and functions, sharing 
of a common “advantage,” a proper “mix” of elements for unity, co-
suffering and co-rejoicing of the members, exclusive allegiance of the 
members); 
5. appealing to the commonplace that factionalism is “human,” whilst concord 
and peace are divine, calling factionalism a childish failing, and 
concomitantly arguing that the things over which the factionalists strive are 
trivial and silly, urging the audience to divert their fractious energies into 
positive strivings for the important things that deserve such energy and 
attention; 
6. appealing to the unity of the leaders to whom the factionalists claim varied 
allegiance; 
7. appealing to the commonplace that factionalism destroys any political body 
infected with it; 
8. appealing to past examples of people and nations who suffered because of 
their factionalism; 
9. stressing the distinction between the political body itself and the “outsiders” 
to emphasize and consolidate group loyalty; and  
10. urging people to maintain the status quo in order to preserve group stability. 
33 Welborn, L L, “Discord in Corinth: First Corinthians 1-4 and Ancient Politics” in 
Welborn, L L, Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles (Macon, Georgia: 
Mercia University Press, 1997), 1-42, p. 7. 
34 Welborn, “Discord”, pp. 6f. 
35 Thiselton, Anthony, C., The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, NIGTC Series, 2000) p. 33; cf. Mitchell, Paul, pp. 17-19. 
36 Mitchell, Paul, p. 19.  
37 Thiselton, The First, pp. 33f, his italics. 
38 Many scholars believe that the canonical 2 Corinthians was formed from a number of 
different letters (see Thrall, Margaret E, II Corinthians Volume I (I-VII) (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, International Critical Commentary, Revised Edition, 2004), pp. 48f for a 
summary of some of the major theories). However, the argument of this thesis does not 
depend on the unity or otherwise of the canonical 2 Corinthians. 
39 Cf. Thiselton, The First, p. 33, ‘[t]o the degree to which Corinthian Christians 
imbibed secular Corinthian culture with an emphasis on peer groups and local value 
systems, the church had indeed become embroiled in what we have termed a 
postmodern pragmatism of the market with its related devaluation of truth, tradition, 
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Gütersloh, 1908; Schmittals, Gnosticism in Corinth: An Investigation of the Letters to 
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51 Cf. Gal. 2.9f; 2 Cor. 10.13-16. 
52 Thrall, II Corinthians (vol. 2), pp. 940f. 
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David G, eds., Christianity at Corinth: The Quest for the Pauline Church (Louisville: 
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54 Barclay, “Thessalonica”, pp. 185-7. 
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Trinity Press International, 1997), pp. 104-125; Danker, Frederick W, Benefactor: 
Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New Testament Semantic Field (St Louis, 
Missouri: Clayton Publishing House, 1982); Lampe, Peter, “Paul, Patrons, and Clients” 
in Sampley, J. P., ed., Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook (Harrisburg: 
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59 Perhaps it is significant that Paul says to the Corinthians that they ‘proclaim the 
Lord’s death’ in eating the bread and drinking the wine (1 Cor. 11.26), which refers 
back to Paul’s earlier discussion of the cross, and so emphasising a cruciform lifestyle 
as against the patronage system. That is, this is not a definitive statement of what is 
happening in the Eucharist, but part of the significance of this meal that is being 
highlighted as being important in the political context of the patronage system. 
Reflecting on this in the contemporary world, Cavanaugh, William, “The World in a 
Wafer: a Geography of the Eucharist as Resistance to Globalization”, Modern Theology, 
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66 E.g. Lampe, “Paul”, p. 497. 
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68 Cf. Bieringer, R, “Paul’s Divine Jealousy: The Apostle and His Communities in 
Relationship” in Koperski, V. and Bieringer, Sharper than a Two-edged Sword  
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Burke, Trevor J., and Elliott, J. Keith, ed., Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a 
Community in Conflict. Essays in Honour of Margaret Thrall (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 
95-113. 
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equality in mind. 
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“Paul and Commendation” in Sampley, J. P., ed., Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A 
Handbook (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003), 101-133, p. 101). 
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uses concepts which describe the way a despot keeps a distance from the common 
people.’ Contrast this with Paul who is led as a defeated captive (2 Cor. 2.14). 
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96). 
78 This is a common topos in talking about factions. See Welborn, “A Conciliatory”, p. 
61; and Mitchell, Paul, p. 96. 
79 Bieringer, “Paul’s Divine”, p. 246.  
80 Furnish, Victor P., II Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1984), p. 32, notes that while 
‘alteration between the first person singular and plural is common in Paul’s letters – and 
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being worked with. Thrall, II Corinthians (vol. I), p. 451, conclude quite reasonably, 
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at the end of the letter (Thrall sees 2 Cor. 10-13 as a separate letter), ‘Paul reverts to his 
original form of address, as a gesture of conciliation and in the hope that he may now be 
understood’ (p. 906). 
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to the Corinthians as a group. Another striking feature of 2 Corinthians is that Paul does 
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identity as the church in Corinth, not a group of factions, or, even more, perhaps he is 
holding them jointly responsible for their falling out with him, even if some may have 
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on the Literary Problem of 2 Corinthians 6.14-7.1”, New Testament Studies 35 (1989), 
550-581, pp. 552, 557, 565; Gloer, W Hulitt, An Exegetical and Theological Study of 
Paul’s Understanding of New Creation and Reconciliation in 2 Cor. 5.14-21 
(Lampeter: The Edwin Mellin Press 1996), pp. 5, 84; Mead, “Exegesis”, p. 160; 
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Dramatic Analysis of Paul’s Responses to Conflict in 2 Corinthians (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement 
Series 51, 1991), p. 98; Marshall, I H, “The Meaning of Reconciliation” in Geulich, R, 
ed., Unity and Diversity in New Testament Theology (Grand Rapids: Eeerdmans, 
1978), 117-132, p. 129; Turner, David L, “Paul and the Ministry of Reconciliation in 2 
Cor. 5.11-6.2” Criswell Theological Review 4/1 (1989), pp. 77-95, pp. 79, 86; and de 
Gruchy, John W,  Reconciliation: Restoring Justice (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
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pp. 438f; and Abernathy, David, “Paul’s Ministry of Reconciliation: Exegeting and 
Translating 2 Corinthians 5.11-6.2” Notes on Translation, Summer Institute of 
Linguistics 15/4 (2001), 48-64, p. 58. However, the logic of Paul’s argument seems to 
be well-summarised by the quotation from Fitzgerald. 
86 In his study of epigraphic material, Bash, Ambassadors, pp. 48-51, notes that both the 
sender and the receiver of an embassy knew that the supplicant was making the request 
from a position of weakness. 
87 Cf. Davies, The Gospel, pp. 209f, ‘He came to accept his limitations; and 2 Cor. 1-9 
reveals a chastened Paul. He apologises for his previous letter, pleads for affection, and 
reveals an acceptance of life, a reconciliation to experience.’ 
88 See, e.g., Snodgrass, K. R., “Reconciliation: God Being God with Special Reference 
to 2 Corinthians 5.11-6.4” Covenant Quarterly60/2 (2002), 3-23, and Beale, “The Old”, 
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89 Paul does bring cultic and reconciliation language together in a later letter (Romans 
5), but that will be discussed in Section 3.3. 
90 Breytenbach first showed this in his Verhsöhnung. Eine Studie zur paulinischen 
Soteriologie (WMANT 60; Düsseldorf: Neukirchener Verlag, 1989). Whilst I have not 
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unchallenged in the literature I have read (e.g. Fitzerald, “Paul and Reconciliation”, pp. 
242-4), and it still forms part of his latest writing in the area (e.g. “Salvation of the 
Reconciled (with a Note on the Background of Paul’s Metaphor of Reconciliation)” in 
van der Watt, Jan G., Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives in Soteriology 
(Leiden: E J Brill, 2005), 271-286, p. 276: ‘It should be stressed, however, that Paul’s 
metaphoric language of reconciliation has little to do with metaphors taken from a cultic 
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thinking that the notion of atonement should be used in interpreting Christ’s death ὑπὲρ 
πάντων in 2 Cor. 5.14 (“Salvation”, pp. 280f; and “The ‘For Us’ Phrases in Pauline 
Soteriology: Considering Their Background and Use” in van der Watt, Jan G., Salvation 
in the New Testament: Perspectives in Soteriology (Leiden: E J Brill, 2005), 163-185). 
91 Breytenbach, “On Reconciliation”, pp. 65f. 
92 I think that this point was made by Breytenbach. 
93 Collins, J.N., Diakonia: Re-interpreting the Ancient Sources (Oxford, 1990), p. 335, 
established that διακονία had a range of meanings. Terms in this word group can mean 
more than just ‘service’ or ‘ministry’, for the underlying idea is activity of an in-
between kind, so διάκονος could refer to a go-between, a messenger, or a courier, and 
διακονία could refer to agency or mediation, including a sort of ambassadorial role. 
94 Thrall,  II Corinthians (vol. I), p. 436, writes ‘The background imagery is political: 
the verb πρεσβεύω and the noun πρεσβευτής are found in inscriptions in connection 
with legates of the Emperpor.’ Cf. Breytenbach, “Salvation”, p. 275: ‘There can be little 
doubt that Paul depicts his role as apostle to the Corinthians metaphorically in the 
language of the Hellenistic and Roman polis-diplomacy.’ 
95 See Bash, Anthony, Ambassadors for Christ: An Exploration of Ambassadorial 
Language in the New Testament(Tübingen, J C B Mohr, 1997), pp. 75f, 88f, 100f for 
examples. 
96 See Breytenbach, “Salvation”, pp. 274f and Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, pp. 
249f for examples. 
97 Bash, Ambassadors. Breytenbach does not dispute this (Breytenbach, “Salvation”, pp. 
272f, n. 3). 
98 Breytenbach, “Salvation”, pp. 274f. 
99 Breytenbach, “Salvation”, pp. 273-276. 
100 Col. 1.20: ‘through him to reconcile (ἀποκαταλλάξαι) to himself all things … 
making peace (εἰρηνοποιήσας)’. 
101 Danker, Benefactor, pp. 216-218, gives the following translation of an inscription 
found at Priene, and present in several other temples of the Eastern Roman Empire: 
 
Decree of the Greek Assembly in the province of Asia, on motion of the High 
Priest Apollonios, son of Menophilos, of Aizanoi: WHEREAS Providence that 
orders all our lives has in her display of concern and generosity in our behalf 
adorned our lives with the highest good: Augustus, whom she has filled with 
arete for the benefit of humanity, and has in her beneficence granted us and 
those who will come after us [a Saviour] who has made war to cease and who 
shall put everything [in peaceful] order; and whereas Caesar, [when he was 
manifest], transcended the expectations of [all who had anticipated the good 
news (εὐαγγέλιον)], not only surpassing the benefits conferred by his 
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predecessors but by leaving no expectation of surpassing him to those who 
would come after him, with the result that the birthday of our God signalled the 
beginning of Good News for the world because of him … 
102 Judge, E. A., “The Conflict of Educational Aims in New Testament Thought” 
Journal of Christian Education 9 (1966), 32-45. 
103 For example, see the debate in Horsley, Richard, ed., Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, 
Israel, Imperium, Interpretation – Essays in Honour of Krister Stendahl (Harrisburg: 
Trinity Press International, 2000). 
104 Strabo Geogr. 8.6.23. Welborn, Politics, p. 41, n. 133, notes this passage, but does 
not make the inferences that will be drawn here. The translation is taken from the 
version on the web page (as at 4.12.07): http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-
bin/ptext?lookup=Strab.+8.6.1 
105 Horsley, Richard, “1 Corinthians: A Case Study of Paul’s Assembly as an 
Alternative Society”, in Horsley, Richard A., ed., Paul and Empire: Religion and Power 
in Roman Imperial Society (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1997), 242-252, p. 
242. 
106 Cf. the list from Breytenbach, “Salvation”, p. 271:Sophocles, Ajax 744; Plato, Symp. 
193B; 2 Macc. 1.5; 5.20; 7.33; 8.29; Philo, Praem. 166; Josephus, A.J. 6.143, 151; 
7.153, 295; Joseph and Asenet 11.18. See also Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, pp. 
252f. καταλλαγή / καταλλάσσω is also used of relationships between the gods 
(Breytenbach, “Salvation”, p. 276). 
107 Marshall, “The Meaning”, p. 121. 
108 Cf. Breytenbach, “Salvation”, p. 277; Marshall, Reconciliation, p. 106. 
109 E.g. Breytenbach, “Salvation”, p. 277-9; Fitzgerald notes that this paradigm shift is 
in continuity with the one that Paul makes with sacrifice, where God’s action is taken 
prior to and apart from human repentance (Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, pp. 253, 
245-248). 
110 Breytenbach, “Salvation”, p. 271. 
111 Kim, Seyoon, The Origins of Paul’s Gospel (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1984, 2nd 
edition), pp. 13-20, 311-315; Kim, Seyoon, “2 Cor. 5.11-21 and the Origin of Paul’s 
Concept of “Reconciliation”” Novum Testamentum XXXIX/4, 360-384. He notes that 
some earlier commentators hinted at the possibility (amongst whom he cites Klöpper, 
A., Kommentar über das zweite Sendschreiben des Apostels Paulus an die Gemeinde zu 
Korinth (Berlin: Reimer, 1874), p. 302; and Menzies, A., The Second Epistle of the 
Apostle Paul to the Corinthians (London: Macmillan, 1912), p. 43), and that some more 
recent ones had come close to affirming it (e.g. Hofius, O., “Erwägungen zur Gestalt 
und Herkunft des paulinischen Versöhnungsgedankens”, originally in ZThK77 (1980), 
now reprinted in his Paul (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1989), p. 14; and de Oliveira, A., 
Die Diakonie der Gerechtigkeit und der Versöhnung in der Apologie des 2 
Korintherbriefes (Münster: Aschendorff, 1990), pp. 371, 379). He notes (2 Cor. 5.11-
21”, pp. 368ff) that there are many allusions to the Damascus road experience in 2 Cor. 
5.1-11. The three aorist participles of vv. 18b and 19c (καταλλάξαντος, δόντος, and 
θέμενος) clearly allude to Paul’s experience of God’s forgiveness/reconciliation, his 
call to apostleship, and his revelation or entrusting of the gospel for him to preach. Kim 
uses Hofius’ observations that: (1) v. 19c corresponds to Paul’s testimony about his 
Damascus experience of God’s revelation of the gospel in Gal. 1.12, 15-16a, and (2) 
that v. 18c corresponds to his testimony of God’s apostolic commission in Gal. 1.16b. 
Added to these can be: (3) the correspondence of v. 18b to what is implicit in Paul’s 
emphasis on God’s grace to him over against his past as a persecutor of the church in 
Gal. 1.13-14. There are many other allusions to Paul’s Damascus experience in 2 Cor. 
5.11-21, including: (1) abandoning his prior “fleshly” estimate of Christ (v. 16); (2) his 
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own experience of being made a new creature (v. 17); (3) the use of the strong language 
of συνέχει (‘compel’, v. 14) accords with his use of other strong language describing 
his Damascus experience, such as: he was κατελήφθην (‘enlisted’, Phil. 3.12) by 
Christ; he is an ὀφειλέτης (‘debtor’) to the Gentiles (Rom. 1.14); and an ἀνάγκη 
(‘fateful necessity) is laid on him to preach the gospel (1 Cor. 9.16); and (4) the 
ἐξέστημεν in v. 13 is an allusion to Paul’s vision of Christ on the road to Damascus. 
112 Kim, “2 Cor. 5.11-21”, p. 365; cf. Martin, Reconciliation, pp. 46f. Budden, 
Following, p. 161, writes that when Paul recognises who it is who is speaking to him in 
Acts. 9.4, the question is: ‘Will Paul be punished or destroyed, or simply allowed to 
move on? The answer is neither. God names the injustice, challenges Saul to tell God 
why he would do this thing, and confronts Paul with a new future in the very act of 
offering reconciliation and a new beginning. The putting right that was demanded of 
Saul, as he became Paul, was that he would now build, and defend, the very church that 
he had set out to destroy.’ 
113 Whilst these words do not come from the pen of Paul, they are not inconsistent with 
his own accounts of the incident (e.g. Gal. 1.13-16), and in Romans 1.10 he writes, 
‘[f]or if while we were enemies we were reconciled to God’. 
114 If 1 Tim. was not written by Paul, then the author has certainly got to the heart of the 
matter when Paul describes himself as the foremost of sinners because he ‘was a 
blasphemer, persecutor, and insolent opponent’ (1 Tim. 1.12-16). To strike at the church 
was to attack Christ, and so be alienated from God. 
115 Cf. Gal. 1.12-16, where the persecution of the church of God is linked with Paul’s 
zeal. Perhaps Paul saw that the Corinthians suffered from the same problem, that their 
zeal was not properly focused (cf. 2 Cor. 7.7, 11). 
116 Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, p. 248 
117 Breytenbach, “Salvation”, p. 271. 
118 Marshall, Enmity, p. 35. 
119 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.9.24, quoted by Marshall, Enmity, p. 38. 
120 Xenophon, Mem. 2.6.35, available as at 7.11.10 on the web page: 
http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-
cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekTexts&query=Xen.%20Mem.%202.6.35&getid=1. I 
was alerted to this saying by Marshall, Enmity, p. 36. 
121 Marshall, Enmity, p. 37. 
122 Marhsall, Enmity, p. 43f. 
123 Porter, Καταλλάσσω, p. 14, writes that διαλλάσσω was most common in the pre-
Hellenistic era, and καταλλάσσω was used infrequently until the Hellenistic period, 
when its usage became wide-spread, especially in Christian texts. 
124 Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, pp. 248-252. 
125 Note that this is different from Paul’s use of it in 1 Cor. 7.11, where Paul’s advice to 
a woman who has divorced her husband is to remain single or to be reconciled with her 
husband. Cf. Marshall, “The Meaning”, pp. 121, 127. 
126 Marshall, “The Meaning”, p. 127f. Marshall, p. 127, documents four different ways 
that καταλλάσσω and διαλλάσσω are used in the literature: 
1. X persuades Y and Z to give up their mutual anger (active). 
2. X persuades Y to give up Y’s anger against X (active). 
3. X persuades Y to give up Y’s anger against X (passive/deponent). 
4. X gives up his own anger against Y (passive). 
Paul’s use does not fit this pattern, and he conjectured that Paul was the first person to 
use the following grammatical structure: 
5. X removes the cause of his own anger against Y, namely, Y’s sin (active). 
   103 
                                                 
Porter, Καταλλάσσω, pp. 16-18, divides the first case into two (one where goods are 
exchanged, and one where reconciliation is enabled), and notes that some other 
categories could have been added, but that this would only cloud the main hypothesis. 
127 Porter, Καταλλάσσω, where the thesis is expressed on pp. 15f. Recall that Paul’s 
usage caused an explosion of the use of καταλλάσσω in Greek literature. 
128 Cf. Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, p. 253. 
129 Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, p. 259. Paul seems to be close to the theology of 
the fourth gospel at this point (cf. Jn. 15.13-15). 
130 Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, p. 254; Bash Ambassadors, p. 155. 
131 Bash, Ambassadors, pp. 98f.  
132 Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, pp. 255f. 
133 Recall καταλλάσσω is a compound of ἀλλάσσω, which meant ‘to alter’ or ‘to 
exchange’ (see the opening paragraphs of this chapter), so the focus here is on the fact 
of the exchange, not its mechanism. This will be discussed further in the next section. 
134 Bash, Ambassadors, pp. 48-51. 
135 See above, point 4 of the standard paradigm of reconciliation. 
136 Cf. Breytenbach, “On Reconciliation”, p. 67: ‘There are various examples in the 
Corpus Hellenisticum where the stronger party ends the war by imposing the conditions 
of the peace treaty on the weaker side. Katallasso refers to the termination of the 
hostilities, katallagai to the new peace relation between the former enemies. The 
relation between the parties has been changed, not the parties themselves. Usually 
katallage “reconciliation” meant that the fighting parties forgive each other and that 
amnesty is granted.’ 
137 Recall that the various partition theories are summarised in Thrall, II Corinthians 
(vol. 1), pp. 48f. 
138 Note that, although Paul mentions all of these problems in 2 Cor. 2.14-6.13 + 7.2-4, 
in some cases he only makes it explicit elsewhere why they were a potential cause of 
alienation from God. 
139 See the discussions in Sections 2.2.1 – 2.2.3 for further details. 
140 Mitchell, Paul, p. 1, n. 1, p. 303; Thiselton, The First, p. 33; Georgi, The Opponents, 
p. 237. 
141 For Christians, there is the imperative to both live a reconciliatory life-style, and to 
proclaim the possibility of reconciliation. ‘Christians bear a missionary responsibility 
for working with God in the divine plan for cosmic reconstruction’ (Lewis, John G, 
Looking for Life: The Role of ‘Theo-Ethical Reasoning’ in Paul’s Religion (London: 
T&T Clark, 2005), p. 33). The event of the cross overthrows the orderings of this world, 
forming new sociality, patterns of living, and community ideals (Lewis, Looking, p. 
206, n. 2). 
142 Webster, John, “The Ethics of Reconciliation”, in Gunton, Colin E, ed., The 
Theology of Reconciliation (London: T&T Clark 2003), 109-124, p. 117. 
143 Systematic Tbeology II, p. 415 
144 Webster, “The Ethics”, p. 120. 
145 Cf. Fitzgerald, “Paul and Paradigm”, p. 325, n. 92 
146 Commentators often make the mistake of finding in this a condensed, and not quite 
comprehensible statement of ‘substitutionary atonement’ (e.g. Gunton, Colin, “Towards 
a Theology of Reconciliation”, in Gunton, Colin E, ed.,  The Theology of Reconciliation 
(London: T&T Clark 2003), 167-174, p. 170). However, as has already been shown 
earlier in this chapter, there is no atonement language in the immediate vicinity of 2 
Cor. 5.21. The problem of interpreting these verses is removed if it is realised that there 
is no interest in the mechanism of the exchange at this point, only in the fact of the 
exchange itself. 
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147 Cf. Fitzmyer, Joseph, Romans, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, Anchor Bible 
Commentary Series, 1993), p. 258, who writes, amongst other things, that the 
righteousness of God is an objective genitive here, the righteousness that God gives to 
human beings as a gift. 
148 Dunn, J D G, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), p. 
433. See further pp. 340-6, where he argues that in Greek thought, righteousness is the 
ideal against which individual action can be measured, but in Hebrew thought, it is 
more relational, the meeting of obligations laid upon the individual by the relationship 
of which he or she is part. Cf. Marshall, Christopher D, Beyond Retribution: A New 
Testament Vision for Justice, Crime, and Punishment (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 
pp. 20, 47f. 
149 For further details, see the footnote at the end of the introductory material to this 
chapter. 
150 “The Social Meaning of Reconciliation” Interpretation 54/2 (April 2000), 158-172, 
p. 166. 
151 This is contrary to Breytenbach, Cilliers, “Using Exegesis: On ‘Reconciliation’ and 
‘Forgiveness’ in the Aftermath of the TRC”, in Holness, Lyn and Wustenberg, Ralf K. 
(eds.), Theology in Dialogue. The Impact of the Arts, Humanities and Science on 
Contemporary Religious Thought (Cambridge, U.K. and Claremont, South Africa, 
2002), 245-256, p. 6f, who argues that, although καταλλάσσω was drawn from 
political discourse, it lost all its political reference when it was used by Paul in 2 Cor. 
5.18-20:  
Reconciliation is not really a concept of Christian or even religious origin. And 
even more important: It is used in the Pauline literature with reference to the 
relationship between God and humankind where God changes the sinner, who 
lived in enmity towards God into a friend, who lives in peace with God. 
Precisely because of the use of this notion within Christian soteriology, it 
becomes virtually impossible to take Paul’s notion of reconciliation as point of 
departure to discuss reconciliation between the victims and the perpetrators of 
state violence during the Apartheid era. It is so deeply attached to Paul’s 
explanation of the saving effect of Jesus’ death that it makes little sense to 
detach the notion of God reconciling humans from New Testament soteriology 
and to reintroduce it into interpersonal and interracial relations in the public 
sector, where a section of the persons involved are not confessing Christians. 
152 It is important to note that the claims that have been made in this chapter about the 
nature and possibility of reconciliation hold even if Paul was wrong in his assessment of 
the actual situation in Corinth. That is, the logic of Paul’s argument stands whether or 
not the actual examples are sound. It is possible to make a stronger claim than has been 
made in this chapter, namely that Paul argues that the seeking of reconciliation is 
imperative, certainly for Christians, if not all people, involved in disputes. However, 
this would engaging with the question of whether Paul was being hegemonic in his 
interpretation of the gospel, and in the nature of the unity on which he was insisting. 
This is a hard problem to argue about, as the church has only preserved part of half the 
conversation (some of Paul’s correspondence), and so whilst I believe that Paul was not 
being hegemonic, so that the pursuit of reconciliation is imperative, it is beyond the 
scope of this present work to make this case. (Examples of works that assert Paul’s 
hegemony include: Castelli, Imitating; Shaw, The Cost; Wire, The Corinthian; and 
some of the discussion in Horsley, Paul and Politics. Ehrensperger, Paul, provides a 
close reading of some of the texts used by these authors, undermining some of their 
claims concerning hegemony.) However, it will be argued, in Chapter 4, that seeking 
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reconciliation is imperative, because it is the only way for the present generation to halt 
its propensity to sin in ways that are shaped by the sins of the past. 
153 Cf. Volf, “The Social”, p. 166: ‘Consequently, reconciliation has not only a vertical 
dimension, but also a horizontal one; without that horizontal dimension reconciliation 
would simply not exist.’ 
  106 
3 Reconciliation: Forgiveness, Repentance, Justice and 
Incompleteness 
 
The previous chapter has established that reconciliation is a viable goal in human 
relationships because it is made possible by God’s work in the world. This chapter will 
build on this by further considering the nature of reconciliation. 
 
Some people are wary of the idea of reconciliation because it seems to be inherently 
unjust. This chapter will argue that justice is established through the process of seeking 
reconciliation. Justice is a gift of God, and it will be recognised as having been achieved 
through the reconciliation process. 
 
The goal of reconciliation is peace, not just the absence of enmity, but the deep meaning 
conveyed by the Hebrew word shalom. In order to establish peace, there must be both 
repentance and forgiveness. Reconciliation arises through a process of negotiating 
repentance and forgiveness. 
 
This chapter will elaborate on the nature of both forgiveness and repentance. In 
particular, it will be seen that repentance is usually more than just apologising, that it 
usually involves doing something that goes towards restoring what was damaged in the 
conflict. However, what it means to repent in any particular situation cannot be 
determined beforehand. It is the fact that the nature of repentance can only be 
determined through the process of seeking reconciliation that makes the nature of 
justice impossible to determine beforehand, but this ultimately leads to a deeper justice. 
 
However, no process of seeking reconciliation, no process of seeking justice, will be 
ever be complete, and, besides, one or more parties in a conflict may refuse to be part of 
the process, and so this chapter must also deal with the problem of incompleteness, 
which will necessitate an excursion into eschatology. 
 
This chapter will proceed in the following way. First of all, it will seek to provide 
sufficiently thick descriptions of forgiveness and repentance. Forgiveness will be 
examined before repentance, not because it must come first in practice, but because the 
literature on forgiveness is much more extensive. After exploring forgiveness and 
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repentance, the notion of justice will be examined, and it will be argued that justice 
arises from the process of seeking reconciliation. In the final section, the problem of 
incompleteness, either because of one or more of the parties refusing to be part of the 
process, or because of the inherent impossibility of achieving full reconciliation – this is 
not a utopian dream – will be addressed. 
 
Many conflicts continue over a period of many generations, centuries even. This raises 
questions about the responsibility of the present generation towards the sins of the past, 
and, indeed, whether a line can simply be drawn under the past without prejudicing the 
future. Building on the work of this chapter, the next chapter will consider the nature of 
reconciliation in such trans-generational disputes. 
  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attend to the secondary material on the biblical 
witness to the same degree as the previous chapter. However, it is believed that the 
development that is presented here is consistent with the biblical witness, and, at the 
same time, deepens the understanding of the nature and process of reconciliation.  
3.1 Forgiveness  
Forgiveness is a concept that has escaped purely theological discourse, and is being 
explored within political,1 philosophical,2 and therapeutic frameworks.3 In this section, 
the focus will be on theological formulations of forgiveness. 
 
In the New Testament, the two main words that are sometimes translated as ‘forgive’ 
are ἄφεσις (release, liberation, forgiveness; ‘it means to remit an offence, debt, fine or 
penalty, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against’4) and ἀφίημι (let go, leave, leave 
alone, release, forgive).5 Note that all of these are directed towards the other, not 
towards oneself or one’s group.6 A rough calculation shows that less than thirty percent 
of the occurrences of ἀφίημι in the New Testament are translated as ‘forgive’,7 whilst 
ἄφεσις is used much less, but two-thirds of the uses are translated as ‘forgive’.8 Word 
studies are problematic, and a careful study of the idea of forgiveness (rather than just 
the use of the word), would not only have to include other words from their semantic 
network, but would have to consider carefully the uses of these two words where they 
have not been translated as ‘forgive’.9 For example, in Lk. 4.18, ἄφεσις is translated as 
‘liberate’. What would happen if the study of forgiveness were to be widened to 
consider its relationship to other concepts, such as liberation?10 
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For the purposes of this thesis, it will be sufficient to consider material from the 
synoptic gospels plus Acts,11 and it will be seen that there are significant parallels with 
some of the lines of thought that were established in Chapter 2 about Paul’s use of 
reconciliation in the Corinthian correspondence. 
 
As a way of approaching the study of forgiveness, it is instructive to consider what 
Donald Shriver and L Gregory Jones have written about Jesus and forgiveness. 
 
Shriver writes that Jesus modelled God’s forgiveness in his healings (e.g. Mt. 9.1-8 // 
Mk. 2.1-12 // Lk. 5.17-26),12 through his teaching on prayer (e.g. Mt. 6.12 //Lk. 11.4), 
and by table fellowship (e.g. Mt. 8.9-13 // Mk. 2.13-17 // Lk. 5.27-32; Lk. 7.36-50; 
11.37-54; 14.1-24; 19.1-10), and Jesus forgave those who crucified him (Lk. 23.34a).13 
 
L Gregory Jones says that Jesus’ statement, ‘Father forgive …’ (Lk. 23.34a) is central to 
Luke’s understanding of forgiveness flowing from the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus; central to Jesus’ proclamation and enactment of the kingdom of God was the 
forgiveness of sins.14 Jesus’ forgiveness of sins was controversial as it diverged from 
Israel’s understanding in crucial ways: Jesus claimed divine authority to forgive sins; 
and Jesus offered forgiveness without necessarily presuming prior repentance (e.g. in 
the healing of the paralysed man (Lk. 5.17-26); he tells stories of lost coin, sheep and 
son in response to charges that he welcomes sinners and eats with them without 
requiring repentance; and he calls Zacchaeus down and eats with him before he 
repents). Jesus’ cry on the cross (“Father, forgive them, for they know not what they 
do” (Lk. 23.34a)) implies that his death is an enactment of divine forgiveness, offered 
even though the people are ignorant of their sins. When resurrected, Jesus offered 
hospitality and forgiveness, and told his disciples to go to the nations proclaiming a 
gospel of repentance and the forgiveness of sins (Lk. 24.47; Acts 2.38; 5.31; 10.43; 
13.38; 26.18). 
 
Both Shriver and Jones are a bit loose in their exegesis. Whilst Lk. 23.34a is a key verse 
for both of them, there are three problems with focusing on this verse in particular. 
Firstly, this text is missing from a wide range of early manuscripts, and so it is 
bracketed in Nestle-Aland 27, indicating that it is of ancient origin, but, in the opinion of 
the editors, it is unlikely to have come from the pen of Luke.15 Secondly, it could be 
  109 
argued that Jesus is not offering his own forgiveness here, but instead asks the Father to 
forgive. The difference between Jesus’ forgiving of sin in Lk. 5.17-26, say, and his 
handing over of the responsibility of forgiveness to his Father here, escapes the notice 
of the major commentators.16 It is unclear what should be made of this distinction.17 
Thirdly, it is not clear whom Jesus is asking his Father to forgive.18 These three 
observations imply that the biblical text needs to be examined a bit more carefully, 
which will now be done. 
  
Focusing on Luke-Acts for the moment, there are two different ways that forgiveness is 
used: the first is the provenance of God, and is the forgiveness of sins; and the second is 
the forgiveness that human beings offer one another. These two aspects of forgiveness 
will be explored in turn. 
 
For Luke, Jesus’ indiscriminate table fellowship is not the enacting of the forgiveness of 
sins, contra Shriver. Rather it is an expression of God’s desire to reincorporate all 
people into the covenant community.19 On this level, it is the same as Paul’s statement 
in 2 Cor. 5.19, that ‘in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself’. What is 
significant in Luke-Acts is that forgiveness, reincorporation into relationship with God 
and with the community, is nearly always associated with repentance,20 and the receipt 
of forgiveness always follows repentance, whether that repentance is expressed simply 
in people seeking Jesus’ company and help (Lk. 5.17-2621; 7.36-5022), or in explicit 
conjunctions of repentance with forgiveness (Lk. 24.47; Acts 2.38; 5.31; 26.18).23 
Moreover, in response to the accusation that Jesus shared indiscriminate table 
fellowship, Jesus told three parables where repentance was the key to the re-establishing 
of relationship (Lk. 15), and Luke’s account of Zacchaeus (Lk. 19.1-10) is an example 
of how Jesus’ table fellowship led to Zacchaeus repenting, and so to his salvation. 
Critically, Zacchaeus’ repentance involved undoing his participation of the unjust 
economic practices of the Roman Empire.24 It was also possible for people to have table 
fellowship with Jesus and not receive God’s forgiveness (e.g. Simon in Lk. 7.36-50). 
That is, Jesus enacted God’s offer of forgiveness, rather than enacting forgiveness itself. 
 
This fits well with the understanding of Paul’s use of reconciliation in 2 Corinthians that 
was established in Chapter 2: in Christ, God is making the offer of reconciliation, and, 
where Jesus came making that offer, now Paul is an ambassador for Christ, God making 
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his appeal through him. The difference, however, is that Paul cannot forgive people 
their sins, but only point to the reconciliation which has been achieved in Christ. 
 
Luke does not write much about human beings forgiving each other. In Lk. 17.3f, the 
followers of Jesus are instructed to forgive whenever there is repentance, whilst in Lk. 
11.4, the disciples of Jesus are instructed to pray, ‘forgive us our sins, for we forgive 
everyone who is indebted to us.’ Matthew, however, is stronger in his insistence on the 
obligation to forgive: God will only forgive people if they forgive others (Mt. 6.14f // 
Mk. 11.25).25 The foundation for this is given in the parable that Jesus tells in Mt. 
18.21-35. In the parable, the king, who represents God, forgives a person a debt that can 
never be paid, and then that person fails to forgive a much smaller debt that is owed to 
him by a ‘fellow servant’ (Mt. 18.28). The king then imprisons the person who he had 
forgiven first of all, because he had failed to forgive his fellow servant. Jesus concludes 
with, ‘[s]o also my heavenly Father will do to every one of you who does not forgive 
your brother from your heart’ (Mt. 18.35). Note that, although all the actors in this 
parable are human beings, the same two levels, which, by now, have become familiar, 
are present: there is the king, who represents God, and all the other people are ‘fellow 
servants’ (Mt. 18.28, 29, 31, 33), and it is God who has taken the initiative in forgiving 
debts, which carries with it the moral imperative for human beings to forgive each 
other.26 
 
Besides the general command to forgive everyone, not only those in the community, in 
Matthew, Matthew is also concerned for the practice of reconciliation within the 
community. In Mt. 5.23f, the worship of God cannot happen unless one is reconciled to 
someone who has something against one. The imperative also works the other way 
around, with Jesus giving a process to encourage the reincorporation of the sinner back 
into full fellowship in the community (Mt. 18.15-20).27 Such a process is implementing 
what Jesus spoke of in the same discourse, the Matthean version of the parable of the 
lost sheep (Mt. 18.10-14).28 Peter’s question about forgiving, and then the parable of the 
unforgiving servant (Mt. 18.21-35), discussed above, stress that the sinned-against 
person goes into this process in humility, as one who has experienced the forgiveness of 
God (for an unimaginably greater debt, according to Matthew). If, in the end, the sinner 
refuses to be reconciled, then this does not mean that she is ostracised, but rather that 
she is treated with special care and attention, as someone who needs to hear the good 
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news of Jesus.29 This resonates with Paul’s concern for the Corinthians, as explored in 
Chapter 2. 
 
It is worth returning to ponder Jesus’ cry in Lk. 23.34a (‘Father, forgive them, for they 
know not what they do’), and the similar prayer on the lips of Stephen as he is being 
stoned to death (Acts 7.60, ‘Lord, do not hold this sin against them.’). As has been 
noted already, commentators and textual critics argue about whether or not Lk. 23.34a 
came from the pen of Luke.30 However, this is to miss the theological point that in 
Luke-Acts, the followers of Jesus continue the ministry of Jesus by the power of the 
same Holy Spirit (Lk. 1.14; 24.29; Acts 2.1-41; etc.). So, it would be a surprise if, in the 
canonical form of Luke-Acts, Jesus and his followers behaved differently when facing 
similar ordeals. Both Jesus and Stephen express similar desires, that God will not count 
the sin against ‘them’. Whilst it is foolish to attempt to construct a theological principle 
on a verse or two, there are indications here that forgiveness is being offered where 
reconciliation between the parties is not possible, for one of the parties will be dead 
before the others can repent. That is, both Jesus and Stephen model a sort of forgiveness 
that goes beyond the strict repentance-forgiveness paradigm of reconciliation. However, 
it is not clear if Jesus was speaking in his capacity as a human being who was being 
killed, or whether the fuller salvific nature of Jesus’ death is in view (cf. Lk. 24.45-47) 
when he says this. That is, his earlier pronouncements of the forgiveness of sin are used 
to make a Christological point, with Jesus forgiving the sins himself,31 but this is a 
prayer to the Father to forgive.32 
 
For human beings, forgiveness is not a transaction between the individual and God, but 
is worked out in social and political life, within the context of God’s eschatological 
grace.33 Forgiving does not say what happened does not matter, nor does it entail 
forgetting.34 Rather, forgiveness recognises that something wrong has been done. The 
resurrection narratives imply that Jesus was raised as forgiveness, the judgement of 
forgiveness,35 and L Gregory Jones calls forgiveness the ‘judgement of grace’.36 Human 
forgiveness implies that the future will not be controlled by the past.37 
 
Shriver is helpful in summarising four dimensions of forgiveness between human 
beings.38 Firstly, ‘[f]orgiveness begins with a remembering and a moral judgment of 
wrong, injustice, and injury.’39 Secondly, whilst not abandoning punishment,40 it does 
require abandoning vengeance, which opens the way to a future that does not repeat old 
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crimes.41 Thirdly, it requires empathy for the humanity of the other. Finally, forgiveness 
is aimed at repairing human relationships. 
 
It is important to remember that an offence against another human being, or another 
community, is also a sin against God.42 Thus, in any situation, there are always two 
levels of forgiveness: the forgiveness being offered by God; and the forgiveness being 
offered by the party against whom the offence has been committed. It is hard to be 
specific in speaking about this, because the same term – forgiveness – is used of both, 
even though they are different, which can lead to confusion. As Volf writes,  
 
[o]nly divine forgiveness actually removes guilt. When human beings forgive 
they (1) forgo resentment, (2) refuse to press the claims of injustice against the 
other and therefore also (3) bear the cost of wrongdoing. As a result of human 
forgiveness, the guilty is treated as if he or she were not guilty (to be 
distinguished from defining forgiveness itself as treating the other as if he or she 
had not committed the offense). But unless forgiven by God, he or she remains 
guilty, human forgiveness notwithstanding.43 
 
Volf is not quite correct when he says that human beings must bear the cost of 
wrongdoing, for, in a very important way, Jesus has born the cost of this wrongdoing on 
the cross, with the result that the process of reconciliation between human beings brings 
something new (2 Cor. 5.17). Nevertheless, he is right to point out that human beings 
can forgive each other, and even be reconciled to one another, but still be in a state of 
alienation from God. That they can forgive each other is because God’s forgiveness has 
made human forgiveness possible, but human forgiveness does not imply a restoration 
of relationship with God. 
 
There is an important implication of this observation in the opposite direction, namely 
that it is possible for a person to know forgiveness, the forgiveness of God, even if this 
is withheld by the offended party, or the offended party is dead and unable to forgive. 
For example, 1 Jn. 1.9 says, ‘[i]f we confess our sins he is faithful and just to forgive us 
our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.’ In the case of the offended party 
being dead, it will still be necessary to seek forgiveness from the surviving descendants. 
 
It can be very difficult for human beings to forgive. Forgiveness may require the victim 
first of all to repent of the desire for vengeance, to refuse to reply in kind, or to refuse to 
be shaped by a dominant story, or to refuse to be shaped by what has been done.44 
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Within the Jewish and the Christian traditions, the imprecatory psalms provide a 
resource for the process of reaching a place where forgiveness can win over vengeance. 
From a Christian standpoint, Volf writes,  
 
[f]or the followers of the crucified Messiah, the main message of the 
imprecatory Psalms is this: rage belongs before God45  – not in the reflectively 
managed and manicured form of a confession, but as a pre-reflective outburst 
from the depths of the soul. This is no mere cathartic discharge of pent up 
aggression before the Almighty who ought to care. Much more significantly, by 
placing unattended rage before God we place both our unjust enemy and our 
own vengeful self face to face with a God who loves and does justice. Hidden in 
the dark chambers of our hearts and nourished by the system of darkness, hate 
grows and seeks to infest everything with its hellish will to exclusion. In the 
light of the justice and love of God, however, hate recedes and the seed is 
planted for the miracle of forgiveness. Forgiveness flounders because I exclude 
the enemy from the community of humans even as I exclude myself from the 
community of sinners. But no one can be in the presence of the God of the 
crucified Messiah for long without overcoming this double exclusion.46  
 
The ability to forgive is a gift of God,47 but it also is a craft, which must be learnt. 
Within the Christian tradition, ‘forgiveness is at once an expression of a commitment to 
a way of life, the cruciform life of holiness in which we seek to “unlearn” sin and learn 
the ways of God, and a means of seeking reconciliation in the midst of particular sins’.48 
The process of forgiveness might involve lament, prophetic indictment, or even 
rejoicing at the sufferings brought on by faithfulness to Christ.49 
 
What makes forgiveness so hard is that, in many disputes, there have been irreversible 
actions. What makes forgiveness hard is not just the rage at injustice and the desire for 
vengeance, but the ‘active suffering of forgiveness’.50 One simply cannot get away from 
the fact that forgiveness is costly, forever carrying the fact that what has been done 
cannot be undone.51 Where this becomes unjust is where one party in the dispute is 
forced, or chooses, to forgive without an agreed process of repentance taking place, but 
this will be returned to in the section on justice below. However, forgiveness is about 
the primary will to be reconciled, or to embrace, which is Volf’s metaphor for 
reconciliation: attending to justice is a precondition of actual embrace, and the will to 
embrace is the framework of the search for justice, so that embrace is the horizon of the 
struggle for justice.52 
 
Sometimes, writers on forgiveness make the category mistake that, because God has 
forgiven, human forgiveness must come first in the process of reconciliation between 
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human beings, before repentance.53 However, human relationships are a lot more 
complicated than that: God’s offer of forgiveness opens up the possibility of 
reconciliation, and the process of achieving reconciliation will usually be some sort of 
dance involving the two parties in processes of forgiveness and repentance. Moreover, 
in most human conflicts, it is unlikely that only one party is guilty. Further, forgiveness, 
and for that matter, repentance, is unlikely to be a one-off event, but is more likely to be 
a process.54 The telos of forgiveness is the restoration of communion.55 
 
As just one example of forgiveness in politics, Shriver narrates the gift of the African 
American people to all the American people. He asks, ‘What makes it possible for the 
politically excluded to include excluders in their own political vision and then to 
proceed politically to weaken the powers of exclusion? How do they relate now to their 
political enemies in ways that hold out the possibility that the latter may yet become 
their civic, political friends?’56 He argues that the overall history of the African 
American peoples in America shows how this is done, giving an ethic for enemies: ‘the 
willingness to count oneself as a neighbor and fellow citizen with enemies in spite of the 
latter’s continuing resistance to reciprocating. In the most practical sense this is 
forgiveness in politics: “We will be neighbors to you even while you are busy being 
unneighborly to us. We belong together, and one day you will know it. We will persist 
until you do.”’57 
 
This example shows that forgiveness is not necessarily passive, but it can be active in 
establishing justice. 
 
Before considering the nature of repentance, the observations of this section about 
forgiveness can be summarised in the following way. Forgiveness is offered by God, 
just as Chapter 2 showed that reconciliation is offered by God. This forgiveness is 
received through repentance. God’s prior offer of forgiveness makes human forgiveness 
both possible and imperative, but it does not imply that human forgiveness must come 
before repentance in resolving conflicts between human beings, although, where it does, 
it may be liberating for the offender. Forgiveness is aimed at the restoration of the 
offender, and at the restoration of relationship with the offender; it is not primarily 
about the well-being of the offended party, but it is nevertheless necessary for that 
party’s well-being. Forgiveness is inherently difficult because what has been done 
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cannot be undone. However, the gift of God is that reconciliation brings new life (cf. 2 
Cor. 5.17). 
3.2 Repentance 
The previous section, on forgiveness, has established that there is often a strong link 
between forgiveness and repentance. As with forgiveness, there are two levels of 
repentance that need to be considered: there is repentance towards God, and repentance 
towards those against whom the offence was committed. As was seen with 
reconciliation, these two levels are linked, for one cannot simply repent towards God 
without also repenting towards the people involved, and perhaps even towards the land, 
although it is possible to repent towards one’s neighbours without repenting towards 
God. There is a further difference between these two sorts of repentance, and it is that 
repentance towards other human beings usually requires that something be done, 
whereas to fully repent, that is to repent towards both one’s neighbours and towards 
God, the only further action required is confession of the sin, and the commitment to 
live differently in the future, through the grace and power of God (cf. 1 Jn. 1.8f).58 This 
is in line with what Paul says in 2 Cor. 5.18-21. 
 
It is the necessarily limited nature of repentance, for what has been done cannot be 
undone,59 even if full restitution is possible, that makes forgiveness difficult,60 and 
causes people to be wary of the process of reconciliation. However, the message of 
hope from the resurrection is that new beginnings are possible (cf. the ‘new creation’ in 
2 Cor. 5.17). 
 
In any conflict, the nature of repentance can only be determined through the process of 
reconciliation. At best, a system oriented towards justice, rather than repentance and 
forgiveness, wants to prescribe what repentance is, before the nature of repentance can 
be determined through the process of seeking reconciliation, and so it limits the 
possibilities of reconciliation; at worst it perpetuates the problems through retribution. 
An investigation of the relationship between reconciliation and justice will be delayed 
until the next section. The purpose of this section is to provide a sufficiently thick 
description of the nature of repentance to make these claims credible. 
 
There is a rich vein of biblical material on repentance. In the biblical understanding, 
human beings are never autonomous, but are made to serve, or to worship. Here 
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worship is being used in its deepest and broadest sense of serving that which animates 
and directs the whole of our lives. Often, the Bible contrasts worship of God with the 
worship of idols. To readers of today, this can seem quite alien. However, the root idea 
of idolatry is not bowing down before carved images, for bowing down before images is 
just making explicit the directionality of a person’s life. Rather, idolatry is life shaped 
and motivated by anything which is not God. Idolatry is bad because it results in 
concrete actions that are destructive.61 Idolatry is all the more insidious when it is not 
recognised. For example, it was shown in Chapter 2 that the Corinthians continued to 
order their lives by the patronage system, which Paul believed was antithetical to a life 
of worship of God. Or today, taking part in the dominant global economic system, 
which destroys the lives of countless millions of people, and appears to be destroying 
the fragile ecosystem, is idolatry. 
 
Human beings are called to turn away from idolatry, and to turn to God. In the Old 
Testament, the key Hebrew root is כושׂ(shûv), which means either to turn away from 
someone or something, or to turn to someone or something, and so it can be used 
(metaphorically) both for turning away from idolatry and turning to God.62 This Hebrew 
word ‘is a central word for the concept of repent. The imagery is one of a person doing 
a turnabout. Critical in this turnabout, if it is to be repentance, is the direction to which 
one turns, namely, to Yahweh. The moves in this turning process are delineated clearly 
in Jer. 3.22-4.2, a veritable liturgy of repentance: acknowledging God’s lordship (3.22); 
admitting wrongdoing (3.23), including the verbal confession, “We [I] have sinned” 
(3.25); addressing the shame (3.25); and affirming and adhering to a new conduct (4.1-
2).’63 Although expressed here in terms of a person repenting, the call to repent in the 
Old Testament is often addressed to the whole communities. Some biblical writers 
stress what is being turned away from, and others the turning to God. For example, ‘[i]n 
Ezekiel repentance is not, as with Amos and Isaiah (Wolff, Dietrich),64 described as a 
return to Yahweh, but as a turning away from wickedness.’65 
  
Often, God spoke through the Old Testament prophets to call people to repentance. 
Thompson and Martens write, concerning the call to repentance, that, 
 
[t]he imperatives are numerous, sometimes by way of warning, and at other 
times by a way of appeal: “Turn from your evil ways” (2 Kings 17.13). In times 
of revival, kings proclaimed, “Return (shûv) to the Lord, the God of Abraham, 
Isaac and Israel, that he may return (shûv) to you who are left” (2 Chronicles 
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30.6). God calls, “Return to me, for I have redeemed you” (Isaiah 44.22). Hosea 
calls, “Return (shûv) O Israel, to the LORD your God” (Hosea 14.1[2]). A 
sustained appeal for return (shûv) is given in Jer. 3.11-4.2. A wordplay makes 
the appeal memorable: “Return (shûv) turnable (meshûvâ) Israel” (Hosea 3.12); 
literally “Return (shûv) ever-turning (shōvāvîm) people” (Jer. 3.14, 22). Ezekiel 
reiterates the appeal: “Repent (shûv)! Turn (hiphil of shûv) from your idols” 
(Ezek. 14.6). The appeal to turn from idols is amplified by Joel’s appeal for 
people to turn (shûv) to Yahweh “your God” (Joel 2.12-13; cf. Mal. 3.17; Jer. 
4.1).66 
 
Repentance allows the flourishing of both human beings and the land (e.g. Hosea 14.4-
7), a reversal of the desertification of the land and the healing of humanity (e.g. Isaiah 
35), a return to life (e.g. Ezek. 37), and, where punishment for sin was understood as 
exile from the land, a return to the land (e.g. Jer. 16.15; 31.16; Ezek. 11.17; 20.34, 41f; 
34.13; 36.24; 37.21; 39. 27f). In Pauline terminology, repentance takes hold of the work 
of Christ, freeing people from the power of Sin, so that they can offer their worship to 
God.67 
 
Repentance is when a person, or community, recognises that the direction of her, or its, 
life is wrong, that intentionally or otherwise she has, or they have, been caught up in 
idolatry, but now wishes to live differently. The Bible is clear that one cannot change 
oneself, but that change comes in reaching out for help from God who can bring the 
change about. Although Olivier Clément is writing about individuals, the following is 
suggestive: 
 
Repentance entails consciously becoming ‘the one who thirsts’68 and at the same 
time recognizing the wretched nature of the idols with which we try to deceive 
this desire; the wretched nature of ‘this world’, the net of passions in which we 
think to catch creation while forgetting the Creator; the wretchedness of our own 
role, or roles, in the great theatre of ‘this world’. 
 
Then we discover the basic truth about ourselves, that we are loved, and it is 
because we are loved that we exist. 
 
And love responds to love. The awareness of being loved and the response that 
it unlocks are the only criterion of repentance.69 
 
The Old Testament does not always specify the nature of repentance, but it often 
implies that some form of concrete action must be undertaken.70 Three examples of 
repentance requiring some form of restitution will now be examined. They have been 
chosen because they have resonances with the situation in Australia. 
 
  118 
For the first example, consider Is. 5.8-10: 
 
Woe to those who join house to house, who add field to field, until there is no 
more room, and you are made to dwell alone in the midst of the land. The Lord 
of hosts has sworn in my hearing: “Surely many houses shall be desolate, large 
and beautiful houses, without inhabitant. For ten acres of vineyard shall yield 
but one bath, and a homer of seed shall yield but an ephah.” 
 
Note how sin results in the land becoming unfruitful.71 In reading this, it is important to 
recall that God’s pronouncement of judgement is supposed to drive people to 
repentance.72 The nature of repentance is not specified here, but it is clear that it must be 
more than refraining from further accumulation of land. Even an apology would be 
insufficient, because it would leave the people continuing in their state of sin. 
Therefore, repentance must include undoing the accumulation of land, and this 
requirement perhaps echoes the jubilee legislation (Lev. 25).73 
 
As a second example of repentance requiring action, consider God’s judgement on those 
who are living a lavish lifestyle that is sustained by the exploitation of the poor (e.g. 
Amos 4.1-12; 6.4-7). Here God escalates disaster in order to bring people to repentance 
(Amos 4.10), but the rich are able, to a certain extent, to shield themselves from the 
disaster affecting others (Amos 6.4-6), not worrying about others (Amos 6.6), and they 
have not repented (Amos 4.10). Again, repentance means taking action that expresses a 
genuine grief over what is happening to the land and its people (e.g. Amos 6.6), and 
which changes the unjust economic system. 
 
As a third and final example of repentance involving doing something, consider Is. 58, 
where the people’s fasting does not express repentance,74 but rather masks a complete 
lack of repentance (Is. 58.3). Here it is very clear that repentance is not just stopping 
doing wrong, but undoing the results of sin (e.g. Is. 58.6-7, 9-10,13). 
 
In all of this, it must be understood that God’s gracious action often exceeds people’s 
willingness or ability to repent. Such is God’s love that, again and again, God works to 
bring righteousness in spite of people’s failure in their response. Sometimes this is 
expressed as being because God has compassion on the people (e.g. Jer. 31.20), or 
because of God’s honour (e.g. Ezek. 36.22-38). Again, recall Paul’s insistence that God 
has acted that the world might be reconciled to God, even when the world is in a state of 
enmity towards God (Rom. 5.10).75 
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Turning to the New Testament, John the Baptist begins his proclamation with the call to  
‘repent’ in all three synoptic gospels (Mt. 3.2 // Mk. 1.4 // Lk. 3.3), and Jesus begins his 
public ministry in the same way in two of the synoptic accounts (Mt. 4.17 // Mk. 1.14). 
Such a command can only be heard against the Old Testament background of God’s oft-
repeated call to the people of Israel to repent; it was, after all, initially addressed to the 
people of Israel. That is, although repenting is an imperative, the nature of repentance 
can only be understood by contemplating the Scriptures of the people to whom the call 
to repent was addressed. God’s call was for people to turn away from their sin, and to 
return to covenant faithfulness, and to do what needed to be done in order to restore 
righteousness.76 This is consistent with the New Testament message of repenting, 
turning away from sin, being (re-)integrated into the covenant community, with a 
lifestyle shaped by the gospel imperatives of the kingdom of God, and empowered by 
the Holy Spirit to do so. 
 
One example of where the nature of repentance is spelt out by Jesus is his encounter 
with a rich young man (Mt. 19.16-30 // Mk. 10.17-31 // Lk. 18.18-30). The young man 
asks Jesus what he must do in order to inherit eternal life. In responding to the young 
man, Jesus appears to quote from the Decalogue, but in the Markan version, there is an 
extra commandment: ‘do not defraud’. Ched Myers notes that 
 
a closer reading [of Mark’s version] reveals that there is … a twist in his 
citation. For one of the statutes listed by Jesus does not in fact appear in the 
Decalogue! It is “do not defraud” (mē aposterēsēs) and is dropped by Matthew 
and Luke.77 The reference in this addition is clearly to economic exploitation: 
 
In the Greek Bible the verb is appropriated to the act of keeping back the 
wages of a hireling ….78 
 
Myers continues, 
 
[t]his is our first indication that much more is being discussed in this story than 
the personal failure of this one man: judgment is being passed upon the wealthy 
class. …  Judging this man to be affluent, Jesus stipulates that his wealth must 
be distributed to the poor. … All this emotion [the man departing gloomily] 
becomes clear in the light of the revelation that “he had much property” (echōn 
ktēmata polla): 
 
A possession is used to describe a piece of property of any kind … a 
farm or a field (Acts 5.1), and in the plural lands or estates.79 
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… With this revelation, the story of the man abruptly finishes, as if the point is 
obvious. As far as Mark is concerned, the man’s wealth has been gained by 
“defrauding” the poor – he was not “blameless” at all – for which he must make 
restitution. For Mark, the law is kept only through concrete acts of justice, not 
the façade of piety.80 
 
Although one may not want to go as far as Myers in judging wealth per se,81 it is 
certainly important to note that, in this particular case, where the wealth has been 
obtained through defrauding others, that repentance includes making restitution to those 
who have been defrauded.82 Although this man does not repent, Luke records the 
repentance of Zacchaeus, who volunteers to give half his wealth to the poor, and to 
return fourfold anything that he has taken (Lk. 19. 1-10).83 
 
In the gospel accounts, Jesus goes beyond just forgiving people their sins by also, as 
God does in the Old Testament, bringing a righteousness that undoes the results of sin.84 
Significantly, the first public words of Jesus in Luke are a reading of verses from Isaiah 
(Lk. 4.18f). Here Jesus is proclaiming that he is going to enact God’s liberation (or 
forgiveness, for recall that ‘liberate’ and ‘forgive’ are the same Greek word). One of the 
ways that he does this is by healing people, and setting them free from demon 
possession.85 That is, Jesus goes beyond requiring simply that others repent by being 
part of the undoing of the results of sin himself.86 That Jesus sends his followers out to 
do the same thing (e.g. Mk. 6.6b-13 // Lk. 9.1-6; Mt. 28.16-20; Lk. 24.44-49) means 
that the role of a follower of Jesus is not only to repent, and so do the things that need to 
be done for one’s own sin, but to work as an agent of redemption in the world. This is 
consistent with Paul’s understanding of being an ‘ambassador for Christ’ (2 Cor. 5.18, 
20). 
 
For those wishing to repent, the situation may be so overwhelmingly bad, that it is hard 
to know where to begin. Here, again, the psalms of lament are helpful, for they show 
how the expression of overwhelmed-ness in the presence of God can lead to clarity of 
vision, which then allows transformation.87 
 
In summary, the biblical material stresses that repentance is imperative, and that often 
some form of restitution is required as part of the process of repentance, although what 
has to be done is often left unspecified, but the process of repentance must include 
paying attention to those who have been affected by what has happened, and working 
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with them to seek their welfare. This may be very costly, as it was for the man who was 
required to divest himself of all of his possessions. What has happened cannot be 
undone, but there is the hope of new beginnings made possible through repentance. 
 
In order to explore further what repentance might look like in practice, two more recent 
examples will be examined briefly: the apology to the Stolen Generations in Australia; 
and what has happened in Germany since 1945. This exploration will begin by 
considering apology, which is an important part of the process of repentance. Some 
authors make the mistake of equating apology with repentance,88 but the biblical 
material has shown that repentance usually requires some actions to be taken to address 
the problems that have been caused.89 
 
An apology is a speech-act.90 Its aim is to release forgiveness, and so lead to the 
restoration of relationship. To be effective, like any speech act, an apology must satisfy 
certain criteria.91 The most complex situation for an apology is a many-to-many 
apology. Tavuchis says that such an apology has the following characteristics: it can 
only be uttered by an authorised person; it is a quintessentially public act; it is not the 
private opinion of the utterer; it is a matter of public record; it is likely to be formal in 
tone, indirect, allusive, and expressed in a compressed manner; it is speaking to a wider 
audience than those offended, including its own institutional history and posterity; it 
doesn’t enumerate all the wrongs; it is a clear prelude to reconciliation; it shifts the 
moral burden to the offended party for forgiveness; and it should not be turned into 
counter-accusation.92 
 
Apology is not easy. Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz says that the German term Entblössung 
(literally, “denuding oneself”) describes something of the difficulty of apology: 
 
[i]t identifies a process by which one returns to the point at which the original 
evil act was done. To revisit this moment implies admitting all the shameful 
implications of that act. It is painful to enter into this shame. It is more painful 
still to acknowledge this act in the face of all those who suffered it. All 
confessions of guilt carry with them an element of self-humiliation which runs 
counter to our pride and seems to threaten our self-esteem. Nobody likes to be 
stripped of his or her defences and to appear naked in front of others.93 
 
Moreover, apology is not easy in litigious cultures, where an admission of guilt is to 
open oneself to liability for compensation.94 
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As an example of apology, consider the apology given by Kevin Rudd, when Australian 
Prime Minister, in February 2008 to the ‘Stolen Generations’. The Bringing Them 
Home report,95 on the implementation and consequences of taking Indigenous children 
from their parents, was published in 1997. These people have become called ‘The 
Stolen Generations’.96 The report brought home to many non-Indigenous people in 
Australia, in a very powerful way, the reality of how some First people had been 
treated, and the drastic consequences of this. Significantly, it was not something that 
had happened a long time ago, but it was a policy that was in place up until into the 
1970s.  
 
Soon after the publication of the report, there was a large public movement, with ‘Sorry 
Books’ being inscribed by people across the country, and a national ‘Sorry Day’ was 
organised,97 which included well-attended marches across major bridges in Australia as 
a way of saying sorry to the Indigenous peoples of Australia. There have been ‘Sorry 
Days’ on an annual basis since, although in 2005, the name was changed to ‘National 
Day of Healing’, to emphasise that there is a deeper need than just apologising.98 
 
Recommendation 5a of the report was: 
 
That all Australian Parliaments 
1. officially acknowledge the responsibility of their predecessors for the laws, 
policies and practices of forcible removal, 
2. negotiate with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission a form 
of words for official apologies to Indigenous individuals, families and 
communities and extend those apologies with wide and culturally 
appropriate publicity, and 
3. make appropriate reparation as detailed in the following recommendations.99 
 
Note that the recommendation was not only for an apology, but also that suitable 
reparation should be made to those who suffered through the policies of separating 
families; that is, repentance is more than saying sorry. The repeated refusal of John 
Howard, the Prime Minister of Australia when the report was published, to make such 
an apology, despite apologies being issued by the State parliaments,100 is well 
documented in the media. Howard’s belief was that the present generation could not be 
held responsible for what happened in the past,101 and that a line needed to be drawn 
under the past, and, instead, work should be done towards a better future.102 However, 
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as will be argued in Chapter 4 that the relationship of the past to the future is not that 
simple. 
 
Howard’s party lost the election at the end of 2007, and he also lost his seat in the 
parliament. One of the policy pledges of the new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, was that 
he would make an apology. After much consultation, in front of a carefully selected 
audience,103 with a huge media presence, and with giant screens placed in public places 
across the country, Rudd made an apology on behalf of the people on 13th February, 
2008,104 the first action of the forty-second parliament of Australia. Significantly, Rudd 
recognised that the present generation of non-Indigenous Australians bears a historical 
burden, when he said, 
 
[a]s has been said of settler societies elsewhere, we are the bearers of many 
blessings from our ancestors and therefore we must also be the bearer of their 
burdens as well. Therefore, for our nation, the course of action is clear. 
Therefore for our people, the course of action is clear. And that is, to deal now 
with what has become one of the darkest chapters in Australia’s history. In 
doing so, we are doing more than contending with the facts, the evidence and the 
often rancorous public debate. In doing so, we are also wrestling with our own 
soul. This is not, as some would argue, a black-armband view of history; it is 
just the truth: the cold, confronting, uncomfortable truth – facing it, dealing with 
it, moving on from it. And until we fully confront that truth, there will always be 
a shadow hanging over us and our future as a fully united and fully reconciled 
people. It is time to reconcile. It is time to recognise the injustices of the past. It 
is time to say sorry. It is time to move forward together.105 
 
In his speech, he recognised that the apology itself did not solve the problems, and he 
hoped that it would be the beginning of a new future for all the people of Australia: 
 
I know that, in offering this apology on behalf of the government and the 
parliament, there is nothing I can say today that can take away the pain you have 
suffered personally. Whatever words I speak today, I cannot undo that. Words 
alone are not that powerful. … But my proposal is this: if the apology we extend 
today is accepted in the spirit of reconciliation, in which it is offered, we can 
today resolve together that there be a new beginning for Australia. And it is to 
such a new beginning that I believe the nation is now calling us. 
 
Australians are a passionate lot. We are also a very practical lot. For us, 
symbolism is important but, unless the great symbolism of reconciliation is 
accompanied by an even greater substance, it is little more than a clanging gong. 
It is not sentiment that makes history; it is our actions that make history. 
Today’s apology, however inadequate, is aimed at righting past wrongs. It is 
also aimed at building a bridge between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians—a bridge based on a real respect rather than a thinly veiled 
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contempt. Our challenge for the future is now to cross that bridge and, in so 
doing, embrace a new partnership between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians.106 
 
In his response to Rudd’s speech, the Leader of the Opposition, Brendan Nelson, 
although too issuing an apology, continued to stress the Howardian line that the present 
generation is not guilty for the past actions: 
 
Our responsibility, every one of us, is to understand what happened here, why it 
happened and the impact it had on not only those who were removed but also 
those who did the removing and supported it. Our generation does not own these 
actions, nor should it feel guilt for what was done in many, but certainly not all, 
cases with the best of intentions. But in saying we are sorry, and deeply so, we 
remind ourselves that each generation lives in ignorance of the long-term 
consequences of its decisions and actions. Even when motivated by inherent 
humanity and decency to reach out to the dispossessed in extreme adversity, our 
actions can have unintended outcomes. As such, many decent Australians are 
hurt by accusations of theft in relation to their good intentions.107 
 
There are a number of points that need to be made about these extracts from the 
speeches of Rudd and Nelson. Firstly, Nelson’s speech repeated the proposition that the 
present generation of people is not responsible for the policy of splitting Indigenous 
families. Whilst this is not even strictly true, for the policy only ended in the 1970s, this 
is to miss the point that the Stolen Generations are but one example of bad policies 
directed towards the Indigenous peoples of Australia; they are part of a continuing 
history of problems caused for Indigenous peoples of Australia by the non-Indigenous 
governments, and the present generation cannot absolve themselves just because they 
were not directly responsible for this particular policy. It will be argued in Chapter 4, 
that a failure of the present generation to repent for sins of the past will lead to it 
continuing policies which are destructive for the Indigenous peoples. Secondly, good 
intentions cannot excuse the policy: although the intentions of many people may have 
been good, history has shown that the results have been disastrous, and so repentance is 
required for what happened, even if the intentions were good. Thirdly, whilst Rudd’s 
speech satisfied Tavuchis’ criteria for a many to many apology (see above), it did not 
fulfil Recommendation 5a of the Bringing Them Home report (see above), because it 
did not promise any form of reparation. That is, his speech failed to be a full act of 
repentance. However, Rudd did detail some concrete measures to help the people who 
had been affected by the removals, as well as more general policies to try to tackle the 
significant welfare problems of Indigenous people in Australia. However, as Chapter 4 
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will argue, these are unlikely to be effective unless they are part of a bigger process of 
repentance. Finally, the nature of repentance cannot be determined by the Subsequent 
peoples, but must arise from engaging with the First peoples. Some of the requirements 
of repentance for what was done to the Stolen Generations were made explicit in the 
Recommendation 5a of the Bringing Them Home report, but they were ignored in 
Rudd’s speech. And this begs the bigger question of what is required of the Subsequent 
peoples in Australia in order to repent in full towards the First peoples. To use an image 
from Rudd’s speech, the Subsequent peoples of Australia must walk over the bridge 
constructed by this apology, and see who they find on the other side. It is still too early 
to judge the depth of the repentance that has been initiated by this apology. 
 
More generally, the example of the apology from Kevin Rudd shows that repentance is 
more than making an apology, and that the nature of repentance can only be determined 
by engagement with the injured parties. In the case of the Stolen Generations, the 
authors of the report specified what they believed was the nature of repentance in this 
case, recommendations which arose from an extensive engagement with those who had 
been affected by the policies of taking children away from their families. This is an 
example of the principle that the nature of repentance is problem-specific, and that it 
can only be determined by engagement with the injured parties. 
 
Sometimes, upon examination of effective apologies, it is found that considerable 
preliminary work oriented towards repentance has happened before the apology is 
issued, and which allows the apology to be recognised as a reconciliatory gesture. For 
example, a German soldier apologised to some Belarusians in 1994, and this apology 
was received as reconciliatory by both young and old, but this apology followed several 
weeks of building a home for children affected by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.108 
Similarly, when Billy Brandt knelt down at the memorial to the Warsaw uprising in 
1970, rather than the usual ritual of bowing his head, it was received with gratitude by 
many Poles, and was important in paving the way for his Ostpolitik, leading to ‘a 
normalization of relationships between Germany and its neighbours in Eastern 
Europe.’109 However, as will be seen below, the action by Brandt was part of a larger 
process of repentance that had been happening in German politics.  
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Repentance is a difficult process, and it can take a long time to achieve. As a second 
example of the process of repentance, consider some of the steps that Germany has 
taken over the decades since 1945.110, 111 
 
The difficulty for a nation of facing up to the enormity of what it has done cannot be 
underestimated; it can mean adjusting to a whole new way of perceiving of its 
identity.112 Yet, very soon after the end of the war, some leaders of the evangelical 
church in Germany met with representatives of other European churches. At the end of 
the meeting, the German church leaders issued a “Confession of Guilt”, which has 
become know as the “Stuttgart Declaration”.113 Some of the people who promulgated 
the Stuttgart Declaration had been imprisoned for opposing the Nazi regime.114 It was 
only a mild confession: three hundred words in total in English translation, of which 
only 3 sentences made a vague and non-specific confession. Mild as it was, the 
declaration raised a storm of protest in politics, in the press, and in the church.115 In 
1947, the Confessing Church issued the “Darmstadt Declaration”. It was much more 
political, and it brought four specific charges against the political-ecclesiastical culture 
of Germany. It detailed failures of the church that had enabled Nazism to thrive,116 but it 
still did not mention anti-Semitism and the murder of millions of Jews, nor the conduct 
of the German army in the places it invaded. It was not until 1950 that the first local 
synod of the church put on record the words, ‘[w]e declare that through negligence and 
silence before the God of mercy, we have shared in the guilt for the crime which was 
committed by men of our nation against the Jews.’ Gustav Heinemann, in his closing 
address to the synod, said that the Stuttgart Declaration ‘had on this occasion been 
defined in real terms at last.’117 
 
So to come to the truth about enormous evils can take time, but also time does not 
change anything of itself, and there is the risk that people will forget. For example, from 
1950, Germany became involved in the Cold War; it made alliances with some of its 
recent enemies, and it began a new conflict with others of its recent enemies. In such a 
situation, it is easy to forget past sins, and church leaders who tried to continue the 
process of repentance were branded as traitors, and America regarded them as people 
who had been fooled by, and were being used by the Communists. 
 
The German nation made financial restitution to some of the people who had been 
damaged by the war. In 1952, a law was passed whereby those who had survived the 
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war with their property intact had to cede half of its value over thirty years to those who 
had fled from the East, or who had suffered war damages, or who had fled from the 
Nazis. By 1982, DM 121 billion had been redistributed. It paid the same amount again 
to people in the Nazi-occupied nations who could prove that they had been robbed or 
had had suffering inflicted upon them. Compensation was paid to individual Jewish 
people, and a gift was made to Israel.118 The German word for this process – 
Wiedergutmachung – is ‘less fiscally tinged’ than ‘compensation,’119 and means making 
good again. A report about their compensation notes that ‘[n]o matter how large the 
sum, no amount of money will ever suffice to compensate for National Socialist 
persecution. … But in dealing with the legacy of the Hitler regime, the Federal Republic 
of Germany has established a precedent, namely that of legislating and carrying out a 
comprehensive system of restitution for injustice.’120 
 
In 1961-62 in Tübingen, the churches made a declaration about the border with Poland, 
and recognising Poland’s status as a country, which was ahead of the political climate in 
exploring the resolution of the border dispute between Germany and Poland. After 
Poland was finally recognised by the German government, there was a meeting of 
school teachers from the two countries so that they could teach a mutually acceptable 
history.121  
 
On 8th May, 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the end of the war in Europe, the president 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard Freiherr von Weizsäcker, gave a 
remarkable speech to the Bundestag, where, amongst other things in speaking about 
Germany’s past, he recounted and apologised for German mistreatment of others. He 
stressed that those of later generations are not guilty for what happened, but what was 
done must always be remembered.122 Shriver writes that this speech ‘touches almost all 
the requirements that are to be met by offending parties if genuine forgiveness is to be 
extended to them by the offended: acceptance of moral judgement; grateful 
acknowledgement that forbearance rather than revenge is being tendered from the other 
side; shared empathy for the hurts that have been inflicted; and the turn in principle, 
policy, and behavior toward a new reconciliation with the offended.’ He concludes that 
‘the von Weizsäcker speech is … a powerful example of the relevance of public 
repentance to politics.’123 
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There is evidence that there is still considerable resentment towards Germany in some 
places,124 which indicates that the process of reconciliation between Germany and some 
other countries is still not complete. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is 
focused on the situation in Australia, to investigate the reasons for this – it could be the 
result of an incomplete process of repentance, or a resistance to forgiveness, or perhaps 
there has not been sufficient engagement between those repenting and those forgiving – 
this example indicates that the length of a reconciliation process may need to be 
measured in generations rather than in years. 
 
Before drawing this section to a close, it is worth noting some observations about the 
process of repentance. From his research, and from his own experience in working to 
bring peace in various conflicts around the world, John Paul Lederach notes that there 
are three levels of leadership that can be involved in making peace: the top-level 
leadership; the middle-range leadership; and the grass-roots leadership.125 The problem 
with operating with people at the top-level is that ‘they are generally locked into 
positions taken with regard to the perspectives and issues in conflict.’126 This is 
especially the case when negotiations are being made in public, under media scrutiny. 
The top-level leaders are guardians of the group’s position; they have a dilemma 
because they ‘must maintain publicly articulated goals and demands in order to not to 
be seen as weak yet move towards each other at the table.’127 (This means that the 
pursuit of Howard when Prime Minister of Australia, to force him to make an apology, 
was probably politically inept.) Clearly, not all top-level leaders have the power and 
influence that is sometimes accorded them in negotiations, but they are important in the 
peacemaking process, because they are the public face of the group, and they set the 
public policy, even if they have limited power to implement it. Negotiation at the 
middle-range leadership level, however, ‘is based on the idea that the middle range 
contains a set of leaders with a determinant location in the conflict who, if integrated 
properly, might provide the key to creating an infrastructure for achieving and 
sustaining peace.’128 
 
To draw this section to a close, the observations concerning repentance can be 
summarised in the following way. Repentance is imperative, and it usually requires 
more than an apology; although the sin cannot be undone, which is what makes 
forgiveness difficult, some form of action is usually required to resolve the problems 
caused by the sin. In the biblical examples that were discussed, exactly what needed to 
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be done was not always spelt out; in practice, the nature of repentance can only be 
determined through engagement with the injured party, in the process of seeking 
reconciliation. The two examples – the Stolen Generations in Australia, and Germany 
since 1945 – showed how complex, difficult, costly, and lengthy the process of 
repentance is in practice. Chapter 6 is a more detailed exploration of what the 
beginnings of the process of repentance might look like for the Subsequent peoples of 
Australia. That is, it is an attempt at giving a thick description of the nature of 
repentance in this particular case. 
 
The next section considers the vexed question of the relationship between reconciliation 
and justice. It will be argued that justice is established, as a gift of God, in the process 
of seeking reconciliation. 
3.3 Reconciliation and Justice 
Reconciliation and justice are inseparable.129 Both reconciliation and justice come as 
gifts of God as the parties involved in a conflict seek to be reconciled to one another; as 
people engage in a dance of forgiveness and repentance that is aimed towards 
reconciliation, so justice appears as the gift of God. The clue for this was given in 
Section 2.5, where it was noted that Paul argues that the grace of God makes a double 
substitution possible: enmity is replaced by peace; and sin by justice. It is this insight, 
that justice is established in the process of seeking reconciliation, which will be 
elucidated in this section.  
 
In focusing on reconciliation, this thesis has been swimming against the tide of Western 
political philosophy, which has focused on justice.130 In Chapter 1, it was noted that one 
of the problems that many people see with the idea of reconciliation is that it sometimes 
seems to be an excuse for avoiding justice, and it is worth recalling the words of Susan 
Dwyer that were quoted in the opening paragraphs of that chapter: 
 
The notable lack of any clear account of what reconciliation is, and what it 
requires, justifiably alerts the cynics among us. Reconciliation is being urged 
upon people who have been bitter and murderous enemies, upon victims and 
perpetrators of terrible human rights abuses, upon groups of individuals whose 
very self-conceptions have been structured in terms of historical and often state-
sanctioned relations of dominance and submission. The rhetoric of reconciliation 
is particularly common in situations where traditional judicial responses to 
wrongdoing are unavailable because of corruption in the legal system, 
staggeringly large numbers of offenders, or anxiety about the political 
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consequences of trials and punishments. Hence, a natural worry, exacerbated by 
the use of explicitly therapeutic language of healing and recovery, is that talk of 
reconciliation is merely a ruse to disguise the fact that a “purer” form of justice 
cannot be realized.131 
 
It is hoped that the work of the previous chapter and this one has given a clear enough 
account of the nature of reconciliation, and that the rest of this chapter will show that 
this is truly just. 
 
Often, people will argue that justice must be done before reconciliation can be pursued; 
even the Kairos document says that it is unchristian to ask for reconciliation before 
justice.132 To advocate cheap reconciliation is to betray those who suffer injustice, 
deception, and violence, ‘[h]ence an adequate notion of reconciliation must include 
justice as a constitutive element. And yet it is precisely here that watchfulness is 
needed. For the imperative of justice, severed from the overarching framework of grace 
within which it is properly situated and from the obligation to nonviolence, underlies 
much of the Christian faith’s misuse by religiously legitimized violence.’133 
 
Volf rightly observes that ‘there is far too much dishonesty in the single-minded search 
for truth, too much injustice in the uncompromising struggle for justice’134 Here he is 
probably thinking of the violence that can arise when searching for justice without the 
prior will for embrace. But justice is even more elusive than this, and injustice can arise, 
even when people are working for what seems obviously to be just.135 For example, in 
Australia, there was a large campaign to gain equality of wages for First people and 
non-Indigenous people working in the cattle industry. Although cattle stations were 
established on Aboriginal land, the First people were able to maintain their connection 
to the land by working on it, and they were able to return to do their ceremonial work 
during certain seasons when there was no work on the cattle stations. Important 
Aboriginal business, such as arranging marriages, could be transacted when 
communities came together, such as at race meetings.136 However, when equal wages 
were awarded, most First people were driven out of the cattle industry. The result was 
that they not only had no income, but whilst they worked in the cattle industry, they 
were still on their own land, and now they had been driven off it.137 Furthermore, as will 
be seen in Chapter 5, by forcing them onto land which was the responsibility of other 
First people, connections were built up with the land in the new places, which has led to 
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conflicts between Aboriginal groups wanting to make land claims, because now more 
than one group had valid connections with the land. 
 
All human notions of justice are going to be inadequate. Marshall writes:  
 
If God is just and God is one, then God’s justice must stand apart from all 
cultural construals of justice. Yet even if we grant the universality of God’s 
justice, the fact remains that every human attempt to give account of that justice, 
and to apply it concretely to real-life situations is unavoidably particular, and 
hence partial and fallible. Divine justice itself may be absolute and pure, but our 
capacity to know, describe, and fulfil that justice most assuredly is not.138 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an extended study of the nature of justice, 
but it will be argued that justice is best understood relationally, and that justice will 
arise from the process of seeking reconciliation. 
 
Before making this exploration, it is important to highlight again that Western notions 
of justice are sometimes quite different from the ends of justice in other cultures.139 For 
example, for the people of Bougainville, it was essential to make peace within villages, 
or else they could be open to attack from other villages. That is, justice was oriented 
towards reintegrating offenders into the village.140 There were no gaols in this culture, 
and the imposition of courts and gaols from foreign cultures has been disruptive to the 
traditional process of reconciliation, branding people as criminals, and their enforced 
exclusion prohibits the possibility of reincorporating them into the community.141 
Further, a foreign-owned copper mining operation and an ensuing war, disrupted many 
aspects of traditional society.142 After the war, people began to work at rebuilding 
broken communities through reconciliation. For disputing groups, a win-win outcome 
was pursued. The aim of the process of negotiation was to reach a point where 
communities were gathered, and people stood before the gathering and confessed what 
they had done, and asked for forgiveness. They gave gifts as tokens of the seriousness 
of the event and the seriousness of their commitment. In the case where a person or 
community has harmed another, a version of restorative justice was followed, where 
token gifts were offered at the end of the process. It was stressed that these were ‘gifts 
to wash away the tears’, not compensation.143 Reconciliation was recognised to be a 
process that could take many years, and where there may be a succession of attempts to 
achieve a good enough result.144 Throughout this process, people found that they were 
drawing on traditional wisdom that was resurfacing. This is not to romanticise 
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traditional culture. An example of an unjust situation in traditional ‘justice’ is where a 
rapist is reintegrated into the community through giving a gift and marrying the woman 
whom he raped, without considering the desires and opinions of the woman who was 
raped.145 Here a proper mediation process, which listened to all the parties, needs to go 
beyond the traditional notions of justice in this culture. Further, and unfortunately, a 
situation has developed where some people in power were trying to initiate amnesty 
provisions, which will disrupt the process of reconciliation.146 
 
After a decade and more of strife, the results of the deeply traumatic events are still 
present in Bougainville. Some United Nations observers, especially those who have 
been involved in Africa, are pessimistic about the Bougainvillean reconciliation 
process. ‘They do not accept that the reconciliation ceremonies, beautiful and moving as 
they are, are sufficient to prevent future blood feuds from breaking out when people are 
stressed by anxiety or jealousy. They believe that punishment and sanctions are 
necessary to prevent future payback from people who have suffered murder, rape and 
torture themselves and in their families.’147 However, it is not clear that these 
alternative, culturally-situated notions of justice are any more adequate. No doubt, there 
will continue to be problems in Bougainville, but from Howley’s account of what has 
been happening in Bougainville, there is no reason to conclude that the processes that 
they have adopted cannot continue to work.148 
 
In the Western tradition, there have been two major approaches to justice: retributive 
and restorative justice. The political experiments in South Africa and Chile, and micro 
experiments on alternative ways of dealing with crime, have begun to shift the focus 
towards restorative justice. But there is no easy calculator that can determine what must 
be done. For example, what does restorative justice mean when the land that was taken 
has been subsequently ‘owned’ by another group for generations?149 
  
To enable clearer thinking about the notion of justice, this investigation will begin with 
the critique of distributive justice made by Iris Marion Young. The fundamental 
problem with this notion of justice is that it reduces justice to the sharing out of goods: 
individuals or communities are nodes and there is a pile of goods that must be shared 
out between them. However, this ignores the relational and structural issues that lead to 
injustice.150 She says that the distributive paradigm is ideological because it forces 
people to talk about distribution, rather than looking at the bigger issues of oppression 
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and domination.151 It is often the case that there are inequalities of power in conflict 
situiations. Justice cannot be blind to difference, but a politics of difference means that, 
in order to promote social justice, some groups will require special treatment.152 Young 
writes that 
 
I endorse and follow the general conception of justice derived from a conception 
of communicative ethics. The idea of justice here shifts from a focus on 
distributive patterns to procedural issues of participation in deliberation and 
decisionmaking. For a norm to be just, everyone who follows it must in 
principle have an effective voice in its consideration and be able to agree to it 
without coercion. For a social condition to be just, it must enable all to meet 
their needs and exercise their freedom; thus justice requires that all be able to 
express their needs.153 
 
Whilst Young overplays the idea of freedom here,154 she is certainly right to emphasise 
the role of communication, deliberation and decision-making, the importance of 
relationships in the notion of justice. This should not be surprising, for conflicts are 
based in broken relationships.155 
 
For many people, the punishment of wrong-doers is an important component of justice. 
Villa-Vicencio recalls a conversation that he had with an elderly man at the gallows 
where Rudolph Hess was hanged in Auschwitz, who said, “You’ve got to have a bit of 
blood in order to have reconciliation.”156 However, Christopher Marshall points out that 
this ascribes too much efficacy to punishment. He rightly argues that 
 
[p]unishment is a finite mechanism; there is a limit to what it can achieve. The 
penal theory of atonement ascribes too much potency to punishment and too 
little to sin. It conceives of sin as a debt incurred against God, which the 
punishment imposed on Christ serves to discharge. But Paul takes sin more 
seriously than that. Sin is more than a moral debt on the pages of the divine 
ledger. It is an alien power that distorts personality, corrupts relationships, and 
enslaves the human will. Sin is not merely an affront to God’s dignity requiring 
reparation, or a breaking of God’s rules requiring correction; it is a state of 
volitional-moral enslavement and relational distortion that requires deliverance 
and reconciliation.157 It is not clear how punishment can effect the kind of 
comprehensive deliverance from the power of sin and renewal of relationship 
with God which Paul ascribes to the atoning work of Christ. Nor is it clear why, 
if God cannot tolerate sin as much as penal advocates insist, God should be 
concerned primarily to exact punishment rather than root out the causes and 
effects of sin in the lives of those it infests. Why shouldn’t a healing remedy, 
instead of payment of damages, satisfy God’s justice? And if it is the lethal 
punishment of Christ that vindicates justice, where does the resurrection fit in? 
Why is it even necessary? How can Paul speak of Christ “being raised for our 
justification” (Rom. 4.24)?158 
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To develop a more adequate notion of justice, one must turn first of all to the Old 
Testament. Kathryn Tanner is helpful in her elucidation of three features of justice in 
the Old Testament: ‘First, justice and righteousness are understood in the context of 
relationship. Second, they are not often opposed to mercy.159 And third, human justice 
and righteousness are supposed to be modeled on, or to correspond to, God’s own 
justice and righteousness.’160 Justice and righteousness language in the Old Testament 
are to be understood in the context of the covenant relationship between God and Israel. 
To justify someone, or the community, is to draw her or them back into the covenant 
relationship. As has been seen already, the purpose of God’s pronouncement of 
judgement on people was to draw them to repentance so that they might be drawn back 
into the community. Thus mercy is an aspect of God’s desire to keep the covenant.161 
The people were expected to act towards other human beings in the way that God 
treated them.162 
 
In the West, a judge is supposed to determine guilt and to apply the law dispassionately, 
but in Israel, during biblical times, judgement was about determining the right standing 
of a person within the covenant; the goal of the forensic process was the restoration of 
fellowship within the community. Punitive penalties were not to maintain cosmic 
balance, but to restore the integrity of the community’s life and its relationship to God.  
God’s righteousness consists of steadfast loyalty to the people and his saving 
intervention on their behalf.163 This 
 
included rescuing Israel in times of need164 and of war, forgiving her sins, and 
defending the rights of the poor and weak within Israel’s own borders through 
the promulgation and enforcement of law,165 the inspiration of prophetic word, 
and the appointment and instruction of kings. For Israel, then, the justice of God 
was not an abstract theological or philosophical axiom; it was something about 
God’s being learned from the concrete experience of God’s actions of claiming, 
blessing, and rescuing Israel. Righteousness language in the Hebrew Bible is 
thus action language as well as relational language. … God’s righteousness is 
characteristically associated in the Hebrew scriptures with God’s love and grace, 
with God’s generosity, forgiveness, and liberation. God’s justice and God’s 
mercy stand, significantly, in parallel, not in opposition.166 
 
Perhaps this hints at why many white people refused to take part in the TRC: they 
regarded justice as punishment, but the native Africans were concerned with giving the 
gift of bringing them into relationship. Many white people could not receive the 
judgment of forgiveness.167 
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This understanding of righteousness and justice is continued into the New Testament, 
expressed particularly in the writings of Paul. Dunn rightly points out that Paul takes 
over this concept of righteousness in his use of the language, so, ‘the righteousness of 
God’ (Rom. 1.17) is Paul’s way of ‘explicating “the power of God for salvation”’ 
(Rom. 1.16).’168 As Marshall writes, justification then is ‘a demonstration of God’s 
rectifying power to accomplish justice on earth.’169 
 
In Section 2.5, it was seen that Paul brings the concepts of justice and reconciliation 
together in 2 Cor. 5.18-21, and it was argued there that this hinted that justice comes as 
a gift of God in the process of seeking reconciliation. Paul brings justice and 
reconciliation together again in Rom. 5.1-11. In 5.9-10, Paul uses justification (to make 
just, or to make righteous) and reconciliation in parallel: both justification (v. 9) and 
reconciliation (v.10b) have the same effect, namely that by them ‘we … shall be saved 
by’ him.170 There is a further linking of justice and reconciliation, for the peace that 
results from reconciliation, the state of being no longer enemies of God (v. 10), is 
brought about by justification (v. 1).171 Dunn overstates the case when he writes, ‘the 
close parallel between v. 9 and v. 10b shows that Paul regards one as equivalent to the 
other … so … a sharp distinction between the language of sacrifice and reconciliation 
should be avoided.’172 Firstly, he speaks without sufficient care of the language of 
sacrifice being parallel to that of reconciliation, whereas the concepts that Paul is 
bringing together here are justification and reconciliation; sacrifice is the mechanism 
that Paul says has brought about justification (and hence reconciliation, as justification 
and reconciliation are being used in parallel here).  Secondly, as Chapter 2 and this 
chapter have been showing, reconciliation is a very rich concept, and is not at all 
identical to justification. However, what is true, and is firmly established by Paul in 
Rom. 5.1-11, is that justification, the establishment of justice, and reconciliation come 
together as a gift from God; that is, justice will be established in the process of 
reconciliation. 
 
Volf is helpful in arguing that the struggle for justice can only happen within the 
overarching framework of the pursuit of reconciliation. He concludes that justice is 
subordinate to grace,173 that justice is transcended by grace,174 that reconciliation has 
primacy over liberation, and love over justice.175 Four interconnected claims follow 
from his discussion.176 Firstly, the primacy of reconciliation over justice implies that the 
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will to embrace (i.e. to be reconciled) is unconditional and indiscriminate.177 Secondly, 
embrace can only happen when truth and justice have been established. That is, 
reaching reconciliation is a process which ‘includes the will to rectify the wrongs that 
have been done and to reshape the relationship according to what one believes to be true 
and just.’178 Thirdly, the nature of justice is shaped by the desire for embrace, that is, 
‘[t]o agree on justice in a situation of conflict, you must want more than justice; you 
must want to embrace.’179 Fourthly, to struggle for justice outside the framework of 
seeking reconciliation will only lead to further injustice. 
 
Reconciliation is the process of negotiating forgiveness and repentance. It was argued in 
the previous section that the nature of repentance could only be known through the 
process of engaging with the other parties in the conflict with the aim of achieving 
reconciliation. The degree of the willingness of the parties in a dispute to engage in the 
process of reconciliation, the degree to which they repent and forgive, is the degree to 
which justice can be established. 
 
With this in mind, it is now possible to see why Dwyer is concerned that seeking 
reconciliation is inherently unjust.180 It may be that, in emerging from a conflict 
situation, the parties are only able to commit to a limited degree of forgiveness and 
repentance in the first instance, or it may be that some parties are hiding behind the 
rhetoric of reconciliation in order to protect themselves from doing the hard work of 
either repenting or forgiving. In the former case, what can be achieved must be 
understood as the first step in the process of reconciliation; all parties need to approach 
the process with the desire that complete reconciliation be achieved, but recognising 
that a lesser goal is all that can be achieved for the moment. However, the latter case is 
not reconciliation at all. 
 
These insights help interpret the problems that were highlighted in Section 1.2 with the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, which has fallen short of 
delivering full reconciliation. In the TRC, not only did the granting of amnesty to 
perpetrators, under certain conditions, offend some people’s notions of justice, but the 
TRC was also constrained by only being able to recommend, but not enforce, 
reparation.181 That is, a limited level of reconciliation and justice was built into the TRC 
from the start; it was the best that could be negotiated at the time in the move from 
armed conflict towards democratic elections. To a certain extent, these problems are 
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mitigated if it is recognised that reconciliation is ‘a long-term process that requires 
ongoing efforts of empowerment, confrontation, pain, dialogue, exchange, 
experimentation, risk-taking, the building of common values, and identity 
transformation.’182 However, this longer-term process of reconciliation must be 
undertaken if a fuller reconciliation, and hence a deeper justice, is to be achieved. 
 
John Paul Lederach gives an example of the relationship between justice and 
reconciliation from his work in Nicaragua during the 1980s. He noticed that Psalm 85 
was read in conciliation meetings. Verse 10, translated from the Spanish in which it was 
read, reads, ‘Truth and mercy have met together; peace and justice have kissed.’ At a 
training workshop, he asked the facilitators of the mediation process what they 
understood by this. For ‘truth’ they suggested honesty, revelation, clarity, open 
accountability, and vulnerability. Mercy brought forth images of compassion, 
forgiveness, acceptance, and a new start, grace. Justice evoked making things right, 
rectifying the wrong, and restitution. Finally, peace was associated with harmony, unity, 
well-being, the feeling and prevalence of respect and security. Ledarach then put these 
four concepts as circles in four corners of a Venn-diagram, and asked what they should 
call the place where truth, mercy, justice, and peace meet, and one of the participants 
immediately said ‘That place is reconciliation.’ Lederach comments on this, saying, 
‘What was so striking about this conceptualization was the idea that reconciliation 
represents a social space. Reconciliation is a locus, a place where people and things 
come together.’183 
 
This section has argued that the pursuit of justice by itself is likely to lead to further 
injustice; even what seems to be just may turn out to be unjust. Justice is relational, and 
is aimed at the establishing of right relationships. Justice is rightly pursued within the 
context of seeking reconciliation. It is only through the process of reconciliation, the 
negotiation of forgiveness and repentance, that the nature of repentance, and hence 
justice, becomes clear, and it is God’s justice-making, God’s work of reconciliation, 
which makes the establishment of justice possible. What happens when one or more of 
the parties involved in a conflict refuses to be part of the process of reconciliation will 
be addressed in the next section.  
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3.4 Unfinished Business: Reconciliation and Eschatology 
In Section 1.2.3, it was noted that people reflecting on the work of the TRC came to see 
it as part of a process of reconciliation: it would not deliver reconciliation itself, but it 
could lay some foundations for the continuing work of reconciliation. Reconciliation is 
always going to be a process.184 It will probably be the case that in any process of 
reconciliation, the parties involved will reach points at which no further progress can be 
made for the time being, either because a significant level of reconciliation has been 
achieved, or because there is currently an insurmountable problem that needs more time 
and work before it can be resolved. 
 
The Christian faith is realistic about the proclivity to sin, and that there will not be any 
final reconciliation in this world. Rather, it looks towards the eschatological banishment 
of enmity (e.g. Rev. 21.1-7). Schreiter expresses it in this way: 
 
We can hold to a conflictive view of reality without making conflict the ultimate 
shape of that reality. This is essentially what Christianity does. It acknowledges 
the enmity between God and the world, and that this enmity will be overcome 
completely somehow in the future, eschatologically.  Perhaps it would be better 
to say that not only may a Christian hold to a conflictive view of reality, but a 
Christian must hold to such a view in order to acknowledge sin and evil in the 
world and to participate in the process of overcoming it.185 
 
It is the nature of human relationships that there will never be complete reconciliation in 
this life. Nevertheless, it is understood that this eschatological hope has broken into 
history through the death and resurrection of Jesus, so that the pursuit of reconciliation 
can bear fruit. 
 
However, what is to be done in practice when one party in a conflict continually refuses 
approaches to seek reconciliation? Typically, this question is asked by people who feel 
that they are the ones who have been wronged, and they are asking about what must be 
done when people refuse to repent, but it can equally be asked the other way around, 
from the point of view of people who wish to repent, where forgiveness is being 
withheld. Volf is surely right when he eschews the messianic task of achieving the final 
reconciliation, but asks instead ‘what resources we need to live in peace in the absence 
of the final reconciliation.’186 There is no getting away from the fact that to offer 
forgiveness, to pursue a non-violent resistance to evil, may ultimately be costly. This 
does not mean that the evil of the other is condoned, but it may be that there is no overt 
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way to stand up to it,187 or that one loses one’s life in the process (in Christian terms, 
taking up one’s cross and following Jesus (Mt. 16.24-28 // Mk. 8.34-9.1 // Lk. 9.23-
27)). However, there are two important caveats to this: firstly, self-oblation is not an 
option, for a cross is always given to someone to carry; and, secondly, human 
martyrdom is not redemptive in the same way as the death of Jesus. As Yoder helpfully 
writes,  
 
[t]he cross is not a recipe for resurrection. Suffering is not a tool to make people 
come around, nor a good in itself. But the kind of faithfulness that is willing to 
accept evident defeat rather than complicity with evil is, by virtue of its 
conformity with what happens to God when he works among us, aligned with 
the ultimate triumph of the lamb. This vision of ultimate good being determined 
by faithfulness and not by results is the point where we moderns get off.188 
 
Christian theologians argue about what will happen at the eschaton, but I find Volf’s 
reading the most convincing one, that in the end there will be the ‘final exclusion of 
everything that refuses to be redeemed by God’s suffering love.’189 Human beings are 
not to attempt a final solution, but if their righteous actions are rejected, and the parties 
permanently refuse God’s redeeming grace, then they will be permanently excluded 
from God’s loving embrace. That is, whilst people might suffer continuing injustice 
from those who refuse to be reconciled with them, and must act in righteousness in 
return, ultimately there will be a final judgement of those who exclude themselves from 
God’s love.190 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has elucidated further the nature of reconciliation, as a dance, a negotiation 
of repentance and forgiveness, which leads to the establishment of justice. 
 
Forgiveness is offered by God, and is received through repentance. God’s prior offer of 
forgiveness makes human forgiveness both possible and imperative, but it does not 
imply that human forgiveness must come before repentance in resolving conflicts 
between human beings. Forgiveness is aimed at the rehabilitation of the offender, and at 
restoring relationships with the offender. Forgiveness is inherently difficult because 
what has been done cannot be undone. However, the gift of God is that reconciliation 
brings new life (cf. 2 Cor. 5.17). 
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Where there has been sin, repentance too is imperative, and it usually requires more 
than an apology; although the sin cannot be undone, some form of action is usually 
required to resolve the problems caused by the sin. In practice, the nature of repentance 
can only be determined through engagement with the injured party, in the process of 
seeking reconciliation. Two examples – the Stolen Generations in Australia, and 
Germany since 1945 – showed how complex, difficult, costly, and lengthy the process 
of repentance is in practice. 
 
This chapter argued that the pursuit of justice by itself is likely to lead to further 
injustice; even what seems to be just may turn out to be unjust. Justice is relational, and 
is aimed at the establishing of right relationships, dealing with the past. Justice is rightly 
pursued within the context of seeking reconciliation. It is only through the process of 
reconciliation, the negotiation of forgiveness and repentance, that the nature of 
repentance, and hence justice, becomes clear, and it is God’s justice-making, God’s 
work of reconciliation, which makes the establishment of justice possible. 
 
The process of reconciliation is always going to be incomplete; the degree of 
reconciliation that can be achieved is the degree of justice and the level of peace that 
can be established. The final section of this chapter considered what happens when one 
or more of the parties involved in a conflict refuses to be part of the process of 
reconciliation. This is less than ideal, but the one-sided approach of repentance, or, 
more likely, the living out of forgiveness, remains imperative, is rewarded with the 
release that comes from acting rightly, and looks towards the reformation of the other 
parties in the conflict, be it within the historical horizon, or only on the eschatological 
horizon. 
 
In all this, it must not be forgotten that the whole basis of being able to seek 
reconciliation is a gift of God. Again it has been seen that God’s offer of reconciliation 
through the offering of forgiveness, had made space in the world for human beings to be 
reconciled to one another. It was also seen that it was possible for human beings to be 
reconciled to one another, without reference to God, but that forgiveness relies on God’s 
prior offer of forgiveness, and that repentance in its fullest meaning is to begin, or 
renew a creative relationship with God, from whom the creativity that enables 
forgiveness and repentance flows. 
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There remains one significant issue to be addressed, and that is what reconciliation, 
forgiveness, repentance and justice, mean in conflicts that have been running over 
multiple generations. Typical questions that arise are: Is the present generation guilty of 
the sins of the past? Can a line be drawn under the past because we are going to live 
differently in the future? Can the present generation do anything about what happened 
in the past? The next chapter will argue that the present generation is likely to sin in 
ways that are shaped by the sins of the past, and so a line cannot simply be drawn under 
the past in order to travel into an untrammelled future. Furthermore, the present 
generation in any dispute is part of a corporate entity which remains guilty of its sins in 
the past. The only way to overcome these problems is to seek reconciliation through a 
process of repentance.
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step is God’s healing of the person who has been wronged, who then must forgive the 
perpetrator, which then leads the wrongdoer to repentance. Interestingly, for problems 
between communities of people, Schreiter says that repentance must come first, then 
forgiveness, then reconciliation. Botcharova, “Implementation”, pp. 288ff, agrees with 
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their land (1.3); removing peoples from their land and taking them into slavery (1.6); 
breaking a treaty and handing the people over to others (1.9); unrelenting hostility 
(1.11); rapacious murder of women in order to take over their lands (1.13); the insulting 
and shaming of a people group (2.1); and so on. This example was suggested by 
Thompson, JA and Martens, Elmer A, שֹוכ, New International Dictionary of Old 
Testament Theology and Exegesis volume 4, (Carlisle: Paternoster Publishing, 1997), p. 
58. 
62 Thompson and Martens, כושׂ, p. 56. 
63 Thompson and Martens, כושׂ, p. 57. 
64 Here Zimmerli is making reference to the following works that appear in his footnote: 
Wolff, Hans Walter, “Das Thema ‘Umkehr’ in der alttestamentlichen Prophetie,” 
Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 48 (1951), 129-148; and Dietrich, Erich Kurt, Die 
Umkehr im Alten Testament und im Judentum (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936), 
especially pp. 137-152. 
65 Zimmerli, Walther, Ezekiel volume 1, Hermeneia Commentary (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1979), p. 386. 
66 Thompson and Martens, כושׂ, p. 57. 
67 That is, there is only ‘freedom from’, not absolute freedom. Chapter 4, “Freedom”, of 
Jones, Tobias, Utopian Dreams: In Search of the Good Life (London: Faber and Faber, 
2007), argues persuasively that this is the case. 
68 Clément must have Is. 55.1-3 in mind here. 
69 Clément, Olivier, On Being Human: A Spiritual Anthropology (1986, ET: New York: 
New City Press, 2000), p. 21. 
70 As a fictional exploration of this, consider Saint Maybe by Anne Tyler (London: 
Vintage, 1992). Ian’s brother, Danny, committed suicide after Ian told Danny that his 
child was probably the result of a relationship his wife, Lucy, had had before they got 
married. (Danny and Lucy had got married very quickly after they first met.) Then Lucy 
went into depression, and died some months later from an overdose. Lucy’s three 
children were then left without parents. Feeling a great weight of responsibility for the 
death of Danny and Lucy, Ian wanders into the ‘Church of the Second Chance’, which 
met in a shop. During the worship he makes a public confession of his sin, and is prayed 
for by the church. Afterwards, he speaks with the minister, and explains what had 
happened. At the end of his explanation, he asks “Don’t you think that I’m forgiven?” 
The minister responds briskly, “Goodness no.”  He goes on to say, “… you can’t just 
say ‘I’m sorry, God.’ Why anyone could do that much! You have to offer reparation – 
concrete, practical reparation, according to the rules of our church.” For Ian, that meant 
dropping out of college, and bringing up the three children. 
71 This will be explored further in Section 6.5. 
72 Jonah is the prototypical example of the understanding of this dynamic, where Jonah 
refuses to go and pronounce God’s judgement on Ninevah, the capital of the Assyrian 
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Empire, the arch-enemies of Israel, because he knows that they will repent, and that 
God will withdraw the threat of destruction. 
73 Moshe Weinfeld, (“‘Justice and Righteousness’ –  והקדצ  פםשׁמ – The Expression and 
Its Meaning” in Reventlow, H G and Hoffman, Y, Justice and Righteousness: Biblical 
Themes and their Influence (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992; Journal for the 
Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series 137), 228-246), pp. 238f, writes, ‘[i]f we 
look for exactly what it was that the prophets opposed, we see that the main wrongdoing 
is not the perversion of the judicial process, but oppression perpetrated by the rich 
landowners and the ruling circles who control the socioeconomic order.’ Is. 5.8 
‘undoubtedly refers to those who foreclose the mortgages of the poor who cannot repay 
their debts, and turn their fields into their own personal property’ (p. 239). Subverting 
justice is not the problem, but the enactment of unjust laws. Micah 2.5 looks forward to 
a future reallocation of land where landowners who have taken the land from others will 
not be allotted any land. Micah condemns those who take the land from women because 
their husbands are away at war (Micah 2.8f). It is noteworthy that when a Shunamite 
women returns to her land after a seven-year absence due to famine to find that it has 
been taken by someone else, she petitions the king, and the land and its produce during 
her absence is returned to her (pp. 238-241). 
74 Fasting, sack cloth, and ashes (present together in Is. 58.5) were typical physical 
expressions of repentance (again, see Jonah 3.6-10). The logic of prayer and fasting 
seems to be this. An unbroken fast will lead to death. By fasting, the people are making 
explicit that they understand that their sin will lead to death. The prayer is prayer of 
repentance. They can only be saved from death caused by the fast if God causes them to 
break their fast by releasing them from their sin and its consequences. 
75 This passage will be discussed further in Section 3.3 below. 
76 Curiously, the article on μετανοέω, μετάνοια in the Theological Dictionary of the 
New Testament (vol. IV, pp. 974-1008), ignores the richness of this heritage. It 
translates these words as ‘conversion’, and it weaves a narrative from the ‘law 
righteousness’ of Judaism to the purity of Christianity, and it concludes that the post-
New Testament conisderation of what repentance means in practice is a ‘fateful relapse 
of post-apostolic and early Catholic Christianity into Jewish legalism’. It finds a 
‘striking expression in the change understanding of μετάνοια. The primitive Christian 
view is moralised. Conversion becomes – for the second time – penance’ (p. 1008). 
This understanding of Judaism is now, rightly, discredited. Moreover, the insistence of 
this article that ‘repentance’ is a one-off conversion event does not take into account 
Jesus’ teaching about repenting multiple times (e.g. Lk. 17.3f), and it completely misses 
the richness of the nature of repentance that is being explored in this section. 
77 Here he is assuming that Mark was written first, and that Matthew and Luke used 
Mark. His conclusion does not depend on this. 
78 Myers is quoting here from Taylor, Vincent, The Gospel According to St. Mark (New 
York: St Martin’s, 1963), p. 428 (italics in Myers). Craig Evans (Mark 8.27-16.20 
(Word Biblical Commentary) (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2001)), p. 96, attributes this 
observation to the earlier Field, F., Notes on the Translation of the New Testament 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899), pp. 33-34. 
79 Myers is quoting here from Taylor, Vincent, The Gospel According to St. Mark (New 
York: St Martin’s, 1963), p. 430. Morna Hooker (The Gospel According to St Mark 
(Black’s New Testament Commentary) (London: A & C Black, 1991)), p. 241, notes 
that ‘defrauding’ could mean ‘“depriving” someone of property’. 
80 Myers,Ched, Binding the Strong Man: A Political Reading of Mark’s Story of Jesus 
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1988), pp. 272-274. It is interesting to note that, where ‘in 
Mt. 19.21 the giving away of one’s goods to the poor expresses how extremely serious a 
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thing it is to follow Christ, in the Gospel of the Nazaraeans it is motivated by charity’ 
(Schneemelcher, Wilhelm, ed., Wilson, R. McL., tr., New Testament Apocrypha: 
Volume One – Gospels and Related Writings (James Clarke & Co Ltd, 1991, Revised 
Edition), p. 158). An extract from Fragment 16 of the Gospel of the Nazaraeans reads: 
[Jesus] said to him: Go and sell all that thou possessest and distribute it among 
the poor, and then come and follow me. But the rich man then began to scratch 
his head and it [the saying] pleased him not. And the Lord said to him: How 
canst thou say, I have fulfilled the law and the prophets? For it stands written in 
the law: Love thy neighbour as thyself; and behold, many of thy brethren, sons 
of Abraham, are begrimed with dirt and die of hunger – and they house is full of 
many good things and nothing at all comes forth from it to them! 
 
(This fragment is quoted by Origen in his Commentary on Matthew, and this translation 
taken from Schneemelcher, New Testament, vol. 1, p. 161). The temptation to reduce 
the claims of justice to charity is an ever-present one. 
81 This issue of wealth and ownership will be returned to in Sections 5.4 and 6.5. 
82 Further, Jesus invites the man, once he has given away his possessions, to follow him 
(Mk. 10.21 // Mt. 19.21 // Lk. 18.22), which is the Markan word for a life of 
discipleship. That is, this narrative implies that being a disciple of Jesus requires the 
return of ill-gotten wealth. 
83 This repentance is also perhaps seen in Acts 2.42-47, where the selling of goods and 
land could be seen as redistributing things accumulated through unjust economic 
practices. Richard Hays is right that a faithful response to this text is not to slavishly 
copy it, that the narrative ‘calls us to consider how in our own communities we might 
live analogously, how our own economic practices might powerfully bear witness to the 
resurrection, so that those who later write our story might say, “And great grace was 
upon them all.” Such metaphorical mappings of the biblical stories onto our lives do not 
require us to imitate the narrated practices point for point or to reprisinate ancient 
economic conventions in detail…. Rather, the metaphorical conjunction between the 
narrated church of Acts 2 and 4 and the church that we experience unsettles our 
“commonsense” view of economic reality and calls us to rethink our practices in radical 
ways’ (The Moral Vision of the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New 
Testament Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), pp. 302f.) He is surely correct when 
he writes that contemporary churches in the West have only practised ‘modest forms of 
economic discipleship [which] fall far short of the New Testament Vision, and most of 
the churches I have known have been formed by the forces of market capitalism as least 
as much as by the teachings of Jesus’ (Hays, The Moral, p. 468). 
84 Cf. Volf, Exclusion, p. 298, ‘After all, the cross is not forgiveness pure and simple, 
but God setting aright the world of injustice and deception’ (his italics). 
85 Cf. Müller-Fahrenholz, The Art, pp. 14f. Recall the earlier discussion of healing in a 
footnote in Section 3.1. 
86 This, then, is also meant to drive us to repentance. Jones, Embodying, p. 125, writes, 
‘[t]he risen Christ – the Judge judged for us, the pure Victim sacrificed for us – returns 
to us his judges with a judgment that does not condemn but calls us to new life. By 
keeping our eyes steady on Christ, we can accept our responsibility for our own 
complicity in the universal disaster of sinful brokenness, and receive forgiveness and 
the re-establishment of communion. That is, forgiveness is done in such a way that it 
requires our repentance and turning away from our complicity in evil (Jones, 
Embodying, pp. 125-127.) 
87 I owe this observation to Judith Crane. 
88 See, e.g., Dwyer, “Reconciliation”, p. 81. 
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89 Cf., for example, the refusal of Native Americans to receive an apology from the 
General Council of the United Church in Canada, because words were not enough 
(Wink, When, p. 58). 
90 Austin, J.L., How to Do Things With Words (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2nd edn, edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, 1975), p. 79; 
Tavuchis, Nicholas, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 22ff. 
91 General criteria are discussed initially in Lecture II of Austin, How, pp. 12-24, and 
then elaborated more fully during the rest of his lecture series. 
92 Tavuchis, Mea, pp. 99-109. See also Shriver, An Ethic, p. 221. 
93 The Art, p. 25. Tavuchis, Mea, p. 8, makes a similar observation: ‘apology expresses 
itself as the exigency of a painful re-membering, literally of being mindful again, of 
what we were and had as members and, at the same time, what we have jeopardized or 
lost by virtue of our offensive speech or action. … As shared mementos, apologies 
require much more than admission or confession of the unadorned facts of wrongdoing 
or deviance. They constitute – in their most responsible, authentic, and, hence, 
vulnerable expression – a form of self-punishment that cuts deeply because we are 
obliged to retell, relive, and seek forgiveness for sorrowful events that have rendered 
our claims to membership in a moral community suspect or defeasible.’ 
94 Tavuchis, Mea, pp. 93-95. 
95 The full title of the report is: Bringing Them Home: National Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families. A 
significant part of the report is the record of the experiences of many Aboriginal people. 
As at 2.12.09, the full text of the report can be found on 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/bth_report/index.html. See also the earlier 
report by Peter Read, “The Stolen Generations: The Removal of Aboriginal Children in 
New South Wales 1883 to 1969”, New South Wales Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 
Occasional Paper No. 1, 1981. The fourth reprinting, dated 2006, is available as at 
1.3.10 on the web page: www.daa.nsw.gov.au/publications/StolenGenerations.pdf. 
96 The term ‘stolen’ was used as early as 1915 by Hon P McGarry, who strongly 
opposed the NSW government ‘Aborigines Protection Amending Act 1915 which gave 
it total power to separate children from their families without having to establish in 
court that they were neglected. … According to McGarry it allowed the Board ‘to steal 
the child away from its parents’’ (Bringing them Home, Part 2, Chapter 3). It was used 
in the title of Read’s report on the taking of children in NSW, “The Stolen”. Attwood, 
“Learning”, also discusses the generation of this disputed term. He notes that ‘[t]his 
narrative accrual could not have happened had there not been an appropriate cultural 
and political milieu for it’ (Attwood “'Learning”, p. 196). McKenna notest that ‘Bain 
Attwood has described how, in three decades between 1970 and 2000 a gradual process 
of ‘narrative accrual’ has seen the work of indigenous writers, academic historians, 
novelists, film-makers, play-wrights, feminists and journalists constitute the Stolen 
Generations narrative as a site of ‘collective memory’ for Aboriginal Australians. With 
the release of Bringing Them Home in 1997, this narrative had become central to the 
identity of Aboriginal Australians. In turn, three decades of increased political activism 
by Aboriginal people and their non-Aboriginal supporters had begun to alter the way 
Australians were remembering their past. Just as Aboriginal people, imbued with a 
greater sense of cultural pride, mourned their historical experience in settler Australia as 
one of subjugation and oppression, non-Aboriginal Australians began to question the 
moral legitimacy of their national past. For both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Australia, the past was being reimagined.’ However, Norman must be right when he 
observes that the term ‘stolen generation’ does not do justice to the complexity of 
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Aboriginal child removal, nor of the wider violent dispossession of the Aboriginal 
people (“An Examination”, p. 14). 
97 Recommendation 7 of the report. 
98 My personal impression of the day in May 2005, when I took part in events in 
Canberra, and then scoured the media for coverage of events across Australia, is that it 
was not a big day in the consciousness of the majority of Australians. It seemed almost 
as if people felt that they had done their bit by saying sorry in the big events on the first 
‘Sorry Day’. 
99 Bringing Them Home, pp. 249f. The report also lists apologies already received from 
a number of churches and other bodies (pp. 250-253). 
100 That the State parliaments had already issued apologies is recorded in Graham Ring, 
“The Hardest Word Has Just Been Uttered “, New Matilda, 13th February, 2008, which 
can be found as at 3.12.09 at: https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/antar-news/2008-
02/msg00036.html. 
101 Howard’s position was rather disingenuous, for he was a Member of the House of 
Representatives from 1974, when the separation policy had only just ended; it was 
something his generation was partly responsible for. 
102 It is also possible that Howard was simply reflecting the opinion of many in 
Australia. For example, Mark Byrne wrote in his article, “Reconciliation: Stalled, 
Fermenting, or Taken Out The Back and Shot?” in New Matilda on 30th November, 
2005 (which can be found as at 3.12.09: https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/antar-
news/2005-11/msg00064.html), 
Nevertheless, the government is motivated by popular opinion as well as 
ideology. Opinion polls have consistently shown that while the majority of 
Australians are willing to accept that Indigenous people were mistreated in the 
past, they are divided as to whether disadvantage today represents continuing 
mistreatment or is rather the fault of Indigenous people themselves. They are 
certainly not in favour of apologising for the actions of people long dead, and do 
not see themselves as perpetuating racism and exploitation by their lifestyles and 
attitudes. In addition, the Howard government has done a sterling job of 
associating an apology to the Stolen Generation with personal and legal 
responsibility for their plight, rather than understanding 'sorry' to be a simple 
expression of compassion. 
103 Phillip Coorey, “Rudd to act on 'blight on the nation's soul'”, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 11th February, 2008, reports that ‘[t] he state and federal governments will pay 
for more than 100 members of the stolen generations to be in Canberra for the event. 
Among those invited will be the sporting stars Evonne Goolagong-Cawley, Matt 
Bowen, Greg Ingliss, David Peachey, Dean Widders and Michael Long. Lady Wilson, 
the widow of Sir Ronald Wilson, who co-authored the 1997 Bringing Them Home 
report will be there, as will its co-author Mick Dodson. The activists Faith Bandler and 
Evelyn Scott, both of whom campaigned for voting rights for Aborigines before the 
1967 referendum, will also be there.’ This article is available as at 3.12.09: 
https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/antar-news/2008-02/msg00018.html. 
104 The full text of his speech can be found at: http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5952. It can 
also be found in the Hansard of the House of Representatives for 13th February, 2008, 
pp. 167-173, which can be found by following the links on: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Hansard/hansreps.htm#2008. Both pages were available on 
2.12.09. 
105 Hansard, 13th February, 2008, p. 170. 
106 Hansard, 13th February, 2008, pp. 170f. 
107 Hansard, 13th February, 2008, p. 174. 
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108 Müller-Fahrenholz, The Art, pp. 27f. 
109 Müller-Fahrenholz, The Art, pp. 32f, 61f. As Müller-Fahrenholz  goes on to observe, 
Brandt’s gesture was not appreciated by everyone, the same people who later claimed 
that his Ostpolitik was a sell-out. See also Shriver, An Ethic, pp. 91f. Shriver notes that 
a New York Times reporter wrote in 1990 that Brandt is the ‘only German who is 
genuinely popular’ in Poland. 
110 The Nuremberg trials were an important part of the post-war process. Whilst this is 
noted here, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine their place in the process of 
repentance. However, it was observed in Section 1.2 that the option of bringing people 
to trial was explicitly eschewed in making the transition from some conflict situations. 
The efficacy of punishment will be briefly discussed in Section 3.3, on the nature of 
justice. 
111 Most of the details in this narrative come from Shriver, An Ethic, pp. 84-92. 
112 In this respect, it is interesting to read an essay by Karl Barth (“The Christian 
Message in Europe Today”, based on a lecture given in the summer of 1946 in 
Düsseldorf, Cologne, Bonn and other German centres, reproduced in his Against the 
Stream: Shorter Post-War Writings 1946-52 (London: SCM, 1954), 165-180), written 
in 1946. He recognises that what has happened as a result of the 1914-1918 and 1939-
1945 wars is the dethroning Europe, at least in its understanding of itself, and wonders 
how it, and the church in particular, should respond to the potential colonisation of 
Europe by either America or Russia, in the face of a very uncertain future. He is very 
careful to say that the church’s role is not in the rescuing of Germany and Europe as a 
national project; Europe may rise again economically, or it might decline, but that is not 
to be the focus of attention of the church. Rather, he exhorts the church to seek the 
Kingdom of God. Where Barth is weak in his article is in not reflecting on the role that 
the church might play in seeking to shape the political life of Europe in such a way that 
it reflects more closely the Kingdom of God. 
113 Walker, Peter K., “Bishop Bell – The Man”, The Expository Times 121/5 (February 
2010), 223-228, p.226. The context of this ‘declaration’ must be born in mind when 
considering it. 
114 de Gruchy, Reconciliation, pp. 107-111. 
115 Shriver, An Ethic, pp. 85. 
116 Shriver, An Ethic, pp. 87f. The apolitical stance of the church, is itself a political 
stance. Cf. Cavanaugh’s critique of the church in Chile during the Pinochet years (see 
his Torture).  
117 Koch, Heinemmand und die Deutschlandfrage, 1972, pp. 119, 121, quoted in 
Shriver, An Ethic, p. 88. 
118 Shriver, An Ethic, p. 89. 
119 Shriver, An Ethic, p. 89. 
120 quoted in Shriver,  An Ethic, p. 89. 
121 Shriver, An Ethic, p. 90. 
122 Shriver, An Ethic, pp. 107-113. An English translation of the speech can be found on 
the page: http://www.hariguchi.org/yoichi/weizsaecker.html (as at 15th April, 2008), 
reprinted from Geoffrey Hartman, ed., Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). Note, however, that this thesis disagrees 
with his statement about the guilt of the present generation. See Chapter 4 for a more 
nuanced argument concerning the responsibility of the present generation for the sins of 
the past. 
123 Shriver, An Ethic, p. 112 (his italics). 
124 For example, consider the way that football matches between England and Germany 
are treated by the English fans, and the way that they are reported in the media, or the 
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very difficult political situation which arose from a proposed visit by President Reagan 
to Bitburg Cemetery (Shriver, An Ethic, pp. 92-107; Müller-Fahrenholz, The Art, pp. 
63f). 
125 See Lederach, Building, pp. 37-55. 
126 Lederach, Building, p. 40. 
127 Lederach, Building, p. 44. 
128 Lederach, Building, p. 46. 
129 Volf, “Forgiveness”, pp. 35f, argues that public discourses on reconciliation are 
often devoid of moral content, and force a choice between unity and justice. 
130 Shriver, An Ethic, p. 6. 
131 Dwyer, “Reconciliation”, p. 82. 
132 Kairos, art. 3.1, p.9. 
133 Volf, “Forgiveness”, p. 36. 
134 Volf, Exclusion, p. 29. 
135 The reason for this is the same as will be explored in Chapter 4, namely that sin 
distorts the ability to know what is right, and hence just. 
136 McGrath, Born, p. 170. See also Willis, Peter, “Riders in the Chariot: Aboriginal 
Conversion to Christianity at Kununurra” in Swain, Tony and Bird Rose, Deborah, 
Aboriginal Australians and Christian Missions: Ethnographic and Historical Studies 
(The Australian Association for the Study of Religions, 1988), 308-320, p. 316. 
137 Keeffe, Kevin, Paddy’s Road: Life Stories of Patrick Dodson (Canberra: Aboriginal 
Studies Press, 2003), pp. 200f; Olive, Noel, ed., Karijini Mirlimirli: Aboriginal 
Histories from the Pilbara (South Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1997), p.12. 
138 Marshall, Beyond, pp. 25f. 
139 As another example, consider the ubuntu theology of Desmond Tutu (Haws, Charles 
G., “Suffering, Hope and Forgiveness: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu”, 
Scottish Journal of Theology 62/4 (2009), 477-489). 
140 Howley, Pat, Breaking Spears and Mending Hearts: Peacemakers and Restorative 
Justice in Bouganville (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 103, 184 
141 Howley, Breaking, pp. 137-139, 184, 195, 200. 
142 For example, elders lost the respect of younger people, some of whom had more 
disposable income, and so no longer lived within the strictures of their traditional 
culture. Village life had been disrupted, with people fleeing into the jungle, or being 
based in camps. The fighting and brutality split villages and caused enmity between 
villages. The consumption of alcohol and the ensuing wild violence was deeply 
damaging to village life and infrastructure. 
143 Howley, Breaking, p. 126, summarises the opinions of many people he spoke to in 
his research thus: ‘Compensation is for gain and is equivalent to setting a value on the 
life of a loved one. With a gift, one asks for forgiveness; with compensation there is no 
forgiveness and the person is attempting something that is impossible, that is putting a 
value on something that cannot be bought or paid for. Compensation does not reconcile. 
Its main effect is a tit-for-tat payback which never ends.’ See also pp. 113, 122-129.  
144 Howley, Breaking, p. 111. 
145 Howley, Breaking, pp. 14, 22, 62, 67, 71, 140-142. However, Walter Moberly 
helpfully pointed out to me that Deuteronomy 22.28f gives a similar requirement, which 
must be about what might be called ‘social security’ of the victim of the rape. 
146 Howley, Breaking, pp. 181-183. 
147 Howley, Breaking, p. 178. 
148 For this thesis it is interesting to note that many disputes in Bougainville were about 
land. The Bougainvilleans are not so much interested in the question of who owns the 
land, treating the land as a commodity, but in who can use it. However, whilst using the 
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land for gardens for a few years makes the question of ownership irrelevant, the 
establishment of plantations, such as cocoa or copra, effectively render the land the 
property of one group of people for a generation or more. (See Howley, Breaking, pp. 
142-144). 
149 This will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
150 Young, Iris Marion, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), pp. 16-18. Cf. p. 53, ‘[t]he injustices of exploitation cannot be 
eliminated by redistribution of goods, for as long as institutionalized practices and 
structural relations remain unaltered, the process of transfer will re-create an unequal 
distribution of benefits. Bringing about justice where there is exploitation requires 
reorganization of institutions and practices of decisionmaking, alteration of the division 
of labour, and similar measures of institutional, structural and cultural change.’ 
151 Young, Justice, p. 74f. 
152 Young, Justice, p. 157f. 
153 Young, Justice, p. 34. 
154 Recall the earlier discussion of worship and freedom in Section 3.2.  There is no 
such thing as absolute freedom for human beings.  
155 Lederach, Building. p. 26. 
156 “Restorative Justice in Social Context” pp. 210f. This view is a very powerful one, 
and underlies some aspects of sacrificial systems throughout various cultures (Young, 
Frances, Sacrifice and the Death of Christ (London: SPCK 1975)). In interpreting Jesus 
to people who hold this world-view, that ‘without the shedding of blood there is no 
forgiveness of sins’ (Heb. 9.22), the writer to the Hebrews interprets Jesus’ death as the 
final, not to be repeated, sacrifice for sins (e.g. Heb. 7.11-10.25). That is, the further 
shedding of blood is unnecessary, and achieves nothing. 
157 These ideas will be explored more fully in Section 4.6. 
158 Marshall, Beyond, pp. 66f. Cf. Volf, Exclusion, p. 122, who observes that, ‘[s]ince 
“no deed can be annihilated,” as Nietzsche said, at the very least the original offense 
remains. Within the framework of justice, guilt is eternal and therefore, concludes 
Nietzsche, “all punishments, too, must be eternal (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathrustra: 
A Book for Everyone and No One (London: Penguin, 1969), p. 162). And yet even an 
eternal hell for the tormentors that Nietzsche’s logic demanded could not set things right 
for those who have been tormented, as Dostoevsky’s sagacity perceived (The Brother’s 
Karamazov (San Fransisco: North Point, 1990), p. 245).’ 
159 Cf Weinfeld, “Justice”, p. 238, noting the combination of kindness with justice, 
righteousness, and mercy in the Hebrew Scriptures, says that ‘‘kindness’ is identical 
with goodness and mercy. It is not a character that is congruous with strict justice, since 
if it were to be applied in court it would otherwise interfere with the execution of 
justice, which must be untempered by impartiality. We must therefore concude that the 
word פםשׁמ [justice], and especially the phrase והקדצ  פםשׁמ [justice and righteousness], 
does not refer to the proper execution of justice, but rather expresses, in a general sense, 
social justice and equity, which is bound up with kindness and mercy.’ Weinfeld seems 
to be arguing in his paper that ‘strict justice’ can be unjust because it may be 
implementing unjust laws. True justice is redemptive, closely tied to kindness and 
mercy. 
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4 Reconciliation and the Sins of the Past 
 
 The past is not dead and gone; it isn’t even past.1 
 
 
The nature of reconciliation – the process of forgiveness and repentance – has been 
explored in Chapters 2 and 3, and it was shown that the pursuit of reconciliation 
establishes justice. However, the particular issues that arise in conflicts that run over 
multiple generations, especially the relationship of the present generation to past sins, 
have not been explored as yet. This is the purpose of this chapter. 
 
In a conflict between groups of people, the dispute can outlast any particular generation 
involved in it. The responsibility of the present generation in a trans-generational 
conflict is widely disputed. This chapter will argue that the present generation in any 
dispute has a propensity to continue to sin in ways shaped by the sins of its forebears. 
Further, the present generation is part of a corporate body that remains guilty of the sins 
of the past generations, even if the sins of the past have not been repeated by the present 
generation. These problems can be overcome, and can only be overcome, by pursuing a 
policy of repentance as part of the project of being reconciled with other parties in the 
continuing conflict, who have a similar responsibility to forgive. This repentance and 
forgiveness is not only for the sins of the present generation, but those of past 
generations as well. 
 
This chapter is of particular importance to the peoples of Australia, for it implies that, 
without the repentance of the present generation of Subsequent peoples, policies 
concerning the relationship between the different peoples of Australia are likely to 
continue to be destructive towards the Indigenous peoples of Australia. The next chapter 
will explore the history of land disputes in Australia over the last half century, as a way 
of testing this hypothesis. Chapter 6 will consider what it might mean for the present 
generation of Subsequent peoples to repent. 
 
The argument of the present chapter is as follows. The next section fleshes out the 
claims of this chapter in a bit more detail, drawing on some examples that seem to 
indicate their veracity, and the following section presents a case study that is 
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theologically suggestive concerning the relationship between the present and past 
generations. Because people in the West tend to think about individuals, and 
conglomerations of individuals, rather than corporate entities, the third section considers 
the nature of corporate entities. The fourth section explores a biblical example of one 
generation complaining that it is being punished for the sins of previous generations, not 
its own sin, and the proof that they were indeed sinning themselves is a warning to any 
community which thinks that it is able to go into the future without being shaped by the 
sins of the past. After a brief excursion discussing the nature of punishment for sin, the 
sixth section argues that corporate entities are shaped by the sins of the past so that they 
are bound to sin in ways that reflect their sinful past. The final section argues that 
corporate reconciliation, corporate repentance and forgiveness, is needed to break this 
inter-generational pattern of sin, and to resolve the problems that are left from the sins 
of the past. 
4.1 Aligning Ourselves 
So far, the discussion of reconciliation, of forgiveness and repentance, has been a bit 
loose in specifying whether individuals or groupings of people were involved. 
However, there is one issue that arises when considering conglomerations of people, 
such as communities or nations, and that is that the problems can outlive the lives of the 
people who were, or who are, currently engaged in them. 
 
It is a well-established fact that conflicts can proceed down the generations. Michael 
Ignatieff, in his exploration of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, helpfully writes, 
 
the past continues to torment because it is not the past. These places [the 
Balkans] are not living in a serial order of time but in a simultaneous one, in 
which the past and present are a continuous, agglutinated mass of fantasies, 
distortions, myths, and lies. Reporters in the Balkan wars often observed that 
when they were told atrocity stories they were occasionally uncertain whether 
these stories had occurred yesterday or in 1941, 1841, or 1441. 
 
He concludes that this ‘is the dreamtime of vengeance. Crimes can never safely be fixed 
in the historical past; they remain locked in the eternal present, crying out for 
vengeance.’2 Here it is clear that the present generation of people in the disputes needs 
to break the cycle of violence, and seek to be reconciled to one another.3 
 
  160 
But what if the conflict appears to lie in the past? For example, can the present 
generation of non-Indigenous Australians be held responsible for the massacres of 
Aboriginal people in the past? Whether or not they can be held responsible, can the 
present generation do anything about it? Specifically does it make any sense for the 
present generation to repent of the sins of the past? And, why has no set of policies ever 
delivered significant welfare improvements for the Indigenous peoples of Australia? 
 
Theologically, there is a subtle, but important relationship between the past, present and 
future. Stated simply, it is that the present generation is likely to continue to sin in ways 
that are shaped by the sins of the past, even if it tries to do the right thing. Moreover, the 
present generation is part of a corporate entity which remains guilty of the sins of the 
past. The only way to overcome these problems is to seek reconciliation.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate these claims. However, before trying to 
establish this case, it is worth taking time to ponder three observations from people who 
have been trying to interpret what has been happening in Australia. 
 
Firstly, the historian Mark McKenna notes that Aboriginal culture and oral history 
stresses continuity in history, whereas the dominant culture wants to push the past away 
as time goes on. However, he argues, this history is inseparable from the present, and so 
remains unreconciled.4 Steve Hemming makes a similar point when he writes,  
 
Stanner’s ‘great Australian silence’ may have ended in one sense, but it lives on 
through the positivist separation of the past and present. This separation allows 
politicians such as John Howard to avoid an apology to the stolen generations and, 
as Rose argues, treat the present as a ‘way station on the road to the future’ rather 
than the ‘real domain of moral action.’5 Positivist history also fails to recognise the 
fundamental formative relationship between the imperial centres of Europe and the 
colonised peripheries such as Indigenous Australia. The west was built on the rest in 
more than just political and economic ways. Indigenous people have been one of 
Europe’s most influential others, shaping the culture of both the colonisers and the 
colonised in fundamental ways. An understanding of the complexity of this long-
term relationship is an integral part of reading the colonial archive.6 
 
Secondly, John Wilcken highlights the fact that the situation of the present generation 
stands in continuity with the past, when he writes, 
 
[p]ast history is a fact, and it cannot be changed. The crimes of the last two centuries 
have to be owned by Australians – not as if we are personally guilty of what was 
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done by our predecessors, but rather as acknowledging that our present situation 
(which includes very particularly the dominant position of the European population) 
stands in continuity with that sin-stained past, and is the direct result of it. Thus we 
Australians today cannot say that what was done in the past is no concern of ours. 
As people living in history, we bear the burden of the crimes of the past – just as we 
are enriched by the grace which was present also in the lives of our predecessors. 
True reconciliation can come about only if we humbly and honestly accept that 
burden.7 
 
Finally, Gillian Cowlishaw pinpoints the way that the present generation of non-
Indigenous peoples has a tendency to side with the Aboriginal peoples because of what 
happened in the past, so denying their continuing responsibility, and which also blinds it 
to the way that it is continuing the same behaviours towards Aboriginal people.  
 
These histories seem to present with ease a view of our own past that fills us, as 
readers, with horror at the same time as it distances us from it. How is it that in 
reading these accounts we position ourselves on the side of the Aborigines and 
identify our forebears as the enemy? These violent and racist men could be our 
grandfathers and they certainly left us something, if not the land they took or the 
wealth they made from it, then the culture they were developing. The call to 
examine the colonial past is in danger of foundering on the complacency of an 
imagined distance from the spectacle of blood and violence. Continuity with the 
past is easily severed and the cultural source of these events is lost. Our disgust and 
horror at the violence and abusive racism means we are absolved. Where before, 
readers were offered no access to the contemporary experience of the 
anthropologists’ timeless Aborigines, now historians immerse readers in an awful 
past and distract them from contemporary forms of violence and racism.8 
4.2 An English Case Study 
Martin Graham tells a story of an experience where an apology of the present members 
of the church for what had happened in the past, created a space for the work of the 
present church to be welcomed, whereas there had been hostility towards it up to that 
point.9 The context was a barbecue mission in Tonbridge, Kent. Each morning of the 
mission, people would hand out invitations to people in the street to come for a free 
barbecue. During the morning and during the barbecue, worship bands would be 
worshipping at various places around the town. However, seemingly inexplicably, there 
was all sorts of disruption to what was going on, a ‘spiritual climate … as if the people 
of the town didn’t like us’.10 For example, someone hung loud speakers out a window 
where there was a worship band, and played obscene music; people were gratuitously 
rude when given an invitation to the free barbecue; and youths cycled through an 
evening meeting. Things like this had not happened in other towns where similar 
missions had taken place. A few days into the mission, there was a message in tongues 
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during the morning worship session, which was attended by the one hundred and fifty 
members of the team that was drawn from the various churches in Tonbridge. In the 
interpretation of the message, a picture emerged of what God was saying to the church: 
‘You need to listen to Tonbridge; Tonbridge is hurting; Tonbridge has been hurt by the 
church.’11 As people there explored what this might mean, it emerged that some 
hundreds of years ago, church authorities in Tonbridge had stolen the poor fund and 
spent it on themselves. As well, in the mid-nineteenth century, when railway workers 
had arrived in the town, they had been informed that they were not welcome in the 
church. There were other stories too, which Graham does not record. Graham 
concludes, that ‘[w]hat became clear was that the contemporary generation of 
Tonbridge residents had, as it were, “received” a dislike for the church, without 
knowing why they should have such an attitude. It was in the DNA of Tonbridge, if you 
like, that the church was disliked from generation to generation – a ‘spiritual 
stronghold’ if ever I saw one.’12 Later that day, when there were about 300 people 
eating at the barbecue, Graham felt God say to him that he had to apologise on behalf of 
the church for what the church had done in the past. He 
 
went to the microphone and said, quite simply, that we had been praying and 
that God had shown us that the church had hurt the people of Tonbridge (I told 
the story of the railway workers) and that in response to this, we really wanted to 
say how sorry we were – if they felt able to receive this apology. I was also able 
to say that, in hurting people in this way, we had misrepresented the image of 
God and the truth was that, unlike the ‘no’ they had received from the church, 
there was a ‘yes’ for them from God.13 
 
Graham records that ‘the atmosphere changed instantly. People were ready to receive us 
– and our message,’14 and, further, that many people became Christians that day, 
including some of the youths who had been so disruptive with their bicycles the evening 
before.  
 
There are several points from this story for which theological investigation will bear 
dividends. Firstly, the story is told of corporate entities: it is the town and the church 
which have a broken relationship, expressed by the behaviour of individuals (e.g. the 
person who played loud music to drown out the worship) and groups of people (e.g. the 
youths who cycled through an event). There was something about the way that the 
people in the town itself were acting as a corporate entity, expressed by Graham as a 
‘spiritual climate’. Secondly, the present generation was living out a hatred of the 
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church, even though it may not have been conscious either of its doing so, nor of the 
roots of the problem. Graham says that the attitude was ‘inherited’, part of the town’s 
‘DNA’. Unfortunately, Graham does not explore in this story how the church’s sinful 
history was part of its DNA, and how this worked itself out in the way that the church 
was continuing to behave. Thirdly, the roots of the antagonism were multiple incidents, 
some of them a long time ago. As was noted in the second point, there is not enough 
information to know if the past attitudes of the church were also being lived out in the 
present generation of the church, or if the offensive incidents were firmly situated in the 
past. Fourthly, an apology on behalf of the church, in this case by an outsider, was 
effective in defusing the animosity between the town and the church.15 
 
4.3 Thinking Together 
One of the hardest things for people brought up in Western culture is to think about is 
the relationship of a person to various groupings of people. This is because a ‘person’ 
has been understood to be an individual, and participation in larger groupings of people 
– family, local community, working community, nation, and so on – is seen as largely 
accidental and/or voluntary. When Margaret Thatcher famously said, ‘who is society? 
There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and, there are families’,16 
she was expressing this dominant understanding. However, the experience of 
bereavement, of being changed oneself when someone dies or moves away, indicates 
that personhood is more than being an individual, that it certainly includes, and is 
formed by, the multiple networks of relationships of which an individual is part.17 
 
Thinking corporately is innate to many other cultures. For example: it was seen in 
Section 3.3 that the village was important in the identity of the people of Bougainville; 
Vincent Donovan gives the example of a whole tribe of Masai converting to 
Christianity, because it was impossible for the tribe to be split;18 and there is an African 
saying, ‘I am because we are, and because we are therefore I am.’19 All of these point to 
the fact that it is possible to conceive of the world very differently. That is not to say 
that these worldviews are perfect, but they provide encouragement for reconsidering the 
nature of corporate entities.20 In fact, biblically, corporate entities are part of the created 
order.21 
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What makes it so difficult for Western people to think about disputes that have run over 
multiple generations is that there is a tendency to reduce guilt to individuals,22 and then 
it is hard to see how a group of individuals could be guilty of the sins of another group 
of individuals in the past. However, the above experience of Graham, indicates that 
there is a stronger cohesion and continuity in the life and actions of a community over 
time. Clearly, a more adequate notion of corporate entity is needed. Alasdair MacIntyre 
is surely correct when he writes, 
 
I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of 
debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. This thought is likely 
to appear alien and even surprising from the standpoint of modern 
individualism. From the standpoint of individualism I am what I myself choose 
to be. I can always, if I wish to, put in question what are taken to be the merely 
contingent social features of my existence. I may biologically be my father’s 
son; but I cannot be held responsible for what he did unless I choose implicitly 
or explicitly to assume such a responsibility. I may legally be a citizen of a 
certain country; but I cannot be responsible for what my country does or has 
done unless I choose … to assume such responsibility. Such individualism is 
expressed by those modern Americans who deny any responsibility for the 
effects of slavery upon black Americans, saying “I never owned any slaves.” It 
is more subtly the standpoint of those other modern Americans who accept a 
nicely calculated responsibility for such effects measured precisely by the 
benefits they themselves as individuals have indirectly received from slavery. In 
both cases, ‘being an American’ is not in itself taken to be part of the moral 
identity of the individual. And of course there is nothing peculiar to modern 
Americans in this attitude: the Englishman who says, “I never did any wrong to 
Ireland; why bring up that old history as though it had something to do with 
me?” or the young German who believes that being born after 1945 means that 
what Nazis did to Jews has no moral relevance to his relationship to his Jewish 
contemporaries, exhibit the same attitude, that according to which the self is 
detachable from its social and historical roles and statuses.23 
 
It should not be impossible to think about ways of conceiving corporate identity, for it is 
already present in the way that language is used. For example, Rudd spoke of ‘the 
government and the parliament’ in his speech of apology,24 or one might say, ‘I play 
cricket for Australia,’ or ‘Australia took part in the war that began in 1914.’ All of these 
examples must be about something that is more than a collection of individuals; the 
second example includes the idea of representation, or doing something on behalf of; 
and the third recognises a historical continuity of a corporate entity. Moreover, 
corporate entities can have a personality. For example, inspectors of government 
schools in England have to report back on the ‘ethos’ of a school. Corporate entities can 
have a way of behaving, or a culture, where this means more than those things that we 
associate with a particular grouping of people (such as baguettes with France), but the 
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things that drive and shape its actions, whether this is implicit or explicit. An example 
of this is America’s understanding of its ‘manifest destiny’ to impose capitalism and its 
understanding of democracy on the whole world.25 
 
In the English legal system, there is no separate notion of a ‘corporation’, but the 
law is based on treating a corporation as analogous to an individual, and developing 
the law based on that.26 This is suggestive, for it can then be seen that this ‘corporate 
individual’ has an existence, a history and a future, that it is not entirely dependent 
on those people who are part of it at a particular time. It is also suggestive of the 
idea of a corporate entity having a ‘personality’, and it lends itself to thinking 
analogously about how a corporate entity might ‘sin’, or be part of a conflict over 
multiple generations, and how the present generation may have responsibility for the 
past actions of this corporate entity. However, one must not press this analogy too 
far, because there are many questions that it cannot answer, such as how does one 
belong to multiple overlapping networks, or how does one become part of, or cease 
to be part of, a corporate entity, or how does it relate to other corporate identities, 
and what is the relationship of the individual to the corporate? 
 
The work that Wink has done on the language of the ‘powers’ in the New Testament 
is helpful.27 The powers are not intrinsically evil, for they were created in, through, 
and for Christ: 
 
For in him all things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and 
invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or powers – all things have 
been created through him and for him. He himself is before all things, and in 
him all things hold together (Col. 1.16f).28 
 
In his careful study of the language of powers in the New Testament, Wink 
concludes that ‘principalities and powers’ refer to the inner and outer aspects of any 
given manifestation of power.29 The inner, spiritual part is its driving force that 
‘animates, legitimates, and regulates its physical manifestation in the world.’30 
McFadyen also recognises that an institution has an internal being, its ‘legitimating 
ground, which, in negotiation with its context, determines its present form, and 
drives any change, an ideal of social life which functions as a quasi-religious basis 
both for the present form of the institution and for any subsequent transformation.’31 
The tangible manifestations of power, such as political systems, offices, laws, 
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economic systems, the church, and nations, are all examples of the outer aspect of a 
power.32 
 
Critically, God addresses corporate identities. For example, as will be discussed in the 
next section, God addresses Israel as a whole, and Jesus speaks to ‘Jerusalem’ (Lk. 
13.34f). In Revelation chapters 2 and 3, John is instructed to write to the ‘angel’ of each 
of seven churches. In each case, the message highlights what might be called the 
personality of that particular church. Another way of saying this is that the angel is the 
‘spirit’ of that particular corporate entity, that church.33 
4.4  ‘It was them. We are not guilty.’ 
This chapter is trying to establish the truth of three interconnected propositions: that the 
present members of any corporate entity will sin in ways that are shaped by the sins of 
the past generations of that corporate entity; that the corporate entity remains guilty of 
the sins of the past; and that the present generation can overcome both problems by 
repenting of sin, both the sins of the past, and its own sin. As was noted in the previous 
section, these propositions are difficult for contemporary Western people to accept 
because of the tendency to think about corporate entities by reducing them to collections 
of individuals. From a biblical standpoint, Ezekiel 18 has been important to people who 
wish to contest the validity of the propositions being explored in this chapter. However, 
this individualistic reading of Ezekiel 18 cannot be sustained.34 Nevertheless, Ezekiel 18 
does have a bearing on the argument of this chapter, and so it will be explored more 
carefully in this section. 
 
Ezekiel gives one of the most robust responses in the Bible to the claim by a group of 
people that they are guiltless, and that their present problems are the result of the sins of 
previous generations. Ezekiel is addressing the generation of people who were alive at 
the time of the defeat of Judah by the Babylonians.35 Both Ezekiel and his readers 
regard the crisis as a punishment for sin. What is contested is who sinned.36 The people 
to whom Ezekiel is speaking quote the parable ‘The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and 
the children’s teeth are set on edge’ (Ezek. 18.2; cf. Jer. 31.29-30).37 That is, they claim 
that their present predicament is the result of the sins of their forebears, not their own 
sin; they prefer to think of themselves as being unjustly punished than to admit their 
guilt (Ezek. 18.19), even to the point of claiming that it is God who is unjust rather than 
them (Ezek. 18.29).38 Ezekiel claims that they are being punished for their own sins. 
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Ezekiel claims that God is just because the proverb is not true: God only punishes the 
guilty party. Ezekiel makes his case by giving three examples (18.5-18), which seem to 
be reflecting on Deuteronomy 24.16.39 It is important to note that Ezekiel is arguing by 
analogy: he is using legal language (i.e. for relationships between human beings) for the 
examples, and raising them to speak about relationships between human beings and 
God.40 The people claim to be in the third category: their fathers have sinned, and they 
are innocent (18.14-18). Ezekiel, however, says that the present generation is sinful, that 
they are suffering the punishment of God for their own sin, for God only punishes the 
guilty.41 
 
Of course, Ezekiel must show that the present generation really is guilty. In the initial 
encounter of Ezekiel with God, God pronounces the guilt of the present generation 
(Ezek. 2.43-8; 3.7). Moreover, in many other places, Ezekiel makes the important point 
that they are not only sinning, but also sinning in the same way as previous generations 
(e.g. Ezek. 6.9f; 20.30-32).42 Finally, God sometimes speaks to the people as if the sins 
of all the generations are happening in the perpetual present (e.g. some of Ezek. 16; 23). 
In summary, God sees Israel as a corporate entity, with a continuity of existence 
through time that is more extensive than any particular generation, and which has a 
consistent history of sin, and, moreover, the present generation is continuing to sin in 
the same way as its forebears. 
 
This should lead any reader of Ezekiel to be concerned about any claims that a line can 
simply be drawn under the past, claiming that it was the previous generations who did 
wrong, for subsequent generations, it seems, might continue to sin in the same way as 
past generations.  
 
Ezekiel goes further than his interlocutors, and speaks of the dynamics of God’s 
relationship with people: it is possible for righteous people to fall out of favour with 
God by their sin, and for sinful people to come back into favour through repentance 
(18.19-29; cf. Jer. 18.7-10). That is, there is no accounting, where the good is weighed 
against the bad, but it is the current relationship that matters. This heightens the sense of 
the responsibility of the present generation, because they could have repented and 
averted the present disaster, but they did not. However, this is also a passage of hope: 
the people could be fatally deflated because they are the generation which is being 
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punished at last, but Ezekiel promises the possibility of redemption if the people do 
repent; God desires the people to repent (18.23, 32), and the whole passage (vv. 21-28) 
is sandwiched by the call to repent, indicating the way that Ezekiel is urging the people 
to go.43 
 
It is important to clarify one point: Ezekiel is speaking to the whole community, not just 
individuals. Joyce notes that the ‘sour grapes’ proverb (18.2) is a complaint of the 
present generation, and that he addresses the people collectively as the ‘House of Israel’ 
(18.25, 29, 30, 31; cf. other uses of the plural form of address in 18.2, 3, 19, 3244);45 
although the legal examples that Ezekiel uses are about individuals from different 
generations, Ezekiel is speaking to the community as a whole. That is, when Ezekiel 
uses the legal metaphor to speak of the relationship between God and people, the 
individuality is about generations, not about persons. 
4.5 An Aside on Punishment in Ezekiel’s Worldview 
Before considering further questions, it is important to clarify the dynamics of the 
situation that Ezekiel was addressing. Within the thought world of Ezekiel and his 
interlocutors, the punishment for breaking the covenant with God was exile from the 
land, the land that was part of God’s covenant gift to the people. The question that 
Ezekiel does not address is: why were earlier generations not punished by exile when 
they were sinful?46 
 
There are at least three partial answers to this question. Firstly, as has already been seen 
in Section 3.2, the announcement of God’s judgement was always to call people to 
repentance and the restoration of the covenant relationship. Secondly, God is presented 
as being merciful in not punishing people as they deserve, but giving them time to 
repent. Thirdly, it is notoriously difficult to attribute a causal relationship between 
particular sins and their consequences; in fact, the reasoning usually goes the other way: 
a disaster has happened, so what was the cause?47 
 
The question of why the sinful generations were not sent into exile immediately, is 
posed sharply right near the beginning of the biblical text, in the story of Adam and Eve 
in Genesis 2-3.48 Adam and Eve are told that if they eat of the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil, then they will die. Yet, when they eat of the fruit of this 
tree, they do not fall down dead; instead they are expelled from the garden. This 
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suggests that the meaning of ‘death’49 and ‘exile’, or how the punishment of sin is to be 
recognised and understood, is more complex than it might first appear. In Australia, the 
continuing problems of the Indigenous peoples, and the repeated failure of any 
programmes to help them, indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong. 
4.6 Bound to Sin 
Ezekiel has established his case that the people are being punished because of their own 
sin, sin that repeats the sins of their fathers. But this leaves a very important question. 
The people to whom Ezekiel was speaking claimed that they were not sinning, and so 
were being punished for the sins of their forebears; Ezekiel claims that they were 
sinning, and so were being punished for their own sin. If Ezekiel was right, that the 
people were sinning, and so they were being punished for their own sin, then the people 
were either wilfully sinning whilst brazenly claiming that they were not, or they did not 
know that they were sinning. What if they did not know that they were sinning? That is, 
is it possible that the people thought that they were, on the whole, doing right, living 
within the covenant that provides a way of dealing with sin, and yet were still sinning in 
ways that they did not know about, ways that were ultimately destructive? More 
pointedly, is it possible that communities continue to sin even when they try to do what 
is right? Or, in terms of the present political discourse in Australia, is the present 
generation guiltless, and can it move into the future without repeating the sins of the 
past?  
 
This section will argue that the present generation of non-Indigenous people is bound to 
sin in ways that follow on from the sins of its forebears, even if it wants to choose what 
is right, unless it begins a process of deep and profound repentance, and seeks 
reconciliation with the Indigenous communities. This does not mean that Indigenous 
communities will not also need to repent, but the primary concern of this section is to 
expose the oft-repeated claim that the present generation of non-Indigenous people is 
not responsible for what happened in the past as a dangerous fiction, for the present 
non-Indigenous generation continues to act in a sinful way which is shaped by its 
history. 
 
The place to begin is to recall a major insight of Paul, that sin is not just wrong actions, 
but sin is also a power that causes people to do wrong things. This observation is critical 
to understanding Romans, and is central to Romans 6 in particular. All human beings 
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are captive to sin, but Christ’s death on the cross has broken the power of sin, so that, 
being incorporated into Christ’s death and resurrection, we may die to sin and rise to 
new life. This conversion experience begins the long process of repentance and being 
released from the grasp of the power of sin, as we learn to live more in the power of the 
Holy Spirit.  
 
Augustine was helpful in elucidating just how pernicious this captivity to sin is, because 
it not only affects the ability to do what is right, but it also damages the ability to know 
what is right. In his arguments with Pelagius, Augustine made an extended argument 
about the will. For Augustine, the will is directed towards what a person sees as ‘good’, 
and pushes away from behaviour that is irrational with respect to this good; it is 
connected to desire and the affections; it is not only drawn to the good, but also pushed 
towards it by the internal dynamic of intentionality of desire.50 Unfortunately, the will 
can become disoriented. This has the unfortunate consequence that a person can will to 
do what is right, but, because the will is not true, the person sins in acting according to 
her will. The will can become distorted through habitual action, or by being compelled 
to take part in sinful actions. In the latter case, being compelled to take part in sinful 
action leads to the distortion of the will, as what has happened becomes internalised.51 
That is, the will becomes distorted, and a person becomes bound to sin,52 which will be 
referred to as ‘bound willing’. 
 
Whilst this argument is usually made for individuals, it has considerable descriptive 
power for conglomerations of people. As was seen above (Section 4.3) one can think of 
corporate entities as having a ‘spirit’ or ‘personality’. As with the will of an individual, 
the will of a corporate entity can also be damaged, so that a corporate entity can be 
bound to sin, that is, a corporate entity may wish to do what is right, but end up sinning 
because it is unable to know what the right thing is to do.53 
 
Often, the will is distorted by the creation and internalisation of a false narrative.54 An 
example of this is the way that Indigenous peoples were written out of the non-
Indigenous narratives of Australian history for several generations; although Indigenous 
peoples had figured prominently in both historical and descriptive works in the 
nineteenth century, they were hardly mentioned in history books between 1900 and the 
1960s; they were virtually written out of history.55 Further, a dominant myth was 
established, of peaceful settlement, of the ‘Aussie battler’, who struggled against the 
  171 
elements to establish the modern nation of Australia. It conveniently forgot that 
wherever the incoming people moved to, a state of war resulted. It is clear from the 
newspaper reports that this happened, that there was a state of war wherever the 
‘frontier’ was to be found. Settlers found themselves to be under attack, and carried 
guns for protection. Reprisals were frequent, and hugely disproportionate, and started 
almost at the beginning of the establishment of the settlement of the first incomers.56 
That the so-called ‘history wars’ – the argument over what really happened in Australia 
– are so vitriolic, shows not only how hard it is for a nation to give up false narrations of 
its history, but also that it is difficult to face the implications of uncovering a truer 
narration of that history, even though it has the potentiality of liberation for all the 
peoples of Australia, if it leads to repentance and forgiveness. 
 
It was suggested in Section 1.4 that by planting a flag in the soil, claiming ownership of 
the land and sovereignty over it for the English Crown, Captain Arthur Phillip 
committed a foundational sin against the First peoples of Australia: he did not recognise 
the Indigenous systems of law, including their ownership of the land, nor did he engage 
with the full humanity of the First peoples. In the next chapter, it will be seen that these 
foundational sins have become established in the very fabric of the life of the dominant 
culture. The Mabo and Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 
judgement recognised this in part, with the majority judgement overturning the previous 
legal precedent that failed to recognise any form of Indigenous ownership of land. 
However, what it was not able to do was address the issue of sovereignty, as the law 
itself was an expression of this claim to sovereignty.57 
 
Given this history, it is not surprising that the attempts to sort out the welfare problems 
of the Indigenous peoples of Australia have continuously failed, for the present 
generation continues to sin in ways that are shaped by the sins of the past, and its will 
has been distorted so that it cannot know what is right, even when it desires to do what 
is right.58 Further, it is to be expected that the present generation of non-Indigenous 
Australians will continue to sin in ways that are shaped by its forebears, unless Rudd’s 
apology leads to a deeper engagement in the process of repentance and reconciliation. 
4.7 Corporate Reconciliation 
Corporate entities that have sinned need to repent. Ezekiel finishes his argument in 
chapter 18 with the call to corporate repentance. ‘The final words of the chapter (vv. 
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30b-32) focus on the challenge to repentance. ‘Get yourselves a new heart and a new 
spirit! Why will you die, O house of Israel?’ (v. 31); ‘Turn and live’ (v. 32). These 
words make explicit the challenge to repentance which is clearly implied in vv. 21-24 
and 26-28.’59 ‘The call to repentance is addressed to the community as a whole, and it is 
the restoration of the whole people of God for which Ezekiel presses.’60 
 
But the present generation can do more than repent of its own sins; it can break the 
pattern of bound willing by also repenting of the sins of the past. As has been argued in 
this chapter, corporate entities can have a history that goes beyond those who are that 
corporate entity at any point in time. Where there has been a conflict that has continued 
over a period of time, where not everyone who has been part of the conflict is still alive, 
then those who are currently part of those corporate entities can do more than be 
reconciled over their own parts in the conflict, for they can be part of the reconciliation 
of the corporate entities themselves. That is, those who are part of a corporate entity 
which has sinned in the past can repent of the history of sin of the corporate entity of 
which they are part, and likewise those whose forebears were sinned against can forgive 
the sins of the past. 
 
Returning to the biblical text for a moment, it is possible to read Ezekiel 18 as 
contradicting this point, for it could be read as saying that the present generation is only 
being punished for its own sins, or, more generally, that guilt does not transfer down the 
generations, for the present generation is being punished only for its own sins, not the 
sins of its forebears. If this reading is correct, then Ezekiel 18 is a significant shift in 
understanding from the main thrust of the rest of the Old Testament, the so-called 
deuteronomistic histories in particular, which argue that the party who received the 
punishment acted wickedly, but nonetheless it received the punishment that had been 
building up for generations (e.g. see 2 Kings 21.15; 22.17; 24.20). This is also the 
understanding of other parts of Ezekiel.61 So why is there this seeming contradiction in 
Ezekiel concerning trans-generational guilt? Kaminsky suggests that Ezekiel was a 
prophet, not a systematic theologian, and the problem that he was addressing in chapter 
18 was a particular complaint by the people that their sin did not warrant the 
punishment of the exile. In such a rhetorical situation, it is possible to use arguments 
that contradict what may be said to another audience on another day about a different 
problem, and so what Ezekiel says in chapter 18 does not signal a paradigm shift.62 That 
is, this thesis ascribes to the, perhaps unfashionable, view that the best reading of the 
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thrust of the Old Testament thinking on this issue is that guilt passes down the 
generations. 
 
Therefore, what Tutu writes about forgiveness is surely true: 
 
If we are going to move on and build a new kind of world community there must 
be a way in which we can deal effectively with a sordid past. The most effective 
way I can think of is for the perpetrators or their descendents to acknowledge the 
horror of what happened and the descendants of the victims to respond by 
granting the forgiveness they ask for, providing something can be done, even 
symbolically, to compensate for the anguish experienced, whose consequences 
are still being lived through today. … If the present generation could not 
legitimately speak on behalf of those who are no more, then we could not offer 
forgiveness for the sins of South Africa’s racist past, which pre-dates the advent 
of apartheid in 1948. The process of healing our land would be subverted 
because there would always be the risk that some awful atrocity of the past 
would come to light that would undermine what has been accomplished thus far 
… True forgiveness deals with the past, all of the past, to make the future 
possible. We cannot go on nursing grudges even vicariously for those who 
cannot speak for themselves any longer. We have to accept that what we do we 
do for generations past, present and yet to come. That is what makes a 
community a community or a people a people – for better or for worse.63 
 
Whilst Tutu is speaking of the importance of forgiveness for all the sins of the past, it is 
surely analogously true too of repentance,64 the counterpart of forgiveness in 
reconciliation.65 
 
There are two important caveats that must be noted. Firstly, Tutu’s remark is most true 
about intentionality. That is, reconciliation is probably like taking the layers off an 
onion: the reconciliation of one layer of problems reveals another layer of problems 
underneath, which will need to be resolved. A one-off process of repentance and 
forgiveness will probably not resolve all the layers at once, but there needs to be the 
intention to resolve each layer as it is revealed. Secondly, what has happened does not 
go away, even though reconciliation has brought justice, healing, and new beginnings. 
Recall the example from Section 4.3 above, where Alasdair MacIntyre says that the 
relationship between a Jewish person and a German born after the war cannot avoid 
being affected by what has happened in the past, even if there has been reconciliation. 
 
This thesis has been focusing on the need for the Subsequent peoples to repent, because 
this need is not often recognised. The present generation must enter a process of 
repenting not only for its own sin, but also the sins of its forebears.66 It was already 
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noted that there was something about the popular apology to the ‘Stolen Generations’ 
that made it feel as if it was not only for what happened to these people,67 but also for 
what has been done to all the Indigenous peoples since the first incomers landed to stay 
in the land. It now behoves the peoples of Australia to work on the process of 
repentance and forgiveness, the seeking of reconciliation. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the nature of the responsibility of the present generation in 
any multiple-generational dispute. It has been shown that the present generation of any 
institution is part of the history of that institution. Although this means that the present 
generation is not guilty of the sins of past generations, it is the case that the present 
generation is part of an institution that is guilty of any unaddressed past sins. Moreover, 
because of the nature of bound willing, the present generation is likely to continue to sin 
in ways shaped by the sins of the previous generations, even if it does not want to do so. 
That does not mean that individuals are necessarily guilty as individuals, but they are 
part of a larger institution, which is guilty. The only way to resolve these two problems 
is for the present generation to repent and seek reconciliation, and for the present 
generation of the offended parties to give forgiveness. 
 
The next chapter, on the history of land in Australia over the past half century, 
investigates if this has happened in practice in Australia. It will be seen that the 
foundational fallacy, or original sin – that British sovereignty and ownership was 
assumed over the continent, without reference to the Indigenous peoples, as part of the 
failure to recognise the full humanity (and culture) of the Indigenous peoples – has 
brought disastrous consequences both for the Indigenous and the non-Indigenous 
peoples, as well as for the land. The reason why no programmes have been able to 
resolve the problems that were introduced at the beginning of Europeans coming to live 
in the continent is that present occupants of Australia have been shaped by their history, 
and have been unable to choose what will bring healing to the land. The only way to 
resolve the problems for all the peoples of Australia is for the Subsequent peoples of 
Australia to seek reconciliation with the First peoples of Australia.
                                                 
1 Attributed to one of William Faulkner’s characters in Shriver, An Ethic, p. 4, and 
widely attributed to Faulkner elsewhere, but I have not managed to find the original 
quotation, nor its context. 
  175 
                                                 
22 Michael Ignatieff, “Wounded Nations, Broken Lives: Truth Commissions and War 
Tribunals,” Index on Censorship 5 (1996), 110-22, quoted in Minow, “Innovating”, p. 
98. 
3 Botcharova, “Implementation” reports on the experience of trying to bring 
reconciliation in the Balkans. 
4 McKenna, Looking, p. 78.  
5 Hemming gives the source of this quotation as Rose, Deborah Bird, “Histories and 
Rituals”, in Attwood, Bain, ed., In the Age of Mabo (St Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 
1996), 33-53. 
6 Hemming, Steve, “Taming the Colonial Archive: History, Native Title and 
Colonialism” in Gray, Geoffrey and Paul, Mandy, Through a Smoky Mirror: History 
and Native Title (Canberra: AIATSIS, 2002), 49-64, pp. 58f. 
7 Wilcken S.J., John, “A Theological Approach to Reconciliation” in Brennan S.J., 
Frank, ed., Reconciling Our Differences: A Christian Approach to Recognising 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Richmond, Victoria: Aurora Books, 1992), 63-77, p. 69. 
8 Cowlishaw, Gillian, “Studying Aborigines: Changing Canons in Anthropology and 
History” in Attwood, Bain and Arnold, John, eds, Power, Knowledge and Aborigines 
(Victoria: La Trobe University Press, 1992), 20-31, p. 27 
9 Graham, Martin, Sizzling Faith:The Dream that Got the Church On the Move! 
(Eastbourne: Kingsway, 2006), pp. 82-88. 
10 Graham, Sizzling, p. 83, his italics. 
11 Graham, Sizzling, p. 84. 
12 Graham, Sizzling, p. 85. 
13 Graham, Sizzling, p. 87. 
14 Graham, Sizzling, p. 88. 
15 Mills, Brian and Mitchell, Roger, Sins of the Fathers: How National Repentance 
Removes Obstacles for Revival (Tonbridge: Sovereign World, 1999) and Mill, Brian 
and Pickering, Brian, Fountains of Tears: Changing Nations Through the Power of 
Repentance and Forgiveness (Tonbridge: Sovereign World, 2004), give many more 
stories of people who have repented on behalf of others over incidents that happened in 
the past, and how this has brought restoration of relationships and healing in the present. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate this phenomenon, particularly the 
issue of who is authorised to repent on behalf of a corporate entity. This behaviour goes 
beyond the suggestion of Tavuchis (see Section 3.2) that apology needs to be made by a 
recognised representative of that entity. 
16 This was said during an interview for Woman’s Own, 23rd September, 1987. As at 
7.12.09, this can be found archived at: 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689. 
17 McFadyen, Alistair, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in 
Social Relationships (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), p. 317, begins his definition of a person 
as ‘[a]n individual who is publicly identifiable as a distinct, continuous and integrated 
social location from whence communication may originate and to which it may be 
directed; who has the capacity for autonomous engagement in social communication, 
and who has a unique identity sedimented from previous interaction.’ This view is 
contested by Harris, “Should”. 
18 Donovan, V J, Christianity Rediscovered: An Epistle from the Masai, (London: SCM, 
1978), p. 92. 
19 Mbiti, J S, African Religions and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 141, 
quoted in Villa-Vicencio, Charles, A Theology of Reconstruction: Nation-Building and 
Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), p. 166. 
  176 
                                                 
20 Maurice Halbwachs has argued that human beings have very few memories that do 
not depend on being part of a group of some sort. This is noted in Parker, Russ, Healing 
Wounded History: Reconciling Peoples and Places (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 
2001), pp. 40f. 
21 Westermann, C, Creation (London: SPCK, 1974), chapter 1.  See also Hardy, D W, 
"Created and Redeemed Sociality", in Gunton and Hardy, chapter 1, pp. 21-47. 
22 E.g. Weber, Theodore R, “Guilt: Yours, Ours, and Theirs”, Worldview 18 (February 
1975), 15-22, p. 19. 
23 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theology (Gerald Duckworth & 
Co Ltd; 3rd edition, 2007), pp. 220f (his italics). Cf. Wendell Berry, quoted in Parker, 
Healing, p. 83, ‘Once you begin to awaken to the realities of what you know, you are 
subject to staggering recognitions of your complicity in history and in the events in your 
own life ... a historical wound, prepared centuries ago to come alive in me at my birth 
like a hereditary disease and to be augmented and deepened in my life.’ 
24 See Section 3.2. 
25 Northcott, Michael, An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Religion and American 
Empire (London: I. B. Taurus, 2004). 
26 The Chambers Concise Dictionary defines ‘corporate’ in the legal sense of a group 
‘legally united into a body so as to act as an individual’. 
27Wink, Walter, Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the New Testament 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), chapter 2. 
28 Wink, Naming, pp. 13-21, 64-67. 
29His interpretation is not uncontested.  Andrew Lincoln is very helpful in mapping out 
the various modern interpretations of this language in his article "Liberation from the 
Powers: Supernatural Spirits or Social Structures", in M Daniel Carroll R, D J A Clines 
and P R Davies (ed.), The Bible in Human Society: Essays in Honour of John Rogerson 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, JSOTS 200), 335-354.  He argues that, although 
this is not what the language meant when the New Testament was written, it is a valid 
interpretation for today. 
30Wink, Naming, p. 5. 
31McFadyen, Call, p. 241. 
32Wink, Naming, p. 5. 
33 Wink, Walter, Unmasking the Powers: The Invisible Powers That Determine Human 
Existence (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), chapter 3. 
34 Many readings of Ezekiel see Ezekiel as being on a trajectory that moves from a 
communal notion of personhood and responsibility to a more individualised one (see 
Joyce, Paul M, Divine Initiative and Human Response in Ezekiel (Sheffield: SAP JSOT 
Supplement Series 51, 1989), p. 36 for some examples of such readings). However, this 
individualised reading of Ezekiel cannot be sustained. 
 
Joel Kaminsky (“The Sins of the Fathers: A Theological Investigation of the Biblical 
Tension Between Corporate and Individualized Retribution”, Judaism, Summer 1997, 
available, as at 24.2.10: 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0411/is_n3_v46/ai_20119166/?tag=content;col1)
rightly criticises the way of thinking that sees Ezekiel on the trajectory from communal 
to individual conceptions of identity and responsibility, noting that this way of thinking 
reflects a modern bias towards privileging the individual over the communal, and the 
political project of wanting to construct a trajectory from the messiness of the 
communal, law-based religion of Israel to the purity of the individual, grace-filled 
Christianity. Besides the problematic ideological position of such an argument, 
Kaminsky notes that the idea of communal responsibility is present in the books of the 
  177 
                                                 
Old Testament that many scholars believe were written late, such as Dan. 6.25 and 
Esther 9.7-10, and he notes that this idea is carried through into the New Testament (e.g. 
Mt. 23.29-36; Jn. 9.2; 1 Thess. 2.14-16). (He makes the same point, about the presence 
of corporate responsibility in parts of the Hebrew Bible that were written late, in 
Chapter 2 of his Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1995; Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series 
196), where he argues that its presence in 2 Kings was the result of a number of post-
exilic redactions of the material.) 
 
To the evidence that is cited in Kaminsky’s paper, the following observations could be 
added. The famous Jer. 31.33 is often mis-translated as ‘I will put my law within them, 
and I will write it on their hearts’, where it should read ‘heart’ (singular), as it is in the 
Hebrew. That is, God is performing this operation on the community. Three further 
pieces of evidence of the communal idea continuing into the NT are also worth 
considering: (1) Matthew sees the work of Jesus as being about the renewal of the 
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it the case that Ezekiel is speaking of individual responsibility here? It is not, for 
Ezekiel was speaking to a community in crisis. He is responding to a community 
complaining that their fathers (i.e. the previous generations) had sinned, and it is they 
(i.e. the present generation) who are being punished. That is, the purpose of Ezek. 18 ‘is 
to demonstrate the collective responsibility of the contemporary house of Israel for the 
national disaster which she is suffering’ (Joyce, Divine, p. 36). He argues convincingly 
that, ‘[a]lthough a single man is considered in each of the three test-cases [Ezek. 18.5-
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[t]here is no self apart from the moral community, just as there is no community 
apart from moral selves. The part and the whole are not separable … Ezekiel 
seeks to reconstruct the ‘house of Israel’ using the old traditions, but is calling 
for commitment to a new orientation within the old traditions. In dialogue with 
the past, Ezekiel seeks to imagine a new reality. That is the function of his 
individual-community motif. It is not to place religion on a new foundation of 
individualism, but to create a new interdependence that will build a community 
of character again. 
 
Whilst this generates creative resonances for a reader of today, who is interested in the 
relationship between the corporate and the individual, and so the text is being 
generative, it is not clear that Ezekiel thought in this way. 
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sins, it also appears to be being punished for the accumulated sins over the generations 
(Kaminsky, Corporate, pp. 42, 44f). 
42 Cf. the deuteronomistic history, which records that each king sinned (and caused the 
nation to sin) in the same ways as his father (Kaminsky, Corporate, pp. 42f). 
43 Kaminsky,  Corporate, pp.166-168. 
44 Kaminsky, Corporate, p. 165. 
45 Joyce, Divine, p. 37; Kaminsky, Corporate, p. 163. On p. 165, Kaminsky writes that 
it ‘is highly unlikely that this language was employed in order to proclaim a new 
theology of retribution in which God judged each person as an autonomous entity.’ 
46 Kaminsky, Corporate, chapter 2, shows that the deuteronmistic historians blame the 
exile on the repeated history of evil of the nation under each king (e.g., see pp. 42f). The 
reforms of Josiah were not enough to turn the tide. Where the exile is sometimes 
blamed on Manasseh (2 Kings 21.1-18; 23.26f; 23.36-24.6), this is more that the sins of 
Mannasseh were so heinous that they would have been sufficient to cause exile by 
themselves, even though God did cause the exile at that point, and the nation under 
subsequent kings continued to sin in the same ways as Manasseh and his forebears (p. 
46). 
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47 Joyce, Divine, p. 38, helpfully points out that ‘it is impossible to demonstrate a direct 
causal relationship between human sin and divine punishment. This is precisely because 
the reasoning characteristically goes the other way: adversity is interpreted as 
punishment for sin and then an attempt is made to identify the sin in question.’  
48 Thanks to Walter Moberly, who reminded me of this. 
49 Moberly, Walter, The Theology of the Book of Genesis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), Chapter 4. 
50 McFadyen, Bound, pp. 179f. 
51 Sexual abuse is an extreme and unfortunate example of where this is the case. 
McFadyen, Bound, chapter 4 is helpful on the dynamics of sexual abuse. See the 
endnote below for a further explication of this. 
52 McFadyen, Alistair, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of 
Sin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 187f. 
53 Parker, Healing, pp. 59f. Cf. Jesus, who says to ‘Jerusalem’ that it is treating him in 
the same way as it treated all the prophets in the past (Lk.13.31-35). 
54 See, for example, Schreiter, Reconciliation, chapter 2. McFadyen, Bound, pp. 113-
116; 123f, demonstrates how a false narrative can be established in the case of the 
sexual abuse of a child. Abusers confuse the victim’s willing. For example: (1) the 
relationship with abuser outweighs the abuse; (2) with rewards, inducements, or other 
benefits; or (3) the initiation of the abuse is seductively incremental. In the first two 
cases, the willing for the inducements may be confused with willing the abuse, 
especially so when desire for benefits leads to initiation of abuse, so eliminating the 
difference between means and ends. ‘Childhood sexual abuse abuses the child’s active 
willing and intentionality, and this is why it can have such long-term traumatic 
consequences’ (p. 124). For incremental abuse, the gradient so shallow that it obfuscates 
not only when they became abusive, but also the point at which willing became 
operative. What seems abusive doesn’t seem so abusive from the step before. So, 
looking back, the victim is easily convinced that the abuse was accepted willingly from 
the beginning. The fact that lots of abusers have been abused suggests that the basic 
pattern and direction of dynamic life-intentionality (their spirit), including will, has been 
affected. Furthermore, sexual abusers of children often seem to have little sexual 
attraction to children, but abuse seems to be about resolving issues of personal identity 
structures sedimented thorough histories of distorted interaction. The issues themselves 
may not be sexual, but may be about security, trust, worth, vulnerability, which the 
abuser tries to resolve through power, domination, humiliation, or the semblance of 
intimacy. 
55 Reynolds, Why, pp. 92-94. 
56 This is well-documented in more recent histories. See for example, chapters VIII to X 
of Reynolds, Why. 
57 In his judgement in the Mabo and Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 
CLR 1 case, Justice Brennan repeatedly made statements along the line of, ‘[i]n 
discharging its duty to declare the common law of Australia, this Court is not free to 
adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human rights if their 
adoption would fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the body of our law its 
shape and internal consistency’ (p. 29). 
58 Concrete evidence of this will be given in Chapter 5 on the recent history of land in 
Australia, and then this will be reflected on theologically in Section 5.4. 
59 Joyce, Divine, p. 53. 
60 Sakenfeld, K D, “Ezekiel 18.25-32”, Interpretation 32 (1978), p. 296, quoted in 
Joyce, Divine, p. 142, endnote 69 to Chapter 3; italics in the quotation. 
61 Kaminsky, Corporate, pp. 41-47; 174. 
  180 
                                                 
62 Kaminsky, Corporate, p. 176. On p. 177, part of the conclusion of his study of 
Ezekiel 18 reads, ‘[s]uch theological innovations should be seen as ad hoc creations that 
were not necessarily intended to systematically reject the more usual corporate 
conceptions of divine retribution. It is very dubious to highlight such an ad hoc speech 
and thus to interpret it as signaling a general shift in Ezekiel’s understanding of divine 
retribution.’ 
63 Tutu, No, pp. 226f. 
64 Cf. Daniel’s prayer of confession of the sins of the past (Daniel 9; cf. Ezra 9.6ff; 
Nehemiah 1.6ff). Cf. also Leviticus 26.40-46, where people are encouraged by God to 
confess not only their own sins, but also the sins of their forebears. 
65 Parker, Healing, p. 17, goes further than this, suggesting that reconciliation in the 
present brings healing to the people who were involved in the past, who are already 
dead. 
66 Parker, Healing, p. 102. 
67 See Section 3.2. 
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5 Land in Australia: Raising Questions About Reconciliation  
The last three chapters have been developing the theology of reconciliation, and now it 
is time to return to the situation in Australia. Chapter 1 briefly outlined the early history 
of the occupation of Australia, and described how the decade of reconciliation, and 
public art and memorials have begun to acknowledge the history of relationships 
between the peoples of Australia. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the state 
of the process of reconciliation in Australia in more detail.  
 
Land has been chosen as the topic of this case study for a number of reasons. The most 
important reason is that land is essential to Indigenous identities, to Aboriginal cultures 
in particular, and so the approach of Subsequent peoples to the claims of First peoples 
concerning their land will be a good indicator of the commitment of Subsequent peoples 
to the process of reconciliation. Secondly, some First peoples have chosen to bring their 
political struggle to the attention of the Subsequent peoples by using the non-Indigenous 
legal system to make claims over their land, and so forcing the Subsequent peoples to 
take note of their rights.1 Thirdly, claiming ownership of the land was part of the 
foundational sin of the British occupation, and so, from the point of view of the 
theology developed in earlier chapters, particularly Chapter 4, it will instructive to see 
how this has played itself out in the recent history of relationships over land. Fourthly, 
the struggle has been well-documented, and so there is plenty of material to work with. 
Finally, the period in view is nearly half a century, a significant proportion of the time 
since the first Europeans arrived to stay, and a sufficient length of time to track changes 
in a situation where the time needed for change is often measured in generations.  
 
The approach taken in this chapter is to study legislation and court cases in Australia 
concerning land from the late 1960s until 2005. Starting and ending dates for a study 
can be somewhat arbitrary. However, the 1960s saw the beginnings of a change in non-
Indigenous attitudes to First peoples, with, for example, the 1967 referendum that 
recognised the Australian citizenship of Aboriginal people for the first time. It also saw 
the beginning of the court case that, although the Yolngu failed to establish their claim, 
was the catalyst for a report which resulted in the first land rights legislation for First 
peoples in Australia. The end date for this study is perhaps more arbitrary, and was 
chosen largely to be able to have closure on this chapter. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of reasons why this choice is not entirely arbitrary. Firstly, it is the year in 
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which I visited Australia to meet with people and talk with them about reconciliation. 
Secondly, the interpretation of the native title legislation seems to have reached a 
furthest extreme by that point. Thirdly, there were some big changes being discussed 
concerning the nature of Aboriginal land tenure, namely the possibility that individuals 
and groups might be able to mortgage corporately held lands, and to cover these 
changes adequately would require leaving this study indefinitely unfinished.2 
 
As the focus of this chapter is on the commitment of the Subsequent peoples to 
reconciliation, and, in particular, the degree of their repentance for what has happened 
since the foundational sins of the occupation, this chapter will largely investigate the 
responses of Subsequent peoples to the land claims made by the First peoples. 
 
In outline, this chapter proceed as follows. The first section attempts to describe some 
of the features of Aboriginal understandings of land. This is necessarily limited in 
scope, a description by an outsider, but it is essential to have at least some 
understanding of land in Aboriginal cultures in order to comprehend why this is such an 
important issue for First peoples, and also to expose some of the ways that the 
Subsequent peoples have failed to engage properly with Aboriginal cultures. Section 5.2 
gives a narrative outline of the history of land through the courts and in legislation since 
the late 1960s, so that the overall picture is not lost in the details presented in Section 
5.3. Finally, Section 5.4 provides a critique of what has happened, from the point of 
view of the theology developed in Chapters 2 to 4. 
5.1 Land in Indigenous Australian Cultures 
Land is very important in Indigenous cultures in Australia. Everything is bound up in 
the relationships between the people and the land: artefacts,3 language,4 ceremonies, 
law,5 knowledge and the process of initiation, conception, birth, life and death. Popular 
slogans such as ‘the land does not belong to the Aboriginals but the Aboriginals belong 
to the land’ do not comprehend the complexity of the relationship, not least because it 
imports the alien category of ‘ownership’ into a relationship that is about responsibility, 
sustenance, and the gift of life.6  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to try to explain the features of any particular 
Indigenous culture in Australia. Instead, some key features of the cultures of the First 
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peoples that will help understand the interaction of First peoples with non-Indigenous 
Australian law will be highlighted.7 
 
Aboriginal people speak of ‘country’.8 This is not just a piece of dirt, but the whole 
package of areas of land, all its geographical and geological features, flora, fauna, 
people, stories, ceremonies, law, and so on. Country need not only be land, but can be 
parts of the sea too. Debbie Rose is helpful here: 
 
In Aboriginal English, the word ‘country’ is both a common noun and a proper 
noun. People talk about country in the same way that they would talk about a 
person: they speak to country, sing to country, visit country, worry about 
country, grieve for country and long for country. People say that country knows, 
hears, smells, takes notice, takes care, is sorry or happy. County is a living entity 
with a yesterday, today and tomorrow, with consciousness, action, and a will 
toward life. Because of this richness of meaning, country is home and peace; 
nourishment for body, mind and spirit; and heart’s ease.9 
 
Connection to country is not just to an arbitrary piece of land, but to particular parcels 
of land. Nancy Daiyi, a member of the Mak Mak people, says, 
 
[w]hen I travel around my country I won’t starve. I know I’ll find good tucker 
because I have the right sweat for my country. It’ll look after us, because we are 
one and the same. You only need to call out. Talk to the land, it gives us life.10 
 
Indigenous peoples in Australia had, and continue to have, both a sophisticated 
understanding of their relationship to the land and a system of land tenure.11 An 
Aboriginal person may have attachments of varying degrees to multiple countries. 
Attachments are formed in many ways, for example: through the place of conception, 
the birth place, through the lines of both mother and father, through marriage, and 
through living in a place for a significant amount of time.12 A person has a whole 
package of responsibilities, and so there is some flexibility in the system for taking up 
responsibility for whichever land seems most appropriate according to various criteria.13 
The country for which a person has primary attachment and responsibility depends on 
making choices amongst the various possibilities, and political issues come into play.14 
 
A group can grow so that it needs to split, or a group may decline and so others may 
take over their land (and songs and ceremonies).15 Periods of ‘abandonment’ of areas of 
land were natural in Aboriginal cultures. When country was abandoned for a time, 
connection to the land was maintained by such things as carrying the objects for that 
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land, and remote ceremonial actions.16 Relationships to the land could also be shaped by 
times of scarcity.17  
 
This natural process has been complicated since the occupation of Aboriginal land in a 
number of ways. The fact that people have moved or have been moved from their lands 
means that they begin to build up attachment to the land on which they are living, either 
through the normal inheritance systems, through the cycle of conception, birth and 
death, or just through the attachment of living there and getting to know the country. 
This is further complicated when there have been waves of settlement in a place, so that 
there are several different groups of First people who have built up land rights in a 
particular place, whilst maintaining rights to their own countries to a greater or lesser 
extent.18 This sometimes results in severe conflicts between people living in the same 
place,19 and also severe conflict in land title negotiations under various non-Indigenous 
laws.20 It must be remembered that the descendents of the original owners of any 
country may have maintained their connection to their land, despite multiple 
disruptions, even in the most surprising circumstances,21 and that they may not 
recognise the claims on country by people who have built up their connections in other 
ways.22 
 
Alongside this understanding of land and tenure systems was a well-developed political 
system with ambassadorial protocols that governed movement over, and the use of land 
by other groups.23 
 
Women and men have different, overlapping, and interacting responsibilities for 
country: they may have different songs and stories, places which only women or men 
are allowed to visit, they share in the process of initiation, and so on. For many decades, 
half of Aboriginal culture was being overlooked without people really realising it, 
namely the place of women in Aboriginal society, and their responsibility for the land. 
The reason for this oversight is obvious: the anthropologists were largely men, who 
only had real access into ‘men’s business’ as they could not talk about ‘women’s 
business’, and who only pursued issues from a male perspective.24 Often, female 
anthropologists were young, and so were not considered eligible for women’s wisdom. 
With colonisation, European models of womanhood were forced onto Aboriginal 
women, who often became domestic slaves. When land issues were moved to the 
courts, the courts were largely dominated by men, again making it impossible for 
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women to be heard, because women could only speak about women’s business to other 
women.25 
 
Because of this overlooking of the role of women in Aboriginal society, people were 
unaware of the complementary nature of the responsibilities of women and men for the 
land, responsibilities that were mutually respected. It was thought that ownership of 
country went down the male line, but, as was seen above, there is a much more complex 
system of the ways that responsibilities for particular countries can be inherited. 
 
First peoples ‘manage’ country. For example, through the use of fire,26 the introduction 
of new species, maintaining the stocks of food,27 knowing when various foodstuffs are 
plentiful,28 and modification of the environment, such as building dams to catch fish.29 
There is even archaeological evidence of settled Aboriginal communities, who farmed 
the land.30 First peoples have changed the landscape and kept it fruitful. This does not 
mean that they are conservationists.31  
 
With the multiple disruptions to the lives of many First peoples, it is no surprise that 
there are often conflicts over land claims. For example, the fact that whole groups of 
people were slaughtered by non-Indigenous people, means that the normal way of 
passing on country was disrupted, not to mention the deep trauma of surviving First 
people themselves. When First people were forced off their land and had to live on the 
land of other people, this introduced conflict, both because the people should not have 
been there, and because the newcomers built up some association with the country 
because of living there. Ironically, as was seen in Section 3.3, many First people were 
forced off the land when a law was passed in 1968 that made it mandatory to pay First 
people the same as other stock workers. An enforced sedentary existence and exclusion 
from country means that vital knowledge has been lost, ceremonies could not be 
performed, and initiation processes have dwindled in many cases. With many 
Aboriginal men now spending time in gaol or with drug and alcohol problems, women 
have taken an increasing responsibility in managing country and deciding who should 
have responsibility for country when the preferred patterns of passing on responsibility 
have become disordered.32 Bell notes that what were once safeguard mechanisms have 
become part of the everyday working of the system; what was once latent in the 
structure of land relations has become consciously articulated principles.33 With 
multiple disruptions to their societies, it is possible that different descendents of the 
  186 
same tribal groups may end up with differing knowledge of particular pieces of 
country.34 All of these things make basing Australian law on the idea of a ‘traditional 
owner’ deeply problematic. Patrick Wolfe, historian, rightly observes ‘that to fall within 
Native Title criteria, it is necessary to fall outside history.’35 
 
Not only have First people been disrupted, but the environment also has been radically 
altered. For example, mining has dried up reliable water sources;36 water sources have 
been damaged by cattle;37 and introduced species, both flora and fauna, which have no 
natural predators, have explosively multiplied.38 Some indigenous species have become 
extinct or are facing extinction, and so the claims of First people to be allowed to do 
what they want to with the flora and fauna in their country becomes problematic, and 
local knowledge is no longer sufficient for making these decisions.39 ‘The colonisation 
resulted in a complex of power of external origin in charge of a new geopolitical space. 
New meanings became engraved upon the landscape and in its peoples’ 
consciousness.’40 
 
When European people first settled in Australia, there were some hundreds of nations 
and languages (and many First people spoke multiple languages). Today there is 
perhaps a wider spectrum of Aboriginal cultures. However, it would be a mistake to 
think that connections with the land and with kinship systems and knowledge has 
disappeared in even the longest settled and most urban of environments: Read, for 
example, makes a fascinating study of continuing Aboriginal attachment to land in the 
Sydney area.41  
 
The presentation here is not meant to romanticise Aboriginal cultures. In particular, it is 
not saying that the cultures are just, nor that there was not and is not abuse of power. 
However, in closing this section, it must be remembered that First peoples have a much 
more communal understanding of personhood and their relationship to the land than that 
which has grown up in the Western Enlightenment tradition, and sometimes their notion 
of justice is the way of making it possible for an offender to be reintegrated into the 
community.42 
 
Armed with this knowledge, the reader may find the recounting of the story of court 
cases and legislation that is narrated in the next section rather bemusing: if all of this is 
true, then why did some cases so disastrously miss the point? Part of the reason is that 
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the understanding given here is now freely available to non-Indigenous people, but it 
has not always been so. This is due to a number of reasons, such as: knowledge only 
being available to properly initiated people; the predominance of male anthropologists 
or anthropologists working in a paradigm of male domination, so that women’s voices 
were not heard; the failure to acknowledge the multiple varieties of Aboriginal cultures; 
the failure to understand the categories of Aboriginal culture; and so on. On top of this, 
there are questions about how to negotiate two conflicting cultures, and conflicting 
presumed rights that have built up over generations, in a land where one culture is much 
more powerful than the other. However, judgements such as this must await the 
drawing together of the threads in telling the story. For now it is enough to note that 
some of the knowledge in this section has only recently been available to non-
Indigenous people, sometimes for good reasons, and sometimes because of the lack of 
attention that has been paid to Aboriginal cultures. 
5.2 An Outline Narrative of Land in Recent Decades 
So that the overall narrative is not lost in the details, the outline is as follows.43 The 
place to begin is always a little arbitrary, but the modern Indigenous land-rights 
movement can certainly be traced back as far as some of the Yolngu people of the Gove 
Peninsula petitioning the Commonwealth government concerning the grant of a lease to 
mine bauxite on their land, a petition which was rejected by the government. In 
response, the Yolngu took the mining company and the government to court, in order to 
establish the ownership of their land, and to have the actions of the government declared 
illegal. The presiding judge recognised the existence of Aboriginal law, but was unable 
to see, in the evidence that was presented to him, an understanding of land ownership 
that could be recognised in non-Indigenous law.44 Following the Gove Peninsula case, 
Woodward J was instructed to produce a more careful report on the relationship of 
Aboriginal people to the land, and the then Commonwealth Labour Government drew 
up legislation, which was followed through, in a slightly altered form, by the new 
Liberal-Country Party government in 1976, forming the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976. As its name implied, it only covered land in the 
Northern Territory. It introduced the notion of ‘traditional owner’ into government 
legislation. A quarter of a century later, most claims under this Act had been settled, and 
over forty percent of the land in the Northern Territory was in Aboriginal hands, with 
certain provisos, largely concerning mining rights. A later Labour Government backed 
away from an election pledge to make similar legislation that would be binding on the 
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rest of the Australian continent. In 1982, a Torres Strait Islander, Eddie Mabo, was 
instrumental in setting up a case against the Queensland government concerning the 
ownership of land on the Island of Mer in the Torres Strait. Through various twists and 
turns, the case was finally decided in 1992, with a majority in the High Court of 
Australia adjudging that a concept of ‘native title’ was consistent with Australian 
common law, and that some of the claimants still held this on the island. The Mabo and 
Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (‘Mabo (2)’) judgement 
recognised that ‘common law title’ could, and had been, extinguished in some lands 
under non-Indigenous law, and indeed by virtue of some Australian and Parliamentary 
and Executive actions already taken. Nevertheless, the decision opened the way for 
other groups of Indigenous peoples to make similar claims about their own lands, which 
would be expected to be successful. In order to respond to this new situation, which 
would have led to protracted and expensive legal cases, the Keating (Labour) 
Commonwealth Government, in consultation with groups of Indigenous leaders, 
introduced the Native Title Act 1993, which ratified the extinguishment of native title on 
large tracts of Australia, as per the Mabo (2) judgement, and, at the same time, set up a 
procedure whereby Indigenous people could try to have their ‘native title’ recognised on 
land where it had not already been extinguished. This was the high-water mark of 
genuine collaborative dialogue between the First and Subsequent Peoples. The Act 
produced a way to fast-track judicial decision-making; it provided for mediation of 
disputes and legal funding for claims; and it established a ‘legislative code’ in relation 
to ‘native title’. This complex, yet genuine framework aimed at reducing time and costs, 
and of course involved some compromise in relation to outcomes. In other words, it was 
clear to all that every ‘Mabo-like’ case would be successful, whilst also acknowledging 
that vast tracts of the continent would not be affected by the decision. Significantly, the 
preferred process included mediation between the claimants, with the results ratified by 
the courts. The Commonwealth government changed in 1995 to a coalition led by John 
Howard, who was distinctly cool about the reconciliation process in general, and land 
rights for Australia’s First peoples in particular.45 The following year, 1996, saw 
another major judgement in the High Court of Australia, in a case between the Wik 
people and the Queensland Government, where the court decided that the existence of a 
pastoral lease did not necessarily extinguish native title.46 Famously, Howard appeared 
on national television holding up a map of Australia, on which he had marked in black 
ink what he described as the seventy percent of Australia that might fall into Aboriginal 
ownership because of ‘judge-made law’ in the Wik decision.47 An orchestrated media 
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frenzy followed, with the Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer, announcing that the 
government would be amending the Native Title Act 1993 so as to achieve ‘bucket-loads 
of extinguishment’. Access to legal funding was restricted, and the benefits of a 
favourable judicial finding under the Act were watered down. The effect was a 
substantial unilateral rescission of the terms of the accord reached by the Keating 
government. Subsequent Federal court judgements gave effect to the clear intentions of 
Parliament in restricting access to, and the meaning of, the ‘title’ intended to be 
recognised by the revised Native Title Act. 
 
In reading this story, it is clear that the key shifts in policy towards First peoples and 
land have often been led by Indigenous people themselves; they have not been passive 
observers, but it has been the dominant culture which has had to respond to Indigenous 
pressure brought within the system of the dominant culture itself.  The struggle within 
the non-Indigenous legal system has not exhausted their political struggle, but it was a 
tactic which forced the non-Indigenous peoples of Australia to take note of their claims 
in a legally enforceable way.48 
 
Although this is a story about the dominant Australian legal system, it does not deny the 
existence of parallel Indigenous legal systems, which have, on the whole, never ceded 
ownership of Indigenous land to others. In fact, for many Indigenous peoples, the 
Australian legal system is ‘lawless’, and is not wholly assented to.49 
5.3 A Narrative About Land in Recent non‐Indigenous Legislation and Law 
5.3.1 The Bark Petition50 
In Australia, extensive exploration for bauxite resulted from the shortage of iron during 
the 1939-1945 war. Deposits were found it in Arnhem Land in 1951, around Yirrkala 
Methodist Mission in particular. When the lease, held by the Methodist Overseas 
Mission Board,51 on two hundred square miles of land ran out in 1957, the 
Commonwealth Government replaced it with a ‘Special Purpose Lease’, which allowed 
mining. In 1958 the Mission board agreed to transfer the land from mission control for 
mining purposes.52 There was no consultation with the local Yolngu, and, whilst it was 
not a secret agreement, it was not publicised. 
 
The Revd Edgar Wells and his wife Ann arrived soon after, in January, 1962. They had 
both studied anthropology under Elkin, and had been missionaries at Milingimbi from 
  190 
1950-1960. Soon after their arrival, the local people, the Yolngu, expressed worries 
about mining activity. A survey peg appeared on Bremner Island. Wells wrote to Arthur 
Calwell, leader of opposition, in January 1963, asking for protection for the Yirrkala 
Yolngu. On 18th February, 1963, the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, announced a 
$50m mining project, and large excisions of land of the Aborigines’ reserve to Grove 
Bauxite Corporation (GBC), representing overseas mining interests. On same day S B 
Dickinson of the GBC attended a meeting of the board of the Methodist Overseas 
Mission, and received rubber-stamp approval. There were no Yolngu at the meeting, 
and they were not informed afterwards. 
 
Wells received a reply from Calwell, and was shocked to find that the mission land had 
been reduced to two square miles, and later to half a square mile. Under the old lease, 
the Methodists acted in control of mission village itself, but it was understood that the 
Yolngu controlled the rest of the land. Now they were to lose all control over their land. 
 
All this was happening at height of Comalco dispute in Cape York, where the Mapoon 
people were refusing to leave their land, and GBC wanted no such problem in the Gove 
area. 
 
Paul Hasluck, the minister for Territories, defended the mining initiatives on the 
principle of assimilation: he said that change was happening from as part of the move 
from ‘protection’ to ‘assimilation’53 and this would assist in the assimilation of the 
Yolngu.  
 
In July, 1963, Kim Beazley and Gordon Bryant, two Commonwealth parliamentarians, 
visited Yirrkala. Letters from the Yolngu had received no response, and they wanted to 
petition the Prime Minister. When Beazley saw Aboriginal paintings in the church, he 
conceived of the idea of a petition being a bark painting. The bark petition drawn up by 
group of Aboriginal artists, and signed by representatives of various clans.54 It 
contained a typescript written in both English and Gumatj.55 Parliament received the 
petition on 14th August 1963, but Hasluck opposed its presence because it contained 
only twelve signatures, some of whom were minors, even though only literate young 
people’s signatures had been used. So the Yolngu prepared a second petition overnight, 
with as many signatures as they could get in one night, about one hundred witnessed 
thumbprints. Photographs of the petitions can be found in Figure 5-1 below.56 
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Figure 5-1: Yirrkala Bark Petitions, 1963, 1963, 1968, various artists of the Yirrkala 
Community. 
 
Significantly, the images around the bark petition were a presentation of the Aboriginal 
ownership of the land. Morphy writes, 
 
[t]he genius of the bark petition was that it introduced an Aboriginal symbol into 
Parliamentary discourse, making it harder for Europeans to respond in terms of 
their own cultural precedents. Petitions framed in parliamentary language can be 
dealt with through parliamentary procedures. Petitions framed with bark 
paintings add a new element. The bark petition emphasised the difference 
between ‘Aborigines’ and other petitioners, and it did so in such a way that the 
issue was likely to be taken up by the media.57 
 
Members of Parliament said that the petition was from Wells and other missionaries, 
that they were guilty of agitation. This was an old political ploy, dating back to at least 
1870s, when no-one could believe the First peoples in Corranderrk, Victoria, were 
capable of writing letters. 
 
Beazley moved that a Select Committee be established to investigate the case, and this 
was accepted on 12th September, 1963. It interviewed many witnesses, including Wells 
  192 
and ten Yolngu, men and women. It accepted evidence in the Gumatj language, and the 
investigators were impressed by the intellectual competence of the Yolngu, and their 
grasp of the issues when giving evidence in their own language through an interpreter. 
Whilst accepting the inevitability of mining, the Standing Committee recommended: 
that the Yolngu be consulted as soon as possible about important sites; several types of 
compensation and royalties; and that there should be a House of Representatives 
Standing Committee to monitor events at Yirrkala for at least ten years.  
 
Within a few days of the release of the report, the Board of the Methodist Overseas 
Mission sent notice to Wells to move him from 1st January, 1964. When he refused, it 
attracted media attention, and he was sacked immediately.58 In November 1965, 
parliament said they would not set up the recommended Standing Committee.  
 
This story has been told at some length because it has features that come up again and 
again in the story of land in the next decades: negotiations about Aboriginal land that 
exclude the First peoples themselves; creative responses by the First peoples; 
investigations whose recommendations are not acted upon; advocacy by some non-
Indigenous people on behalf of First peoples; the overwhelming power of the non-
Indigenous parliament and legal system; and the power of the system to destroy those 
who get in its way.59 
5.3.2 The Wave Hill Strike 
Minimum wages existed for people working in certain industries, but First people were 
excluded. In 1965 the North Australian Workers’ Union supported the Aboriginal cause 
in an application to the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, claiming equal wages 
for them. The employers opposed it. The Commission awarded the wage, but said that 
employers would not be required to pay it to ‘slow workers’.60 Following this 
disappointment, the Gurindji people of Wave Hill, an immense British-owned cattle 
station owned by Lord Vesty, withdrew their labour. They held out for over a year. 
Then they ‘took a step which was to have the most profound influence on the coming 
general Aboriginal struggle for land rights. They moved onto their traditional lands (part 
of the Vesty-owned station) and established a settlement there of their own which they 
renamed – as it had traditionally been known – Daguragu.’61 
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On 16th August, 1975, after much negotiation with the Vesteys, the Labour government 
was able to hand the title for part of their land to the Gurindji people. At Kalkaringi on 
that day, Gough Whitlam addressed Vincent Lingiari and the Gurindji people, saying: 
 
On this great day, I, Prime Minister of Australia, speak to you on behalf of all 
Australian people – all those who honour and love this land we live in. For them 
I want to say to you: First, that we congratulate you and those who shared your 
struggle, on the victory you have achieved nine years after you walked off Wave 
Hill Station in protest. I want to acknowledge that we Australians have still 
much to do to redress the injustice and oppression that has for so long been the 
loss of Black Australians. I want to promise you that this act of restitution which 
we perform today will not stand alone – your fight was not for yourselves alone 
and we are determined that Aboriginal Australians everywhere will be helped by 
it. I want to promise that, through their Government, the people of Australia will 
help you in your plans to use this land fruitfully for the Gurindji. And I want to 
give back to you formally in Aboriginal and Australian Law ownership of this 
land of your fathers. Vincent Lingiari, I solemnly hand to you these deeds as 
proof, in Australian law, that these lands belong to the Gurindji people and I put 
into your hands part of the earth itself as a sign that this land will be the 
possession of you and your children forever.62 
 
The photograph of Gough Whitlam pouring a handful of sand into Vincent Lingiari’s 
hand, has become an iconic image in Australian history.63 This story of Vincent Lingiari 
and his people is also remembered by one of the slivers in Reconciliation Place in 
Canberra (Figure 5-2).64 
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Figure 5-2: Two sides of the sliver in Reconciliation Place recalling the events 
leading up to Vincent Lingiari and his people being given title to their land 
5.3.3 Milirrpum and Others v  Nabalco Pty. Ltd. and the Commonwealth of 
Australia (1971) 17 FLR 141 (‘Milirrpum’):65 Aboriginal Law Recognised, but 
not Aboriginal Ownership 
With the failure of their petition, the Yolngu took the company and the Commonwealth 
Government to court in 1968.  
 
In order to comprehend this case, some rudimentary concepts from both non-Indigenous 
property law, and also the place of land in Indigenous life, must be understood. The 
latter was examined in Section 5.1, and the key ideas of non-Indigenous property law 
will be outlined in the following paragraph.66  
 
The foundation of non-Indigenous law in Australia, in its own eyes, depends on the 
nature of the occupation of the land by the non-Indigenous population. At the time of 
occupation of Australia, European law recognised three ways that a European nation 
could take over another land: through conquest; through cession; and through settlement 
of an unoccupied land. Moreover, settlement of an unoccupied land was extended to 
include the taking over of a land which was inhabited by people who were ‘so 
primitive’67 that they did not have a system of law which could be recognised by 
European law,68 nor an obvious claim to sovereignty.69 Critically, in the third case, it 
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was understood that the law that now held sway over the land was the law that was 
brought with the incomers.70 The non-Indigenous legal system in Australia is based on 
this extended third case: that when the Crown proclaimed sovereignty over the eastern 
half of the landmass of Australia,71 it also established the legal system that was brought 
with the first incomers. As was discussed in Section 1.1, it quickly became clear that 
this was not the case, yet this ‘legal fiction’ was firmly established as the basis of non-
Indigenous law, and in its eyes, binding on all the inhabitants of the land.72 With this 
legal system came an inherited system of property law, with its origins in the feudal 
system, where all land title was derived from the Crown. Property ‘ownership’ is a 
relationship, and includes the following rights: ‘the right to exclusive physical control 
of the property; the right to possess the property; the right to enjoy and use the property; 
and the right to alienate (that is, transmit, devise or bequeath) the property.’73 
Ownership is a bundle of rights, and it is possible for several people to have varying 
degrees of ownership over any particular piece of property at the same time.74 
Ownership is not absolute, but is subject to a relativity principle: any ownership claim 
has to be proved to be stronger than that of someone else who may assert a claim on 
ownership.75 The legal cases and legislation that will be examined in the rest of this 
chapter arise from trying to work out the implications of this legal foundation, and its 
subsequent development, in the face of the fact that First cultures had, and retain, 
complex and sophisticated systems of land ‘ownership’. 
 
In his judgement, Blackburn J recognised that the legal foundation of the non-
Indigenous legal system was contrary to facts, at least as they were now understood, but 
his judgement had to be ‘not one of fact but of law’, and he was thus constrained to 
make a judgement within the legal system.76 
 
Despite the subsequent attacks on his judgement, Blackburn J comes across as very 
sympathetic to the Yolngu case in his judgement.77 The case ultimately failed because 
Blackburn J could not find, in the evidence put before him, sufficient proof that the 
Yolngu ‘owned’ the land in a way that could be recognised in non-Indigenous law. 
Whilst the ability to alienate the land might be able to be waived when considering 
another system of ownership, in the end he could not find sufficient evidence that any of 
the plaintiffs had the exclusive right to use and enjoy the land in question, and the right 
to exclude others from it.78 He thus famously concluded that the Yolngu association to 
the land was ‘spiritual’ rather than ‘economic’, by which he meant that it had been 
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clearly established that certain groups of people had (sometimes overlapping) 
responsibility for particular ceremonies and sacred sites, but that the same thing had not 
been demonstrated for ownership of the land.79 
 
He also rejected the notion that ‘native title’ could be recognised in common law: 
 
I have examined carefully the laws of various jurisdictions which have been put 
before me in considerable detail by counsel in this case, and, as I have already 
shown, in my opinion no doctrine of communal native title has any place in any 
of them, except under express statutory provisions. I must inevitably therefore 
come to the conclusion that the doctrine does not form, and never has formed, 
part of the law of any part of Australia.80 
 
Some believe this to have been a misconception,81 although others understand that this 
was an invitation to the High Court to re-examine the issue.82 
 
Nevertheless, Blackburn J made a statement about the nature of the system of law the 
Yolngu people, which was significant for the later Mabo (2) judgement. He described 
the Yolngu system of law as being 
 
a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the people 
led their lives, which provided a stable order or society and was remarkably free 
from the vagaries of personal whim or influence. If ever a system could be 
called ‘a government of laws, and not of men’, it is that shown in the evidence 
before me … Great as they are, the difference between that system and our 
system are, for the purposes in hand, differences of degree. I hold that I must 
recognize the system revealed by the evidence as a system of law.83 
 
Stepping back from the judgement itself, there are several observations that need to be 
made. Firstly, there was a mismatch between what the Yolngu and the non-Indigenous 
legal system thought that they were doing, arising in part from differing conceptions of 
dispute resolution. In particular, the Yolngu thought that their primary task was to give 
knowledge, which would lead to respect and the recognition of their land rights. ‘They 
found it difficult to accommodate defence counsel’s mode of questioning, and of 
attempting to elicit from them inconsistent or contradictory responses. Having seen the 
court situation as analogous to traditional meetings where they expected explanation 
and persuasion to lead to the expression of consensus, the Yolngu leaders were 
unprepared for a situation in which Europeans explain only enough to “win”.’84 Because 
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Yolngu ways of disputation seek consensus, this put them at a disadvantage in an alien 
cultural system that emphasised adversarial approaches to dispute.  
 
Secondly, the Yolngu were taking a risk in revealing knowledge and sacred objects that 
would not normally be available to those who had not reached the recognised stage of 
maturity in their culture.85 They therefore had to weigh up how much they were willing 
to break with their culture, which potentially had dire consequences for those who did 
so, and what bits they simply would not reveal.86 So they were in a position where, 
culturally, they may not have been able to give the information that was needed for the 
court to make an adequate decision. 
 
Thirdly, and consequently, the court was unable to ascertain that the Yolngu really did 
have a proprietary interest in the land, which could have been recognised in non-
Indigenous law. This was partly because some important information was not presented: 
‘[t]hey left largely implicit, for example, the procedures of seeking permission to use 
the resources of lands owned by other groups. They did make statements about 
permission, but, perhaps because of the form in which they expressed them, the court 
appeared to comprehend them imperfectly or to ignore them. They also left implicit or 
only partially interpreted the various categories of subsidiary rights in land, including 
those of “sister” clans linked by a common myth and those entailed in the alternative 
generation märi-gutharra relationship, in the interests of describing their relationship to 
land in terms they hoped would be comprehensible to English speakers.’87 They were 
not helped by the fact that the expert witnesses sometimes contradicted the evidence of 
the Yolngu themselves,88 and there were problems arising from the fact that the people 
translating for the Yolngu were not authorised to speak for some of the land in 
question.89 
 
Perhaps the clearest thing from the case and the judgement is that there was no-one who 
was sufficiently versed in both systems of law for there to have been a proper 
conversation.90 This is an indictment particularly on the dominant system, which could 
have taken the time to understand things better, well before the First people had to bring 
a case like this to court. 
 
As an afterword, McIntosh notes, in 2000, that the mine was earning Nabalco $300 
million per year, and yet they paid nothing to the Yolngu. Further, there has been 
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terrible damage to the environment: ‘[t]oxic waste ponds occupy hunting grounds; 
alumina dust pollutes the air, and a mining town of 4000 occupies land within view of 
the Yolngu communities. The processing plant expels chemicals in to Melville Bay, and 
in 1990 it was discovered that unacceptably high levels of heavy metals, such as 
cadmium, had been dumped into the harbour, and the Yolngu were warned not to eat 
shellfish.’91 
5.3.4 The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (‘ALRA’) 
Following the Milirrpum judgement, it seemed that the only way to advance Aboriginal 
land claims was through explicit legislation. This was the purpose of the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. 
 
After twenty-three years in opposition, November 1972 saw the election of a Labour 
government under the leadership of Gough Whitlam. In their campaign they promised 
‘to legislate to establish for land in Commonwealth territories which is reserved for 
Aboriginal use and benefit, a system of Aboriginal tenure based on the traditional right 
of clans and other tribal groups and, under this legislation, vest such lands in Aboriginal 
communities.’92 On being elected, the government immediately began to legislate 
concerning Aboriginal Affairs. Within three months, Mr A.E. Woodward, who had 
acted for the plaintiffs in the Milirrpum case discussed above, and who was now a 
judge, was appointed to report on ‘the appropriate means to recognize and establish the 
traditional rights and interests of the Aborigines in and in relation to land, and to satisfy 
in other ways the reasonable aspirations of the Aborigines to rights in or in relation to 
land’.93 
 
Woodward J reported back in 1974, and his recommendations were broadly taken up in 
the bill the Labour government presented to Parliament on 16th October, 1975 as the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Bill 1975. However, the bill was to lapse, 
for the Governor General, John Kerr, took the unprecedented step of dissolving both 
houses of the Federal Parliament on 11th November, 1975. Nevertheless, a modified bill 
was re-presented by the incoming conservative (Liberal-Country Party) government, 
and it became the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 
(Commonwealth). The Act created a new form of land title, inalienable communal 
freehold, and gave the holders of this title some control over mining on their lands.94 
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At the heart of the legislation was the definition in Section 3(1) of ‘traditional 
Aboriginal owners’:95 
 
“traditional Aboriginal owners”, in relation to land, means a local descent group 
of Aborigines who – 
(a) have common spiritual affiliations to a site on the land, being affiliations 
that place the group under a primary spiritual responsibility for that site 
and for the land; and  
(b) are entitled by Aboriginal tradition to forage as of right over that land. 
 
The Act says that only ‘traditional aboriginal owners’ can make a claim, and then they 
will have rights in relation to the land that others cannot enjoy.96  
 
This Act has been susceptible to multiple criticisms: it further entrenches the idea in 
public consciousness, although maybe not in law, of First peoples having to be 
‘traditional’, so making it harder for other groups to have their ownership of land 
recognised;97 it was based on a wrong model of patrilineal descent of rights to land;98 it 
ignored women’s business;99 it set up a system of land management (land councils) 
based on male power;100 these land councils were the mediation point between non-
Indigenous power and Indigenous power, but in Aboriginal culture, only those 
associated with a particular piece of country could speak for it;101 and it took no account 
of disruption due to non-Indigenous activity since 1788. 
 
Despite the shortcomings of the ALRA, the application of the Act was allowed to evolve 
over time so that it overcame some of these objections.102 For example, writing from a 
position of three years’ experience of working on land claims under the Act as an 
employee of the Central Land Council, Meredith Rowell saw how the role of women in 
land claims became increasingly important.103 By describing several land cases, she was 
able to show that there was increasing participation by women,104 with equal 
participation in the final case she considered, where the claim book was prepared by 
both male and female researchers (J Wafer and P Wafer), after many years of research. 
At one point during the hearing of the last case, at the insistence of Ms Wafer and Ms 
Bell, the court was cleared of all but the essential male participants so women could 
more freely give evidence. Women’s evidence was complete and in no way secondary 
to that of the men. Moreover, it was clear from the transcript, that the claim would have 
been sufficient on the women’s evidence alone. Observations such as these were 
enough to convince people that, although the definition in the original Act was not 
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accurate, because it did not correctly represent the varieties of forms of Aboriginal 
tenure, the way that the application of the Act had developed in practice, with 
considerable flexibility in the interpretation of ‘traditional Aboriginal owners’, meant 
that the definition did not have to be revised in subsequent revisions of the Act.105 
 
The Northern Territory Government opposed every land claim made under the Act, 
engaging in litigation that is estimated to have cost over ten million dollars.106 
Nevertheless, in 1998, about 44.3% of the Northern Territory (573 000 square 
kilometres) had been granted to Aboriginal Land Trusts for the benefit of Aboriginal 
people.107 The Act was reviewed by Reeves in 1998,108 and was followed by the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1999. Towards 
the end of 2005, proposals were being tabled, recommending a radical change in the Act 
in order to allow the mortgaging of land by groups and individuals. This represented a 
huge shift from the inalienable communal freehold that was established in the Act. As 
was stated in the introduction to this chapter, these developments have not been 
included here, for the sake of being able to bring the chapter to an end. 
 
The curious reader may be wondering why such a large proportion of the land mass in 
the Northern Territory escaped having title to it being held by non-Indigenous people. 
The reason is that the land itself could not support any sort of agricultural industry, so it 
was useless to non-Indigenous peoples. However, it has been discovered that many 
parts of this land are rich in minerals, and, as has been noted earlier in this section, the 
title granted under the ALRA does not include ownership of the mineral resources. This 
means that ownership confers little in terms of participation in the non-Indigenous 
economy,109 whilst exposing the title-holders to considerable disruption of their land. 
 
It is worth noting at this point that a long journey had been made in a relatively short 
time: it was only after the referendum in 1967 that First peoples were counted as people 
in Australian population statistics, and that the Federal Government was given the 
power to legislate for the First peoples, and now, nine years later, it was possible for 
some First peoples in the Northern Territory to have their ownership of land recognised 
by non-Indigenous law. 
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5.3.5 Mabo  and Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (‘Mabo 
(2)’):110 The Recognition of ‘Native Title’ 
 
It is a terrible thing for us to have to go to this kind of court to prove what we 
have always known: that these islands are our homes, not something to be 
bought or sold. But we have no choice.111 
 
Henry Reynolds records Eddie Mabo’s astonishment and horror when he learned in the 
late 1970s that, in Queensland law, Mer had been regarded as Crown land since 1879.112 
Like the Yolngu in Arnhem Land, who had been ‘more or less free to have virtually 
complete enjoyment of their land rights as they understood them’ until about 1969, 
when plans for a bauxite mine at Gove Peninsula were made,113 the Meriam had had the 
Murray Islands more or less to themselves. Again, like the Yolngu ‘the possibility of 
their being ousted was unthinkable.’114 They were not bringing their case to the tribunal 
of the Crown in a state of mind in which failure was conceivable. The chairman of the 
Murray Island Council, Ron Day, made this clear both firmly and courteously before the 
cameras with Justice Moynihan alongside him outside the court at Mer in 1989: the 
Murray Islanders owned the land from which they grew, something that no judge, no 
lawyer, no politician – not even the Crown could take away.115 
 
The Mabo judgement in fact was made in two stages, called Mabo (1) and Mabo (2). 
The case went in two parts because the Queensland Government tried to short-circuit 
the land claim by retrospectively enacting the extinguishments of title from when it took 
over the administration of the islands in 1879 (The Queensland Coast Islands 
Declaratory Act 1985), and the Mabo defendants agreed that if this stood, then they 
would drop their case.116 The argument against the action of the Queensland 
Government that proved to be decisive was that it contravened the Racial 
Discrimination Act.117 It will be seen in subsequent sections below that, since this 
judgment, there have been many attempts, some of them successful, to dismantle the 
Racial Discrimination Act. 
 
The second judgment, in a six to one majority, upheld the Meriam claim on their land, 
and so established the concept of ‘native title’ for the first time in non-Indigenous 
Australian common law. With the approval of the other members of the Court, Mason 
CJ and McHugh J, summarised the judgement in the following way: 
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In the result, six members of the Court (Dawson J dissenting) are in agreement 
that the common law of this country recognizes a form of native title which, in 
the cases where it has not been extinguished, reflects the entitlement of the 
indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their laws or customs, to their 
traditional lands and that, subject to the effect of some particular Crown leases, 
the land entitlement of the Murray Islanders in accordance with their laws or 
customs is preserved, as native title, under the law of Queensland. The main 
difference between those members of the Court who constitute the majority is 
that, subject to the operation of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), 
neither of us nor Brennan J agrees with the conclusion to be drawn from the 
judgments of Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ that, at least in the absence of clear 
and unambiguous statutory provision to the contrary, extinguishment of native 
title by the Crown by inconsistent grant is wrongful and gives rise to a claim for 
compensatory damages. We note that the judgment of Dawson J supports the 
conclusion of Brennan J and ourselves on that aspect of the case since his 
Honour considers that native title, where it exists, is a form of permissive 
occupancy at the will of the Crown.118 
 
It is worth summarising the argument of Brennan J in making his judgement, as it will 
be important later in reflecting on this narrative of land from the point of view of the 
understanding of reconciliation that was developed in earlier chapters in this thesis. The 
heart of what Brennan J argued was that the High Court is charged with developing a 
truly Australian law,119 and it has the power to overturn previous judgements. This is 
particularly applicable where judgements had been made under a developing system of 
law that was based on treating Australia as if it was empty, without any systems of law, 
when it had been occupied by Europeans.120 It was now known that this did not 
represent the truth of the situation, and the existence of Aboriginal systems of law had 
also been established in non-Indigenous law.121 Previous judgements had assumed that 
when the Crown took radical title for the land (that is, all ownership of land was legally 
derived from the Crown), it had also assumed full beneficial title (that is, it really owned 
the land, so extinguishing all the title of the First peoples). The question that Brennan 
asked was: is it possible to make a judgement that recognised the Crown’s radical title, 
but denied that it held full beneficial title (so that the title of the First peoples had not 
been automatically extinguished in non-Indigenous law), without fracturing the skeleton 
of the non-Indigenous law?122 His opinion, and that of the majority of the judges in the 
case, was that it could.123 Moreover, justice required such a judgement to be made if it 
could be.124 Because the Crown still held radical title, wherever it had extinguished the 
title held by First peoples, that extinguishment remained sound under non-Indigenous 
law.125 That is, ‘native title’ was a remnant title, and it only existed where it could be 
proved that it had not been extinguished. ‘Native title’, according to the judgement did 
not conform to traditional common law titles, but was unique, or sui generis.126 It was 
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also adjudged that, apart from some small areas, which had been subject to leases, the 
native title to the Murray Islands had not been extinguished.127 
 
Clearly, the majority judgement opened up the possibility of bringing other cases 
concerning the continuing existence of native title. The Native Title Act 1993, discussed 
in the next section, was enacted in order to facilitate this process in such a way that 
claimants did not face costly legal battles. Also, the case brought by the Wik peoples of 
Queensland, discussed in Section 5.3.7, opened up the possibility that native title had 
not been extinguished in as many cases as had been thought. Before moving on to 
discuss the Act and the Wik case, it is worth considering some of the responses to the 
Mabo (2) judgement. 
 
Any judgement is an interpretation of the material which is brought before the Court, 
and Dawson J, in dissenting from the majority of the bench, argued that the correct 
interpretation of what had happened in the past was that there was a clear political 
intention that the Crown held full beneficial title of the land, and so all title held by First 
peoples had been automatically extinguished at occupation by the British. Even though 
it was unpalatable to do so, the present Court must uphold this principle, until there was 
a political change, enacted by the government.128 
 
Although the majority judgement within the Mabo (2) was operating firmly within the 
remit of the law, the judgement by Dawson J rightly points out that the majority 
judgment had significant social and political consequences, although only over land 
where it could be proved that native title had not been extinguished. There was an 
inevitable political furore,129 some of which was ill-founded because it missed the point 
that the judgement did not disturb the title of others over land where native title had 
been extinguished. The primary charge against the majority judgement was that it was 
an example of ‘judicial activism’, that the Court went beyond its remit, and made a 
political rather than a legal decision.130 However, this misses the point that the Court 
was operating firmly within the legal framework, and either decision that the Court 
could have made was going to have political consequences: if the majority judgement 
had sided with Dawson J, then it would have had equally radical consequences, 
effectively ending the possibility for the First peoples to pursue their rights to land in 
the non-Indigenous legal system. It can be argued that the decision that the Court did 
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make was the more just of the two decisions that it could have made, given the present 
understanding of what has happened in Australia since occupation by the British. 
 
It is important to recall that, although the Mabo (2) judgement had an effect on the land 
rights of all of Australia’s First people, the concept of land tenure in the Torres Strait 
Islands is significantly different to that in Aboriginal cultures. 
 
It was seen in Section 5.3.3 above, that the process in the Milirrpum case was 
criticised.131 In a similar way, the Mabo (2) case was criticised, both for the process, and 
also for how the judges understood the evidence. Nonie Sharp had worked in the Torres 
Strait Islands since 1978, and contributed to the case from its earliest days. Her book, 
No Ordinary Judgment, aims to show that the Meriam people were not heard properly at 
vital points in the case. She believes that: they were belittled; they were asked questions 
in a logic which was alien to them, and did not allow for subtle explanation; their 
metaphorical system of knowledge was not understood;132 their oral culture, in 
particular, the oral handing down of property rights, was classed as hearsay, and not 
properly admissible evidence, even though the written form of documentation that was 
required by white people, and kept to a certain extent, was understood by the Meriam 
people as being of less importance than oral instructions; they were constantly 
interrupted with objections to their evidence by the defence team (for example,  Eddie 
Mabo gave evidence over ten days, which was recorded in 536 pages of transcript, and 
his evidence attracted 289 objections from Queensland133);134 the court would not 
recognise Malo’s law as a valid system of law;135 and there was incomprehension as to 
how it could function to solve land disputes, that is, that it could not be a real system of 
law.136 
 
Some people took a creative response to the Mabo (2) judgement. An outstanding 
example of this happened in the Cape York area. In 1994, the cattlemen’s convention 
decided to try to reach a land use agreement with the Aboriginal people. Noel Pearson 
and some of his fellow First people accepted the invitation to attend the 1995 
convention. In November 1995 a working party was established to produce an 
agreement. After eleven meetings between the Cattlemen’s Union and the Cape York 
Land Council, with the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Wilderness Society 
joining part way through the discussions, an agreement was reached and signed within 
three months. It then faced a long delay because the Queensland government refused to 
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ratify it, even though it was supported by successive Commonwealth Governments. 
Finally, when a new Queensland Government was elected in 2001, the original 
signatories were still happy with it, so the government ratified it, and the agreement 
came into effect.137 
5.3.6 The Native Title Act 1993 (‘NTA’): Responding to Mabo (2) 
The Hawke Labour government was elected in 1983 in part on a platform of 
implementing national, uniform, Land Rights legislation. The idea was to create 
national legislation like that of the ALRA in the Northern Territory, but the government 
abandoned the idea in 1986 due to political pressure.138 Seven years later, the Mabo (2) 
judgement meant that Indigenous ownership of land could be recognised under 
Australian common law, and the consequences of this judgement had to be worked out. 
It was now possible for First people to pursue the recognition of their ownership of land 
through the normal workings of the law, rather than needing special legislation, in the 
limited case that native title had not been extinguished by a superior grant by the 
Crown.139  
 
The Labour Prime Minister, Paul Keating, heralded the Mabo (2) decision as ‘a large 
step towards reconciliation and away from the injustice dealt to Aborigines over 200 
years’,140 when on 10th December, 1992, he launched the International Year for the 
World’s Indigenous Peoples with a speech in Redfern.141 In this speech, he declared,  
 
Mabo is an historic decision. We can make it an historic turning point, the basis 
of a new relationship between indigenous and non-Aboriginal Australians. The 
message should be that there is nothing to fear or to lose in the recognition of 
historical truth, or the extension of social justice, or the deepening of Australian 
social democracy to include indigenous Australians. There is everything to 
gain.142 
 
Because pursuing each claim through the courts would be very expensive, a three-
staged process was planned as a response to the Mabo (2) judgement: land legislation; 
an Indigenous Land Fund to enable First people to purchase their land where they could 
not have their ownership recognised under the legislation; and social justice 
measures.143 The land legislation materialised as the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), and the 
Indigenous Land Fund was set up,144 but the social justice measures were not tackled 
before the Keating government was replaced by the Howard government. 
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Noel Pearson, and Aboriginal leader and the Director of the Cape York Land Council, 
explained the position of some First people in an article in The Australian newspaper on 
8th June, 1993. It was not, he wrote, sufficient to treat native title as other interests. 
 
Yet to compare Aboriginal rights to the rights of others not discriminated against 
in the past 200 years is not appropriate. So much has been lost that Aboriginal 
people are entitled to expect special protection for what remains. There needs to 
be positive acknowledgement of different treatment of Aboriginal title which 
reflects the fact that Aboriginal culture is inseparable from the land to which 
Aboriginal title attaches. The loss or impairment of that title is not simply a loss 
of real estate, it is a loss of culture. … The IDC [Interdepartmental committee of 
officials, set up to prepare the legislation] has assumed that to treat Aboriginal 
equally and “no less favourably” than other titles means Aboriginal title must be 
treated like “normal” titles. The fallacy of this approach is that strict adherence 
to the notions of formal equality compounds inequality because it fails to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of difference, particularly of culturally distinct 
minorities.145 
 
The political process for reaching the NTA 1993 was bloody, inflammatory and 
vitriolic.146 Various points in the proposed Act were hotly contested by Aboriginal 
organisations,147 and the Act was nearly scuppered by a change of Federal government, 
but the Labour Party won an unexpected victory on 13th March, 1993. As an example of 
the degree of hostility to the Mabo (2) judgement and the proposed legislation, the 
Premier of Western Australia, Richard Court, suggested that the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975 should be watered down (recall that it was crucial in establishing the Mabo (1) 
case), and he embarked on a campaign, falsely suggesting that suburban backyards 
throughout the state were under threat from Mabo (2).148 He argued that the ‘original 
Mabo ruling was flawed and discriminated against all Australians in the State’.149 
Playing on fear, and fostering the belief that non-Indigenous Australians are victims of 
policies that wrongly advantage Indigenous peoples has been a recurrent theme in 
Australian politics.150 The race card would not be used unless it worked, which shows 
the awkwardness of many Australians in approaching reconciliation. The Mining 
industry also was particularly vociferous in its opposition to any legislation. ‘Under the 
heading Mabo – Protect Your Children’s Future, it urged that “all Australians must be 
equal”; rejected “special rights and privileges based on race”, and called for the 
restoration of the “principle of equality”.’151 
 
The NTA 1993 received royal assent on 24th December, 1993, and largely took effect 
from 1st January, 1994. The Act went through a bitter revision process and was 
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significantly revised by parliament in 1998 as a result of the Wik judgement. The Wik 
judgement will be discussed in the next section, and the revisions to the Act in the 
following one. Before doing this, there are some important observations to be made 
about the Act, and how it was interpreted.  
 
The NTA 1993 formally extinguished native title for Crown grants made before 1st 
January 1994, or through legislation before 1st July, 1993.152 
 
The Act encouraged agreements about land use by mediation and negotiation, rather 
than resorting to the time-consuming and expensive process of deciding claims through 
the courts. Under the act, the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT)153 was set up to 
help mediate claims to native title, agreements over the use of Indigenous lands, and 
future acts.154 Claimants had to approach the NNTT in the first instance, to see if their 
claim met the conditions for it to be considered. If it did, then it would be registered 
with the Federal Court. A period of negotiation would then ensue, with the aim that as 
many claims as possible would be settled by the mediation offered by the NNTT. A 
handbook about the mediation process was produced for the NNTT.155 
 
Several shortcomings have become evident in the working of the NNTT. Firstly, the 
system is working very slowly.156 In 2005, Fred Chaney, a Deputy President of the 
NNTT, estimated that it would take another thirty years to clear the backlog at the 
current rate of working.157 Not only is this delay frustrating, but death and illness during 
this period may compromise the ability of some groups to establish native title. 
 
Secondly, it was envisaged that contact between the claimants and other interested 
parties would be an important part of the process. However, the mediation manual for 
the NNTT notes that it is increasingly the case that parties are represented by legal or 
other representatives, and sometimes one person represents more than one party. They 
note that this goes against the spirit of the process: 
 
Legal or other representatives may not have instructions or may not be suited to 
convey their clients’ perspectives and emotions in the story telling part of the 
process. For Indigenous parties, mediation may be understood as an opportunity 
to explain and contextualise both their ongoing culture and their cultural loss. 
The concomitant opportunities for genuine cathartic and cross-cultural 
communication of indigenous experience may be compromised where the 
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parties are not participating directly in the mediation process. This can have a 
negative effect on mediation.158 
 
Thirdly, the Indigenous parties may be swamped by the number of other interested 
parties. The NNTT must notify all such parties, and their experience is that they have 
had to make as few as three notifications, typically between ten and two hundred, but in 
an extreme case in Victoria there were 4113, and in South Australia there was a case 
requiring 5409.159 
 
Fourthly, although the process is supposed to be designed to take into account power 
imbalances and to build the capacity of parties to take a full role in negotiations, it is not 
clear that this can be done effectively at the moment, especially as the international 
literature on mediation in situations of gross power imbalance is sparse.160 
  
In implementing the NTA 1993, the Australian government departed significantly from 
what was done both in the United States of America and Canada.161 There, the 
vulnerability of native title was seen to need special protection, and, initially, protection 
was provided by giving exclusive jurisdiction concerning native title to the federal 
governments in both countries. Treaties and agreements were to be made which fully 
respected native title and its equality before law, and the situation was allowed to 
develop in the natural way of common law (cf. the development of the interpretation of 
the ALRA, discussed in Section 5.3.4, above). In contrast, the hastily constructed NTA 
1993, having explicitly rejected the north American approach,162 especially after the 
1998 amendments, has led, in some cases, to great complexity and a very costly 
combative and litigious approach. Bartlett concludes, ‘[r]elying on the common law, 
without legislation, as in the United States of America and Canada, it now seems, would 
have been more beneficial to human rights, efficiency and productivity.’163 This thesis 
notes these observations, but it is beyond the competence of this work to make an 
assessment of their validity. 
5.3.7 The Wik Peoples v Queensland and Others ; The Thayorre People v 
Queensland and Others (1996) 187 CLR 1 (‘Wik’) : Native Title is Not 
Necessarily Extinguished by the Granting of a Pastoral Lease 
The Wik judgment was made in the High Court, following the failure of a land claim 
that had started in 1993. In January 1996, Drummond J, of the Federal Court, had ruled 
that some pastoral leases had extinguished their native title. The appeal to the High 
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Court overruled the Federal Court decision, with a majority of four to three. In 
summary, the majority Wik judgement was: 
 
(1) that the leases did not confer rights to exclusive possession of the areas on 
the grantees. 
(2) that the grants of leases did not necessarily extinguish all incidents of native 
title in respect of the areas.164 
 
Recalling that ‘ownership’ in non-Indigenous law is a bundle of rights, and that several 
people may have conflicting rights,165 the force of the Wik judgement is ‘that the 
granting of a pastoral lease, whether or not it has now expired (or has been otherwise 
terminated), did not necessarily extinguish all native title rights that might otherwise 
exist.’166 
 
The primary question that the Court had to answer was whether the granting of leases 
over the lands of the Wik and Thayorre Peoples extinguished any native title rights that 
might have existed before the granting of the leases. The basis of the dissenting 
judgement was that ‘in the absence of any contrary indication, the use in statute of a 
term [lease] that has acquired a technical legal meaning is taken prima facie to bear that 
meaning.’167 Such a lease would normally be understood as including ‘the right of 
exclusive possession’168 which would necessarily result in the extinguishment of any 
existing native title. 
 
The majority judgements argued that the nature of the leases in question had to be 
examined in detail to see their legal implications, rather than relying on the expected 
legal implications of them being called ‘leases’, for they were a creature of statute, not 
common law.169 What had to be determined was the nature of the possession conferred 
by the leases: in particular, if this possession excluded the Wik and Thayorre Peoples 
from continuing some forms of possession.170 There were four principle reasons why 
the majority believed that the leases did not grant exclusive possession to the lessees, 
and hence that some of any existing native title interests will have survived the granting 
of the leases.171 Firstly, it was argued that the historical documentation proved that a 
special sort of leasehold was being set up in Australia, which acknowledged Aboriginal 
rights.172 Secondly, the leases were limited to ‘pastoral purposes’ only, and so did not 
cover all the rights over the land.173 There was nothing in the leases which granted the 
lessees a form of possession which excluded the rights and interests of the Indigenous 
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inhabitants that derived from their traditional title.174 Thirdly, there were a significant 
degree of reservation, restriction, and exceptions in the leases, such as: minerals, timber 
and other materials; access; and the depasturing of stock upon a stock route.175 Fourthly, 
the leases concerned vast areas, and so it was unlikely that the intention was to exclude 
the Wik and Thayorre Peoples from the land.176 In summary, the judgement was based 
on the content of the leases, rather than the concept of a lease,177 and they thus 
concluded that the legal intention of the leases was not to extinguish all possible native 
title rights. 
 
The judgement was clear that the legal rights of lessees were not affected by it: ‘[t]he 
holders of pastoral leases are left with precisely the legal rights which they enjoyed 
pursuant to the leases granted under the Land Acts “for pastoral purposes only”. Those 
rights will prevail, to the extent of any inconsistency with native title.’178 That is, any 
clash of rights is automatically resolved in favour of the lessee, against any native title 
claim. 
 
There was considerable legal debate concerning the significance of the judgement.179 
Potentially, the Wik judgement affected large areas of Australia under pastoral tenure.180 
 
A practical result of Wik was that each lease over any parcel of land for which there was 
a native title claim would have to be carefully interpreted as to the extent that it 
restricted native title claims. Bartlett notes that at the end of 2002, the High Court 
decisions in Wik and Ward (see Section 5.3.9, below) indicated that most of the above 
leases did not extinguish all incidents of native title, and so came under the Native Title 
Act. The exceptions were the perpetual leases in New South Wales, as established in 
Wilson v Anderson (2002) 190 ALR 313.181 
 
Wik opened way for negotiated co-existence, but sadly this option has not been 
explicitly explored in legislation.182 
5.3.8 The Native Title Amendment Act 1998: “Bucket Loads of Extinguishment” 
On 2nd March, 1996, a Liberal-Country Party government was elected to the Federal 
parliament, led by John Howard. Part of its election platform had been the promise to 
reform the NTA 1993. Plans were prepared for this by 8th October of that year. 
Following the Wik judgement on 23rd December, 1996, there was a huge political storm. 
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The furore was fanned by the Prime Minister, John Howard, showing a map of 
Australia with the areas coloured in where First peoples might claim land, playing the 
race fear card again. 
 
The response of the Deputy Prime Minister was to promise ‘bucket loads of 
extinguishment’.183 In order to do this, the government introduced its Ten Point Plan, 
outlining ten major changes to the NTA 1993.184 The proposed changes to the NTA 1993 
were intended to achieve the following outcomes:185 
• the validation of non-Aboriginal grants from 1994 to Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1; 
• certainty for pastoralists; 
• ‘confirmation’ of extinguishment by freehold and most leases; 
• removal of impediments to the development of municipal services; 
• assurance of government powers over water; 
• ‘workability, through removing impediments to development’; 
• ‘devolution to the States and Territories’; and 
• ‘speedy and sustainable resolution of concerns and uncertainty’. 
 
The bill, re-introduced to the House of Representatives on 9th March, 1998, ran to 346 
pages to supplement the 147 pages of the original Act. Part of the reason for this is that 
the High Court had ruled (Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373) 
that the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 took precedent over the NTA 1993 where there 
was any ambiguity, and the government wanted to make it clear that the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 was being specifically overruled at many points.186 
 
The changes will not be discussed in detail here. Rather, Section 5.3.9 below will 
examine how the interpretation of the revised Act has worked out in practice. 
 
Such are the vagaries of parliamentary politics that the fate of the Bill was in the hands 
of an independent Senator, Brian Harradine, for neither party had a majority in the 
Senate. First peoples were not included in the political process in the preparation of the 
Native Title Amendment Act 1998. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC), the peak representative body of Indigenous peoples that was 
recognised by the government at that time, had no formal part in the process.187 Mick 
Dodson said,  
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[w]hat I see now is the spectacle of two white men, John Howard and Brian 
Harradine, discussing our native title when we’re not even in the room. How 
symbolically colonialist is that?188 
 
Many Aboriginal groups prepared responses to the proposed changes, even though they 
found it hard to have their voice heard by government.189 
 
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination expressed concern that the Ten Point Plan breached the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, on four counts: 
(1) the validation of past acts which were otherwise invalid; (2) the confirmation of 
extinguishment provisions; (3) allowing primary producers to upgrade and change the 
nature of their land use without respect to native title interests; and (4) the restrictions 
on the right to negotiate. These provisions effect widespread extinguishment of native 
title, and allow further extinguishment without negotiation.190 Australia thereby became 
the first Western nation to be subject of an ‘early warning/urgent action’ procedure by 
the United Nations.191 
 
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner argued that the 
changes were not only a lost opportunity to build on the co-existence envisaged by Wik 
(1996) 187 CLR 1, but were ‘destructive of the most valuable resource … trust.’192 
Tehan concludes that ‘[t]he overall effect of the amendments was to significantly 
diminish the area of land and water over which native title might exist and the areas of 
land or water and types of activities over which indigenous people have meaningful 
rights in relation to future uses’,193 a conclusion that seems to have been born out in 
practice. 
 
5.3.9 The Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 (‘Ward’)194 and Members of 
the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria and Others (2002) 214 CLR 
422 (‘Yorta Yorta’) Claims: Retreating from Mabo (2) 
The Ten Point Plan and Native Title Amendment Act 1998 entailed a substantial denial 
of equality before the law, and the tenor of these changes were carried over to the 
judicial system.195 
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In order to understand the judgements in the High Court in these two cases, some 
preliminary observations need to be made. Firstly, the changes brought in by the Native 
Title Amendment Act 1998 represented an explicit change in political will. Secondly, the 
government appoints the High Court judges, and so, as vacancies appear, it appoints 
people who it believes will support government policy. Kirby J made this point very 
strongly in a lecture in 2005, when he said that ‘[i]f the Mabo case on Aboriginal land 
rights … [here he lists other trials] … had come to the High Court in its present 
composition, the outcomes would probably have been very different.  In the business of 
judging, much depends on the time of one's appointment and the values of one's 
colleagues.’196 Thirdly, and as a consequence of this, the judgements turned on the 
interpretation of ‘native title’ and ‘native title rights and interests’ in s 223(1) of the 
Native Title Act 1993: 
 
The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the 
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters,197 where: 
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws 
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and 
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and 
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 
 
Although the clear intention of the Keating government when framing this Act was for 
this to refer to the developing common law concerning native title,198 in the absence of 
explicit reference to this in the Act, the High Court was free to treat s 223(1) of the Act 
as being the definition of new concepts called ‘native title’ and ‘native title interests’ 
(which coincidentally, and confusingly, had the same name as some different concepts 
discussed in earlier judgements), the nature of which had to be determined by the Court, 
by close examination of the Act. This is how the High Court chose to read the Act,199 
and the way that the Court interpreted these ‘definitions’ in the Act in the Ward (2002) 
213 CLR 1 and Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422 cases resulted in a significant 
curtailment of the way that the common law had been developing. 
 
It is worth spending a little time examining these two judgements.200 
 
Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 was the first contested mainland native title determination. It 
concerned an area of 7900 square kilometres in the eastern Kimberley, overlapping the 
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border between Western Australia and the Northern Territory. The case went before Lee 
J in the first instance, who made a determination of the existence of native title over 
most of the claim area. In making his judgement, Lee J continued the development of 
the common law concerning native title in a way that was sympathetic to the tenor of 
the Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1 and Wik 187 CLR 1 judgements, in particular allowing for the 
transformation of traditional practices.201 This judgement was largely overturned in the 
full Federal Court on 3rd March, 2000. An appeal to the High Court was made in March 
2001, and it delivered its judgement on 8th August, 2002. The effect of the judgement 
was to overturn many of the features of the Wik judgement. In summary, the key aspects 
of the judgement were:202 
 
• frozen rights: native title was treated as a distinct sort of title. In particular: the 
customary rights given by traditional laws were not to be counted as equivalent 
to ownership under common law; it rejected Aboriginal rights over mineral and 
petroleum resources; it required the statement of which particular rights the 
people had over the area, rather than granting them a bundle of rights; and the 
rights are those which existed in 1788, so that the development of rights over 
time was ruled out. 
• principles of extinguishment: the requirement to show that there was a clear and 
plain intention to extinguish native title in any leases was ignored, instead using 
an aspect of the Native Title Act 1993 (Pt 2 Div 2B) to override this requirement; 
when there was inconsistency, extinguishment will be to the extent of the 
inconsistency; and temporary suspension was regarded as equivalent to 
extinguishment. 
• vesting of reserves: the vesting of land in reserves was seen to lead to the 
extinguishment of title. 
• pastoral leases: the Court ignored the requirement of the existence of a clear and 
plain intention for extinguishment in the granting of pastoral leases. 
• the NTA: the judgment declared that the NTA was determinative in any native 
title claim, and in developing common law, rather than the common law 
judgements of Mabo (2) and Wik interpreting the NTA. 
  
The claim in Yorta Yorta Community v Victoria was for various public lands and waters 
in northern Victoria and southern New South Wales, on either side of the Murray River. 
In summary, the judgement was that ‘tides of history’ had wiped away the claim.203 
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Like the Ward claim, the Yorta Yorta claim went through three levels of the court 
system,204 but, unlike the Ward claim, it was rejected at each level. The first hearing of 
the case was before Olney J. He was clear that there was no ‘warrant within the Native 
Title Act for the Court to play the role of social engineer, righting the wrongs of past 
centuries and dispensing justice according to contemporary notions of political 
correctness rather than according to law.’205 The High Court decision was largely in 
accord with the original judgement by Olney J. The key features of the High Court 
judgement are that:206 
 
• ‘traditional’ in s 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 was interpreted to mean the 
laws and customs that existed on or before the assertion of sovereignty by the 
British Crown; 
• the society which had these laws and customs must have continued in existence, 
and that the laws and customs from before the occupation by the British must 
have continued undisturbed; and 
• the onus on proving that the laws and customs had been maintained was placed 
firmly on the claimants, without any presumption of continuity. 
 
A feature of the judgement was that it left undisturbed the preference shown by Olney J 
for the written evidence of Europeans over the oral tradition of the Yorta Yorta people, 
despite the precedent given in the Supreme Court in Canada,207 that oral historical 
evidence must be ‘accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of 
historical evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical 
documents.’208 Critically, some written evidence, used in a way that was ignorant of the 
issues in interpreting historical documents, was crucial in establishing that the practices 
of the Yorta Yorta people had changed.209 
 
In summary, ‘the combined effect of the three recent cases [Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 
Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422, Wilson v Anderson (2002) 190 ALR 313] is to 
drastically reduce the numbers of indigenous people who will be able to successfully 
claim native title either because native title has been extinguished over land or because 
of the difficulties in proving the necessary elements said to be required under s 223 of 
the Act.’210 Bartlett comments further that the end result of the Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 
CLR 422 case ‘is that native title claimants in remote areas will find proof of native title 
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very difficult, but in the south they are likely to find it impossible.’211 Following Ward 
(2002) 213 CLR 1 and Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422, there is the further possibility 
that previously successful native title applications will be revisited and have their rights 
diminished.212 
 
As a postscript to the legal debate, the Yorta Yorta people persisted in their negotiations 
and in 2004 signed the ‘Co-operative Management Agreement between the Yorta Yorta 
Nation Aboriginal Corporation and the State of Victoria.’ 
5.3.10 Further Developments 
Howard’s vision was for everyone to own their own business and their own house. 
Reports began appearing from around May 2005 suggesting changes to the title held by 
the First peoples so that people could mortgage the land.213 This risks further 
destruction of Aboriginal identity and communal title to land. Mick Dodson was right 
when he said that Howard was ‘trying to get rid of communal ownership … He doesn’t 
like the idea of communal ownership. His religious and spiritual traditions don’t allow 
for this form of ownership.’214 
 
The reason why there has been little economic development with the granting of land 
has nothing to do with the type of title, but the reasons include: the majority of it is 
desert and is unsuitable for economic activities such as grazing and agriculture (which is 
often why the land was left to the First peoples and so is available for claim); high 
transport costs for remote communities; and limited markets, lack of skilled workforce, 
and infrastructure.215 To this must be remembered that native title is only over the land, 
not over any mineral resources contained in it. 
5.4 Theological Reflection: Reconciliation or Continuing the Sins of the 
Fathers? 
In Section 1.4 it was claimed that the claim of the British Crown to sovereignty over, 
and ownership of, the land of Australia, without regard to its Indigenous inhabitants, 
was a foundational sin, part of its failure to engage with the First peoples in their full 
humanity. Chapters 2 to 4 developed the theology of reconciliation. Part of the claim 
made in those chapters was that the present generation needs to repent of the sins of the 
past, or else it will continue to sin in ways shaped by the sins of the past, even if it is 
doing what it thinks is right.  
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The issue that will be addressed in this section is whether what has happened with land 
over the past half century or so, as narrated in this chapter, has been reconciliatory, or if 
it has continued to sin in ways shaped by the past. 
 
The place that this analysis will begin is with the granting of a mining lease on Yolngu 
land in the Gove Peninsula. The way that the lease was granted, and the response given 
by the Federal Government, was firmly in the mould of past actions. Things began to 
change when the Yolngu then took the government to court.216 Although the Yolngu 
may have thought that they were having a conversation between two systems of law, the 
court had no option, under non-Indigenous law, other than to consider the case as a 
question of whether or not the Yolngu claims to ownership of the land in question could 
be recognised within non-Indigenous law. 
 
It is thus immediately clear that trying to assert Indigenous ownership of land through 
the non-Indigenous legal system has already limited the possible range of outcomes,217 
and some believe that it was a political mistake to put so much resource into this 
process,218 but such a judgement is beyond the purview of this work. However, the 
inherently limited nature of this process, and hence the limited possibilities of 
repentance, will be returned to later in this section. 
 
It is certainly true that Milirrpum (1971) 17 FLR 141 was a partial repentance for what 
has been called the foundation sins, for it recognised for the first time that the Yolngu 
people had a system of law, which could be comprehended by non-Indigenous law. This 
was also important in forming the key Mabo (2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 judgement, which 
recognised a form of Indigenous ownership of land, which it called ‘native title’, in non-
Indigenous law for the first time. 
 
Again, this was a limited form of repentance, for the judgement, and the subsequent 
Native Title Act 1993, affirmed the extinguishment of native title over large tracts of 
Australia; Indigenous ownership of land was only recognised where it could be proved 
that it had not been extinguished. It must be understood that this was a political choice. 
Although it may have been the only politically possible action at the time which could 
preserve some of the Indigenous rights over land that had not been extinguished in non-
Indigenous law, it also perpetuated the sins of the past, in confirming the legal rights of 
all those who were living off the inheritance of land which had been taken from its 
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Indigenous owners. Also, ‘native title’ was sui generis, that is, a new and unique form 
of title, the nature of which had still to be determined. It has proved to be a weak form 
of title.219 
 
Milirrpum (1971) 17 FLR 141 also led to the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act (1976). This Act also limited the areas of land for which First peoples 
could have their ownership of the land recognised in non-Indigenous law: only Crown 
land where there had been no interests in the land granted to non-First peoples could be 
claimed.220 This Act continued the sin of failing to properly engage with the First 
peoples, because it set up Land Councils to manage the land for which Aboriginal 
ownership had been recognised, organisations based on white, male, non-Indigenous 
power structures, and completely upsetting the fundamental principle in Aboriginal law 
that only the ‘owners’ of the land could speak for that land. That is, even when it the 
law was seeking to do good, and it did much good, what was done caused further 
problems for the Indigenous peoples. 
 
One cannot help thinking that an opportunity was lost with Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1 
judgement, to formally explore what the co-existence of rights of ownership might 
mean in Australia, rather than using it simply as a vehicle for allowing the 
determination of what native title rights have survived a less than complete 
extinguishment by some forms of Crown grant.221 
 
Before considering the way that subsequent events moved away from this 
understanding, it must be noted that the recognition of Aboriginal ownership of land has 
sometimes left First peoples in a more difficult place than before it was recognised. For 
example, native title has sometimes put administrative and insurance burdens on people, 
which they cannot meet, and so they cannot access their land.222 This is an example of 
where trying to do the right thing has had the consequence of causing further problems 
for First peoples. 
 
The second half of the last decade of the twentieth century in Australia was an 
extremely hostile one towards reconciliation and the rights of the First peoples. It saw 
the emergence of the One Nation party, which argued against what they saw as the 
unfair special treatment that was being given to First peoples. Campaigns which raised 
the fear about what land Aboriginal people might be able to claim manifested 
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‘themselves in antipathy towards local Indigenous groups. Indigenous communities 
were forced into a position of having to defend their rights against the attacks of the 
fearful and misinformed, rather than dealing with the issue at hand.’223 The Howard 
government was elected, and it rapidly deconstructed the Native Title Act 1993, and the 
High Court then began a process of interpreting the Act in a way that restricted the 
rights conferred by the recognition of native title, and, at the same time, considerably 
raised the bar for the recognition of native title. This was clearly unjust, and against the 
spirit of Mabo (2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, and the intentions of the framers of the Native 
Title Act 1993,224 as discussed in Section 5.3.9 above. As such, this was an explicit and 
intentional continuation of the sins of the past generations; there was not even any 
pretence of trying to do what was best for the First peoples. However, even though the 
interpretation of the law has gradually narrowed, the law is susceptible to change, and 
so it is possible that the interpretation could open out again.225 
 
Pursuing land rights through the courts was always going to be a limited exercise: 
‘native title is all about what is left over. And land rights have never been about the 
dispossession of the colonisers and their descendents. Whether it be statutory land rights 
or common law land rights – these land rights have always focused on remnant 
lands.’226 Graeme Neate, during his office as President of the Native Title Tribunal, 
rightly said, ‘[i]t is my view that far too great a weight of expectation has been put on 
native title to deliver what it was not capable of delivering. There are areas of Australia 
where native title will deliver little or nothing.’227 Who knows what progress might 
have been made if resources had not been put into a battle against land claims, and a 
different attitude had prevailed?228 
 
Pursuing the recognition of the ownership by First peoples through the non-Indigenous 
legal system is a limited exercise, because non-Indigenous law was based on the non-
recognition of Indigenous systems of law. Gillian Cowlishaw rightly puts her finger on 
part of the problem when she highlights the approach of Nancy Williams in her book 
following the failure of the Milirrpum case: 
 
Perhaps the strongest defence of liberal humanist anthropology still comes from 
the appeal to knowledge as the source of liberation from oppressive relations. 
For instance, when Williams alluded to the difficulty of ‘explaining the concepts 
of one culture in the language of another’229 she was trying to improve the 
chances of the Yolngu in their struggle to gain control over land. Their chances 
in the original Blackburn case were inhibited, she argues, by the Court’s 
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ignorance of their system of land tenure, and Williams’s book is intended to 
overcome this nescience. The good intentions behind such authors’ work are 
clear, but they are vitiated by lack of attention to the context in which their 
endeavours are situated. Much intellectual energy is expended in explaining and 
defending Aboriginal culture and little on who it is being explained to and 
defended from. 
 
It is the humane but naïve face of liberal egalitarianism which assumes that 
discrimination, domination and exploitation flow from the limited information 
about the ‘Other’ in the colonial world.230 
 
That is, the law is not neutral, but it is part of the dominant culture, and was based on an 
untruth about Indigenous relationship to the land, and so pursuing rights through the 
legal system will only allow a limited repentance. In the words of Atkinson, ‘[i]n the 
final analysis, it seems that it is not so much a question of the law providing justice for 
Indigenous people but one of how justice can be achieved against existing barriers. 
…[the law] becomes the instrument of power that is used to serve the vested interests of 
settler society and to maintain the status quo. Under these conditions, it is the power 
dynamics between the dominator and the controlled, and notions of racial superiority 
that continue.’231 
 
Furthermore in terms of process, there has not been a level playing field.232 Whether in 
mediation233 or court, Indigenous peoples are working in an alien environment for 
settling disputes. They tend to have less resources than others,234 their evidence has 
often not been understood properly, and there is a difference in cultures – one largely 
written and one largely oral – so there continues to be a problem about what constitutes 
admissible evidence.235 
 
A constant theme of all the legislation and court cases has been to leave non-Indigenous 
title undisturbed, and so the question of what to do about the people who cannot have 
the title over their land recognised, has not been addressed; all the legislation has 
perpetuated this sin from the past. This is not a trivial matter; the easy answer, that it 
would be unjust to take land away from those who have held it for generations, ducks 
the question of what repentance might look like. In his study of the theology of property 
ownership, including the ownership of land, in the early centuries of the church, 
commonly called the ‘Patristic’ period, Charles Avila showed that some theologians 
argued that the present generation of people who ‘owned’ property that had been taken 
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from someone else by previous generations of people, were continuing that theft, and 
remained guilty of the theft until the property was returned. 
 
Avila’s study of Patristic material on ownership provides some interesting insights into 
the issue of land.236 Of course, Avila was looking for material which would help in the 
movement for land rights in the Philippines, but what he has gathered together from 
Clement of Alexandria, Basil the Great, Ambrose, John Chrysostom and Augustine, is 
quite extraordinary.237 Of particular interest to this work is the observation that 
individual ownership of the land, a gift of God that is something that should be common 
to all, is robbery: 
 
Tell me, then, how did you become rich? From whom did you receive it, and 
from whom he who transmitted it to you? From his father and grandfather. But 
can you, ascending through many generations, show the acquisition just? It 
cannot be. The root and origin of it must have been injustice. Why? Because 
God in the beginning did not make one man rich and another poor. Nor did he 
afterwards take and show to anyone treasures of gold, and deny to the others the 
right of searching for it: rather He left the earth free to all alike. … 
 
Why then, if it is common, have you so many acres of land, while your 
neighbour has not a portion of it …? But I will not urge this point too closely. 
Let us grant that your riches are justly gained, and not from robbery. For you are 
not responsible for the covetous acts of your father … or granting that he did not 
obtain it by robbery, that his gold was cast up somewhere out of the earth. … 
 
What then? Is wealth, therefore, good? By no means. At the same time it is not 
bad, you say, if its possessor be not covetous; it is bad; it is ensnaring. “But if he 
does no evil, though he does no good, it is not bad,” you argue. True. However, 
is this not an evil, that you alone should enjoy what is common? Is not “the earth 
God’s and the fullness thereof”? If then our possessions belong to one common 
Lord, they also belong to our fellow-servants. The possessions of one Lord are 
all common.238  
 
Mark the wise dispensation of God. … He has made certain things common, as 
the sun, air, earth, and water, the sky, the sea, the light, the stars, whose benefits 
are dispensed equally to all as brethren. … And mark, that concerning things 
that remain common there is no contention but all is peaceable. But when one 
attempts to possess himself of anything, to make it his own, then contention is 
introduced, as if nature herself were indignant.239 
 
Avila notes that the logic of the first quotation is that ‘[i]f restitution is not made, then 
indeed, property is nothing but a continuing and fresh robbery.’240 
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Further, Patristic thought did not have the concept of compensation for those who 
owned the lands, rather, they had to give them back to the poor; it was a matter of 
simple justice. Ambrose wrote, ‘Not from your own do you bestow upon the poor man, 
but you make return from what is his. For what has been given as common for the use 
of all, you appropriate for yourself alone. The earth belongs to all, not to the rich. … 
Therefore you are paying a debt.’241 Chrysostom was of like mind: ‘Do you give to the 
poor? What you give is not yours, but your Master’s, common to you and your fellow-
servants.’242 Augustine of Hippo wrote, ‘God gives the world to the poor as well as the 
rich. … Those who offer something to the poor should not think that they are doing so 
from what is their own.’243 So, from all corners of the Roman Empire – Milan, the 
Eastern Roman Empire, and Africa, there is the resounding voice that what has been 
stolen must be returned as an act of justice. 
 
Whilst Avila’s research opens up alternative vistas of how the ownership of land could 
be understood, the passages highlighted here have a predetermined notion of justice, 
namely returning to some mythical ‘original state’ where there were no problems. Of 
course, there is such a baseline in the case of Australia, but this thesis has argued that 
justice is achieved through the process of reconciliation, not attempting an impossible 
return to the past. 
 
A fuller repentance, a genuine seeking of reconciliation, must face up to this issue, and 
work with the First peoples to see what must be done about the land which has been 
alienated. This cannot be done within the non-Indigenous legal system, for this system 
of laws is itself a creature of the foundational sins of the British Crown; addressing the 
issue is a political act, and it requires the sort of conversation which the Yolngu were 
hoping to have in the Milirrpum case, not only with people who still obviously have a 
connection to their land because they are living on it, but also with those who were 
dispossessed long ago. Without doing this, the present generation of non-Indigenous 
peoples will continue to pursue policies which are detrimental to the First peoples. 
 
There are two further observations that need to be made in order to bring this section to 
a close. The first is that some First people are pushing for a treaty, or recognition of the 
rights of First peoples to be enshrined in the Australian Constitution, in order for their 
rights to be protected from the vagaries of the political and legal process. The dangers 
inherent in this approach will be discussed in Section 6.7. Secondly, and more 
  223 
positively, although the process of pursuing land rights through the courts has had 
limited legal results, it could be argued that these long arguments have led to a 
significant change in non-Indigenous culture, which is a further repentance, and an 
indication of a desire for a deeper repentance by the non-Indigenous peoples. For 
example, in his role as Deputy President of the National Native Title Tribunal, Fred 
Chaney has noticed that groups are working outside the statutory structures to create 
new agreements and relationships that work for them. He has seen a change to a culture 
of negotiation and agreement making, and even some mining companies have made it 
corporate policy to negotiate agreements with Indigenous groups, focusing on 
relationships rather than a narrow interpretation of the legislation.244 Langton and 
Palmer note that ‘[b]ecause of the NTA administrative regime, governments are being 
forced to treat with Aboriginal people in a variety of ways. We thus find that by default 
Aboriginal people are, through the cumulative effect of native title determinations both 
by Tribunal and by the Federal Court, being treated as peoples.’245 There have also been 
some real advances in Indigenous and non-Indigenous people working together on 
managing land.246 Noting that, in June 2005, there were 170 Indigenous Land Use 
Agreements registered under the Native Title Act 1993, with 100 of them in 
Queensland,247 Aden Ridgeway said that ‘[p]ractical flexible agreements like these are 
signs of communities moving forward.’248 No systematic study has been made of such 
agreements as yet.249 It is too early to assess how far-reaching these promising 
developments will prove to be. 
 
Because the discussion in legislation and in the courts has focused almost exclusively 
on ‘ownership’ as understood in non-Indigenous law, the deeper questions about human 
relationships to the land have been largely unaddressed. It could be argued that some of 
the damaging changes wrought on the Australian landscape, through various economic 
practices, have arisen precisely because of the land being seen in an economic rather 
than spiritual way.250 Without addressing these issues, the silent conquest of the land 
continues.251 The Aboriginal assertion that the non-Indigenous legal system is ‘lawless’ 
can, in part, be understood in this way. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore a 
theology of the land itself, although the next chapter will give some pointers in this 
direction. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that any process of reconciliation – 
with the Indigenous peoples of Australia and with the land itself – must include 
grappling with this part of Indigenous cultures, which has been significantly overlooked 
in legislative and legal history in Australia.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there was a significant degree of repentance within the non-
Indigenous legal system, with regards to the foundational sin of not recognising 
Indigenous law systems, and the concomitant ownership of land by Indigenous peoples: 
the Milirrpum (1971) 17 FLR 141 judgement recognised for the first time in non-
Indigenous law that a group of First people, the Yolngu, had a recognisable system of 
law, and Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1 recognised for the first time that the sort of ownership 
that was part of this law could also be recognised in non-Indigenous law. However, the 
power of the legal system to do much with this is limited: the legal system is firmly 
bound by what this thesis has called a foundational sin, namely the failure to recognise 
Indigenous legal systems and their implications for Indigenous ownership of the land. 
With this constraint, the legal system has done as much as it can, by highlighting the 
possibility of Indigenous people having their ownership of the land being recognised 
within the non-Indigenous legal system, as long as the Crown has not alienated the 
land to someone else; any other provable ownership claim on the land, by anyone else, 
trumps whatever rights the Indigenous people may have otherwise had in non-
Indigenous law. The law is simply not the right vehicle for the larger problem of what 
must be done concerning the history of dispossession of the rest of the land, for it does 
not have the power to do this in and of itself. Nor can it properly explore what must be 
done more generally by the Subsequent peoples to repent of the wider consequences of 
what has flowed from this foundational sin. 
 
This chapter has also shown that, even when legislation has been brought to enable the 
securing of Indigenous ownership of land within the non-Indigenous legal system, that 
this has sometimes created structures that are antithetical to the Indigenous way of 
managing land, and so, even when the legislative system has been trying to do what is 
right, it has continued to sin against the First peoples, so confirming, in practice, what 
was argued in Chapter 4. Even when legislation has tried to protect the remaining 
Indigenous rights within the non-Indigenous legal system, this chapter has shown how 
this is subject to the political whims of subsequent governments and courts. Clearly 
something else must be done in order for the Subsequent peoples to properly repent of 
their sins towards the First peoples. 
 
When the Yolngu brought their ownership of the land in the Gove Peninsula to the non-
Indigenous court, they may have believed that they were going to have a conversation 
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between two different legal systems. However, the non-Indigenous court system does 
not have this power, and it is constrained to work in a way that is consistent with its 
sinful foundation, until it is changed through the political system.252 In order for a fuller 
repentance to take place, in order truly to pursue reconciliation in Australia, there needs 
to be a proper engagement with the Indigenous systems of law, which may lead to the 
need to radically reformulate non-Indigenous law. 
 
However, amongst the ups and downs of politics, this long legal battle still seems to 
have played an important part in causing a change in the attitudes of Subsequent 
peoples towards First peoples. This chapter has noted what has been more generally 
true, that the Subsequent peoples have failed again and again to pay proper attention to 
what the First peoples have been saying to them. Any process of repentance must 
include listening properly to what the First peoples are saying, and so the next chapter 
looks at some of the things that they have been saying to the incomers.   
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probably for some fauna, such as freshwater crayfish. Since this is a new area of 
research, it is likely that further examples of Aboriginal land management will be 
uncovered. 
28 Broome, Aboriginal, p. 15, writes, ‘Lazarus Lamilami recalled that his people, the 
Maung of Goulburn Island, would go to various place to gather turtles, bandicoots, 
goannas, geese, wild honey or yams, depending on the season. They knew that when the 
peewee birds returned after the wet season, the water lily roots were ready to eat; when 
a brown scum came on the sea young sharks could be caught off the beach. The tribes 
around southern alps in Victoria knew exactly when to climb the mountains to eat the 
Bogong moth. Those around southern Queensland knew precisely when the Bunya nut 
feasting could begin.’ See also Rose, Dingo, pp. 97-99; Walsh et al., Planning for 
Country, “Seasonal Calendar”, pp. 60f, who make similar points. 
29 Maddison, Black, p.64. 
30 McLoughlin, Annie, “Fire Unearths forgotten Aboriginal Settlement”, The 
Australian, 3rd February, 2006. A fire on 24th January 2006 near Tyrendarra in the far 
south-west of Victoria uncovered remains of Aboriginal settlements. Stone dwellings up 
to five metres wide were laid out in a village-style arrangement. Eel traps were found 
near some of the houses. Discarded flints from around the houses are from rocks not 
found in the area. A similar site was earlier found at the nearby Lake Condah, where 
there is evidence of stone houses built by First people, one hundred square kilometres of 
swamp had been modified to act as an eel trap, and trees were shaped as smoke houses. 
Budden, Following, pp. 49f reminds readers that there was a wide variety of Aboriginal 
cultures, with those in southern areas living in houses, cultivating and harvesting the 
land and the sea. However, these settlements were over-run by early incomers, and so 
the idea of First people as being nomadic has held sway. 
31 Adams, Michael, and English, Anthony, “'Biodiversity is a whitefellas word’: 
Changing Relationships Between Aborigines and the New South Wales National Parks 
and Wildlife Service” in Taylor, Luke; Ward, Graeme K.; Henderson, Graham; Davis, 
Richard; and Wallis, Lynley A., eds., The Power of Knowledge, The Resonance of 
Tradition (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2005), 86-97, p. 87; Herbert, Eileen, 
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“Reconciliation in Cape York Peninsula”, Chain Reaction 75 (Kuly 1996), 34-36; 
Horstman, Mark, “Black Shadows, White Shadows, Grey Shadows: Does the Cape 
York Regional Agreement Provide a Model for the Reconciliation Process?”, Arena 
Magazine 22 (April-May 1996), 26-31. 
32 Langton, “Grandmothers’”, p. 86, writes: 
It is increasingly acknowledged by anthropologists that amongst Aboriginal 
groups which have endured rapid population loss as a result of frontier violence 
and disease, forced removals or other impacts of colonialisation, the senior 
women of the relevant land tenure corporations take on a special role in 
succession arrangements to land where the original land-holding corporation has 
not survived. 
and (ibid., p. 92): 
The paradigm in which men’s evidence is the cornerstone in proving the 
existence and rules of customary land corporation will be less efficacious in 
native title claims in those areas where the massacres, epidemics, forced 
removals and impact of alcohol abuse, imprisonment, employment in the 
pastoral industry and itinerant labouring have resulted in a female gerontocracy 
of the remnant clans and of amalgamated customary land corporations such as 
“tribes”. 
Langton claims that senior Aboriginal women had power over marriage arrangements, 
which were essentially about distributing kin across various “countries”, and that this 
role has come increasingly to the fore because of the problems mentioned in the above-
quoted paragraphs. The women tend to out-live the men, and so they become 
increasingly important in their preservation of knowledge (Langton, “Grandmothers’”, 
p. 107). 
33 Bell, Daughters, pp. 140f. 
34 A situation such as this arose with the Hindmarsh Bridge development. At the heart 
of the dispute were two groups of Ngarrindjeri women, one of which claimed that a 
sacred area to do with women’s fertility would be destroyed by the development, and 
the other which said that there was no such area. For a narrative of the events, ‘which 
had more legal turns than a lawyers’ car rally’, and many underhand tactics, see 
Broome, Aboriginal, pp. 249-253. Bell made an analysis of the case in her Ngarrindjeri 
Wurruwarrin: A World That Is, Was and Will Be (Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 1998) 
(see also her “The Word of a Woman: Ngarrindjeri Stories and a Bridge to Hindmarsh 
Island” in Brock, Peggy, ed., Words and Silences: Aboriginal Women, Politics and 
Land (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 117-138, 181-183). Bell’s analysis is 
contested in Kimber, Richard, “Diane Bell, the Ngarrindjeri and the Hindmarsh Island 
Affair: ‘Value-free’ ethnography”, Aboriginal History 21 (1997), 202-232, who finds 
the book ‘severely flawed’ (p. 232). Kimber makes lots of detailed criticisms, but he is 
also concerned that Bell’s feminist stance is not value-free, to the point of ignoring 
difficult evidence (e.g. pp. 217; 227); of importing concepts from native Americans 
(e.g. pp. 206; 213; 231); and even been instrumental in telling the women some things 
they did not know (e.g. pp. 220f), to the point that reasonably knowledgeable readers 
will ‘be likely to feel … that they’ve occasionally been misled’ (p. 217). The final twist 
and turns of the case happened after the publication of the book. Justice John von 
Doussa of the Federal court ruled that the women’s knowledge was not fabricated, 
although by then, the bridge had been built. Broome, Aboriginal, p. 253, writes, 
 
[w]hat is clear is that this disagreement was manipulated in a battle over the 
development at Goolwa and those who wished to discredit Aboriginal custodial 
claims in native title deliberations. This affair also revealed the continuing gap 
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between European and Aboriginal systems of knowledge and belief, and the 
politics and manipulations that flourish in that gap. The media gave the issue 
plenty of space. The public, who were bewildered by the conflicting claims of 
the women, anthropologists, politicians and inquiries, probably followed their 
existing prejudices. Those sympathetic to the Aboriginal cause believed the 
secrets were true, while those who were unsympathetic believed it was a case of 
mere fabrications preventing legitimate development. Despite the recent 
vindication of von Doussa’s decision in the compensation case, Aboriginal 
cultural claims across the country have been harmed by the case. 
35 Quoted in Atkinson, “Reflections”, p. 6. 
36 E.g. Olive, Karijini, p. 77, records an account by Peter Stevens: 
At Bimbanha Springs, between the pipeline between Tom Price and Marandoo, 
you can see that the water is just about finished. There have been a lot of cattle 
there. It is now dirty when once it was always running. It has stopped running 
now. This is on Hammersley Station. And Bimbanha never used to go dry, that 
was the old people’s main camp. Now it’s dry, finished. There’s lots of carvings 
there, too. It is an important place. You can see where they used to grind them 
seeds all over the place. 
 
Those carvings can tell you many stories. They can tell you what food is in that 
area, and what you can eat in that land. The same things happened down not far 
from the Channar mine near Paraburdoo. The mud springs there was a 
permanent source of water. It is now finished, all dry. There was also a night 
spring there which would run every night; it’s finished, too. 
 
These two springs have gone dry since the Channar mine started operations. The 
mining is sucking all of the water from these natural springs. The springs were 
never properly protected from the cattle and this made the springs dirty. But the 
cattle will be finished now it’s dry, because there is no water. 
37 Olive, Karijini, p. 77. Also, Rose recalls stopping at the side of a road in 1986 to film 
some of the most spectacular erosion in the Victoria River District. She asked her 
Aboriginal teacher/friend, Daly Pulkara, what he called that country. He said, “It’s the 
wild. Just the wild.” ‘He then went on to speak of quiet country – the country in which 
all the care of generations of his people is evident to those who know how to see it. 
Quiet country stands in contrast to the wild: we were looking at a wilderness, man-made 
and cattle-made. This wild was a place where the life of the country was falling down 
into the gullies and washing away with the rain’ (Rose, “Sacred”, p.117).  Quiet country 
was the result of the organisational ‘management’ of the land by his ancestors. Daly 
said that the damage in wild country was killing both life and time, “We’ll run out of 
history,” he said, “because kartiya [Europeans] fuck the Law up and [they’re] knocking 
all the power out of this country”’ (Rose, “Sacred”, p. 118). See further Rose, Deborah, 
Reports from a Wild Country: Ethics for Decolonisation (Sydney: University of New 
South Wales Press, 2004), especially chapter 4, “Cattle Kings and Sacred Cows”.  
38 Besides sheep and cattle, some famous examples include rabbits, cane toads, water 
buffalo, and mimosa pigra (Rose, Country, pp. 127-132). 
39 Nesbitt, Brad; Baker, Lynn; Copley, Peter; Young, Frank; and Anangu Pitjantjatjara 
Land Management, “Cooperative Cross-cultural Biological Surveys in Resource 
Management: Experiences in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands” in Baker, Richard; 
Davies, Jocelyn; and Young, Elspeth, eds., Working on Country: Contemporary 
Indigenous Management of Australia’s Lands and Coastal Regions (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 187-198; and “The Role of Traditional Ecological Knowledge 
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and Skills in ‘Modern’ Aboriginal Land Management and Education” in Walsh, Fiona 
and Mitchell, Paul, eds., Planning for Country: Cross-Cultural Approaches to Decision-
Making on Aboriginal Lands (Alice Springs: Jukurrpa Press, 2002), 142-147, give 
examples of the importance of using of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal knowledge 
in wildlife management.  
40 Tehan, Maureen, “A Hope Disillusioned, An Opportunity Lost? Reflections on 
Common Law Native Title and Ten Years of the Native Title Act”, Melbourne 
University Law Review 27/2 (2003), 523-571, p. 524. 
41 Read, Belonging. See also Hinkson, Melinda, “Exploring ‘Aboriginal’ Sites in 
Sydney: A Shifting Politics of Place?”, Aboriginal History 26 (2002), 62-77, which 
makes a similar observation. Baker, Richard; Davies, Jocelyn; and Young, Elspeth, 
“Managing Country: An Overview of the Prime Issues” in Baker, Richard; Davies, 
Jocelyn; and Young, Elspeth, eds., Working on Country: Contemporary Indigenous 
Management of Australia’s Lands and Coastal Regions (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 3-23, p. 14, write, ‘for a high proportion of indigenous people, the 
opportunities to look after country are very limited – their country has largely been 
alienated and it is likely that they have been physically excluded even from visiting it. 
Under such circumstances it is astonishing that indigenous residents of major cities like 
Sydney or Melbourne have retained so much knowledge of where their country is and 
strong feelings about the need to look after it.’ Related to this is the long memory of 
genealogies (Feary, Sue, “Moving Towards Joint Management in New South Wales: A 
Jervis Bay Case Study” in Baker, Richard; Davies, Jocelyn; and Young, Elspeth, eds., 
Working on Country: Contemporary Indigenous Management of Australia’s Lands and 
Coastal Regions (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 276-294, p. 288). 
42 Section 6.3 will discuss the Mawul Rom project, teaching people about reconciliation 
from a Yolngu perspsective. 
43 This narrative bears the marks of heavy revision by Pat McIntyre, for which I am 
extremely grateful. 
44 Milirrpum and Others v  Nabalco Pty. Ltd. and the Commonwealth of Australia 
(1971) 17 FLR 141, 167, 168, 170, 171, 272, 273. 
45 He had opposed the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 when a 
member of the Frazer government. 
46 The Wik Peoples v Queensland and Others ; The Thayorre People v Queensland and 
Others (1996) 187 CLR 1 
47 This event has entered Australian folklore, but I have yet to track down a definitive 
reference to it. 
48 Joe McIntyre, personal communication. 
49 Langton, Marcia, “Medicine Square” in Keen, Ian, ed., Being Black: Aboriginal 
Cultures in ‘Settled’ Australia (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988), 201-225, p. 
218. Scott, Domination, is interesting on the existence of lived counter-narratives in the 
face of dominant systems. 
50 This section is largely taken Harris, John, One Blood: Two Hundred Years of 
Aboriginal Encounter with Christianity: A Story of Hope (Sutherfield: Albatross Books, 
1990), which has a fuller discussion of the history, as compared with other sources, 
such as Perkins and Langton, First, p. 349, and the webpage (as at 22.12.09): 
http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/item.asp?dID=104, which has images of the petition 
and some discussion of the history and significance of the document. 
51 Note that the ‘Overseas’ mission board was operating in Australia. 
52 The agreement was made between Roger Nott on behalf of the government, and the 
Revd. Cecil Gribble, General Secretary of the Methodist Overseas Mission, and the 
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Revd Gordon Symons, chairman of northern Australia district, previously 
superintendent of Yirrkala. 
53 Recall the Geoff Pryor cartoon (Figure 1-2). 
54 This was not the first petition from First peoples. For example, the First peoples on 
Flinders Island petitioned Queen Victoria in February 1846, the petition arriving in 
March 1847 (Reynolds, Fate, pp. 7-14). 
55 The English version of the text is as follows: 
 
TO THE HONOURABLE THE SPEAKER AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED: 
 
The Humble Petition of the Undersigned Aboriginal people of Yirrkala, being members 
of the Balamumu, Narrkala, Gapiny, and Miliwurrwurr people and Djapu, Mangalili, 
Madarrpa, Magarrwanalinirri, Gumaitj, Djambarrpuynu, Marrakulu, Galpu, Dhalnayu, 
Wangurri, Warramirri, Maymil, Rirritjinu, tribes, respectfully showeth – 
 
1. That nearly 500 people of the above tribes are residents of the land excised from 
the Aboriginal Reserve in Arnhem Land. 
2. That the procedures of the excision of this land and the fate of the people on it 
were never explained to them beforehand, and were kept secret from them. 
3. That when Welfare Officers and Government officials came to inform them of 
decisions taken without them and against them, they did not undertake to convey 
to the Government in Canberra the views and feelings of the Yirrkala Aboriginal 
people. 
4. That the land in question has been hunting and food gathering land for the 
Yirrkala tribes from time immemorial; we were all born here. 
5. That places sacred to the Yirrkala people, as well as vital to their livelihood are 
in the excised land, especially Melville Bay. 
6. That the people of this area fear that their needs and interests will be completely 
ignored as they have been ignored in the past, and they fear that the fate which 
has overtaken the Larrakkia tribe will overtake them. 
7. And they humbly pray that the Honourable the House of Representatives will 
appoint a Committee, accompanied by competent interpreters, to hear the views 
of the Yirrkala people before permitting the excision of this land. 
8. They humbly pray that no arrangements be entered into with any company 
which will destroy the livelihood and independence of the Yirrkala people. 
 
And your petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray God to help you and us. 
56 These images © the Yirrkala Community and the House of Representatives of the 
Australian Commonwealth Government. Original document of the House of 
Representatives, Australian Parliament House. These images are subject Copyright and 
may not be used or reproduced without permission from the Parliament House Art 
Collection. Used here with permission. When I visited in May 2005, the original 
petition was on display in a glass case in the Parliament building in Canberra. 
57 Morphy “‘Now”, p. 115. 
58 In contrast, Gribble was awarded an OBE for work for the advancement of Aboriginal 
people of Australia, and later Symons received the same award. 
59 Not all Mission Societies behaved like the Methodist Overseas Mission did in this 
case. For example, Church of England CMS missionaries were wise in working in the 
system when they negotiated a mineral exploration licence for Groote Eylandt on behalf 
of its Aboriginal owners. When BHP wanted to mine the island, they were forced to 
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details. 
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who flog it off to developers of all sorts, particularly the mining industry. And the 
original owners of that property, they get very little from it.’ 
110 The Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1 judgement can also be found on-line (as at 20.4.10): 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1992/23.html. 
111 Flo Kennedy, quoted in Sharp, No, p. 29 
112 Reynolds, The Law, pp. 185f 
113 Stanner, “The Yirrkala”, p. 11 
114 Stanner, “The Yirrkala ”, p. 12 
115 Sharp, No, p. 38. Sharp has paraphrased Daly’s words from Yarra Bank Films, 1990. 
116 Bartlett, Native, pp. 15-21; Sharp, No, pp. 46-48; Young, “Into” 
117 Young, Doug, Briggs, John, and Denholder, Anthony, “Into the Fray Again: Native 
Title and the Racial Discrimination Act” in Hiley QC, Graham, ed., The Wik Case: 
Issues and Implications (Sydney: Butterworths, 1997), 57-62, gives the key reason for 
this. State legislation which conflicts with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (RDA) 
will be invalid to the extent of any inconsistency by virtue of s 109 of the Australian 
Constitution. The key provision of the RDA that came into operation on 31st October, 
1975, for this case was s 10(1): 
 
If, by reason of, or of a provision of, a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or 
Territory, persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin do not 
enjoy a right that is enjoyed by persons of another race, colour or national or 
ethnic origin, or enjoy a right to a more limited extent than persons of another 
race, colour or national or ethnic origin, then, notwithstanding anything in that 
law, persons of the first-mentioned race, colour or national or ethnic origin shall, 
by force of this section, enjoy that right to the same extent as persons of that 
other race, colour or national or ethnic origin. 
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The section guarantees equality before the law when that right is otherwise denied by 
the Commonwealth or States or Territory. Rights included the ‘right to own property 
alone as well as in association with others’ and the ‘right to inherit’. (International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Articles 5(d) (v), 
(vii)). The High Court said that this right to own and inherit property includes immunity 
from the arbitrary deprivation of property. Mabo (1) therefore said that Queensland Act 
was inconsistent with the RDA because it discriminated on the basis of race in respect to 
the human right to own and inherit property because the native title rights which it 
sought to extinguish were only held by indigenous people. (Cf. Bartlett, Native, p. 17.) 
118 Mabo (2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 15. 
119 Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 29 (Brennan J): 
Australian law is not only the historical successor of, but is an organic 
development from, the law of England. Although our law is the prisoner of its 
history, it is not now bound by decisions of courts in the hierarchy of an Empire 
then concerned with the development of its colonies. It is not immaterial to the 
resolution of the present problem that, since the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) came 
into operation, the law of this country is entirely free of Imperial control. The 
law which governs Australia is Australian law. … Increasingly since 1968 … 
the common law of Australia has been substantially in the hands of this Court. 
Here rests the ultimate responsibility of declaring the law of the nation. 
120 Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Brennan J). 
121 This was recognised by Blackburn J in Milirrpum (1971) 17 FLR 141, 267, 268, as 
discussed in Section 5.3.3, above. 
122 Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 29 (Brennan J): 
In discharging its duty to declare the common law of Australia, this Court is not 
free to adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human 
rights if their adoption would fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the 
body of our law its shape and internal consistency. 
Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 43 (Brennan J): 
However, recognition by our common law of the rights and interests in land of 
the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony would be precluded if the 
recognition were to fracture a skeletal principle of our legal system. The 
proposition that the Crown became the beneficial owner of all colonial land on 
first settlement has been supported by more than a disregard of indigenous rights 
and interests. It is necessary to consider these other reasons for past disregard of 
indigenous rights and interests and then to return to a consideration of the 
question whether and in what way our contemporary common law recognizes 
such rights and interests in land. 
123 Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 48 (Brennan J): 
By attributing to the Crown a radical title to all land within a territory over 
which the Crown has assumed sovereignty, the common law enabled the Crown, 
in exercise of its sovereign power, to grant an interest in land to be held of the 
Crown or to acquire land for the Crown's demesne. The notion of radical title 
enabled the Crown to become Paramount Lord of all who hold a tenure granted 
by the Crown and to become absolute beneficial owner of unalienated land 
required for the Crown's purposes. But it is not a corollary of the Crown's 
acquisition of a radical title to land in an occupied territory that the Crown 
acquired absolute beneficial ownership of that land to the exclusion of the 
indigenous inhabitants. If the land were desert and uninhabited, truly a terra 
nullius, the Crown would take an absolute beneficial title (an allodial title) to the 
land … there would be no other proprietor. But if the land were occupied by the 
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indigenous inhabitants and their rights and interests in the land are recognized 
by the common law, the radical title which is acquired with the acquisition of 
sovereignty cannot itself be taken to confer an absolute beneficial title to the 
occupied land. Nor is it necessary to the structure of our legal system to refuse 
recognition to the rights and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants. The 
doctrine of tenure applies to every Crown grant of an interest in land, but not to 
rights and interests which do not owe their existence to a Crown grant. The 
English legal system accommodated the recognition of rights and interests 
derived from occupation of land in a territory over which sovereignty was 
acquired by conquest without the necessity of a Crown grant. 
Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 50,51 (Brennan J): 
Recognition of the radical title of the Crown is quite consistent with recognition 
of native title to land, for the radical title, without more, is merely a logical 
postulate required to support the doctrine of tenure (when the Crown has 
exercised its sovereign power to grant an interest in land) and to support the 
plenary title of the Crown (when the Crown has exercised its sovereign power to 
appropriate to itself ownership of parcels of land within the Crown's territory). 
Unless the sovereign power is exercised in one or other of those ways, there is 
no reason why land within the Crown's territory should not continue to be 
subject to native title. It is only the fallacy of equating sovereignty and 
beneficial ownership of land that gives rise to the notion that native title is 
extinguished by the acquisition of sovereignty. 
124 Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 40, 42 (Brennan J): 
The theory that the indigenous inhabitants of a “settled” colony had no 
proprietary interest in the land thus depended on a discriminatory denigration of 
indigenous inhabitants, their social organization and customs. As the basis of the 
theory is false in fact and unacceptable in our society, there is a choice of legal 
principle to be made in the present case. This Court can either apply the existing 
authorities and proceed to inquire whether the Meriam people are higher “in the 
scale of social organization” than the Australian Aborigines whose claims were 
“utterly disregarded” by the existing authorities or the Court can overrule the 
existing authorities, discarding the distinction between inhabited colonies that 
were terra nullius and those which were not. … The fiction by which the rights 
and interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were treated as non-existent was 
justified by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law of this country. 
. … Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognize 
the rights and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, 
an unjust and discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted.  
The expectations of the international community accord in this respect with the 
contemporary values of the Australian people. 
(Cf. Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Brennan J).) 
125 Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Brennan J): 
The dispossession of the indigenous inhabitants of Australia was not worked by 
a transfer of beneficial ownership when sovereignty was acquired by the Crown, 
but by the recurrent exercise of a paramount power to exclude the indigenous 
inhabitants from their traditional lands as colonial settlement expanded and land 
was granted to the colonists. Dispossession is attributable not to a failure of 
native title to survive the acquisition of sovereignty, but to its subsequent 
extinction by a paramount power. 
Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 69. (Brennan J): 
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Where the Crown has validly alienated land by granting an interest that is 
wholly or partially inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title, 
native title is extinguished to the extent of the inconsistency. Thus native title 
has been extinguished by grants of estates of freehold or of leases but not 
necessarily by the grant of lesser interests (e.g., authorities to prospect for 
minerals). 
The extinguishment of native title is discussed further in Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 63-69 
(Brennan J). 
126 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 89 (Deane and Gaudron JJ) (Cf. Mabo (2) 175 CLR 
1, 63-133 (Dawson J)); Neate “Turning”, p. 8. Tehan, “A Hope”, pp. 534f, writes, 
[t]he title was outside the common law’s tenurial system, but it encompassed 
rights that were recognised and protected by the common law, although those 
rights were not part of the common law itself. In fact, the title was said to be sui 
generis and the precise nature of the title and where it sat within the broader 
property system was unclear. Was it proprietary or was it merely a usufructuary 
right? Was it a right to exclusive occupation or was it a lesser right and, if so, 
what did that right conceptually entail? 
These were resolved in a particular way by the Native Title Act 1993, and several key 
decisions, including Ward and Yorta Yorta, discussed below (Sections 5.3.6-5.3.9). 
127 Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 76 (Brennan J). 
128 Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1, 142, 145 (Dawson J): 
Therefore the policy of the Imperial Government during this period is clear: 
whilst the aboriginal inhabitants were not to be ill-treated, settlement was not to 
be impeded by any claim which those inhabitants might seek to exert over the 
land. Settlement expanded rapidly, and the selection and occupation of the land 
by settlers were regulated by the Governors in a way that was intended to be 
comprehensive and complete and was simply inconsistent with the existence of 
any native interests in the land. … There may not be a great deal to be proud of 
in this history of events. But a dispassionate appraisal of what occurred is 
essential to the determination of the legal consequences. … The policy which 
lay behind the legal regime was determined politically and, however insensitive 
the politics may now seem to have been, a change in view does not of itself 
mean a change in the law. It requires the implementation of a new policy to do 
that and that is a matter for government rather than the courts. In the meantime, 
it would be wrong to attempt to revise history or to fail to recognize its legal 
impact, however unpalatable it may now seem. To do so would be to impugn the 
foundations of the very legal system under which this case must be decided. 
129 Tehan, “A Hope”, pp. 526f, has a helpful discussion of the types of response, and 
further pointers into the literature. 
130 Gibbs, in his Foreword to Stephenson, M.A. and Ratnapala, Suri, eds., Mabo: A 
Judicial Revolution (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993), p. xiii, 
summarises well the sorts of questions that were being asked: 
Did the Court carry judicial activism too far in departing from principles that 
were thought to have been settled for well over a century, on the ground that 
those principles were contrary to international standards and the fundamental 
values of the common law? In doing so, the Court applied what some of its 
members perceived to be current values and the further question arises whether 
in fact those values are widely accepted in the community and whether, 
assuming they are, it is right to apply contemporary standards to overturn rules 
formulated at a time when community values were not necessarily the same. 
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131 See Section 5.3.3, above. Cf. Goodall, Heather, “’The Whole Truth and Nothing But 
…’: Some Interactions of Western Law, Aboriginal History and Community Memory” 
in Attwood, Bain and Arnold, John, eds, Power, Knowledge and Aborigines (Victoria: 
La Trobe University Press, 1992), 104-119, which discusses how the legal system failed 
to hear the truth of what the First peoples were saying in the inquiry into atomic tests in 
Australia. 
132 Sharp, No, p. 74, writes that ‘evidence was not always presented in a form which the 
judge could understand, and this was not primarily a problem of language. For example, 
the mythical-religious idiom of many fundamental truths for the Meriam is one of 
metaphor and analogy, and hence not readily accessible to the literal mind.’ 
133 Keon-Cohen, B.A., “Some Problems of Proof: The Admissability of Traditional 
Evidence” in Stephenson, M.A. and Ratnapala, Suri, eds., Mabo: A Judicial Revolution 
(St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993), 185-205, p. 200, n. 34. 
134 Sharp, No, pp. 76, 105-108, 112-114. 
135 Sharp, No, pp. 94f. See also her “Malo’s”. 
136 Sharp, No, pp. 139-144, 154. 
137 Broome, Aboriginal, p. 256; Foley et al, A People’s, pp. 101-105; Herbert, 
“Reconciliation”; Horstman, “Black”. 
138 Gunstone, Andrew, “The Responses of Australian Governments to Indigenous 
Challenges to the Australian State: 1967-2003”, Journal of Australian Indigenous 
Issues 6/2 (June, 2003), 3-25, p. 11; Jennett, Christine, “Aboriginal Affairs Policy” in 
Jennet, C, and Stewart, Randal G, Hawke and Australian Public Policy: Consensus and 
Restructuring (Melbourne: The Macmillian Company of Australia, 1990), 245-283, pp. 
254-257. 
139 Merlan, “The Regimentation”, p. 65. 
140 The Australian, 17th October, 1992, p. 4. 
141 Redfern is an inner-city area of Sydney, with a large population of First peoples. 
142 Keating, Paul, “The Redfern Park Speech” in Grattan, Michelle, Essays on 
Australian Reconciliation (Melbourne: Black Inc, 2000), 60-64, p. 64. 
143 Tickner, Taking, p. 221; Bartlett, Native, p. 34; Ridgeway, Aden, “Mabo Ten Years 
On – Small Steps or Giant Leap” in McGlade, Hannah, ed., Treaty: Let’s Get It Right! A 
Collection of Essays from ATSIC’s Treaty Think Tank and Authors Commissioned by 
AIATSIS on Treaty Issues (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2003), 185-197, 200-
216, p. 186; Dodson, Mick, “Unfinished Business: A Shadow Across Our 
Relationships” in McGlade, Hannah, ed., Treaty: Let’s Get It Right! A Collection of 
Essays from ATSIC’s Treaty Think Tank and Authors Commissioned by AIATSIS on 
Treaty Issues (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2003), 30-40, 200-216, pp. 39f. 
144 Robert Tickner was the Federal Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs during this period, and he gives his personal account of this process, Taking, pp. 
191-220 for the Act, and pp. 221-236 for the land fund. See also chapter 3, “Political 
and Legislative Responses to Mabo”, of Bartlett, Native, pp. 33-44. 
145 The Australian, 8th June, 1993.  
146 Bartlett, Native, pp. 35-39, summarises some of the types of opposition from the 
States, mining companies, and pastoralists, including saying that First people were ‘too 
primitive’ for it to be possible to make a treaty with them, calling them ‘stone-age’ 
people, and saying that unless Mabo (2) 175 CLR 1 was rescinded, Australians would 
revert to the Stone Age. 
147 Bartlett Native, p.39. 
148 The West Australian, 19th June, 1993; 21st June, 2003, p. 4; 24th June, 1993, p. 4. 
Bartlett, Native, p. 35, notes that ‘Western Australia is the principle jurisdiction in 
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Australia which has made no provision for rights to land for Aboriginal people. It is 
undoubtedly the jurisdiction in Australia most affected by Mabo.’ 
149 The West Australian, 20th July, 1993, p. 3. 
150 Cf. the perceptive observation of Ann Curthoys, “Mythologies” in Nile, Richard, ed., 
The Australian Legend and Its Discontents (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
2000), 11-41, pp. 13, 37: 
Many non-indigenous Australians have difficulty in seeing themselves as the 
beneficiaries of the colonisation process because they, like so many others, from 
the United States to Canada to Israel and elsewhere, see themselves as victims, 
not oppressors … [For the victim], the legacy of the colonial past is a continuing 
fear of illegitimacy. 
151 Bartlett, Native, p. 39, quoting an October 1993 advertising leaflet from the 
Association of Mining and Exploration Companies. 
152 NTA 1993, ss 11, 15; Bartlett, Native Title, p. 40. 
153 The National Native Title Tribunal has an excellent website, http://www.nntt.gov.au. 
It contains, for example, information about the process of making a native title claim, or 
making an indigenous land use agreement, or an agreement about a future act, the 
current status of negotiations about these issues, maps, and so on. They have also 
produced a video/DVD Native Title Stories. 
154 The provision for future acts allowed registered native title claimants and holders the 
‘right to negotiate’ about use of the land for which they were claiming, or held native 
title. 
155 Mediating Native Title Applications: A Guide to National Native Title Tribunal 
Practice. 
156 As at 14.4.06, data about determinations of native title can be obtained from the web 
page: http://www.nntt.gov.au/applications/determinations.html. 
157 Personal communication in an interview on 28.5.05. This was confirmed in an 
interview with Jenny Macklin, the Federal Indigenous Affairs Minister, on 21st May, 
2008: ‘Ms Macklin says it would take at least 30 years to resolve the backlog of 
outstanding claims under the current system and some of the burden should be removed 
from the courts’ (ABC Online, as at 2.4.09: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/05/21/2251850.htm). 
158 National Native Title Tribunal, Mediating, p. 179. 
159 National Native Title Tribunal, Mediating, p. 73. 
160 Cf. Dodson, Mick, “Power and Cultural Difference in Native Title Mediation”, 
Aborigianl Law Bulletin 3/84 (September 1996), 8-11. A study of the experience of 
mediation from the perspective of mediators can found in Williams, Rhiân, “Native 
Title Mediation Practice: The Commonalities, the Challenges, the Contradictions – A 
Survey of Native Title Mediators”, AIATSIS Indigenous Facilitation and Mediation 
Project 3, 2004. Available on web page (as at 6.4.09): 
http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/ifamp/research/pdfs/report3ntmediationpractice.pdf. 
161 Bartlett, Native, p. 39. 
162 Draft report of the Interdepartmental Committee of Officials, paragraph 33. 
163 Bartlett, Native, p. 39. 
164 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 3. This was the judgement of Toohey, Gaudron, Gummow 
and Kirby JJ, with Brennan CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ dissenting. 
165 See Section 5.3.3, above. 
166 Hiley, Graham, “Introduction” in Hiley QC, Graham, ed., The Wik Case: Issues and 
Implications (Sydney: Butterworths, 1997), 1-5, p. 1. 
167 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 76 (Brennan CJ). 
168 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 78 (Brennan CJ). 
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169 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 115-116 (Toohey J). Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 116 (Toohey 
J): 
The point is that the rights and obligations of a person holding an interest under 
the legislation involved in the present appeals are not disposed of by 
nomenclature. A closer examination is required. 
170 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 120 (Toohey J) notes that 
it is unlikely that the intention of the legislature in authorising the grant of 
pastoral leases was to confer possession on the lessees to the exclusion of 
Aboriginal people even for their traditional rights of hunting and gathering. 
Nevertheless, "intention" in this context is not a reference to the state of mind of 
the Crown or of the Crown's officers who, for instance, made a grant of land. 
What is to be ascertained is the operation of the statute and the "intention" to be 
discerned from it 
171 Bartlett, Native, pp. 46f; 49. 
172 The research of Reynolds and others (Reynolds, Henry and Dalziel, Jamie, 
“Aborigines and Pastoral Leases – Imperial and Colonial Policy 1826-1855”, University 
of New South Wales Law Journal 19/2 (1996), 315-377) was critical here, arguing that 
the instructions from Lord Grey concerning leases at the foundation of the colony of 
South Australia led to this interpretation. For example, Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 119 
(Toohey J) quotes from Despatch No 24 Earl Grey to the Governor Sir Charles FizRoy, 
11 February 1848: 
 
I think it essential that it should be generally understood that leases granted for 
this purpose give the grantees only an exclusive right of pasturage for their 
cattle, and of cultivating such Land as they may require within the large limits 
thus assigned to them, but that these Leases are not intended to deprive the 
Natives of their former right to hunt over these Districts, or to wander over them 
in search of subsistence, in the manner to which they have been heretofore 
accustomed, from the spontaneous produce of the soil except over land actually 
cultivated [or] fenced in for that purpose. 
 
and in Despatch No 134 Earl Grey to Sir Charles FitzRoy, 6 August 1849, he reiterates 
that the intention was ‘to give only the exclusive right of pasturage in the runs, not the 
exclusive occupation of the Land, as against Natives using it for the ordinary purposes.’ 
 
Reynolds’ interpretation is not without its challengers, such as Fulcher, Jonathan, “Sui 
Generis History?: The Use of History in Wik” in Hiley QC, Graham, ed., The Wik Case: 
Issues and Implications (Sydney: Butterworths, 1997), 51-56, who argues, amongst 
other things, that Reynolds has misinterpreted the documents by reading them in the 
context of today rather than the context in which they were written. 
173 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 122 (Toohey J). 
174 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 122 (Toohey J). 
175 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 154 (Gaudron J): 
The strongest indication that a pastoral lease granted under the 1910 Act did not 
confer a right of exclusive possession is to be found in those provisions of the 
Act conferring rights on persons authorised in that behalf to enter upon land the 
subject of a pastoral lease to remove timber, stone, gravel, clay, guano or other 
material (s 199) denying the lessee the right to ringbark, cut or destroy trees (s 
198) and also denying the lessee power to restrict authorised persons from 
cutting or removing timber or material within the holding (s 200). There is a 
similar indication in the provision permitting others to depasture stock if a stock 
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route or road passed through the holding (s 205). And, of course, there were the 
reservations in the Leases as required by the prescribed form of lease. In 
particular, there were the identical reservations in both Leases of "the right of 
any person duly authorised in that behalf ... at all times to go upon the said 
Land, or any part thereof, for any purpose whatsoever, or to make any survey, 
inspection, or examination of the same" (emphasis added). 
176 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 130 (Toohey J). Cf. Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 154 (Gaudron 
J). 
Moreover, the vastness of the areas which might be made the subject of pastoral 
leases and the fact that, inevitably, some of them would be remote from settled 
areas militate against any intention that they should confer a right of exclusive 
possession entitling pastoralists to drive native title holders from their traditional 
lands. Particularly is that so in a context where, in conformity with the 
prescribed form, the grants were expressed to be made "for pastoral purposes 
only". 
177 Bartlett, p. 47. Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 2-3 (Toohey, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby JJ): 
The rights and obligations of the grantees of the pastoral leases in question 
depend upon the terms of the grant of the pastoral lease and upon the statute 
which authorised it. There was no necessary extinguishment of native title rights 
by reason of the grant of those pastoral leases. Whether there was 
extinguishment can only be determined by reference to such particular rights and 
interests as may be asserted and established. If inconsistency is held to exist 
between the rights and interests conferred by native title and the rights conferred 
under statutory grants, those rights and interests must yield, to that extent, to the 
rights of the grantees. 
178 Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 250 (Kirby J); cf. Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 132 (Toohey J). 
179 See, for example, Brennan, Frank, The Wik Debate: Its Impact on Aborigines, 
Pastoralists and Miners (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1998); Byrne, 
David, “Sharing Country” in Research Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, 
Sharing Country: Land Rights, Human Rights, and Reconciliation After Wik – 
Proceedings of a Public Forum held at the University of Sydney on February 28, 1997 
(The Research Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Sydney, 
1997), 101-114 the papers in Hiley QC, Graham, ed., The Wik Case: Issues and 
Implications (Sydney: Butterworths, 1997) (Hunter, Philip, “The Wik Decision: 
Unnecessary Extinguishment”, 6-18; Bottoms, John, “Thayorre People v Queensland”, 
19-22; Smith, Paul Anthony, “Pastoral Leases and Native Title”, 23-26; McIntyre, 
Greg, “How Wik Applies to Western Australia”, 27-29; McDermott, Peter M, “Wik and 
Doctrine of Tenures: A Synopsis”, 35-39; Love, Mark, “The Farmgate Effect”, 40-44; 
Williamson, Simon, “Implications of the Wik Decision for the Minerals Industry”, 45-
50; Fulcher, “Sui”; Young et al, “Into”). 
180 Bartlett, Native, p. 50 records that in 1994, the area of pastoral tenure was: 
State or Territory Per cent of state or 
territory 
Area (square kilometres) 
Western Australia 38 951 006 
South Australia 42 413 210 
New South Wales 
(perpetual) 
41 325 880 
Queensland Term 54 
Perpetual 14 
927 844 
241 855 
Northern Territory 51 682 205 
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Victoria, Tasmania, 
Australian Capital Territory 
0 0 
 
181 Bartlett, Native, p. 50. 
182 Spindler, Sid, “A Program for Practical Reconciliation”, Dissent 15 (Spring 2004), 
55-57, p. 55; Tehan, Maureen, “Co-Existence of Interests in Land: A Dominant Feature 
of the Common Law”, Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title 1/12 (January, 1997), 
available on web page (as at 17.4.06): http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/ntpapers/ntip12.pdf. Cf. 
Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 102 (Toohey J): 
In effect the Wik Peoples and the Thayorre People each argued for native title or 
aboriginal title, “co-existing” with the interests of the lessees. In the event of an 
inconsistency between the rights exercisable by a lessee and rights exercisable 
by the holders of native or aboriginal title, the appellants accepted that the 
former would prevail. While accepting the language of extinguishment, the 
appellants were disposed to argue in terms of restrictions on the enforceability of 
their rights. 
183 This phrase was used by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer, to describe 
the effect of the plan (ABC Television, ‘Interview with Tim Fischer by John Highfield 
on Native Title Act Amendments’, World At Noon, 4th September, 1997). 
184 Senator N. Minchin, The Ten Point Plan: The Federal Government’s Response to 
the Wik Decision, 1997; Bartlett, Native, pp. 52-64; Broome, Aboriginal, pp. 255-262, 
Butt, Peter and Eagleson, Robert, Mabo, Wik & Native Title (Sydney: The Federation 
Press, 2001, 4th edition), pp. 109-113; Tehan, “A Hope”, pp. 554f; Viner, Ian, “The Wik 
10-Point Plan: A Plan for Racial Discrimination”, Australian Rationalist no. 45 (1997), 
63-70. 
185 The Ten Point Plan Explained, Senator N Minchin, 1997, as summarised by Bartlett, 
Native, p. 54. 
186 Bartlett, Native, p. 55, writes, ‘[e]xamination of the substance of the Native Title 
Amendment Act 1998 reveals that it is a substantial, complex, and specific disapplication 
of the protection of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).’ 
187 McGlade, Hannah, “'Not Invited to the Negotiating Table’: The Native Title 
Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) and Indigenous Peoples Right to Political Participation and 
Self-Determination Under International Law”, Balayi: Culture, Law and Colonialism 
1/1 (January 2000), 97-113, pp. 97-100. ATSIC collected some responses to native title 
developments. With the disbanding of ATSIC in 2005, its website has been archived, 
and the relevant web pages can be accessed through (at 15.4.06): 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/41037/20050516/www.atsic.gov.au/issues/land/native_titl
e/Default.html. 
188 Brearly, David, and Nason, David, “The Long Division, What can Black and White 
Australia Expect to be Reconciled?”, Weekend Australian (24-25 October, 1998), p. 25, 
quoted in McGlade, “‘Not”, p. 100. 
189 For example, Native Title Representative Bodies, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission, the Indigenous Land Corporation, the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner and the National Aboriginal and Islander 
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and Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422, 453: 
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until 1975, the year of the Racial Discrimination Act. 
• In 1993, the Native Title Act confirmed the extinguishment of Indigenous land 
rights from 1975 until 1994. 
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224 This was the substance of Noel Pearson’s criticism in his “The Fifth Annual Hawke 
Lecture”, Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial Centre, University of South Australia, 3rd 
November, 2002, available on the web page (at 15.4.06): 
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Harbour, 3rd June, 2005, available on web page (as at 17.4.06): 
http://www.democrats.org.au/speeches/index.htm?speech_id=1616&display=1 
and http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/conf2005/papers/RidgewayA.pdf, p. 13. Ridgeway was 
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249 O’Fairchaellaigh, “Evaluating”, p. 304, raises the following questions: ‘But what are 
the outcomes or results of agreement making in practice? Is a negotiation-based 
approach actually offering win-win situations and an equitable distribution of costs and 
benefits between Indigenous and non-Indigenous interests? What benefits are being 
delivered to Indigenous Australians by agreements, and are those benefits being 
experienced equally by different Indigenous groups? Does agreement making represent 
an equitable and sustainable basis upon which to address native title issues? Or are 
agreements essentially a rhetorical and ideological device designed by non-Indigenous 
interests to create the impression that Indigenous concerns are being addressed, while in 
reality they constitute a vehicle for continuing dispossession of Indigenous peoples?’ 
Following his preliminary study, he concludes that the outcome for Indigenous groups 
is highly variable, with some Indigenous groups ‘achieving substantial economic 
benefits and innovative provisions to minimise the impact of commercial activities on 
their traditional lands. In other cases the benefits gained by Indigenous groups are 
negligible, impact minimisation provisions are similar to those already provided in 
general legislation, while in some cases restrictions are placed on the exercise of rights 
that Indigenous parties possess under general legislation’ (“Evaluating”, p. 304). Tehan, 
“A Hope”, pp. 569f, also highlights problems. 
250 Perhaps this too explains in part why non-Indigenous people are variously awed, 
don’t know what to do with, and do not see the fecundity of large tracts of Australia. 
The following account by Diane Bell (Daughters, pp. 23f) is worth pondering, and 
considering the extent to which it might be described as a ‘conversion’ experience: 
When I first drove along he Stuart Highway north of Taylor Crossing to 
Warrabri, I heartily agreed with those who said it was the most barren stretch of 
country they had encountered. I couldn’t cover the distance fast enough. Now I 
can drive barely a mile without seeing something worthy of comment. In what 
was once open spinifex plains broken only by the odd acacia stand, I now see 
highly differentiated foraging grounds, rich in small fruits and goanna; in burnt-
out plains, I now see prime hunting grounds and I wonder, ‘Whose fire burnt 
through here?’ Local people always know who has lit a fire because only 
persons in the correct relationship to a particular tract of land may do so. In the 
wide, dry creek beds, I now find the wild potato runners, I recognize the 
potential water sources, the places where frogs may be hidden deep in the cool, 
damp sand. I scan the horizon for smoke; I see a red tinge in the rock and I look 
for ochres. 
 
In the vast grandeur of the rolling sandhills I now recognize the body shape of 
certain ancestors, but in the finer details of clustering rocks, the overhanging 
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wild figs and the patination on leave, I have also learnt to see signs of ‘intent 
towards man’. At one point on the northward-bound track to Warrabri we crane 
our necks and look for a particular tree – its name would be called by somebody 
in our party and soft singing would accompany the telling of the story associated 
with the dreaming which that tree represented. At other points we would drive 
quietly, so as not to disturb the dreamings who had passed through this area. 
Women knew every inch of the country and always impressed upon me that I 
must travel with others, that there must be somebody with me who knew the 
country. It was their country, their yawulyu: I was never afraid we might lose 
our way and indeed we never did! 
251 Cf. the observation of Debbie Rose (Dingo, p. 191): 
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embedded. This is a fatal error, for there are no other life systems. As Riley 
Young said, ‘I know government say he can change him rule. But he’ll never get 
out of this ground.’ 
252 I am grateful to Joe McIntyre for helping me to understand the relationship between 
the law and government. 
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6 Pursuing Reconciliation in Australia 
The previous chapter has explored the history of relationships between the peoples of 
Australia through the vehicle of investigating how land has been treated in legislation 
and in the courts over the past half century. It showed that there has been limited 
repentance within the system for what has happened in the past, and that a much more 
radical approach must be taken in order to achieve a deeper reconciliation between the 
peoples of Australia.  
 
This chapter will argue that the Subsequent peoples of Australia need to ponder what it 
means to be ‘Subsequent’, not ‘First’, and so the process of reconciliation needs to be 
approached from a place of humility, a place of decentring the dominant culture. 
Decentring is essential for being able to listen properly to what First peoples have been, 
and are continuing to say to the Subsequent peoples. Whilst some reports, such as 
Bringing Them Home,1 have been significant pieces of listening, which led to 
widespread acts of apology and, eventually, an apology from the Prime Minister, this 
process of listening needs to be developed much more extensively. The rest of this 
chapter is devoted then to listening to some of the things that First peoples have been 
saying to Subsequent peoples. In fact, it is probably not too strong to say that in 
listening properly to the First peoples, the Subsequent peoples will find that they have 
been offered reconciliation all along, and that the First peoples have been saying what 
must happen in order for it to be achieved; they have been telling Subsequent peoples 
what must be done in order to achieve the healing of all the peoples of Australia, and 
the land itself. 
 
The primary metaphor that Volf develops for reconciliation is embrace.2 This is a 
particularly potent metaphor for the conflict situations he is addressing, because he is 
writing of reconciliation in a situation where there has been long-standing, and recent, 
violent atrocities committed by communities against each other. For Australia, this 
metaphor is a reminder to Subsequent peoples that the aim is to become friends with the 
First peoples of Australia, and so to work for the welfare of all the peoples occupying 
this land, not to solve ‘the Aboriginal problem’.  
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It cannot be stressed too strongly that the failure to listen properly to what Indigenous 
people are saying fuels the continuing problems for Indigenous people in Australia. All 
government programmes aimed at dealing with Indigenous disadvantage will fail until 
time is taken to listen properly to the people themselves, as part of a larger process of 
reconciliation. John Paul Lederach has shown that difficult short-term measures only 
work in a culture where there is trust that they are part of a long-term strategy for 
reconciliation with which all the parties are happy,3 and there is, understandably, little 
trust of non-Indigenous peoples by the Indigenous communities.4 
 
This chapter is shaped as follows. The first section will consider the implications of 
being ‘First’ and ‘Subsequent’. Following that, two sections will explore the general 
approach that some First peoples have had towards the Subsequent peoples, that they 
have not been submissive to the dominant system, but they have stood their ground, 
critiquing the peculiar and destructive nature of the way of life of the incomers. This 
will then lead to two sections that briefly explore what can be learnt about history, and 
how human relationships with the land can be better understood, when properly 
attending to what First peoples are saying. Finally, the penultimate section briefly 
outlines what some First peoples are telling the Subsequent peoples remains as 
‘unfinished business’, and the last section considers the inherent dangers for First 
peoples in pursuing a treaty in order to establish their security, unless this is undertaken 
as part of the process of repentance by the Subsequent peoples. 
 
6.1 On Being ‘First’ and ‘Subsequent’5 
In recent years there has been a move towards calling the Aboriginal people in Australia 
‘First peoples’ or ‘First Australians’, and others ‘Second’. However, as was argued in 
the first endnote of Chapter 1, this terminology is not sufficiently fine-grained to reflect 
the rather more complex history of immigration into Australia since the first Europeans 
took up residence in 1788. This thesis has preferred the term ‘Subsequent’ peoples, to 
emphasise that more recent immigrants, who were not ‘second’, and who might want to 
excuse themselves from any responsibility for the plight of the First peoples,6 cannot do 
so, for, as Chapter 4 has argued, they too share the responsibility with everyone else in 
the current generation of non-Indigenous people for repentance, both for the sins of the 
past, and the sins of the present generation. So, all subsequent peoples are being 
addressed here. 
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This way of speaking of the people groups opens up important questions about the 
priority of Indigenous peoples in Australia, and the way that relationships between the 
various people groups should be approached. 
 
It has proved very difficult for Subsequent peoples in Australia to see the First peoples 
in their full humanity. From early on, First peoples were thought of as barely human.7  
Social Darwinism was strong.8 The fact that Indigenous peoples were the subjects of 
anthropological studies stressed their otherness and difference from the unquestioned 
norms of the cultures of Subsequent peoples, that they were people to be studied as 
curiosities, rather than people to be engaged with, people who might teach the 
Subsequent peoples about what it means to be human, and how to live in the land called 
Australia. These anthropological studies imported hierarchical, patriarchal and other 
cultural assumptions into their work,9 and tended to focus on ‘traditional Aboriginals’ 
rather than the majority of the Aboriginal population, which had multiple other 
cultures.10 Subsequent peoples valued being settled, and saw cultivation of the land as 
more ‘civilised’ than cultures where people moved around, and yet they conveniently 
overlooked both settled Aboriginal communities, and the way in which First peoples 
managed crops and land.11 After incomers arrived, some Aboriginal communities 
successfully farmed European-style crops, only to be forced off the land by their 
incoming neighbours.12 Subsequent peoples have struggled either to understand or to 
acknowledge the complex political and economic systems and the relationship to the 
land of First peoples. There was a time when First people were written out of Australian 
history, and now there is a powerful debate amongst historians from the Subsequent 
peoples both about the nature of the responsibility of the Subsequent peoples for the 
historical and current plight of the First peoples, and about the nature of history.13 
 
Budden14 argues that the primary identity that Subsequent peoples have given First 
peoples is invisibility,15 which has a sting in its tail: ‘[i]n all cultures, invisibility always 
has the possibility of visibility, a forced visibility whose purpose is shame and the use 
of people for political ends.’16 Furthermore, Nicholas Thomas notes that the 
construction of Aboriginal identity is an essential part of the construction of non-
Indigenous identity, when he writes, ‘[i]n settler societies, cultural colonization 
proceeds … through forging national narratives that situate indigenous people firmly in 
the past, or in the process of waning, while settlers are identified with what is new and 
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flourishing and promising. In this way, the potential paradox arising from the use of 
natives to affirm the native status of settlers is mediated by a narrative of succession: 
future is to past as settler is to savages.’17 
 
It is helpful here to return to the New Testament, because the nature of the relationship 
of First to Subsequent is at the heart of Paul’s theological struggle. Two of the 
important underlying themes in Paul’s letters are: firstly, the priority of God’s covenant 
with the Jews; and secondly, the relationship between Jewish and Gentile Christians. 
Both of these themes are prominent in Romans, where Paul explores both the 
relationship between the covenant that God made with the people of Israel, and how 
people can now be related to God through the work of Jesus,18 and also the relationship 
in Rome of the larger Gentile Christian community to the smaller Jewish Christian 
community. The problem for larger communities is that there is always a tendency to 
regard the larger community as the norm, and to ignore the smaller community. There is 
also, in this case, the forgetfulness by the Gentile Christians that the Christian faith did 
not come to them first, but second; it was the Jewish Christians who brought the good 
news of Jesus as a gift to them. 
 
In his argument with the non-Jewish Christians in Rome, Paul stresses that they are like 
a wild olive shoot that has been grafted onto a cultivated olive tree, and now shares in 
the nourishment of that tree. They must remember that it is the root of the tree that 
supports them, not the other way around. Moreover, they have been grafted in contrary 
to nature (cf. Rom. 1.26; italics mine).19 Christians today continue this tendency, even 
to the point of imagining that they are the ones who are entitled, rather than receiving a 
gift.20 
 
There are analogies here concerning the European (and subsequent) colonisation of 
Australia. At the very least, Paul’s admonition of the Gentile Christians should 
engender humility of the incoming peoples towards the First peoples and their lands. 
The fact that the first incomers nearly died of starvation, as they struggled to produce 
food, and the dominant narrative is of battlers who have overcome hardship, even the 
land itself, struggling against nature (cf. Rom. 11.24) in order to establish a European 
lifestyle on a different land, should cause us to stand back and look at the cost of this to 
the land and its peoples. The Subsequent peoples have not behaved as if they are the 
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wild olive shoot that has been grafted onto the cultivated tree, but as if they are 
supporting the root. 
 
The penultimate use of ‘reconciliation’ in the New Testament occurs in the context of 
the relationships between Jewish and non-Jewish Christians, First and Subsequent 
Christians (Eph. 2.11-21). Here, the writer to the church in Ephesus says that God has 
removed the dividing wall of hostility between the Jews and non-Jews, reconciling them 
to one another, making peace between them.  
 
This drives us back to what Paul wrote in 2 Cor. 5 in his build-up to his statements 
about reconciliation. In v. 16, Paul writes, ‘from now on, therefore, we regard no one 
from according to the flesh.’ Exactly what Paul means by this is not entirely clear,21 but 
he must mean at least that it is not adequate to look at people from our own cultural 
perspective, but we must allow ourselves to be changed by an encounter with the other, 
who was, and remains, First.  
 
In Chapter 2, it was noted that Paul was arguing with people who saw the dominant 
social system (patron-client relations) as compatible with Christianity, so much so that 
they could not comprehend the way that Paul exercised his leadership of the Christian 
community. In calling the Corinthian community to be reconciled to God, he was, as the 
weaker party in the socio-economic system of his day, calling on the dominant party to 
be reconciled by changing their relationship with him, and the system of relationships 
within their community. The First peoples of Australia have the right to call on the 
Subsequent peoples to be reconciled to them. An important part of this process is the 
Subsequent peoples coming in humility to listen to the First peoples. 
 
Moreover, the Subsequent peoples in Australia need the ministry of the First peoples for 
their healing. In the narrative of Paul’s encounter with the crucified-risen Jesus in Acts 
9, Paul is in the position of power (he is in the dominant party within the Jewish 
people), and he requires the ministry of Ananias, who is part of the part of the 
persecuted minority of Jewish followers of Jesus, part of the group of people who Paul 
has been persecuting, to come and pray for him so that he might be healed. It is not so 
much that there is an ‘Aboriginal problem’ in Australia, but that there is a problem in 
Australia, regarding which the Subsequent peoples need to be open to receiving the 
ministry of the First peoples in order for it to be resolved. 
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6.2 Beginning to Listen to the First Peoples 
At this point, it is important to recall that First peoples have not been passive in the face 
of the occupation of their lands by the incomers. There has been bemusement and pity 
at the strange ways of the incomers.22 They have refused to accept the hierarchy of 
relationships that the incomers so often tried to impose upon them. There are echoes of 
the way that Paul stood out against the patronage system in Corinth in the way that First 
people have responded to incomers. For example, in his work with the Miriwung people 
in Kununurra in the late 1960s, Peter Willis found that First people refused to become 
clients. Instead, they attempted to achieve their own objectives under the cover of the 
patron’s initiative, sponsorship and protection. He writes, 
 
[a]boriginal conversion to Christianity in this context can then be defined as a 
specific reciprocal act by which an Aboriginal group or individual displayed 
formally and solemnly their affection for and support of the missionaries, 
without becoming their clients and accepting their attempted patronage in any 
strict sense. … The difference is of course that they refused to internalise the 
role of subordinate clients, to become grateful and obedient and to seek to 
become like their masters. They offered a lot in return but as quasi kin and allies, 
not as servants.23 
 
In a similar vein, Debbie Rose writes, 
 
… there is also our failure to attend to what Aborigines have been saying to us, 
with words and deeds, in art and ritual, for many years. I believe that the greatest 
impediment to our understanding has been our expectations of what a conquered 
people could be thought to say to us. Cargo cults made it easy. From a position 
of mastery it is not difficult to hear from those less wealthy and powerful that 
they feel inadequate. And as Koepping suggests, we are equally well prepared to 
hear expressions of resentment, even hatred. Overt resistance, abuse, emulation 
– we expect these responses, and are mystified by their absence. I will suggest 
that at least some Aboriginal responses have gone unnoticed because they offer 
us what, from a position of power, is virtually unthinkable.24 
 
Kenelm Burridge studied the encounters of First peoples with anthropologists and 
concluded ‘that Aboriginal life has become a field in which many of the intellectual 
structures of the west have been reflected, examined, tested, and evaluated, and in 
which many a personal and intellectual battle has been fought. Throughout this history 
of encounter, Aboriginal life has remained elusive. From the European viewpoint, 
according to Burridge, Aboriginal life constitutes a paradox: it is both “primitive” and at 
the same time “perhaps the most complicated representative of human life.”’25 
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In fact, in many parts of Australia, First people have not judged themselves as inferior 
to the incomers, but see the incomers as ‘ignorant, at best, and grossly immoral at 
worst.’26 Harris records the bemusement of some missionaries at how the First peoples 
did not obey the missionaries, but instead were kind to them, treating them as equals, 
whilst also considering them odd and to be pitied.27 
 
First people have worked the system. For example, where missionaries tried to make 
them settle in one place, sometimes they would use these camps as a base, or returned to 
them according to the seasons. One example of this is, 
 
[f]rom a Kuku-Yalanji perspective, the mission did have its uses – primarily in 
providing food and other resources, and in offering protection and refuge for 
young women and the ill. The missionaries also acted in some instances as 
useful third parties in disputes. The mission was based on the assumption that 
everything had to be centralized and that all Bloomfield Aborigines would come 
and stay there. Yet, as with other Aboriginal groups at the tin mines in the area, 
Kuku-Yalanji at Bloomfield treated the mission as a camp which was on a 
particular estate belonging to particular individuals and their group who had 
significant primary rights there.28 
 
The introduction of poor quality alien foodstuffs (flour, sugar, tea) to First people has 
had a long-term detrimental affect on their welfare, but it also provided relief from the 
problems of finding food in difficult seasons, especially when many foods were taboo. 
Cattle began to be incorporated into the dreamtime, showing the adaptability of 
Aboriginal tradition, but also bringing them into the system of taboos.29 Although cattle 
stations were established on Aboriginal land, First peoples were able to maintain their 
connection to the land by working on it, and they were able to return to do their 
ceremonial work during certain seasons when there was no work on the cattle stations. 
Important Aboriginal business, such as arranging marriages, could be transacted when 
communities came together, such as at race meetings.30 Perhaps surprisingly, 
considering how much damage cattle have done to the environment,31 some Aboriginal 
groups have continued to keep cattle. Sometimes this is the only way that they can raise 
cash for other things that they regard as necessary, such as the Mak Mak people who are 
trying to control the spread of mimosa, an introduced weed that is taking over the 
wetlands in their country.32 
 
When under threat, one typical response by First peoples has been to accommodate, 
through reciprocal sharing, integrating alien things into their cosmic order.33 For 
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example, First people gave themselves in marriage to the incomers, with the idea that 
they were incorporating these people into their kinship systems, and so they would then 
have responsibility towards their kin and for the land.34  This adoption into the kinship 
system is sometimes understood as an attempt to bring the ‘wild’ into a moral order.35 
They are then bemused when this has not resulted in people taking their responsibility. 
6.3 Listening to the Yolngu 
Throughout the narrative of this thesis, the Yolngu have appeared at a number of 
significant points. This section will briefly recount and analyse some aspects of their 
approach to the problem of relationships with non-Indigenous people – who they call 
‘Balanda’ – as an example of the tireless and endlessly creative approach of many First 
people towards the Subsequent peoples, and yet that is missed by the dominant narrative 
concerning relationships between the peoples. 
 
The Yolngu hold objects which represent their ownership of the land. These items – 
‘rangga’ in the Yolngu languages of Elcho Island –  are only allowed to be seen by 
those with the appropriate level of knowledge. However, in the late 1950s, in order to 
establish their claim on the land, the Yolngu on Elcho Island decided to display some of 
their rangga. This was a bold move on their part, making an accommodation to the non-
Indigenous legal system, displaying their rightful ownership of the land, and expecting 
it to be respected.36 
 
It was Yolngu who presented a bark petition to the Commonwealth Parliament, making 
their claim on their land in a multi-cultural medium, and, when this failed to have the 
desired effect, they took the government to court, an important point in the recent 
history of land in Australia. They have not given up their claim against the mining 
industry, and have travelled to Switzerland to lobby the mining company,37 and their 
rock band, Yothu Yindi has carried their message around the world, including London, 
New York, Paris and Rome.38 
 
Yet, despite all of this, relationships between the non-Indigenous system and the 
Yolngu remain difficult. At the invitation of the Revd Dr Djiniyini Gondarra, one of the 
present leaders of the Yolngu of Arnhem Land, Richard Trudgen, who has spent more 
than two decades working with the Yolngu, wrote a book for non-Indigenous people, 
which interprets why the Yolngu have found the dominant culture so debilitating.39 
  261 
Trudgen sees that the root problem for the Yolngu has been loss of control, and he lists 
forty-three factors that have led to loss of control for these people.40 Besides the 
foundational causes of taking their land, the destruction of their economy, and the 
introduction of alien diseases, it is clear from reading Trudgen’s book that attempts at 
trying to ‘fix’ the resulting mess have largely failed because non-Indigenous cultures 
are so alien to the Yolngu, and, on the whole, non-Indigenous people have not taken the 
time to, and put the resources into, understanding Yolngu culture and interpreting non-
Indigenous culture to these people. For example, millions of dollars have been spent on 
medical intervention, with little effect, because the medical model that is being used is 
alien to the Yolngu, and has never been properly explained. The Yolngu are intelligent 
people, but some ways of trying to teach them, such as using puppets, have treated them 
like stupid children. When Trudgen has used dialogical teaching methodologies, 
speaking in their own languages, and with knowledge of their culture, the Yolngu have 
been able to integrate the new knowledge into their cultural system and teach it in 
appropriate ways.41  
 
Since Trudgen wrote his book, there have been publications concerning good projects in 
other parts of Australia that have helped Aboriginal people engage with the alien culture 
of the incomers.42 
 
However, it would be poor to read Trudgen’s book as only arguing what must be done 
in order to interpret non-Indigenous culture to the Yolngu. It also opens up the 
possibility for non-Indigenous people to begin to look at the strangeness of their own 
culture by being able to look at it from the standpoint of another culture. Programmes 
aimed simply at acquiring enough knowledge in order to teach First people to engage 
with non-Indigenous cultures are in danger of perpetuating the damaging relationships 
that have been going on since Europeans first landed in Australia, and they miss the 
opportunity to be challenged and changed by a real encounter with vibrant and viable 
alternative worldview.43 To allow this to happen will be challenging, but ultimately 
healing to the land and its peoples.  
 
More generally, as the incomers have made anthropological studies of First peoples, so 
they should open themselves up to hear what the First peoples have to say to them. 
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For example, here are some quotations from the early work of Debbie Rose with the 
Victoria River people. They are worth pondering. 
 
Unlike many European Australians, Victoria River Aborigines believe that the 
lives of all Australian people are inextricably bound together, as are the soils, 
water systems, and the lives of plants and animals. In refusing to deny or forget 
the past, they assert the value of their own understanding of Australian life, in 
particular, and for the future of life on earth.44 
 
Hobbles has offered a set of profound gifts to a non-Aboriginal audience: an 
acceptance of the conditions of the past as a basis from which we will build our 
future; some means of transforming the wrongs of the past into more equitable 
relationships. Flesh and blood, earth and water are offered as media through 
which Aboriginal and European Australians can be truly at home together in this 
continent. Hobbles may not have realised that beyond his overt statements he 
was also offering other gifts; his narratives point to a theory and practice of 
otherness, of generating structures which empower, rather than diminish, people. 
He offers the means by which nobody loses, and all life is sustained. 
 
These gifts, like the meaning of his stories, are not always immediately obvious. 
For me, the most profound gift is also, at times, overwhelming. European 
ideologies of conquest assert that conquest is finished, and it was the product of 
so many compelling and inescapable causes that it was inevitable. Ideologies 
throw the ball back to Aborigines, metaphorically, telling them that they cannot 
live in the past, and will just have to adapt to the new order. 
 
Hobbles and others disentangle the mystifying ideologies of conquest, showing 
that at every moment there is an act of will. They say that it is Europeans who 
are living in the past, still following a law that has no future. And they ask that 
others make choices, exercising their will as an act of consideration for the fact 
that we all live, and die, together. The challenge can be overwhelming because it 
throws open to us the limits of our own power within structures that oppress.45 
 
Again, the Yolngu have been creative in this direction, seeking to teach the Subsequent 
peoples how to live in the land. For example, Yolngu now teach at the Charles Darwin 
University,46 and the Revd Dr Djiniyini Gondarra, in association with Patrick McIntyre, 
has initiated the Mawul Rom project, which teaches people about reconciliation from a 
Yolngu perspective.47 This course is now accredited as a Masters Degree (‘Masters in 
Indigenous Knowledges (Mawul Rom)’) from the Charles Darwin University, with the 
first students graduating in 2009.48 
6.4 Learning About History 
In Chapter 1 it was noted that there was a period of time when Indigenous people were 
written out of non-Indigenous histories of Australia. Even when they have been 
recovered into non-Indigenous history, the historical methodologies have largely drawn 
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on non-Indigenous historical methods, using non-Indigenous historical resources, and 
the so-called ‘history wars’ have largely been over the conclusions that can be drawn 
from these resources. However, there is a bigger debate about the nature of history 
itself, especially the problem of trying to create a universal history, ‘[r]ather than history 
being an aggregation of particular routes from events in the past to events in the 
present.’49 The problem with this is that other histories tend to either get subsumed, and 
thus reinterpreted, within the grand narrative, or are left aside.50 It is important, 
therefore, that non-Indigenous people acquaint themselves with Indigenous narrations 
of history. 
 
The telling of history from an Indigenous perspective is becoming increasingly 
accessible to non-Indigenous people, and is presented in a wide range of media, such as 
dance,51 theatre, films,52 comedy, music,53 art,54 recorded oral histories,55 personal 
narratives,56 biographies,57 academic studies,58 and histories presented from an 
Aboriginal perspective.59 Many examples of these genres were available at The 
Dreaming: Australia’s International Indigenous Festival, held at Woodford in 
Queensland, 10-13 June, 2005.60 
 
Aboriginal cultures have been extremely resilient under pressure, and have often 
responded very creatively to the oppression of the dominant culture. Throughout, there 
is a stubbornness that refuses to be defeated, that refuses to take on the dominant view 
of history, and refuses to give up ownership to the land. Listening to this strand of 
history would be particularly helpful to the dominant culture as it tries to come to terms 
with its history of relationship with the Indigenous people. Reflecting on the history of 
Australia that she has learnt from the Yarralin people, Rose puts it well, 
 
Yarralin people’s stories of Captain Cook and Ned Kelly offer us a mirror in 
which we can see ourselves. In no way does the image inscribed in these stories 
tell us that we are the fairest, the most deserving, the most worthy. But it does 
tell us that we are not without redemption. 
 
Revealing us to ourselves, these stories also offer us a different future. Social 
justice, they say, is not to be achieved through the destruction of the past, but 
rather through recognition. We are the successors, the ‘behind mob’; and it is up 
to us to determine to which law we will adhere. These stories tell us that truth is 
revealed in myth, and that people are capable of changing their society to 
conform to that truth. …  
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This, I believe, is why we have had such difficulty understanding Aboriginal 
people’s responses to invasion. Unlike cargo cults which flatter our sense of 
mastery and, on the surface, suggest that it is others who want to change, Ned 
Kelly stories suggest that it is we who are in the dire need of radical change. The 
last thing one would expect, or be prepared to hear, from a position of power, is 
that the dispossessed claim to have indeed understood. That they have accepted. 
And that they are offering us redemption.61 
6.5 Learning About Land 
One of the things that has been noted time and again about Indigenous cultures is that 
their relationships to the land are much more complex than the Western notion of 
‘ownership’; the land is harmed when its connection with its people is broken.62 Yet the 
non-Indigenous court system has consistently failed to grapple with this, preferring 
instead to engage with Indigenous claims over land in terms of its understanding of 
ownership, or rights to various forms of usage. This section will briefly look at some 
Christian theological ideas that are being recovered, or developed, which might be good 
places to start engaging with Indigenous understandings of relationships to the land. ‘To 
seek to encounter God with Aboriginal people is to question the way we impose a story 
that stops this place being country.’63 This section is not meant to be comprehensive, 
but its intention is to stimulate further thought. 
 
It is difficult for people brought up in the Western theological tradition to develop an 
adequate theology of land, for several reasons. Firstly, the relationship of human beings 
with land has been one of dominance and exploitation, often theologically bolstered by 
particular interpretations of Gen. 1.26, and seeing human beings, rather than the rest of 
the seventh day of creation (Gen. 2.1-3), as the ‘crown of creation’.64 Secondly, the 
economic system in the West has been dominated by the generation of wealth and waste 
through excess production, and land has been commodified.65 Thirdly, settled existence 
has been seen as preferable to nomadic existence, and land was seen as ‘wasteland’ until 
it was cultivated and made fruitful.66 Fourthly, there is the concept of land ownership, 
where ownership is strongly related to two ideas, namely the ability to exclude others 
from the land, and the freedom to do whatever you want with it. Finally, all these 
cultural practices have found their way into interpreting the biblical text, making the 
Bible much harder to understand, increasing the hermeneutical gap. 
 
Walter Brueggemann writes helpfully that ‘the Bible insists that fertility is impossible 
without justice’67 Land has been treated promiscuously: it has been bought, sold, traded, 
used, discarded as a convenient commodity, and dominated as if it had no rights. 
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However, ‘[t]he mystery of faithfulness is to hold the land so loyally so as not to reduce 
it to a commodity, but to hold so freely as to respect its rights as partner and not as 
possession. … we shall not have fertility until we have justice toward the land and 
toward those who depend on the land for life’68 In his study, Brueggemann notices a 
strong link between the mistreatment of people, women in particular, and mistreatment 
of the land.69 He argues that it is unlikely that a new ethic for land will be possible until 
a new ethic has been established for human relationships; they are interconnected.70 
This is in line with the main argument of this thesis, that problems with the land will not 
be resolved until better relationships are established between the peoples of Australia, 
which necessitates work on the relationship of human beings to the land.  
 
Howard Morphy writes helpfully concerning ‘art’, sacred sites, and ‘religious business’ 
in some Aboriginal cultures, that 
 
[a]boriginal paintings are maps of land.71 It is necessary, however, to define 
precisely what is meant by a ‘map’ in this context. The danger is in transferring 
too literally a Western concept of topographical map on to Aboriginal cultural 
forms and making them into something they are not. … It is possible to relate 
nearly all Aboriginal art to landscape, and some paintings and designs do 
represent quite precisely the topographical relationship between different 
features of the landscape. But taken too far the analogy between Aboriginal art 
and maps can be misleading because it oversimplifies and gives the wrong 
emphasis. 
 
From an Aboriginal perspective the land itself is a sign system. The Dreamtime 
ancestors existed before the landscape took form; indeed, it is they who 
conceived of it and gave it meaning. Rather than being topographical 
representations of land forms, Aboriginal paintings are conceptual 
representations which influence the way in which landscape is understood. 
When Aboriginal paintings do represent features of the landscape, they depict 
them not in their topographical relations to one another but in relation to their 
mythological significance.72 
 
Modernity brought a change in the way the world was understood by European peoples. 
In medieval times, the world was criss-crossed with holy places to which people 
journeyed, making pilgrimage;73 a sacred geography held sway.74 With the emergence 
of modern ‘maps’, which divided space up into equal parts and described it by 
geographical features, the idea of ‘itineraries’ over sacred geography was replaced by 
journeys on a map. De Certeau writes, ‘[i]f one takes the “map” in its current form, we 
can see that in the course of the period marked by the birth of modern scientific 
discourse (i.e. the fifteenth to the seventeenth century) the map has slowly disengaged 
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itself from the itineraries that were the condition of its possibility.’75 Cavanaugh 
summarises de Certeau’s insights on the transformation in this way: 
 
Pre-modern representations of space marked out itineraries which told ‘spatial 
stories’, for example, the illustration of the route of a pilgrimage which gave 
instructions on where to pray, where to spend the night, and so on. Rather than 
surveying them as a whole, the pilgrim moves through particular spaces, tracing 
a narrative through space and time by his or her movements or practices … By 
contrast, modernity gave rise to the mapping of space on a grid, a “formal 
ensemble of abstract places” from which the itinerant was erased. A map is 
defined as a ‘totalising stage on which elements of diverse origin are brought 
together to form a tableau of a “state” of geographical knowledge’. Space itself 
is rationalised as homogenous and divided into identical units. Each item on the 
map occupies its proper place, such that things are set beside one another, and 
no two things can occupy the same space. The point of view of the map user is 
detached and universal, allowing the entire space to be seen simultaneously.76 
 
Some Christian theologians are working towards a better understanding of land and of 
place. Brueggemann reminds us that the story of God’s relationship with human beings 
cannot be separated from the land. 
 
In the Old Testament there is no timeless space, but there is also no spaceless 
time. There is rather storied place, that is a place which has meaning because of 
the history lodged there. There are stories which have authority because they are 
located in a place. This means that biblical faith cannot be presented simply as 
an historical movement indifferent to place which could have happened in one 
setting as well as another, because it is undeniably fixed in this place with this 
meaning. And for all its apparent ‘spiritualising’, the New Testament does not 
escape this rootage.77 
 
John Inge draws on the European medieval world view and Brueggemann’s notion of 
storied space to develop a theology of place, where  
 
[w]e might say, therefore, that it is clear from the incarnation that places are the 
seat of relations or the place of meeting and activity in the interaction between 
God and the world, and argue further that place is therefore a fundamental 
category of human and spiritual experience. 78 
 
In places, the material becomes the vehicle for God’s self-communication, leading to a 
sacramental view of place,79 which may be related to the Aboriginal notion of sacred 
sites. Inge writes, 
 
[w]hen places become associated with divine disclosure they become the 
defining coordinates of a sacred geography the function of which is to remind 
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believers that they are to understand all their experience in the light of the 
creation of the world by God and its redemption in Jesus Christ. Sacramental 
encounters have also an eschatological dimension, since they reveal the reality 
of things as they will be. This sacramental understanding allows us to steer a 
middle course between ignoring the importance of the material, and its 
idolatrous exaltation.80 
 
Places within a sacred geography become places of pilgrimage, so linking people and 
places and God over time. 
 
The notion of the holiness of place can be seen to derive directly from the 
scriptures, and was an essential part of the Christian tradition from the beginning 
of Christian history. It is clear, from both the scriptures and the tradition, that 
God chooses some places for self-revelation to people, just as God chose one 
place for the incarnation. It cannot be otherwise since, as we have seen, places 
are the seat of meeting and interaction between God and the world. It is not that 
some places are intrinsically holy, but that this self-revelation on the part of God 
is then built into their story, and this makes such places worthy of pilgrimage. It 
puts people in touch with their Christian story, their roots. There then develops a 
three-way relationship between people, place, and God which endures across 
time. In other words, it is not that God has chosen some places in preference to 
others, but rather that holy places point to the redemption of all places in Christ. 
Places have a story, and sacred places are those places whose story is associated 
with God’s self-revelation and with the lives of the holy. These, then, are places 
which attract pilgrimage. Pilgrimage is a very powerful model which links 
people, places, and God together in a way which has great potential because it is 
dynamic and yet it also roots people.81 
 
In closing this section, it must be recalled again that both the land and Indigenous 
traditions are changing. The future of the land depends on co-operation between the 
various people groups of Australia,82 generating new knowledge of country. However, 
this cannot just be about incorporating Indigenous people into the dominant economic 
system. Sarah Maddison rightly reminds people that there is a diverse Indigenous 
response to the levels of engagement with the dominant economic system.83 However, 
any engagement which is not open to the dominant system being changed by the 
encounter is unlikely to honour the land in an appropriate way. The final New 
Testament use of the word ‘reconciliation’ is in Col. 1.19f, where cosmic reconciliation 
is in view: ‘For in him [Jesus] all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through 
him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by 
the blood of his cross.’ By seeking to be reconciled to the Indigenous peoples of 
Australia, by being changed through this encounter, the non-Indigenous peoples of 
Australia open up the way to also making peace with the land itself. 
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6.6 Unfinished Business 
In the final report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, the unfinished business 
between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples of Australia was discussed. They 
wrote,84 
 
[t]he definition of unresolved issues for reconciliation was also difficult. While the 
definition could have contained a list of issues, similar to that contained in the 
Council's document Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Rights, it has 
been left deliberately general to avoid pre-empting the matters that will be identified 
by the processes contained in this Act.85 The definition refers to the fact that many 
of these issues have already been identified, including through the work of the 
Council. They may include, but are not limited to:  
• a comprehensive agreements process for the settlement of native title and 
other land claims; 
• compensation and reparation with respect to loss of legal rights over land 
and waters;  
• protection of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture, heritage and 
intellectual property;  
• the achievement of substantive equality;  
• the effective implementation of relevant recommendations of the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission's Bringing them Home Report and other 
reports;  
• recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander customary law;  
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander self-government and regional 
autonomy;  
• economic development;  
• constitutional reform to enable the recognition of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples and the protection of their rights;  
• effective political participation;  
• a bill of rights that specifically protects the rights of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples; and  
• principles for negotiated outcomes at other levels.  
 
Although lengthy, this list is not new: Mick Dodson rightly notes that ‘[e]verything 
mentioned in the Council’s report …  [has] been addressed in some report somewhere 
in the last three decades, so coverage of these issues is not new, it is unfinished.’86 The 
frustration of Indigenous peoples is clearly both comprehensible and justified. 
 
The final report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation included two documents: 
‘Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation’, and ‘The National Strategy to Sustain 
the Reconciliation Process,’87 as well as draft legislation to put their recommendations 
into effect.88 What some sections of the Indigenous peoples of Australia were looking 
for in terms of a process to reach reconciliation could not have been made any clearer. 
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However, like other documents produced during the Howard regime, these documents 
were shelved upon receipt, and not acted on at the time. 
6.7 Warning: The Dangers Inherent in Seeking a Treaty89 
The Indigenous peoples of Australia have been looking for ways to secure their future.90 
This thesis has demonstrated how both legislation and the law courts have failed to 
deliver justice to Indigenous peoples in Australia concerning land. Some Indigenous 
people have sought to make their position more secure by enshrining their rights in the 
Australian Constitution,91 with respect to which both legislation must be enacted, and 
also the law must be interpreted in the courts. As well, the Constitution is much harder 
to change than the law. 
 
Closely related to the desire to change the Constitution is the wish to establish a treaty 
between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples of Australia, which may be 
supported by the Constitution.92 The modern treaty movement stems from the proposal 
for a treaty made by the Larrikia people, whose land covers Darwin, in 1972, which was 
rejected by the Prime Minister at the time, because the people ‘were British subjects, 
and it would be inappropriate to negotiate with them as if they were foreign powers, and 
it was too difficult to know with whom to negotiate a treaty.93 John Howard famously 
said, ‘a nation … does not make a treaty with itself,’94 in spite of the examples of such 
treaties within the US, Canada, and Aotearoa /New Zealand. His statement 
demonstrates his refusal to acknowledge the point that the Indigenous peoples have 
been trying to make all along, namely that they do not recognise the sovereignty of the 
State of Australia over them. This inability to comprehend the idea that several different 
peoples may be able to exist in one land is at the root of the failure of the policies of 
non-Indigenous governments in Australia over time, which have consistently had the 
effect of trying to erase Indigenous identity, and consequently subsuming it under the 
identity of the State of Australia.95 
 
It was argued, in Chapter 4, that the present generation of people in a dispute will 
continue to sin in ways that are shaped by the sins of the past, and it was argued in 
Section 5.4 that this is indeed what has happened with land. Therefore, the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia need to be careful if they are going to pursue a treaty as a way of 
ensuring their future. Aden Ridgeway is correct when he writes that ‘… you cannot treat 
the symptoms of dysfunction in isolation from the historical causes. Good public policy 
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can only emerge when there has been an honest and accurate analysis of past errors and 
omissions, and a genuine commitment to meeting the needs and aspirations of the 
people affected by any new policy.’96 However, this thesis has argued that honesty 
about the past and a commitment towards the future is not sufficient. Mick Dodson is 
closer to the mark when he writes, ‘[t]he history of white/black conflict in Australia 
should drive government to negotiate a treaty with both Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders. The negotiations should be in good faith. The government should act on 
behalf of its immigrant population to deal with history truthfully, and its consequences 
honourably.’97 It is the recommendation of this thesis that any treaty has to be a process, 
and that it will only be safe for Indigenous peoples if negotiations are approached by 
non-Indigenous peoples as part of their process of repentance in seeking reconciliation 
with the Indigenous peoples of Australia. Whilst it is important to know the goal of a 
treaty process,98 as was seen in the previous section, the needs of the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia will only be clarified through the process of seeking reconciliation. 
A treaty will have to support a structure for the on-going process of reconciliation; that 
is, it is unlikely that a satisfactory treaty will be a final document, but it will need to be 
something that grows with the process of reconciliation. 
 
In September 2007, Australia was one of only four nations that voted against the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the others being the USA, 
Canada and Aotearoa/New Zealand).99 This must be worrying for Indigenous peoples in 
Australia. However, Indigenous peoples need to be careful as they seek to draw on the 
experience of other treaties in developing their thinking about forming a treaty in 
Australia,100 for they need to look at how the treaties were negotiated and established, 
and whether they are perpetuating the problems of the past. 
 
One of the themes running through this thesis is that there are multiple Indigenous 
cultures, with multiple histories of contacts with other cultures, leaving people with 
diverse issues that need to be resolved. ‘For example, an Indigenous person who is a 
member of the stolen generations may view the key outstanding issues in a treaty 
process in quite a different way to someone who has had a relative die in custody, or 
someone who has had their native title rights extinguished by historical act or 
transaction. Furthermore, there are many Indigenous Australians who regard the 
question of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sovereignty as the most pressing and 
important business for the nation to address. It is important therefore in the treaty 
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making process, we include all points of Indigenous view on the subject, including 
those views that reject or diminish the importance of the issue.’101 It is unlikely that a 
single treaty will be sufficient, but that some framework needs to be established to 
enable treaties at a local or regional level to satisfy the differing needs and aspirations of 
various Indigenous groups.102 
6.8 Conclusion 
Recognising that repentance is a process which requires significant listening to the other 
people involved in the conflict, this chapter has explored some of the things that the 
Subsequent peoples might learn if they listened properly to what First peoples have 
been saying to them. The chapter began by arguing that deep listening could only 
happen if Subsequent peoples approached the process from a place of humility, 
recognising the implications of their being ‘Subsequent’, not ‘First’. When this is done, 
it opens up the way to hear what Indigenous people have been saying, about the 
Subsequent peoples, their culture, their understanding of human relationships to the 
land, what has happened in Australia since 1788, and so on. Repentance by the 
Subsequent peoples of Australia includes a process of listening to what the First peoples 
of Australia have to say about them, and being open to being changed by that encounter. 
This chapter has introduced some of the anthropological observations from First 
peoples about Subsequent peoples, touching on their perceptions of their relationships 
with Subsequent peoples, on history, and, perhaps most importantly, on the nature of 
human relationships with the land, where the concept of ‘ownership’ has been found 
wanting. The ‘unfinished business’ of reconciliation was briefly touched on. The 
chapter concluded with a section on the idea of a treaty, which is being promoted by 
some First people in order to ensure a more secure foundation for the future of First 
peoples in Australia. A warning was issued to those who wish to pursue this path, that 
to do so without it being part of the repentance process by Subsequent peoples will lead 
to a further fixing of the original sins of the first European incomers. 
 
It must be stressed, that the process of listening must not be done in such a way that it 
imposes further burdens on the First peoples of Australia. 
 
The next chapter will draw the argument of the thesis together.
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Wescott Hall, Oxford, 16th-18th September, 2009). 
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p. 120. 
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Chapter 5, “Postcolonial Feminist Geographies”. 
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Faith (London: SPCK, 1977), p. 187. 
78 Inge, John, A Christian Theology of Place (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), p. 
52, author’s italics. 
79 Inge, A Christian, p. 66, is careful in defining what he means by sacramental: 
… we need to be clear that although God reveals himself in the world, 
sacramentality does not mean the world itself is self-revelatory of God in a 
general and indiscriminate manner. Rather, it means that the world in all its 
diverse aspects can be the place of God’s own self-revelation to us. This is 
because, as Tim Gorringe puts it, sacraments should be seen as: 
 
those rents in the opacity of history where God’s concrete engagement to 
change the world becomes visible. It is therefore to speak of the Holy 
Spirit, which is to say the awareness of events which are wholly worldly, 
opaque and ordinary on the one hand, and wholly divine, radiant and 
mysterious on the other, for such a duality is the mark of the Spirit. 
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mismatched, but proper expressions of each other (Gorringe, T., 
“Sacraments” in Morgan, R., ed., The Religion of the Incarnation: 
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Anglican Essays in Commemoration of Lux Mundi (Bristol: Bristol 
Classical Press, 1989), p. 159). 
80 Inge, A Christian, p. 91. 
81 Inge, A Christian, p. 100. 
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Walsh et al, Planning. 
83 Maddison, Black, pp. 74-79. 
84 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Reconciliation, Appendix 3 (available 14.2.10 
at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/2000/16/appendices03.htm). 
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88 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Reconciliation, Appendix 3. 
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is instructive that Hawke wanted to make up by calling for a compact, a term 
that is more at home in seventeenth-century political texts. The term carries 
connotations of an agreement between equals, between like beings, to join a 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Talk to us about reconciliation  
Only if you first experience 
the anger of our dying. 
 
Talk to us of reconciliation  
If your living is not the cause 
 of our dying. 
 
Talk to us about reconciliation 
Only if your words are not products of your devious scheme 
 to silence our struggle for freedom. 
 
Talk to us about reconciliation 
Only if your intention is not to entrench yourself 
 more on your throne. 
 
Talk to us about reconciliation  
Only if you cease to appropriate all the symbols 
 and meanings of our struggle. 
J Cabazares1 
 
 
The former Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, once said, ‘Australia’s treatment of her 
Aboriginal people will be the thing upon which the rest of the world will judge 
Australia and Australians – not now, but in the greater perspective of history.’2 This 
thesis has argued that the Subsequent peoples in Australia need to pursue reconciliation 
with the First peoples in Australia, for the well-being of all the peoples in Australia, and 
for the well-being of the land itself. 
 
Patrick Dodson has written that ‘the forces of destruction inherent in Australia’s nation-
building project, which have sought to extinguish Indigenous people’s society and 
  281 
culture in their own country, are as powerful today as they were in the era of violent 
dispossession and state-sanctioned human rights abuses.’3 This thesis has tested the 
veracity of Dodson’s words, and found them to be true. It has given an explanation of 
why these forces of destruction continue to work, and it has explored the nature of the 
reconciliation process that is needed in order to halt the continuing destructiveness of 
the Subsequent peoples of Australia. This chapter will draw the argument of this thesis 
together. 
 
When he planted the British flag in the ground, Captain Philip committed a foundational 
sin, namely the failure to recognise Indigenous systems of law, including the 
sovereignty and the ownership of the land by the First peoples of Australia, part of a 
bigger failure to engage with the First peoples in their full humanity. Chapter 4 
established the theological case that the present generation in any dispute has the 
propensity to continue to sin in ways that are shaped by the sins of former generations; 
there is a continuity between the behaviour of our forebears and ourselves. This 
theological observation was shown to have been true in practice by the study of how 
disputes over land have been treated by the non-Indigenous parliamentary and legal 
system during the past half century in Australia (Chapter 5), where the non-Indigenous 
system has continued to sin against the First peoples of Australia in ways that have been 
shaped by the sins of the past. 
 
It could be argued that it is anachronistic to say that what Captain Philip did was wrong, 
for he was only acting in accordance with the developing European international law of 
his day. However, the failure of the incomers to change their understanding when they 
recognised that the land and its peoples were different from what they had expected, 
although it may have been difficult for them to see this through their particular cultural 
lenses, leaves them culpable, and it established a pattern of relating to the First peoples 
of Australia which has still to be broken. It simply will not do to say that the people 
were working within their cultural moral framework and so they should not be judged 
for actions that we now believe are wrong, because it can now be seen that the ways that 
they behaved had grave consequences for the land and its peoples, and their actions 
have continued to shape the behaviour of people ever since. 
 
Some would also say that it is not fair that they are being made to feel guilty for what 
was done in the past. However, such sentiments are mistaken in two ways. Firstly, as 
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has been demonstrated in this thesis, the problems have not arisen only from the actions 
of people in the past, but they continue to be perpetuated in the present. Secondly, this 
way of thinking is too individualistic: although individuals may not have deliberately 
done things which have damaged the First peoples of Australia, they are part of a 
generation which has, and this corporate responsibility must be dealt with.4  
 
The situation, however, is not irredeemable; there is a way to break the pattern, and that 
is through seeking reconciliation. Chapter 2 argued that reconciliation is made possible 
by God. Reconciliation, said Chapter 3, is a process that involves both forgiveness and 
repentance, and Chapter 4 argued that the present generation has the responsibility of 
repenting both of its own sins and the sins of its forebears, and similarly forgiveness 
needs to be given for the sins committed over the generations. Crucially, the nature of 
repentance cannot be known beforehand, and it is certainly more than just an apology, 
but the nature of repentance emerges during engaging in the process of reconciliation. 
Similarly, the nature of justice cannot be determined beforehand, but what is truly just 
arises from the process of reconciliation. 
 
Clearly, these theological observations are applicable beyond the particular situation 
addressed in this thesis.5 
 
This thesis has focused on the need for the Subsequent peoples to repent. This does not 
mean that there will not be things for which the First peoples need to repent, but the 
need for the Subsequent peoples to repent has been highlighted because of the way that 
many people from the dominant culture believe that they can distance themselves from 
the past, and go into the future without repeating the sins of the past. However, it is 
simply not possible to draw a line under the past because, without repentance, the 
present generation will continue to sin in ways that are shaped by the sins of the past. 
 
Land was chosen for the case study in Chapter 5 because land is foundational to 
Indigenous identities, and so how land has been treated is indicative of the real will of 
the Subsequent peoples of Australia towards reconciliation. When it was judged that 
native title could be recognised by non-Indigenous law, there was an opportunity to 
explore what this precious, sui generis title might be; it could have been a point of 
engagement between the multifarious Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities, 
instead of which it turned out to be a rather fragile concept that was not allowed to take 
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root.6 Chapter 5 showed that the reflex response of the Subsequent peoples was still to 
protect their own perceived rights over those of the First peoples, so continuing to sin in 
a way that is shaped by the foundational sins, failing to pursue reconciliation. However, 
the fact that many people have failed to have claims to their land recognised in the non-
Indigenous legal system does not mean that the land is owned by those who hold title to 
it according to the non-Indigenous legal system; there are two competing systems of 
ownership, and the ownership of land is still contested.7 
 
It cannot be stressed strongly enough that recognising the land title held by First peoples 
does not resolve the problems for First peoples in Australia, for their survival is 
dependent on more than just land.8 The case study on land confirmed the more general 
point that the relationships between the First and Subsequent peoples of Australia 
continue to be shaped by the foundational sins and the whole complex history of 
interrelationships that has flowed from this ever since.  Unless there is repentance for 
the whole history of destructive relationships, then the First peoples of Australia will 
continue to be under siege, even if they are granted title to their land.  
 
There are indications that some changes are occurring in the way that Subsequent 
peoples are thinking about their First neighbours in Australia. For example, there was 
the Prime Minister’s speech of apology to the ‘Stolen Generations’, as discussed in 
Chapter 3,9 and there are an increasing numbers of Indigenous Land Use Agreements, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, indicating a willingness to negotiate with First peoples about 
land use. It is still too early to make any judgements about whether these are changes 
are going to be sustained, and if they will be catalysts for a more far-reaching process of 
repentance. Chapter 6 therefore considered some of what needs to happen if the 
Subsequent peoples of Australia are to pursue a process of repentance. Patrick Dodson, 
in a continuation of the quotation from him above, wrote, ‘[t]he repudiation of 
assimilation as a philosophy of Australian nationhood will require a creative dialogue 
between the Indigenous peoples as much as a discourse between Indigenous people and 
settlers, so that a philosophy of recognition and respect of the culture of the First 
Peoples can become a foundation principle of Australian nationhood.’10 The formation 
of a treaty, as pursued by some of the First peoples of Australia, in order to secure their 
future, will only be safe if it is part of a process of repentance. Most of all, the 
Subsequent peoples need to allow themselves to be addressed by the First peoples, and 
to see what needs to be done in response: it not about seeking to include First peoples, 
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but for the non-Indigenous institutions to be changed by their encounter with First 
peoples.11 
 
In all of this, it is important to recognise that there is no universal Indigenous voice or 
experience.12 No government has really addressed the diversity of Indigenous cultures.13 
Too often, governments have listened to some dominant Indigenous voices, and then 
made policies affecting all First peoples, rather than listening to the people who were 
authorised to speak on behalf of their land and people.14 In any discussions, the 
diversity of conflicting opinions of First peoples must not be used to divide them, but 
should be understood as an indication of the complexity of really engaging with them.15 
 
Ben Okri rightly tells us that  
 
[s]tories are the secret reservoir of values: change the stories individuals and 
nations live by and tell themselves and you change the individuals and nations. 
… Nations and peoples are largely the stories they feed themselves. If they tell 
themselves stories that are lies, they will suffer the future consequences of those 
lies. If they tell themselves stories that face their own truths, they will free their 
histories for future flowerings.16 
 
Larissa Behrendt reminds us that that ‘confronting history, especially the moments that 
might not make one proud, allows the legacies of those moments to be countered. It is 
not about shaming or “guilting” or blaming. It is about acknowledging a truth, and with 
that acknowledgement will come reconciliation, healing, empowerment and pride.’17 
But it is necessary to go further than this, for it has been shown that reconciliation is a 
process that involves both repentance and forgiveness, and that both reconciliation and 
justice come as a gift of God. More accurate are the words of Rowan Williams, who 
writes, 
 
[t]o the objection that this simply produces an unprofitable and unrealistic guilt 
over actions that are now irreparable and may have been justifiable, the Church 
can only reply that it never seeks to generate guilt as an end in itself; but that its 
recollection of the fact of violence is a call to responsible acknowledgement and 
to conversion. Whatever may have been the heavy constraints which led men or 
nations to destructive acts, nothing can alter or soften the suffering caused. The 
Church speaks for that; yet by saying that this suffering belongs with the passion 
of the Saviour, the passion of God, it shows that penitent self-knowledge 
coincides with the knowledge of a forgiving and recreating Lord. And it must 
manifest this in the fact that its judgement – like that of Jesus – is at the same 
time an invitation, into a new form of life and a new pattern of relations: the 
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penitent are summoned to sit and eat at the Saviour’s table, and to be themselves 
carriers of the gospel’s judgement and the gospel’s hope.’18 
 
This has been a work of Christian theology. The purpose of this thesis has been to 
understand the nature of the problems in Australia for First and Subsequent peoples, and 
for the land itself. It has explored the nature of reconciliation from a Christian 
theological standpoint, and proposed reconciliation as a way of resolving the problems 
in Australia. In particular, it has focused on what it might mean for the Subsequent 
peoples of Australia to repent. With this understanding of reconciliation, pursuing 
reconciliation will not be just another policy done to the First peoples of Australia (cf. 
Figure 1-2). 
 
Unfortunately, it has not proved possible in this thesis to engage fully with the law 
systems of the First peoples of Australia, to make this work itself a proper act of 
repentance. Therefore, this thesis is only the beginning of a conversation; how its 
insights are worked out, for example in non-Indigenous law,19 or what will happen 
when the ideas contained in it are engaged more fully with the systems of law of the 
First peoples of Australia, is beyond the scope of this thesis. But it is hoped that what 
has been written here will show why it is imperative to pursue reconciliation in 
Australia, and that it will stimulate the process of reconciliation. It is hoped that this 
work will be found beneficial for the peoples and the land of Australia, amongst whom I 
count myself.
                                                 
1 J Cabazares is a Filipino poet, and this poem is reproduced from Wink, When, p. 27. 
2 cited in Reynolds, The Law, p. 183. 
3 Patrick Dodson, p. ix of the Foreword to Maddison, Black. In the opening pages of the 
Bringing Them Home Report, the editors make a similar point: 
[t]he actions of the past resonate in the present and will continue to do so in the 
future. The laws, policies and practices which separated Indigenous children 
from their families have contributed directly to the alienation of Indigenous 
societies today. … In no sense has the Inquiry been ‘raking over the past’ for its 
own sake. The truth is that the past is very much with us today, in the continuing 
devastation of the lives of Indigenous Australians. That devastation cannot be 
addressed unless the whole community listens with an open heart and mind to 
the stories of what has happened in the past and, having listened and understood, 
commits itself to reconciliation. 
4 This does not mean that there have not been outstanding people and communities who 
have worked well with First peoples, and for their benefit, even seeking to change the 
way that the non-Indigenous cultures related to First peoples. However, it does say that 
these people have been part of a larger and continuing history of destructive practices 
towards First peoples in Australia.   
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5 For example, the massacre of the Jews in the 1939-1945 war can be seen as the 
culmination of relationships between Jewish people and others in Europe for nearly two 
millennia. It thus made sense for a recent Pope to apologise on behalf of the Roman 
Catholic Church for their failure towards the Jews in this war. The present generation of 
Christians has an obligation to seek reconciliation with Jewish people for the sins 
committed against them for two millennia. 
6 Healy, Forgetting, p. 130. 
7 Mansell, “Citizenship”, p. 13, writes, 
 
Often, government or the High Court “declares” that certain Aboriginal rights do 
not exist. … 
 
However, the decisions of these bodies, while binding on Australian citizens, are 
binding only on those citizens. Decisions by the High Court rejecting the 
existence of Aboriginal sovereignty (Coe v C/W 1979; Coe v C/W 1993), for 
example, declare the law for Australian citizens. The declaration has no binding 
effect on all Aborigines as a sovereign, independent people. The High Court’s 
declaration merely means that Australian law does not recognise Aboriginal 
sovereignty. 
 
A legal ruling by the High Court against Aboriginal sovereignty does not mean 
that Aboriginal sovereignty does not exist. It simply means white law does not 
recognise it. The question of the existence of sovereignty is entirely in the hands 
of the people who assert its existence, in this case Aborigines. The Court cannot 
be the absolute ruler on the point because neither the Court nor the Australian 
nation, has obtained the consent of indigenous peoples to decide. 
 
Action was taken by Aboriginal leaders Paul and Isobel Coe (Coe v C/W 1979; 
Coe v C/w 1993), to test the High Court’s position on Aboriginal sovereignty. 
This was not implied consent for the institutions of the Australian state to sit in 
judgement on Aboriginal rights. Those cases, like the Mabo case, simply tested 
the internal position of the Australian law. 
A similar point is made by many other First people (e.g. Galarrwuy Yunupingu in 
McIntosh, Aboriginal, p. 109). 
8 National Indigenous Youth Movement of Australia, “ A Story”, p. 113, write, ‘Native 
Title has also divided the Indigenous community, and the focus on native title in the 
Indigenous rights debate has ignored the fact that Indigenous cultures and survival are 
based on much more than only land, though this is obviously central. Many Indigenous 
people have, as a result of history, lost their greater connection to their land through 
separation and death, and we need to include this as part of our identity as Indigenous 
peoples. We must address all the needs of our communities, not just those that are land-
based. Further the [Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody]’s 
recommendations have never been fully implemented by either the federal or 
state/territory governments.’ 
9 Healy, Forgetting, p. 216, quite rightly notes that ‘[o]n the one hand Rudd’s speech 
was tightly focused on the stolen generations, while on the other he seemed to be 
making reference to a broader process of reconciliation.’ However, Norman, “An 
Examination”, p. 14, is quite right to express disquiet that ‘[t]he people’s movement for 
reconciliation, encapsulated as the walk across the bridge, came to equate 
Reconciliation with saying sorry for the stolen generations.’ This is not enough. 
10 Patrick Dodson, p. ix of the Foreword to Maddison, Black.  
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11 Budden, Following, pp. 90, 134, 159, makes this case concerning the church. 
12 Farley, “What’s”, pp. 107f. 
13 Maddison, Black, pp. xxxviii ff. 
14 Pat McIntyre, personal communication. 
15 Maddison, Black, is a reflection of the diverse opinions of some well-known 
Indigenous people on various issues that affect them. Several of the people interviewed 
expressed their concern that the Subsequent cultures made it hard for them to be 
allowed to have disagreements. 
16 quoted in McIntosh, Alistair, Soil and Soul: People versus Corporate Power 
(London: Aurum Press, 2001), p. 46. 
17 Behrendt, Larissa, Achieving Social Justice: Indigenous Rights and Australia’s 
Future (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2003), p. 5. 
18 Williams, Rowan, Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 2002, 2nd edition), p. 60. 
19 As the preparation of this thesis was drawing to a close, I enjoyed stimulating 
conversations with Pat McIntyre about this question. 
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